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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 286 Records
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1952 (10) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the truth or helped the Tribunal in determining what the true profits and gains of the assessee were. It is also important to note that the Tribunal makes it a point of drawing our attention to the fact that very often assessees disclose those sales where the profits are less and do not disclose those sales where the profits are higher, or they show the profits on sales where the profits are small and do not disclose the profits on sales where the profits are higher. This aspect was also present to their mind when they determined upon the average rate of 18 per cent. Therefore on these facts in our opinion the Tribunal did not adopt a wrong method in assessing the profits as the did, nor did the Tribunal reject or not take into consideration any evidence which was material or relevant evidence placed before the Tribunal by the assesses. We therefore answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative. Assessee must pay the costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1952 (10) TMI 44 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y be on his case falling under Section 4(3)(i). Therefore we do not think it necessary to construe Section 4(3)(ia) for the purposes of this reference. It may be said that the result we have come to is rather unfortunate because in a case where the trust is admittedly a charitable trust and where the commission earned by the trustees is admittedly applied to charitable purposes, the income cannot be held to be exempt from tax. But perhaps it is necessary to point out that the Income-tax Act unfortunately does not permit an assessee to give his income in charity and to claim exemption by reason of that generous impulse except under Section 15B of the Act. It is only in very restricted cases that an income is exempted from tax under Section 4(3)(i) or Section 4(3)(ia). In the result the answer to question (1) is that the commission earned by the assessee is not exempt under Section 4(3)(i). Question (2) is unnecessary. Assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (10) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the assessee was being under-assessed. It cannot, therefore, be said that the fact was discovered later that the assessee had been under-assessed. In this view of the matter notice under Section 34 was clearly wrong and the Income-tax Officer had no authority to reopen the assessment already made by him. 6. Learned counsel for the assessee has referred us to -- 'Chuni Lal v. Commr. of Income-tax', 1951-20 ITR 568 (Punj), a decision of the Punjab High Court and -- 'Fazal Dhala v. Commr. of Income-tax, Behar and Orissa', 1944-12 ITR 341 (Pat), a decision of the Patna High Court. The decisions do, to some extent, support the contention of the assesses. The case before us is clearly a case where the Income-tax Officer wanted to make the assessment piecemeal which, in our view, he was not entitled to do under the Indian Income-tax Act. 7.The question, therefore, is answered in the negative. The assessee is entitled to his costs which we assess at ₹ 300.
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1952 (10) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ht Bruce in Haigh v. Haigh(1) "It is true that he states in his affidavit that he did not allow those explanations to influence him in -his report upon the accounts, and I have no doubt he honestly intended this to be the case; but it is impossible to gauge the influence which such statements have upon the mind. We must hold, without meaning the least reflection the arbitrator, that he was guilty of legal misconduct and that was sufficient to vitiate the award. Shri S. P. Sinha then urged that the plaintiff had waived her right if any to challenge the award the ground of legal misconduct. No waiver however was pleaded by the defendant I and it was not competent to him to urge this contention at this stage before us. The result therefore is that the judgment of the High Court cannot stand. We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court with costs throughout' Appeal allowed.
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1952 (10) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uake, and if that is true, as it seems to be from the letter written by the' M.L.A. to the Additional District Magistrate the 1st November, 1950, it appears to us harsh, if not unjust, to ask him to produce the same paddy or a similar quantity of paddy. The order-of the High Court sending back the case to the Magistrate for taking action according to law under section 514 will, therefore, stand set aside. We generally do not interfere in the matter of sentence, but in this case we find that the Magistrate has held that the appellant's plea that he was ignorant of the provisions of the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947, was a genuine one. Having regard to this circumstance and the fact that from a fine of ₹ 50 to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹ 1,000 is a big jump, we think it is appropriate that the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the High Court should be set aside and we order accordingly. The fine of ₹ 1,000 will stand.
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1952 (10) TMI 40 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce of opinion. The reason is obvious. On the new point based on Section 16(3) (a) (iii) of the Income-tax Act there is only the opinion of the third Member. The two other members of the Tribunal had no opportunity of going into that question and, if the point had been raised before them, they might not have taken the same view as the third Member took. The jurisdiction of the third Member, it appears to us, is clearly defined in Section 5-A(7) of the Income-tax Act and he cannot, therefore, take it upon himself to decide the appeal by either dismissing or by allowing the same. 3. The result, therefore, is that, in our view, the case has never been properly disposed of by the Tribunal and there is no order of the Tribunal from which the reference under Section 66 of the Income-tax Act could arise. The case must, therefore, go back to the Tribunal for decision according to law. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, parties should bear their own costs of this case.
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1952 (10) TMI 39 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f the plaintiff and they only succeeded before us in regard to the claim of the plaintiff which had been allowed by the trial Court. If an order for proportionate costs of this appeal were made it would certainly work to the prejudice of the heirs and legal representatives of the plaintiff. We are not disturbing the order which had been made by the High Court in regard to the costs of the appeal before it. No time was taken up before us in arguing the appeal on other points except the one in regard to the resolution for the suspension of the plaintiff being ultra rites and we think that under the circumstances of the case the proper order to pass in regard to the costs of this appeal before us should be that each party should bear its own costs. The only order which we need pass in this appeal before us under the circumstances is that the appeal is allowed, the decree of the trial court is restored, and each party do bear and pay its own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (10) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oncern may have a lull during the period of its activity, when it is waiting to acquire a new business, or when it is prospecting for business that is going to be started, and in such a case it may be possible to say, though it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the point, that the assessee was still carrying on business. On the facts admitted by learned counsel that question does not arise in this case. It was admitted that the business activities that the assessee was carrying on had ceased. The mere fact that he had maintained a staff to pay some of the cane growers from whom he had purchased cane on credit cannot be said to be an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. We have pointed out that the last part of the question does not arise in this case. The answer to the rest of the question can only be in the negative. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (10) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts. It does not say that the proceedings must be treated as having freshly commenced. What is contemplated in the latter part of the section is a notional commencement, if such a term could be used. The section obviously means that all rights which arose or are likely to arise in the future shall remain intact notwithstanding the new set-up, and that they would be dealt with by the Union Courts in place of the Courts of the Covenanting State. There is nothing in the section to justify the view that any taking away of a vested right of appeal retrospectively was intended. The decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving( 1905 A.C. 369) clearly applies to the facts, and the order of the High Court that the appeals are not competent is, in our opinion, erroneous. The result is that Appeal No. 152 of 1951 is dismissed with costs throughout, while Appeals Nos. 167 and 167A of 1951 are allowed with costs throughout. Appeal No. 125 dismissed. Appeals Nos. 167 and 167A allowed.
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1952 (10) TMI 36 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h- is accidental and the accused has acted in a peculiar manner regarding the disposal of the dead body for reasons best known to himself. One of them might well be that he was afraid of a false case being started against him. Life and liberty of persons cannot be put in jeopardy mere suspicions, howsoever strong, and they can only be deprived of these the basis of definite proof. In this case, as found by the High Court, not only were the Sub- Inspector of police and police constables and other witnesses guilty of telling deliberate lies but the prosecution was blameworthy in introducing witnesses in the case to support their lies and that being so, we feel that it would be unsafe to convict the appellant the material that is left after eliminating the perjured,, false and inadmissible evidence. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant under section 201, Indian Penal Code, and acquit her of that charge also. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (10) TMI 35 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ghts of appeal and might place them under the risk of incurring heavier penalties than they would otherwise incur. 11. We are fully alive to the fact that owing to the inefficient manner in which the prosecution was handled by the lawyers appearing for the Government and by the magistrates before whom the case was tried, the unfortunate result may be that persons who may have committed serious crimes might escape but if during all these years the accused have not been given the charges which they could reasonably follow and meet, such a result is unavoidable. We consider that further trial of these accused will not in any way advance the course of justice. 12. The result is that we feel constrained to quash the order of the High Court directing a 'de novo' trial of the appellants. The appeals are therefore allowed, the order of the High Court directing a 'de novo' trial of the appellants before itself is set aside and the order quashing the charges is upheld.
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1952 (10) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t would not be true to say that he did not reside in the taxable territories for more than two years. Mr. Kolah says that it is possible on the facts of this case for the assessee not to be resident in the taxable territories for more than two years and also to be resident in the taxable territories for more than two years. But we are not concerned with the residence of the assessee in Africa. We are concerned with his residence in the taxable territories, and if he has resided in the taxable territories for more than two years then he does not satisfy the second condition laid down in Section 4B of the Act. Therefore the Tribunal was right when it took the view that the assessee was not "not ordinarily resident" in the taxable territories in the year 1944. We therefore answer the question in the negative. Notice of motion taken out by the assessee dismissed. Assessee to pay the costs of the reference and of the notice of motion. Reference answered in the negative.
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1952 (10) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd for possession of the f same is decreed and it is directed that the defendants do deliver Possession of the suit properties to the plaintiff. It is further declared that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from the defendants. An enquiry will be made as to the amount of mesne profits due prior and-subsequent to the institution of the suit and there will be a decree for the amount so determined. In conclusion we do express the hope that this judgment will finally conclude the ruinous litigations which have-been going in courts since the last 62 years in respect of Raj Ballav’s estate and ingenuity of counsel will no longer-be pressed into service to again reopen questions which must now be taken as finally settled. Appeal No. 110 allowed. Appeal No. 111 dismissed. Agent for the appellants in C. A. No. 110 and respondent No. 1 in C.A. No. Ill S. C. Bannerjee. Agent for respondents Nos. 1 (a) and (b) in C.A. No. 110 and appellants in C. A. No. Ill Sukumar Ghose.
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1952 (10) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioner No. 1, who is an Advocate of the Supreme Court' can, in addition to exercising his right of pleading the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court which is not challenged by anybody, claim, by virtue of the provision of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, the right to "act" the Original Side of that Court, although according to the rules framed under the Letters Patent an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court may not appear in the Original Side unless instructed by an Attorney - Held that:- Petition dismissed.
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1952 (10) TMI 31 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , Board of Revenue(1). Section 2 (h) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, which defines sale price , has been reproduced in the judgment. That provision appears to be identical with Section 2 (h) of the Central Pro- vinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. The learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court construed this definition in the same way as we have done and have held that the sale price as defined in Section 2 (h) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, includes any amount charged or realised separately as sales tax from the purchaser by the dealer. 10.. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 247 of 1951 in the affirmative and dismiss Miscellaneous Petition No. 88 of 1952 with costs. Costs of the reference will be borne by the applicant in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 247 of 1951. Counsel s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Reference answered in the affirmative. Application dismissed. (1) 1949 1 S.T.C. 193 53 C.W.N. 278.
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1952 (10) TMI 30 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... commission payable to the commission agent but it must not be overlooked that we are dealing with a set of circumstances out of the ordinary way. There was an emergency and the Government were acting under extraordinary powers conferred on them by emergency legislation in fixing the prices and in controlling the movement and distribution of essential commodities like firewood. That is why we find the Government, in the interest of all parties, fixing the commission payable to the respondents as agents for the owners of the firewood. The Government having proceeded all along on the assumption that all that the respondents were entitled to was commis- sion at a fixed rate, cannot now claim to treat them as independent dealers. We agree with the learned trial Judge s finding that the plaintiffs dealings come within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act and that therefore they are not liable to pay the tax. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1952 (10) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
Whether sales here in question, which occasioned the export in each case, fall within the scope of the exemption under Article 286(1)(b)?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. We are clearly of opinion that the sales here in question, which occasioned the export in each case, fall within the scope of the exemp- tion under Article 286(1)(b). Such sales must of necessity be put through by transporting the goods by rail or ship or both out of the territory of India, that is to say, by employing the machinery of export. A sale by export thus involves a series of integrated activities commencing from the agreement of sale with a foreign buyer and ending with the delivery of the goods to a common carrier for transport out of the country by land or sea. Such a sale cannot be dissociated from the export without which it cannot be effectuated, and the sale and resultant export form parts of a single transaction. Of these two integ- rated activities, which together constitute an export sale, whichever first occurs can well be regarded as taking place in the course of the other
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1952 (10) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... in a fiduciary capacity of his position to make a gain. The law says that such a person shall not keep that gain to himself but shall give it up to the person to whom he owes a fiduciary duty. To such a suit there is no other article applicable and therefore Article 120 must apply. The decision of the Full Bench of this court in Subbiah Thevar v. Samiappa Mudaliar supports us in this view. The suit was filed in 1946 and is well within the time of six years provided by Article 120. We therefore do not agree with the learned Judge that the claim is barred by limitation. To this extent we allow this appeal and pass a decree in favour of the company for Rs. 8,510. From this amount of Rs. 8,510 will be deducted a sum of Rs. 2,406-1-0 which is the amount debited against Ramalingam towards godown rent. The decree will bear interest at six per cent. per annum from the date of suit. In this appeal, the appellant and the contesting respondents will pay and receive proportionate costs.
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1952 (10) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Memorandum and articles of association – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... eclared intention in Exhibit A-5. It is brought to our notice that on a petition filed by the appellant, a commissioner was appointed by this court on 2nd May, 1951, to prepare a list of all documents and registers and that he was discharged on 2nd August, 1951, by PANCHAPAKESA AIYAR J. In an appeal against that order, GOVINDA MENON J. and RAMASWAMI GOUNDER J. appointed a receiver, who called a general body meeting at which six directors were re-elected. It is sufficient to say that during all this period, the second defendant continue to function as secretary and treasurer. What happened subsequent to the suit is quite immaterial and cannot affect its merits. For reasons given supra, it is quite impossible for us to give the plaintiff any relief in the plaint as framed and on the footing on which he has come to court. We dismiss his appeal, but we consider this to be a fit case in which the parties should be directed to bear their own costs throughout and direct accordingly.
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1952 (10) TMI 17 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Meetings and Proceedings – Chairman of Meeting, Restriction on exercise of voting rights of members who have not paid calls, Etc., Proxies , Ascertainment of directors retiring by rotation and filling up vacancies and Alternate director – Appointment and term of office of
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