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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 286 Records
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1952 (11) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... there was succession to the business within the meaning of Rule 9, sub-rules 1 and 2. Applying the principle of these authorities it is clear that in the present case there has been succession to the business within the ambit of Section 25(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act and the argument on behalf of the assessee on this part of the case must prevail. For the reasons we have expressed we hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that there was not a discontinuance of the business but that the Tribunal was not right in holding that there was no succession to the petitioner's business as contemplated under Section 25(4) of the Income-tax Act. The reference is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee. But since the question of discontinuance has been answered in favour of the department there will be no order as to costs. The assessee is entitled to withdraw the amount of ₹ 100 which he has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (11) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... formal letter that Limsey wrote to Dattu on 8th October inviting him to come to his house and Dattu's response to his call suggest that apparently at that moment they were on good terms. There was thus no strong motive for Limsey to murder Dattu. No doubt, a very strong suspicion arises against Limsey by reason of the existence of the tomb of Dattu in his house but we are unable to hold that the High Court after taking into consideration all the circumstances in the case was wrong in not treating this circumstance as conclusive of the guilt of Limsey. As against the other two respondents, there is not the slightest evidence to hold that they are in any way responsible for the murder of Dattu. 10. For the reasons given above we think that it is not a case which calls for interference with the acquittal order of the High Court in exercise of this Court's powers under Article 136 of the Constitution and we accordingly dismiss the appeal and maintain the acquittal order.
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1952 (11) TMI 13 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... pply. Surely that could not possibly be the case, for it would mean that the Government or a local authority will always be bound by the Act in respect of the building put up by the lessee under building leases granted by it in respect of land belonging to it. In that case the immunity given to the Government or a local authority will be wholly illusory and worthless. In’ our view in the case before us the demised premises including the building belong to a local authority and are outside the operation of the Act. This Act being out of the way, the appellants were well within their rights to file the suit in ejectment in the City Civil Court and that Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and to pass the decree that it did. I The result, therefore, is that we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the City Civil Court. The appellant will be entitled to costs throughout in all Courts. Appeal allowed.
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1952 (11) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal being taken away if all that Had happened is a change in the conditions and requirements to be fulfilled before the right of appeal can be enforced. The argument is no doubt attractive, but I am afraid it is not open after the ruling of the Full Bench in -- 'AIR 1929 Mad 381 (B)', for there too it could have been argued on the same analogy that the right of filing an appeal under Clause 15, Letters Patent was not taken away but only a condition imposed, namely, that leave should be obtained. 23. My conclusion is that Article 133(1) of the Constitution applied to this case and therefore the requirements as to valuation must be determined by the provisions of Clause (a), viz., that the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than ₹ 20,000. 24. With this expression of opinion the petition will go before the learned Judges who referred the matter to the Full Bench.
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1952 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ions of article 19(1)(d) and (e) and article 21. This matter is concluded by the majority decision of this court in Gopalan's case ( 1950 S.C.R. 88.) and 'the High Court quite correctly negatived this contention. Sri Dadachanji has not sought to support the views of Bhandari J. regarding the Act being inconsistent with article 19 (1)(g). Nor has learned counsel seriously pressed the objection of unconstitutionality based on article 15, which, in our view, was rightly rejected by the High Court. Although we hold that the High Court erred on the construction they Put upon article 22 and the appellant has succeeded -on that point before us, this appeal will, nevertheless, have to be dismissed on the ground that the Tribunal was not properly constituted and its order was without jurisdiction, as conceded by the learned Solicitor- General. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal on that ground. We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed Agent for the appellant P. A. Mehta.
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1952 (11) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n or any direction of law, and it was not stated also what these directions of law were. We think, therefore that we must accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant that even on the prosecution evidence, as it stands, the accused could rot be convicted of criminal breach of trust. The result is that the appeal should be allowed. In our opinion, it would not be proper to make an order for retrial in this case. In the first place, the charge of accepting illegal gratification upon which alone any retrial could be ordered, was definitely abandoned by the prosecution at the time of the trial. In the second place, the accused has fully served out the sentence of imprisonment during the period that the appeal was pending in this court and a further trial would not be proper in the interests of justice. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the accused be acquitted. The fine if paid, should be refunded to him.
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1952 (11) TMI 9 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cles of luxury and therefore the word glass-ware must be understood to apply only to such articles made of glass as are used for luxury. I do not think that all the articles specified in this Schedule can be properly regarded as luxury articles. Even assuming that Schedule I is confined to only articles of luxury, that is to say, the articles used by the well-to-do classes, it seems difficult to hold that glass panes would not fall within the term glass-ware . It is common knowledge that glass panes are not used by the poorer classes of people. For, they are not affixed to windows or doors of their houses. In my opinion, therefore, the term glass-ware whether it is interpreted in a narrow sense or otherwise, would necessarily include glass panes. I answer the second question accordingly. 9.. The answers be sent to the Board of Revenue. Costs of this reference will be borne as incurred. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641. (2) 1914 1 K.B. 641 at 647.
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1952 (11) TMI 8 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Oppression and Mismanagement – Right to apply under section 397 and 398 ... ... ... ... ..... hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip hellip The obtaining of the consent is a condition precedent to the making of the petition. In other words, consent must have been obtained prior to the presentation of the application. The two sets of shareholders, who subsequently gave their consent, have clearly indicated in the document embodying their consent that the petition had already been filed and that they were expressing their approval thereof. Their subsequent consent is not a valid consent under sub-section (3). I am, therefore, of the opinion that the requirements of law regarding the obtaining of consent in writing have not been complied with and consequently this petition is not maintainable. It should fail on the preliminary ground. The opposite parties are entitled to their costs. Opposite parties 1 and 2 shall receive a sum of Rs. 500 each as costs and such of the remaining opposite parties as have engaged separate counsel shall get a sum of Rs. 200 each as costs.
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1952 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 14,00,000 was the assessee company's income within the meaning of Section 2(6C) of the Indian Income-tax Act and liable to pay income-tax under the Indian Income-tax Act?
Held that:- Te High Court was right in holding that the ₹ 14,00,000 is assessable to tax. The appeal fails and is dismissed
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1952 (10) TMI 56 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he period of limitation is to run from the time when the mistake is first discovered. But it was also held that where a Patnidar sues the landlord for return of the money paid in excess of the amount of cesses, the relief being based on mistake, Article 62 was applicable and not Article 96. This case, in my opinion, does not help the plaintiff in any way. 10. Reference was next made to -- 'Gorakhpur Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Nariman and Co.', AIR 1948 All 75, where in a different set of circumstances Article 120 was applied. 11. After considering all these cases and the arguments of counsel, I am of the opinion that the learned Small Cause Court Judge had erroneously applied Article 96 to the "facts of the present case. The Article applicable is 62. 12. I would therefore allow this petition, set aside the decree of the trial Court and dismiss the plaintiff's suit, but in the circumstances of this case I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
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1952 (10) TMI 55 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , as the interlocutory remand order of the High Court was one without jurisdiction and that being so, the subsequent proceedings taken in consequence of it, viz., the order of the Subordinate Judge restoring the application for execution to the extent of ₹ 92,000, and the further order of the High Court on appeal restoring the execution case on terms, are null and void and have to be set aside and the order of the executing court dated the 25th April, 1945, restored. We order accordingly. Appeal No. 13 of 1951 is dismissed. 31. In the peculiar circumstances of this case we direct that the parties be left to bear their own costs through-out, that is, those incurred by them in the High Court in the proceedings which terminated with the remand order, the costs incurred in the subordinate court after the remand order, and the costs thereafter incurred in the High Court and those incurred in this court in these appeals. 32. Appeal No. 12 allowed. 33. Appeal No. 13 dismissed.
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1952 (10) TMI 54 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
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... ... ..... o the Advocate on the other side, we consider that copy of the application made by the Police Inspector, Shri Abbas, to the Magistrate requesting for the issue of search warrants, may also be granted. We accordingly direct that certified copies be granted of the Magistrate's order dated 14th June 1952, and of the application dated 13th June 1952, made by the Inspector, Shri S. W. Abbas, for the issue of the search warrants. 5. In view of the above decision we think that both sides should have a further opportunity to place before us any additional arguments that they may have as to the legality of the searches in the light of the consents of the application for the issue of search warrants. 6. These petitions will, therefore, be heard again at a very early date. Any of the petitioners may apply to this Court and obtain before the next hearing date certified copies of any of the documents whose copies have been hereby directed to be granted. R.L. Narasimham, J. 7. I agree.
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1952 (10) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the head office as was carried on in Kanpur and Calcutta. It had to be conceded on behalf of the Department that if the assessee's head office was at Mirzapur and he had merely branches at Kanpur and Calcutta for carrying on the same business, then he was entitled to deduct from his business income the expenses incurred in connection with the maintenance of the staff for the realisation of the outstandings at Kanpur and Calcutta and in connection with the rent of the premises at these two places. We, therefore, with the consent of the counsel, re-frame the question as follows Q. Whether the expenses of the branches at Kanpur and at Calcutta can, in the circumstances of the case, be legally allowed as business expenses of the year under consideration? Our answer to this question is also in the affirmative. 10. In view of the fact that, we have answered one question in favour of the Department and another in favour of the assessee, we direct parties to bear their own costs.
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1952 (10) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ult on this occasion does not cease to be a wilful default on account of his being regular in payment in the past. 10. The argument that there was no default, or no wilful default, because the respondent had refused to accept the money orders for the arrears before the decree was passed is devoid of force. The refusal of the respondent to accept the money orders did not wipe off the appellant's liability. The appellant remained liable to pay the arrears though he might not be liable to pay the costs of the suit brought by the respondent to recover them. In spite of the previous refusal, the appellant was bound to pay the decreed arrears; that was the decree passed against him. Further when the respondent demanded the decreed arrears through notice, the appellant was bound to pay them. He could not refuse to pay them on the ground that the respondent had refused the previous tender. 11. The decree passed by the lower appellate Court is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.
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1952 (10) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. 19. Having regard to the observations which we have made above, we have come to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was estopped from contending that Gangabai had the right to adopt him as a son to her deceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. This estoppel prevails in spite of the fact that both the courts below have found that he was validly adopted by Gangabai as a son to her deceased husband on the 12th December, 1943. 20. The result therefore is that the Plaintiff's suit is barred by estoppel, that he is not entitled to any relief which he has prayed for in his plaint, that the decree which has been passed by the Trial Court in his favour and which the High Court has confirmed is liable to be set aside and that his suit is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly allow this appeal, reverse the decree which has been passed by the High Court in favour of the Plaintiff and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.
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1952 (10) TMI 50 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nal. Therefore, far from there being any finding that any firm of the name of Vasantsen Dwarkadas is in existence, there is a clear finding that the business of Vasantsen Dwarkadas is the business of Purshottam Laxmidas and that there is no separate entity like Vasantsen Dwarkadas and no firm of the name of Vasantsen Dwarkadas which could be assessed under Section 23(5) or whose total income can be ascertained under that section. Therefore this particular argument is not open to Sir Nusserwanji. Therefore we hold that in this particular case, as the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas has already been assessed and its total income ascertained, it was not open to the Department to separately assess the assessee as a partner of the firm of Purshottam Laxmidas on his partnership income which did not form part of the total income of Purshottam Laxmidas as ascertained by the Department under Section 23(5). Therefore the answer we give to the question submitted to us is in the affirmative.
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1952 (10) TMI 49 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... business or whether it merely reduces the liability to the tax or the rate of the tax. With very great respect to the learned Judges, when we turn to the judgment they assume that there is no doubt that a transaction can be avoided under Section 10A irrespective of the circumstance whether the effect of that transaction is to make the Act altogether inapplicable to the business or part of the business or whether it merely reduces the liability to the tax or the rate of the tax. Not only is there a doubt but there is a very serious doubt whether that is the true interpretation of Section 10A of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and we feel certain that if the matter had been fully argued before the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court they would have taken a different view of the matter or at least they would have realised that the matter is certainly not so clear as they thought it was. The result therefore is that we must answer the question submitted to us in the negative.
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1952 (10) TMI 48 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... een the obtaining of probate and the taking of possession of the property by the executor. The will indicates that he was unwilling that his property should be in the direct possession and management of his wives and he cannot have contemplated that following his death they should remain in possession until in due course his son-in-law obtained probate. The directions in his will about obtaining probate and about managing the properties are two separate directions, not connected with each other. He was aware that in the usual course, if the executor was to act under the will at all, he would have to take out probate, and he was merely emphasizing the necessity for the probate in directing his son-in-law to take out probate. He was certainly not making the taking of possession of the estate by his son-in-law dependent upon the son-in-law first obtaining probate. 25. For the reasons I have given the appeal fails and I would dismiss it with costs. Sarjoo Prasad, J. 26. I agree.
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1952 (10) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... greement on which the assessee firm relied and the agreement merely showed the consideration for which the commission was shared. But, as we said before, the mere fact that there is consideration for sharing the managing agency commission is not sufficient to lead to the inference that the commission was shared exclusively and wholly for the purposes of the assessee's business. The Tribunal has taken the view that on that decision no question of law arises and that the decision turns purely on appreciation of evidence and is nothing more than a decision on a question of fact. We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal and therefore in our opinion no question of law arises out of the decision of the Tribunal. The result is that the answer to the first question submitted to us is, "For each assessment". The answer to the second question is "See Judgment". Assessee to pay the costs. Notice of motion dismissed with costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1952 (10) TMI 46 - NAGPUR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as the Advocate General gave an undertaking that the Government would rehear the case according to law. This decision demonstrates the necessity of issuing orders and directions on quashing the order on 'certiorari'. In this case no final order could be passed by the High Court as the tribunal had not reached any findings of fact uninfluenced by extraneous considerations. The case was rightly sent back for rehearing. This is what a High Court does in second appeals. This decision cannot be used as an authority for the proposition that a 'mandamus' cannot issue to a judicial tribunal and that the jurisdiction of the High Court ends with advising the tribunal on the state of law and quashing its orders. 170. I, therefore, agree with Hemeon and Mudholkar JJ. that the High Court has power to pass an order granting permission to the Petitioner or to direct the Rent Controller to grant the permission and that in the instant case an order granting permission should.
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