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Showing 21 to 40 of 286 Records
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1952 (12) TMI 29 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... no substance whatever in this contention. Peti- tioner No. 7 is the firm of Metro Motors. It is well-known and well understood that a firm has no legal entity. It is merely a compendious name of the partners of whom it is constituted. Therefore we have on the record not a corporation or a legal entity consisting of Metro Motors, but what we have on record before us is the partners of that firm, and the petitioners on oath state that both the partners of that firm are citizens of India and that allegation has not been denied in the affidavit in reply by the Government. Therefore, if we were called upon to give relief under Article 19, we could certainly have given that relief at least to the seventh petitioner whose partners consist of citizens of our country. The result therefore is that the petition succeeds and there will be an order issued against the respondents in terms of prayer (a) of the peti- tion. Respondents must pay the costs of the petitioners. Petition allowed.
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1952 (12) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... condition precedent paid in, the amount admitted in the return, when the return was filed, and to the extent admitted therein. This however will not apply to any excess paid because to that extent it is not a tax payable under the Act and the question does not arise (b) Where the dealer has not filed a return or filed a return which is not correct or complete, then as to the amount assessed under Sec- tion 11(1) and (2), or the amount so assessed less the amount already paid under Section 10(3), together with penalties, if any, payable under the Act, immediately upon the notice under Section 11(3) being served upon him in the prescribed form. In this particular case, notice in Form VII was served on the com- pany on 17th May, 1950, which is well within twelve months prior to the date of the winding up order and clearly therefore the Government is entitled to priority in payment thereof. I therefore agree with the order made by my Lord the Chief Justice. Ordered accordingly.
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1952 (12) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... supports the tax, and the State has not given the less merely because it has conditioned the demand of the exaction upon happenings outside its own borders. The fact that a tax is contingent upon events brought to pass without a State does not destroy the nexus between such a tax and transactions within a State for which the tax is an exaction . In view of these authorities it is manifest that the constitutional objection raised by the learned counsel must fail. It is also important to notice that the explanation to Article 286(1)(a) of (1) 1948 16 I.T.R. 240 75 I.A. 86. (3) 311 U.S. 435. (2) 1948 F.C.R. 121 17 I.T.R. 63. the Constitution expressly confers upon the State the power to tax sale or purchase of goods which are actually delivered for consumption inside the State. For the reasons I have expressed I am of opinion that this applica- tion is without merit and must be dismissed with costs. Hearing fee five gold mohurs. SARJOO PROSAD, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 26 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hed by, or on behalf of, the dealer to an address outside Bihar. It is manifest that the principle laid down by the Board of Revenue in Case No. 64 of 1948 has been superseded by the decision of this Court reported in Tobacco Manufacturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar(1). It is obvious that the answer to the question formulated is that the Board of Revenue was wrong in directing the Sales Tax Officer to follow the principle laid down in Case No. 64 of 1948. It is, on the contrary, clear that the Sales Tax Officer must follow the principle laid down by the High Court in Tobacco Manu- facturers (India) Ltd. v. State of Bihar(1), and then decide the question whether the assessee is entitled to the deduction he has claimed under Section 5(2)(a)(v) or under Section 5 (2)(a)(ii) of the Bihar Act VI of 1944. We accordingly answer the reference in the terms stated above. There will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1950) I.L.R. 29 Pat. 746 1 S.T.C. 282.
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1952 (12) TMI 25 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but outside that State. There is undoubtedly prima facie much force in the contention of Mr. Ghosh, and Article 286 requires very careful examination. The matter will have to be decided at one stage or another either by the Revenue Authorities themselves or by this Court on an appropriate reference made for that purpose. As at present advised, I do not consider it necessary to deal with this problem, as I am also of the view that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Sales Tax Authorities relied upon an ultra vires provision of the Sales Tax Act in making the assessment, the action of the authorities was not without jurisdiction, and the party aggrieved is entitled to have his grievances redressed by the appropriate procedure which the machinery of the Act itself provides. This view, as my learned brother has rightly held, is fortified by the decision of the judicial Committee in Raleigh Investment Co., Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council(1). Application dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... under section 10(2) and as a condition precedent paid in the amount admitted in the return, when the return was filed, and to the extent admitted therein. This however will not apply to any excess paid because to that extent it is not a tax payable under the Act and the question does not arise (b)Where the dealer has not filed a return or filed a return which is not correct or complete, then as to the amount assessed under section 11(1) and (2), or the amount so assessed less the amount already paid under section 10(3), together with penalties, if any, payable under the Act immediately upon the notice under section 11(3) being served upon him in the prescribed form. In this particular case, notice in Form VII was served on the company on 17th May, 1950, which is well within twelve months prior to the date of the winding up order and clearly therefore the Government is entitled to priority in payment thereof. I therefore agree with the order made by my Lord the Chief Justice.
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1952 (12) TMI 23 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Style, etc., of liquidator and Penalty for wrongful withholding of property ... ... ... ... ..... re in this connection. We do not think that we can accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant on this aspect of the case. In our view, the conduct of the appellant cannot be brought within the scope of the rule laid down in these decisions. On a consideration of all the contentions and the arguments placed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant, we do not think that any sufficient ground has been shown to us to dissent from the order of the learned trial Judge. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the charges have been proved against the appellant on the evidence that has been placed before the trial court and the conviction and sentence by the learned trial Judge are correct. We, therefore, while confirming the conviction and sentence, dismiss this appeal. The official liquidators will have their costs of this appeal from out of the assets of the bank in their hands. The appellant will surrender before the Registrar on the 19th December, 1952.
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1952 (12) TMI 22 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the company had by the conduct of its two members abandoned its right to challenge the forfeiture?
Whether the form of the order could not be supported as one validly made under section 38 of the Indian Companies Act?
Held that:- In our opinion there is no evidence of abandonment of the company's right to challenge the validity of the purported forfeiture
he mills had also reduced its capital by having the face value of the 84,000 shares which had been issued reduced by repaying to the shareholders ₹ 5 in respect of each of those shares. There were, however, 16,000 unissued shares of ₹ 10 each which were not affected by the reduction. While, therefore, it was clearly impossible for the court to direct that the company should be replaced on the register in respect of its original shares, the court could, under section 38, give notice to the persons to whom the shares had been re-allotted or those claiming under them and make them parties to the proceedings and then make an appropriate order for rectification and, if necessary, also direct the mills to pay damages under that section.
Principle to the present application under article 181. If article 181 applies then time began to run after the company came to know of its right to sue. It is not alleged that the company had any knowledge of the forfeiture between the 5th September, 1941, when the resolution of forfeiture was passed and the 9th September, 1941, when the company became defunct. After the last mentioned date and up to the 16th February, 1945, the company stood dissolved and no knowledge or notice can be imputed to the company during this period. Therefore, the company must be deemed to have come to know of its cause of action after it came to life again and the present application was certainly made well within three years after that event happened on the 16th February, 1945. If article 181 does not apply then the only article that can apply by analogy is article 120 and the application is also within time. In either view this application cannot be thrown out as barred by limitation.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal must succeed. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court in appeal and restore the order of the trial court.
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1952 (12) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Foreign Income, High Court, Income Tax, Tribunal's Order
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1952 (12) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the assessee Company had any business connection in British India within the meaning of Sections 42(1) and 42(3) of the Income-tax Act ?
Whether any profits could reasonably be attributed to the purchase of entire cotton made in British India by the secretaries and agents of the assessee-company within the meaning of Sections 42(1) and 42(3) of the Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- In this case the raw materials were purchased systematically and habitually through an established agency having special skill and competency in selecting the goods to be purchased and fixing the time and place of purchase. Such activity appears to us to be well within the import of the term "operation " as used in Section 42(3) of the Act. It is not in the nature of an isolated transaction of purchase of raw materials. The first contention of the assessee is therefore negatived.
In this case there was a regular agency established in British India for the purchase of the entire raw materials required for the manufacture abroad and the agent was chosen by reason of his skill, reputation and experience in the line of trade. The terms of the agency stated in the earlier part of this judgment fully establish that Messrs. Best & Co. Ltd. were carrying on something almost akin to the business of a managing agency in India of the foreign company and the latter certainly had a connection with this agency. We therefore negative this contention of the learned counsel as well. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a true construction of Section 25(4) of the Act, and on the facts stated the period the profits of which were entitled to exemption from the payment of tax is the period between 1st July, 1939, to 29th February, 1940, (a period of eight months) or the period commencing from 1st July, 1938, and ending with 29th February, 1940, (a period of 20 months)?
Held that:- After a careful consideration of the different provisions of the Act relevant to this enquiry, we have reached the conclusion that the expression " end of the previous year " in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 in the context of those sub-sections means the end of an accounting year (a period of full 12 months) expiring immediately preceding the date of discontinuance or succession, (in this case 30th June, 1939). We are satisfied that Viswanatha Sastri, J., was right when he held that having regard to the object of the legislature in enacting sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 and having regard to the plain language of these sub-sections, the assessee's contentions could not be upheld. We are, however, unable to subscribe to the conclusion reached by the learned Judge that the expression " previous year " in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 25 was co-related to the year of assessment 1940-41.
We allow the appeal and hold that the answer given by the senior Judge to the question referred was wrong and that the answer given by Viswanatha Sastri, J., was the correct one.
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1952 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether no return was filed at any stage of the case disclosing an income, profits or gains at all?
Whether proceedings were later take under Section 34?
Whether in the course of these proceedings the assess claimed that a certain loss should be determined and recorded?
Held that:- Question referred was rightly answered in the negative by the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (11) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... kesa Aiyar J. now under appeal. In O.S. A. No. 17 of 1948 Horwill and Raghava Rao JJ. held that the true scope of Expl. I was only to nullify the decision in -- 'Duraiswami Mudaliar v. Md. Anwaruddin', 1948-1 Mad L. J. 441 and that it had not the effect of overruling the line for authorities which had held that settlement made by parties involving appropriation of payments could not be reopened. This decision was followed by Govinda Menon Ramaswaini JJ. in C. M. A. No. 180 of 1950 and by Subba Rao J. in S. A. No. 2115 of 1947. We agree with the views expressed in these decisions and do not find sufficient reason for upsetting the construction which had been put upon the explanation in a long course of decisions. We are accordingly of opinion that appropriations made by a debtor as part of a settlement are not liable to be reopened under Expl. I to Section 8. 9. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the decree of the Courts below are restored with costs throughout.
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1952 (11) TMI 22 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n a representation that it is of a different character, then it is wholly void and inoperative. Such a deed does not require to be set aside under Article 91 and a suit to recover possession of the properties comprised therein would be governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. The fact that there is a prayer for a declaration that the deed is void or that it should be set aside does not affect the position, such prayers being ancillary to the substantive prayer for possession. As observed in the decisions already cited, such prayers might be regarded as mere surplusage. We accordingly hold on issue No. 3 differing from the lower Court, that the suit is not barred by limitation under Article 91. 8. In the result this appeal is allowed and the suit is remanded for disposal on all the issues excepting issue No. 3. As the appeal has been filed in forma pauperis no order is necessary for refund of court-fee. The costs of this appeal will abide the result of the suit.
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1952 (11) TMI 21 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te. Such a certificate would entitle the Respondent to obtain possession under Rule 95 of Order 21. There is nothing in that rule to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with his application. On the confirmation of the sale it is compulsory to issue the certificate. The failure to issue the certificate - whether the delay arises due to the action of the Court or to the inaction of the purchaser - has no bearing on the limitation for the application under Article 180. The purchaser cannot seek to extend the limitation on the ground that the certificate has not been issued. It is patent, therefore, that the issue of a certificate is not the 'sine qua non' of the application. The application being properly within limitation, the evidence of title could be supplied later and this is what has happened. The order passed by the learned Judge is, therefore, correct and we see no reason to interfere. 6. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1952 (11) TMI 20 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... Disputes Act, 1947, clearly laid upon the Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta the duty to determine whether the petitioner was or was not a workman and consequently, even if a wrong decision was given, that decision cannot be interfered with by a writ of certiorari. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner pressed various grounds before us to show that the decision that the petitioner was not a workman was incorrect. One of the grounds was that there had been a previous decision by an adjudicator appointed in pursuance of the order passed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Another ground was that, on the facts before the Tribunal, the finding that the petitioner was not a workman was unjustified. These are only questions relating to the correctness or incorrectness of a decision by the Tribunal in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it, and, as we have said above, we cannot investigate these circumstances. 14. This petition is, therefore, not maintainable and is dismissed.
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1952 (11) TMI 19 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e duty was payable to the State of Rajasthan under the provisions of the Rajasthan Excise Duties Ordinance No. 25 of 1949. An argument was addressed to us that in view of the fact that no valid rules can be said to have been framed under Ordinance No. 25 of 1949, the State of Rajasthan could not recover cotton excise duties from the applicant. That is a question on which we need not express any opinion while answering the first question put to us, as we take it that the question assumes that the duty was payable to the State of Rajasthan. 16. Our answer, therefore-, to the first question addressed to us is that the Union of India is not entitled to levy and recover arrears of excise duty on cotton cloth held in stock or manufactured before 1-4-1950, by the applicant, by virtue of Articles 278 and 295 of the Constitution of India, and the agreement entered into between the President of India and the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan. Let these answers be returned to the Bench concerned.
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1952 (11) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE
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... ... ..... was the contract that was the source of income but the construction which was in the nature of an asset or business capable of yielding the income. The Madras High Court in a case in --'Commr. of Income Tax, Madras v. Anamallais Timber Trust Ltd.', 1950 18 ITR 333(Mad) (C) in which the facts are very similar, and which has referred to and relied on has taken the same view as we do and fully supports the assessee in this case. We are, therefore, entirely in agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal. 8. In the result our answer to the question raised before us is that the Tribunal was right in holding that the income assessed by the Income Tax Officer or any part thereof with which we are concerned in this case was not taxable under the Indian Income Tax Act as applied to Civil and Military Station, Bangalore. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this reference. 9. Order accordingly.
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1952 (11) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... itted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. We have not been able to see that any compelling or substantial reasons existed for reversing the acquittal order in this case and none has been pointed out by the High Court in its decision. No attempt has been made in the judgment to discuss the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or to explain satisfactorily the discrepancies that were of a material nature and which had been pointed out in those statements by the Sessions Judge in his careful and detailed judgment. We are satisfied that this was not a case for interference with the acquittal order in an appeal under Section 417, Criminal P. C. 11. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the appellant.
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1952 (11) TMI 16 - MADHYA BHARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rve the order of injunction on the Income-tax Officer, a clerk in the office refused to accept service and informed him that the Income-tax Officer was not in the office; and that when thereupon, the process-server inquired about the residence of the Income-tax Officer, he was not given the necessary information to enable him to go to the residence of the Income-tax Officer for effecting service of the order. I hope that this state of things is remedied soon by the Income-tax Officer. In the result the order dated 29th February, 1952, of the Income- tax Officer imposing the penalty of ₹ 25,000 is declared illegal and without jurisdiction and is set aside. The petitioners' application under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the provisional assessment and the notice of demand dated 19th February, 1952, is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs. SHINDE, C.J.-I agree. MEHTA, J.-I agree. Ordered accordingly.
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