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Showing 161 to 180 of 182 Records
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1988 (10) TMI 22
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the assessment was barred by limitation.
2. Whether the successor Income-tax Officer was required to hear the assessee afresh.
3. Whether the Revenue was entitled to the extended period of limitation under section 153(1)(b).
4. Whether the assessee had concealed its income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c).
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the assessment was barred by limitation:
The Tribunal accepted the preliminary objection of the assessee that the assessment was time-barred. The assessment should have been made before February 8, 1973, under section 153(1)(c) of the Act. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the Revenue that the time for completion of the assessment was extended under section 153(1)(b) of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the Income-tax Officer did not invoke or apply section 153(1)(b) before the assessment became time-barred on February 8, 1973. The Tribunal also noted that the penalty proceedings initiated on March 21, 1973, were routine and the said penalty proceedings were ultimately dropped, concluding the issue against the Revenue.
2. Whether the successor Income-tax Officer was required to hear the assessee afresh:
The Tribunal rejected the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the period from September 6, 1972, to March 31, 1973, should be excluded due to the change in the incumbent of office. The Tribunal held that the successor Income-tax Officer could legally continue the proceeding at the stage left by his predecessor and was under no obligation to reopen the previous assessment or rehear the assessee unless demanded by the assessee. In this case, there was no such demand from the assessee.
3. Whether the Revenue was entitled to the extended period of limitation under section 153(1)(b):
The Tribunal found no prima facie evidence that the assessee was guilty of concealment within the meaning of section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal noted that the assessee's return of income was on an estimate basis, which was also adopted by the Income-tax Officer. A difference in estimate does not lead to the conclusion of prima facie concealment. The penalty proceedings initiated on March 21, 1973, were routine and after the assessment became time-barred. The Tribunal concluded that the Revenue was not entitled to the extended period of limitation under section 153(1)(b).
4. Whether the assessee had concealed its income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c):
The Tribunal noted that the returns filed by the assessee were not accompanied by complete and correct statements of accounts, the audit report was delayed, and the books of account were withheld. However, these do not constitute valid reasons for holding that the assessee had concealed its income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal held that there was nothing on record to indicate that the assessee was guilty of concealment of income. The Tribunal also noted that the penalty proceedings against the assessee were ultimately dropped.
Conclusion:
The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the assessment was time-barred and the Revenue was not entitled to the benefit of the extended period of limitation under section 153(1)(b). The successor Income-tax Officer was not required to rehear the assessee unless demanded. The Tribunal's findings of fact were not challenged by the Revenue, and the assessment was thus invalid. The question referred was answered in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee, with no order as to costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 21
The High Court of Gujarat quashed complaints against the petitioners, who were assessees, for allegedly concealing income and claiming a deduction. The court found that there was no dishonest intention or mala fide intention to defraud the Revenue. The court also noted that any mistakes made by the assessee in filing tax returns may not amount to a crime. The complaints were deemed misconceived and an abuse of the court process, so they were quashed.
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1988 (10) TMI 20
Issues:
- Validity of family arrangement and partnership claimed by the assessee.
- Treatment of income of the business as income of the Hindu undivided family.
Analysis:
The case involved the conversion of a Hindu undivided family business into a partnership business between S.R. Kalani and his adoptive mother, Smt. Badamibai. Initially, the assessee claimed a partial partition and subsequent partnership, but later shifted the claim to a family arrangement due to legal constraints. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claims, which were upheld in subsequent appeals. The Tribunal found discrepancies in the story presented by the assessee, noting that Smt. Badamibai was being maintained out of family funds, making the maintenance claim dubious. The Tribunal observed inconsistencies in the reasons given for the alleged family arrangement, such as disputes between family members and Smt. Badamibai's age and lack of business acumen. The Tribunal concluded that the capital contribution by Smt. Badamibai was not genuine, and the partnership was fictitious.
The Tribunal's decision was based on substantial evidence and considerations of the material on record. The Tribunal had the authority to investigate the genuineness of the partnership despite the formal partnership deed. The Tribunal also considered the subsequent conduct of Smt. Badamibai, finding no new material presented for the assessment years in question. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision was consistent with the earlier findings and did not overlook any relevant material.
Therefore, the High Court affirmed the Tribunal's findings, ruling in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Court held that the Tribunal's conclusions were well-founded, supported by evidence, and not based on mere suspicion or surmises. The Court also noted that the assessee failed to provide compelling evidence to substantiate the claims made regarding the family arrangement and partnership. Consequently, the Court upheld the decisions of the Tribunal, denying the claims of the assessee and directing each party to bear their own costs in the matter.
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1988 (10) TMI 19
Issues:
1. Depreciation on construction of roads as part of factory building.
2. Depreciation on roads as 'plant'.
3. Inclusion of specific items in capital for relief/deduction under sections 84/80J.
4. Inclusion of items in capital for relief under section 80J for specific assessment years.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Depreciation on construction of roads
The court referred to a previous decision in CIT v. Colour-Chem Ltd. [1977] 106 ITR 323, which established that depreciation could be granted on the cost of construction of roads as part of the factory building. The court answered this question in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee based on the precedent.
Issue 2: Depreciation on roads as 'plant'
Since the answer to question 1 was affirmative, the court did not find it necessary to address question 2 regarding depreciation on roads as 'plant'. Therefore, no specific analysis or decision was provided for this issue in the judgment.
Issue 3: Inclusion of items in capital for relief/deduction
Regarding the inclusion of specific items in capital for relief/deduction under sections 84/80J, the Tribunal's decision went against the assessee. The Tribunal held that certain items could not be included in the computation of capital based on rule 19 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, applicable during the assessment year in question. However, the court refrained from answering question 3 as the reference was deemed incompetent, following the Supreme Court's ruling in CIT v. V. Damodaran [1980] 121 ITR 572. Consequently, the decision of the Tribunal stood against the assessee.
Issue 4: Inclusion of items in capital for relief under section 80J
The court referred to the decision in CIT v. Advani Oerlikon Pvt. Ltd. [1986] 161 ITR 449, which directly considered Section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and rule 19A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. Based on this precedent, the court answered question 4 in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee. The judgment highlighted that previous decisions of the High Court and other courts were followed to arrive at this conclusion.
In conclusion, the court provided detailed analyses and decisions on the issues related to depreciation, inclusion of items in capital for relief/deduction, and the application of relevant rules and precedents to determine the outcomes for the respective questions raised before the court.
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1988 (10) TMI 18
Issues Involved:
The judgment addresses the issue of whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) was exigible for the assessment year 1969-70 due to alleged concealment of income from private practice and interest on fixed deposit receipts by the assessee.
Details of the Judgment:
*Assessment Years 1965-66 to 1968-69:*
The assessee filed voluntary returns without showing income from private practice, but later admitted to private practice during assessment proceedings. The Income-tax Officer added estimated amounts towards private practice for these years.
*Assessment Year 1969-70:*
The assessee initially did not show income from private practice in the return but later filed a revised return disclosing income from private practice and interest on fixed deposit receipts. Penalty proceedings were initiated, and a penalty was imposed by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner.
*Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's Decision:*
The Tribunal cancelled the penalty, stating that the assessee was not guilty of conscious concealment of income.
*Legal Precedents and Interpretation:*
The court considered legal precedents and noted that the onus is on the Department to prove concealment of income. The court highlighted the assessee's actions, including the delay in disclosing income from private practice despite prior admissions and assessments.
*Decision and Rationale:*
The court found that the assessee had concealed income from private practice and interest on fixed deposit receipts. It emphasized that the initial return should be considered for assessing the conduct of the assessee. Consequently, the court held that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) was exigible based on the facts and circumstances of the case.
*Conclusion:*
The court ruled against the assessee, upholding the imposition of the penalty under section 271(1)(c) and awarded costs to the Department.
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1988 (10) TMI 17
Issues involved:
The validity of assessment u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without service of notice u/s 148.
Formation of association of persons in a transaction of purchase and sale of land.
Validity of Assessment u/s 143(3) without Notice u/s 148:
The Income-tax Officer made a best judgment assessment u/s 144 as an "association of persons" due to non-service of notice u/s 148 on all four individuals. However, the notice was refused and not served on two deceased individuals and one who was in Delhi at the time. The cancellation of assessment u/s 146 due to non-service of notice on the assessee was upheld. The subsequent assessment made on the return filed by one individual, who voluntarily associated himself, was deemed valid only for him. The Tribunal erred in holding the assessment invalid for this individual but not binding on the others, as no notice was served on them. Thus, the first question was answered in favor of the Department regarding the individual who received the notice.
Formation of Association of Persons:
The Department failed to establish that the four individuals formed an association with the purpose of earning income when purchasing the land. The transaction seemed to be a joint venture of owning property rather than forming an association for income. The sale of land after eight years, even when divided into plots, did not indicate an initial intent to earn profits. The individuals were co-owners who jointly invested in the property without forming an association for income. Citing a relevant case law, it was concluded that the individuals did not form an association for income. The Tribunal correctly held that no association of persons was formed in the transaction. Thus, the second question was answered against the Revenue.
In conclusion, the High Court answered both questions of law as detailed above.
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1988 (10) TMI 16
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana upheld the reassessment proceedings under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court found that the assessee did not fully disclose all material facts, leading to the initiation of valid proceedings. The court ruled in favor of the Revenue, holding the assessee liable to pay the costs of the proceedings.
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1988 (10) TMI 15
Issues:
- Prosecution under section 276C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and section 195 of the Indian Penal Code.
- Quashing of proceedings due to approach to Settlement Commission.
- Interpretation of Settlement Commission's finding in relation to criminal proceedings.
Analysis:
The petitioner faced prosecution under section 276C of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and section 195 of the Indian Penal Code after valuables were found during a raid on their premises. The petitioner sought to quash the proceedings as they had approached the Settlement Commission, which had registered their petition and found no concealment established. The petitioner argued that allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the Settlement Commission's finding would be unjust, citing a Delhi High Court case where it was held that once a petition is registered by the Settlement Commission, criminal proceedings cannot proceed. However, the Revenue's counsel contended that the mere registration of a petition with the Settlement Commission does not automatically grant immunity, and therefore, criminal proceedings should not be quashed solely based on that.
A judgment by a single judge of the High Court was referenced, where it was held that the mere pendency of a petition before the Settlement Commission does not necessitate the quashing or staying of criminal proceedings. The key distinction in the present case was that the Settlement Commission had already recorded a finding that no income had been concealed and was unlikely to be established as concealed. This finding was crucial as it could lead to an anomalous situation if criminal proceedings were allowed to continue despite potential immunity being granted by the Commission in the future. Therefore, the court ruled that while the complaint should not be quashed at that stage, it needed to be stayed until the Settlement Commission made a final decision on immunity. Consequently, the criminal complaints pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate were stayed until the Settlement Commission's decision on immunity was rendered. The petitions were partly allowed, and the rule was made absolute to that extent.
In conclusion, the court decided to stay the prosecution based on the Settlement Commission's finding to prevent any potential inconsistency if immunity was granted in the future. This case highlights the interplay between criminal proceedings and proceedings before the Settlement Commission, emphasizing the importance of the Commission's findings in determining the course of criminal prosecution.
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1988 (10) TMI 14
The High Court of Punjab and Haryana ruled in favor of the assessee, citing a previous decision in CIT v. Ram Narain [1980] 126 ITR 267. The assessment of the assessee as an unregistered firm was canceled due to a memorandum of partial partition not creating a sub-partnership relation. The court answered the question in the affirmative and in favor of the assessee, with no order as to costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 13
Issues Involved:
1. Effective Date of Tax Levy
2. Legislative Intent and Interpretation
3. Conduct of State Government in Litigation
Summary:
1. Effective Date of Tax Levy:
The crux of the argument presented by the petitioners was that the additional levy under the Amendment Act of 1987, which became effective from July 1, 1987, should only apply from the next financial year starting April 1, 1988. The court evaluated whether the levy could be effective from April 1, 1987, given the existing provisions of the amendment Act. The court concluded that the Schedule brought in by the Finance Act of 1987 should be employed for the computation of the plantation tax for the year 1987-88. The court emphasized that the assessing authority is bound to apply the rate relevant for that year as indicated by the amendment of the Schedule for the year 1987-88.
2. Legislative Intent and Interpretation:
The court examined the legislative intent behind the amendment, noting that the Government had a clear intention to raise revenue for the financial year 1987, as declared in the budget proposals and the preamble of the Act. The court referenced principles from various judicial dicta, emphasizing that the words of the statute should be given their ordinary meaning and that there is no room for any intendment or equity about a tax. The court also noted that the history of the enactment and the reasons which led to its implementation could be used as aids to construction. The court concluded that the amended rates are necessarily to be applied from the very commencement of the financial year 1987-88.
3. Conduct of State Government in Litigation:
The court expressed strong disapproval of the State Government's conduct in the case, noting the lack of effort to conserve its interests and the inadequate counter-affidavit filed by the State. The court highlighted the importance of finality in tax liability to contain and control litigation and criticized the State for not presenting a substantial defense. The court declined to award costs in the petitions due to the State's negligence and emphasized the need for the State to sort out its papers properly and keep its desk in order.
Conclusion:
The writ petitions were dismissed, and the court underscored the importance of legislative clarity and the responsibility of the State in handling substantial financial stakes. The court also highlighted the need for vigilance and accountability in governance, quoting Sidney Low and Burke to emphasize the importance of ministerial responsibility and the efficiency and integrity of ministers.
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1988 (10) TMI 12
Issues:
Interpretation of section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 regarding inclusion of gold ornaments as jewellery in the net wealth for assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the interpretation of section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, specifically focusing on whether gold ornaments should be considered as jewellery for the purpose of calculating net wealth. The Tribunal initially declined to refer the matter to the High Court, citing a decision by the Orissa High Court and deeming the question self-evident. However, the petitioner argued that the High Court's decision would be binding on the Tribunal. The High Court referred to a Supreme Court decision in CWT v. Arundhati Balkrishna [1970] 77 ITR 505, which held that jewellery intended for personal use is exempt from taxation. The Act was later amended to exclude jewellery from the list of taxable assets but included gold ornaments within the definition of jewellery from April 1, 1972, through Explanation I.
The court emphasized that prior to April 1, 1972, gold ornaments were not considered jewellery for wealth tax purposes. The judgment highlighted that while jewellery was excluded from section 5(1)(viii) retrospectively from April 1, 1963, the inclusion of gold ornaments under the definition of jewellery was effective only from April 1, 1972. The court rejected the argument that the Explanation was added for cautionary purposes, stating that its effect could not predate April 1, 1972. The court also declined to consider a decision of the Gujarat High Court due to lack of detailed information.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitions, concluding that the answer to the legal question was self-evident based on the legislative intent and the timeline of amendments to the Act. The judgment clarified that for the assessment years in question, gold ornaments could not be included as jewellery in the calculation of net wealth, as the relevant amendment was effective only from April 1, 1972.
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1988 (10) TMI 11
Issues:
1. Refusal to admit and adjudicate on additional grounds of appeal related to deduction under section 80J for export wing and vanaspati unit.
2. Interpretation of "capital employed" for deduction under section 80J.
3. Tribunal's jurisdiction to consider additional grounds of appeal.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dealt with a case where the assessee-company, Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd., claimed deduction under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for its export wing and vanaspati unit for the assessment year 1972-73. The Income-tax Officer allowed some deduction for the vanaspati unit but none for the export wing. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed the findings, and the appeal was taken to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. During the appeal, the assessee raised additional grounds related to the computation of deduction under section 80J for both units, emphasizing the inclusion of total capital employed, including borrowed money. The Tribunal, while allowing the deduction for the export wing, refused to admit and adjudicate on the additional grounds related to computation, leading to the present reference to the High Court.
The High Court emphasized that the additional grounds raised by the assessee were not fresh but clarification sought on the computation of deduction under section 80J, which was already in contention. The Court highlighted the importance of correctly working out deductions as per the law and criticized the Tribunal for not considering the computation aspect despite allowing the deduction. The Court referred to the retrospective amendment introduced by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, and the varying interpretations of "capital employed" for deduction under section 80J. Citing the case of Lohia Machines Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court noted the changing legislative history regarding the inclusion of borrowed money in computing capital employed, emphasizing the need for the Tribunal to adjudicate on the additional grounds raised by the assessee.
In conclusion, the High Court held that the Tribunal erred in refusing to consider the additional grounds related to the computation of deduction under section 80J for both units. The Court highlighted the necessity of including borrowed money in the computation during the relevant period and ruled in favor of the assessee on both questions referred, without costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 10
The High Court of Calcutta ruled that an appeal can be made against rectification made under section 154 to enhance interest levied under section 139 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court held that the Tribunal was not justified in denying the appeal in such a case. The decision favored the assessee. The Tribunal was directed to dispose of the appeal in accordance with a specific court case precedent.
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1988 (10) TMI 9
The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir allowed the petition, quashed the penalty order imposed on the petitioner firm, and directed reconsideration of the application by the Commissioner of Income-tax. The decision was based on a previous case where it was held that the Commissioner failed to exercise jurisdiction and the order was non-speaking. The parties were left to bear their own costs. (Case citation: 1988 (10) TMI 9 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR High Court, Judge: M. A. SHAH)
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1988 (10) TMI 8
Issues:
Late filing of income tax return and imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Interpretation of section 271(4A) of the Act for condonation of delay. Application of the provision to old assessees. Judicial review of the Commissioner's order rejecting condonation of penalty.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a firm engaged in contract works and transport business, filed its income tax return for 1970-71 late and was penalized Rs. 5,225 under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act. The Commissioner rejected the petitioner's request for condonation of delay under section 271(4A) of the Act. The main contention was that the Commissioner erred in interpreting the law, believing the provision applied only to new assessees, not old ones. The petitioner relied on a previous court decision to support the argument that the provision applies to all assessees, old or new.
The respondents argued that section 271(4A) applies only when the return is not filed within the prescribed time and that the delay in this case was unjustified. They contended that the penalty was rightly imposed, considering the reasons for the delay provided by the petitioner. They also argued that the previous court decision cited by the petitioner was not applicable to the Income-tax Act.
The judge analyzed the provisions of section 271(4A) of the Act in comparison to the Wealth-tax Act and found that the Commissioner's order suffered from two flaws. Firstly, the Commissioner's approach did not align with the law, and secondly, the order lacked reasoning and did not consider all grounds presented by the petitioner for condonation of penalty. The judge noted that the disclosure made by the petitioner was voluntary, and the reasons for delay, including the partners leaving due to war, were not fully considered by the authorities.
Consequently, the judge ruled in favor of the petitioner, quashing the Commissioner's order and directing a reconsideration of the application for condonation of penalty under section 271(4A) of the Act. The judge emphasized that the Commissioner had erred in not considering the petitioner's request on its merits and under a misconception of the law. The parties were instructed to bear their own costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 7
Issues Involved:
The issues involved in this case are:
1. Whether commission payments made by the assessee are allowable deductions u/s 37(1) of the Income-tax Act?
2. Whether the Tribunal erred in ignoring material evidence regarding the genuineness of commission payments?
3. Whether the finding that the parties rendered services for earning commission is perverse?
Summary:
The Commissioner of Income-tax filed an application u/s 256(2) of the Income-tax Act seeking to refer three questions of law to the High Court regarding the assessment year 1971-72. The assessee, a public limited company, claimed deductions for commission payments, which the Income-tax Officer disallowed. The Commissioner upheld the disallowance and the initiation of proceedings u/s 147(a) due to non-disclosure of material facts. The Tribunal, while upholding the initiation of proceedings, found the commission payments genuine and wholly for business purposes.
The Commissioner contended that the Tribunal's findings were perverse as some parties were untraceable and lacked proof of services rendered. However, the Tribunal meticulously examined each case, correspondence, and payment methods, concluding that the payments were genuine and for business purposes. It rejected the argument that middlemen were unnecessary for public sector undertakings, highlighting their various roles in business transactions.
The High Court noted that the Tribunal's findings were based on evidence and not devoid of proof. It emphasized that the Tribunal is the final fact-finding authority, and as long as there is evidence supporting its conclusions, it cannot be deemed perverse. Therefore, the High Court rejected the application, with no order as to costs.
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1988 (10) TMI 6
Issues Involved:
1. Title and possession of the disputed property.
2. Application of Section 2(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988.
3. Applicability of the Ordinance to pending proceedings.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Title and Possession of the Disputed Property:
The trial court had initially declared the title of the petitioner in respect of the disputed property, rejecting the contention of the opposite parties that the petitioner and her deceased mother were mere ostensible owners or benamidars. This decree allowed the petitioner to recover possession of the property. However, the first appellate court overturned this decree, and the judgment was affirmed by the High Court in a second appeal, holding that the petitioner and her deceased mother were mere benamidars of the petitioner's father. Consequently, the property was duly inherited by the father's second wife, who properly conveyed it to opposite party No. 1. Following this, opposite party No. 1 applied to the trial court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the disputed property, which was granted ex parte on March 4, 1988. The petitioner was directed to restore possession of the property to opposite party No. 1, who then applied under Order 21, Rule 35 of the Civil Procedure Code for a writ of delivery of possession.
2. Application of Section 2(1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988:
The petitioner objected to the application under Order 21, Rule 35, arguing that the order dated March 4, 1988, was no longer sustainable due to the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988, promulgated on May 19, 1988. Section 2(1) of the Ordinance states: "No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property." The court concluded that the proceeding under Order 21, Rule 35 is a proceeding in execution and not a suit, but it is a proceeding to enforce a claim. The decree recognizes the claim of the respondent that the petitioner and her mother were benamidars, and any step to enforce that decree would be a step to enforce that claim. The court also considered that the term "action" in Section 2(1) of the Ordinance includes execution proceedings necessary for the enforcement of such decrees.
3. Applicability of the Ordinance to Pending Proceedings:
The court examined whether the Ordinance applies to proceedings that were already pending at the time of its promulgation. It was argued that the Ordinance should not apply to pending proceedings without express words to that effect. However, the court found that the language of Section 2(1) of the Ordinance, which uses the expression "shall lie" instead of "shall be instituted," indicates the intention to cover proceedings pending at its commencement. The court held that a proceeding lies until it is disposed of, and if it is provided that a proceeding "shall not lie," it bars both its commencement and continuance. This interpretation aligns with the object of the Ordinance to prohibit the right to recover property held benami, making the provisions applicable to all cases where the right to recover such property is sought to be enforced or resisted after the promulgation of the Ordinance.
The court also noted that the Ordinance has been replaced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, with Section 4 of the Act corresponding to Section 2 of the Ordinance. The provisions of Section 1(3) of the Act provide that Section 4 and other provisions, except Sections 3, 5, and 8, are deemed to have come into force on May 19, 1988. Therefore, the court's observations on Section 2 of the Ordinance apply to Section 4 of the Act.
Conclusion:
The revision was allowed, and the proceedings for recovery of possession of the disputed property and the order directing the issuance of a writ for delivery of possession were quashed as illegal and violative of Section 2 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988, now replaced by Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (10) TMI 5
The High Court of Calcutta addressed questions under the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 1972-73, 1974-75, and 1976-77. The court ruled on the treatment of borrowed capital for relief under section 80J and declined to answer a question regarding the claim under section 35C as the assessee did not appear. No costs were awarded.
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1988 (10) TMI 4
The High Court of Bombay discharged the rule in a case involving the rejection of an application under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal's decision lacked reasoning for rejection, referencing only an earlier order without providing details. The Court criticized this practice and emphasized the need for clear reasoning in such decisions. The Court discharged the rule but directed the parties to bear their own costs. (Case citation: 1988 (10) TMI 4 - BOMBAY High Court)
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1988 (10) TMI 3
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the assessee regarding the creation of a development reserve before assessment, citing a previous decision in CIT v. Janardhan Zarapkar. The question referred by the Revenue was answered in the affirmative. Each party will bear their respective costs.
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9911796707
