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Case Laws
Showing 301 to 313 of 313 Records
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1953 (1) TMI 19 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich also dismissed the appeal on the merits. Learned counsel has pointed out that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal being completely without jurisdiction, the order of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be deemed to be an order under Section 33. In case the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal, in the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction, had varied that order to the disadvantage of the assessee, it may have been possible to ask for a reference for the decision of the question whether they had any jurisdiction to do so; but, they having merely dismissed the appeals, the effect of the order of the Income-tax Officer remained and, as there was no appeal provided for against that order, the order of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be treated as an order under Section 33 against which a reference is provided for under Section 66. This reference cannot be entertained and is rejected. We make no order as to costs. Reference rejected.
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1953 (1) TMI 18 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n the Zamindar's Sherista. Although in the rent receipts Dobson continued to be shown as the recorded tenant, eventually Jones's name appears on the rent receipts as tenant. In spite of the increase in land value and the letting value the landlords through whom the plaintiff derives his title did not at any time make may attempt to eject the tenant or to get any further enhancement of rent since 1860. All these circumstances put together are explicable only on the hypothesis of permanency of the tenure and they irresistibly lead to the conclusion, as held by the lower Courts, that the tenancy in question was heritable and a permanent one. The decision of Mukherjea, J., in the case of Probhas Chandra Mallick v. Debendra Nath Das (supra) is definitely in point. In this view of the matter we hold that the Courts below were right in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for ejectment.' In the result this appeal must fail and we dismiss it with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to enact; that Part I of the Act was not severable, that the whole Act hung together and therefore the whole was invalid. I hold that the trial held under the Regulation is void under article 13, read with articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and the conviction and sentence of the petitioner should be set aside. Following the view taken in Lachmandas’s case(1) I direct that the petitioner shall be tried according to law. This order will govern petition No. 368 relating to the other petitioners. (1) 1947 A.C. 503. (2) 1952 S.C.R 710. ORDER. BY THE COURT -As the Constitutional issues. raised in the petitions have also been raised in the appeals preferred by the petitioners they have been dealt with in the appeals by consent of parties, and the petitions are dismissed. The constitutional points in the appeals having been decided against the appellant,; by the majority the appeals will be heard on other points when the appeals are ready for hearing. Petitions dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 16 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... right. I, therefore, agree that the sale of loom hours does not come within the definition as given in the Sale of Goods Act and the Sales Tax Act and is exempt from payment of tax. The second question formulated by the Board is as follows Are sales to registered dealers, through commission agents, whose offices are situated outside Bihar, sales of the class mentioned in Section 5(2)(a)(ii)? In view of the findings in the statement of the case submitted by the Board it is quite obvious that the question does not arise and need not be answered. The Board rejected the contention of the assessee that it was a sale to the Tatas and held, on the contrary, that it was sale to Shaw Wallace and Co., who are admittedly not registered dealers in Bihar, and, therefore, the exemption under Section 5(2)(a)(ii) is not available to the assessee. In my opinion, therefore, that question has rightly not been answered and did not arise for consideration at all. Reference answered accordingly.
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1953 (1) TMI 15 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibed is fatal to the validity of the reference. We further held in the circumstances of that case that the Board of Revenue improperly made the reference in violation of the provision of the statute and the High Court was capable of entertaining objection to the statement of the case, and if it came to the conclusion that the case should never have been stated, the High Court was not compelled to express its opinion upon the questions of law referred. For the reasons stated, we think that the first question of law raised in the statement of the case should be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Sales Tax Department. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the other three questions of law referred to in the statement of the case. The assessee must pay the costs of hearing. We fix the hearing fee at ten gold mohurs. Reference answered accordingly. (1) (1930) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 472. (2) (1952) A.I.R. 1952 Pat. 357 3 S.T.C. 167.
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1953 (1) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... over Section 16-A the accused alleged that he was not a dealer but a commission agent and the Sub- Divisional Magistrate came to the conclusion that the accused is not therefore a dealer and that he is not liable to pay the tax and so he cannot be prosecuted. In coming to this conclusion he committed an error be- cause it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court in Radhakrishna Rao v. Province of Madras , that the term dealer will take in a com- mission agent also as in the instant case. Therefore, the Court below ought to have found that the accused is an assessee falling within the scope of the Act and that he is liable to pay the tax. In the result, the order of acquittal of the lower Court is set aside and the accused is convicted as charged and he is fined in a sum of Rs. 50. The tax is also made recoverable from him as if it were a fine. Time to pay the fine and the tax amount three weeks from the date of the receipt of this order in the lower Court. Appeal allowed.
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1953 (1) TMI 13 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court will require the Board of Revenue to state a case only where the High Court was not satisfied that such refusal was justified. The refusal evidently would be justified if the application to the Board for reference was made beyond time, and in those circumstances it would not be open to the High Court to call for a statement of case, because whatever the other reasons may be on merits, the order of the Board refusing to make a reference would be on the face of it legal and valid. If it were otherwise, then an assessee could at any time without regard to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 21 make an application to the Board for making a reference, and on such refusal apply to the High Court within the time provided under sub-section (2) to call for a statement of case and have the matter decided on merits. This could not be the intention of the law. The application of the assessee must, therefore, fail and has to be dismissed with costs. Reference not answered.
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1953 (1) TMI 12 - HIGH COURT OF NAGPUR
Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956 – Winding up – Powers of liquidator ... ... ... ... ..... tinguished from the interests of some of the directors or the managing directors or the managing agents, whose interests may not be entirely identical with the interests of the general body of shareholders. It, therefore, appears to us that the court below while passing the order under appeal removing the official liquidator lost sight of this aspect of the case. In our opinion considering the interests of the general body of shareholders it is necessary that the official liquidator should continue to be in charge of the liquidation proceedings. It is also necessary that the liquidation proceedings should be brought to a speedy conclusion. We would therefore set aside the order passed by the court below removing the appellant from the office of the official liquidator and appointing the first respondent as such. The appellant is entitled to his costs of this appeal including hearing fee of Rs. 100 to be paid by the first respondent. The cross-objection is dismissed. No costs.
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1953 (1) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the sums of ₹ 12,68,480 and ₹ 4,40,878 were sale proceeds of the goods sold by the assessee to merchants in British India or were debts due by the said merchants ?
Whether if they were sale proceeds, they were received in British India ?"
Whether the profits of the assessee's business are included in the sums of ₹ 12,68,480 and ₹ 4,40,878 ?
Held that:- The High Court was right in holding that the two sums of ₹ 12,68,480 and ₹ 4,40,878 were the sale proceeds of the goods sold and delivered by the appellant to merchants in British India, that they were received by Messrs. Jagmohandas Ramanlal & Co., and by the banks and shroffs through whom the railway receipts were negotiated, on behalf of the appellant in British India, that they were liable to tax under Section 4(1)(a) of the Act as having been received in British India on its behalf, that there is nothing either in the facts and circumstances of the case or in law why they should be exempted from such liability, that the answers given to the questions which were ultimately considered by the High Court were correct, and the appellant was rightly held liable for the tax on these two amounts subject to all just deductions and allowances. The appeal therefore fails and must stand dismissed
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1953 (1) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Whether in the circumstances of this case, the moneys deposited by customers with the assessee firm as security deposits were 'borrowed money' within the meaning of Rule 2A of the Second Schedule to the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, either throughout the chargeable accounting period ended 12th April, 1945, or during any part of that chargeable accounting period ?
Held that:- Set aside the order of the court below and answer the question referred in the affirmative with reference to the last part of the chargeable accounting period, namely, 14th February, 1945, to 12th April, 1945, and in the negative with reference to the rest of that period.
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1953 (1) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the income, profits and gains derived from the sale of salt in British India are assessable to tax as income, profits and gains received or deemed to be received under Section 4(1)(a) ?
Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in accepting the contention of the Department that the income accrued or arose or is deemed to accrue or arise in India and is assessable to tax as contemplated by Section 4(1)(c) ?
Whether the Tribunal was right in the circumstances of this case in rejecting the contention of the assessee (applicant) that the income, profits and gains are chargeable to tax from the sale of salt in British India under Section 42 only ?
Held that:- High Court correctly answered Question (1) in the affirmative so far as income-tax is concerned. Excess profits tax, however, cannot be levied on this basis.
Question (2). The Tribunal was wrong in accepting the contention of the Department that the income accrued or arose in India. The Tribunal did not hold that the income is income which should be deemed to accrue or arise in India. The part of the question which states that the Tribunal did so is not in accordance with fact. We find that the income, profits and gains must be deemed to have arisen or accrued in India so far as excess profits tax is concerned and that Section 42(3) of the Income-tax Act applies to the levy of excess profits tax by virtue of Section 21 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.
Question (3). The Tribunal was right in rejecting the contention that the income, profits and gains are chargeable to tax under Section 42 only. They are also chargeable to income-tax as falling within the purview of Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act as income received in India on behalf of the assessee company. In such a case Section 42 of the Income-tax Act would have no application. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on a true construction of Rule 5 of Schedule II of the Excess Profits Tax Act the expression 'so far as the contrary is shown' applies only to sub-clause (a) or also to sub-clause (b) ?
Whether the managing agency commission payable by the company to its managing agents for the year 1943 is borrowed money for the purposes of Rule 2A or a debt for the purposes of Rule 2 of Schedule II to the Excess Profits Tax Act ?
Held that:- A loan imports a positive act of lending coupled with an acceptance by the other side of the money as a loan. The relationship of borrower and lender cannot ordinarily come about by mere inaction. The clause in the Articles of Agreement quoted above was relied on for the purpose of showing that there was such an agreement in the case. We are unable to construe the provisions in that way. They merely give the managing agents a right to receive their commission at a certain time. If the money is not paid in time it lies with the assessee as a debt due to the agents.
We agree with the High Court that it is a debt under Rule 2 and not a borrowing under Rule 2A. Appeal dismissed.
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1953 (1) TMI 1 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Warehoused goods - Duty liability ... ... ... ... ..... sanction of the Central Board of Revenue had to be taken in order to take certificate action against the appellants. Rule 161 provides for three modes for realization of the excise duty. The Excise authorities may either proceed upon the bond executed by the owner of the goods or may realize the dues by sale at public auction of the goods or in such other manner as the Central Board of Revenue may in any particular case direct. It appears in this case that the Central Board of Revenue directed the realization of the dues by certificate action under Section 11 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and this notice was served on the 29th of August, 1950 that is, on a date after the Constitution had come into force. For this reason the second point urged by the learned Advocate General cannot be accepted. 25.The result is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed but having regard to the special circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs of this court.
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