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Showing 61 to 80 of 998 Records
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1973 (12) TMI 14
Whether a declaration made under section 184(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for continuation of partnership signed by the partners, before the expiry of the accounting period is a valid declaration in law - we find that the question which is referred to us should be answered in the negative
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1973 (12) TMI 13
Profit on sale of shares - Held that the assessee in the instant case held a number of shares as he had shown Rs. 46,980 as income from dividend in the assessment year in question. A legitimate inference can be drawn from the facts that the assessee entered into contracts for forward sale in respect of 15,000 shares with the sole motive of profit and derived profit therefrom, He also showed the amount in question as business speculation profit in his return - held that the assessee derived the said amount as adventure in the nature of trade, and, as such, it was an income from business, within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Act, liable to be taxed
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1973 (12) TMI 12
Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 - whether the payment of Rs. 75,000 which the assessee has made to meet the marriage expenditure of his daughter is covered by the exemption clause (j) of section 5 of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 - We find that the whole of the disputed expenditure of Rs. 75,000 is exempted under clause (j) of section 5 of the Act. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the affirmative
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1973 (12) TMI 11
Penalty for concealment - assessee received certain deposits and balances had not been returned to persons entitled to them - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law in cancelling the penalties levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66 ? " - So also in the present case, the admission was wrong and it was for the department to prove positively on other material that there was concealment of income. Being a quasi-criminal proceeding, the burden is entirely on the department. Apart from the so-called admission, there is no material to hold that the income was concealed - Question answered in the affirmative
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1973 (12) TMI 10
Whether the Government or the taxation authorities can retain with themselves amount of tax collected by them when the very basis of that collection has been subsequently held by the highest tribunal in the land to be without any legal basis or without any foundation in law - In the instant case we have based our decision on Tilokchand Motichand's case and the other two decisions of the Supreme Court in Gila Devi Aggarwal's case and Champalal Binani's case . Hence, it cannot be said that the question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Though one requirement, namely, of clause (a) is satisfied, the other requirement of clause (b) of article 133(1) as it stands after the 30th Amendment is not satisfied Under these circumstances, we regret that we cannot certify that this is a case which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the oral application made on behalf of the petitioner
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1973 (12) TMI 9
Assessee was to acquire property absolutely on the death of his ancestor, according to a trust created by the latter - There was also a provision in the will giving share of commission to the assessee absolutely - In addition, the assessee also received income from ancestral property - Whether the income derived from the property received by Gordhandas under the trust settlement, and/or share income of the managing agency received by him under clause 12 of the will is assessable, in the hands of the Hindu undivided family consisting of Gordhandas and his son as coparceners - whether by his subsequent conduct the assessee had treated these properties as Hindu undivided family properties. - mere fact that the assessee had not kept separate accounts in respect of his income from these two types of properties cannot, in my opinion, be enough or equivalent to having thrown them into the common stock or of having blended them - income from the property received under the trust settlement and share of commission received according to the will are assessable as the assessee's individual income
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1973 (12) TMI 8
Excess depreciation was allowed due to non-disclosure by assessee of initial depreciation - income chargeable to tax escaping assessment - Whether it can be said that there is under-assessment due to default of the assessee - petitioners challenge these notices under section 148 of the Act of 1961 seeking to re-open assessments under section 147.
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1973 (12) TMI 7
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the deed of revocable settlement dated 4th July, 1957, constitutes a gift liable to gift-tax.
2. If affirmative, whether the value of the gift can be taken to be zero in the absence of a specified period for which the transfer was not revocable under section 6(2) of the Gift-tax Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Whether the deed of revocable settlement dated 4th July, 1957, constitutes a gift liable to gift-tax.
The court examined the provisions of the Gift-tax Act, 1958, particularly the definitions of "donee," "gift," "property," and "transfer of property" under section 2. The term "gift" is defined as a transfer of property made voluntarily and without consideration. Section 6(2) deals with the valuation of gifts that are not revocable for a specified period.
The court also referred to relevant provisions from the Transfer of Property Act, the Indian Trusts Act, and the Estate Duty Act, 1953. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act states that a gift revocable at the mere will of the donor is void. Section 78(b) of the Indian Trusts Act allows for the creation of a revocable trust, and Section 12(1) of the Estate Duty Act considers property under a revocable trust to pass on the settlor's death.
The main contention was that the trust property should not be liable to gift-tax because the trust was revocable at any time at the will of the settlor. The court agreed, stating that the donor cannot be said to have transferred property if he retains an unrestricted power to revoke the trust. This view aligns with the essential meaning of a gift, which must be irrevocable, as indicated by section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 6(2) of the Gift-tax Act. The court concluded that a trust with an unlimited power of revocation does not amount to a gift under the Gift-tax Act.
Issue 2: If affirmative, whether the value of the gift can be taken to be zero in the absence of a specified period for which the transfer was not revocable under section 6(2) of the Gift-tax Act.
Since the court decided that the trust in question does not constitute a gift liable to gift-tax, this issue did not arise. However, the court noted that even if the trust were considered a gift, section 6(2) would not apply because it deals only with gifts that are not revocable for a specified period. Therefore, the value of the property in such a trust cannot be taken to be zero under section 6(2).
Conclusion:
The court answered the first question in the negative, stating that the deed of revocable settlement does not constitute a gift liable to gift-tax. Consequently, the second question did not arise. If necessary, the court would have stated that section 6(2) has no application to the trust in question, and the value of the property cannot be taken to be zero under that section. The Commissioner was ordered to pay the assessee's costs of the reference.
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1973 (12) TMI 6
This appeal is directed against an order of the District Judge by which the petition of the appellant under section 153A(1)(f) of the Companies Act, 1913, seeking an order providing for payment of certain tax outstandings of respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1 and/or respondent No. 3 was dismissed on the grounds that the petition was not only not maintainable but was also barred by time and the question that this appeal raises are as to the true construction of the provisions of section 153A(1)(f) of the Act of 1913 and its corresponding provision in the Act of 1956 as also of the provisions of article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Whether application for discharge of tax liability of transferor-company under a scheme of amalgamation by transferee company and/or liquidator of transferor-company would be maintainable
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1973 (12) TMI 5
Is Chapter XXA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as inserted therein by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, wholly or partly a law enacted "for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty" within the meaning of article 31(5)(b)(i) and/or is it a "law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" within the meaning of the first part of article 31C of the Constitution - Whether provisions for acquisition of property in cases of certain transfers to counteract evasion of tax are valid - Whether they interfere article 14, 19 and 31 of Constitution of India
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1973 (12) TMI 4
Scope and effect of the provisions in sections 54 and 59B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and sections 137 and 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - position of law relating to privilege after April 1, 1964 - "What is the effect of the production of certified copies relating to income-tax assessment records, and how far certified copies can be admitted in evidence?" - whether the confidential nature of the aforesaid documents, records, etc., and the prohibition against their being required by a court to be produced or evidence thereof to be given as well as the liability of a public servant to be punished for disclosure of the particulars contained in the documents, records, etc, continued to subsist even after April 1, 1962, with effect from which date the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had been repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force
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1973 (12) TMI 3
This is a petition under article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash and set aside an order of rectification of a wealth-tax assessment passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax on the 22nd of February, 1972, pursuant to the amendment effected in section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971 (Act No. 32 of 1971) as well as for a writ in the nature of prohibition and/or mandamus restraining the respondents from taking any further steps or proceedings for recovery of the tax on jewellery and ornaments in enforcement of the said rectification order dated 22nd February, 1972
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1973 (12) TMI 2
Section 132 of Income-tax Act, 1961 & Rule 112 of 1962 IT Rules do not violate the fundamental rights under article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution - no substance in the contention that the income-tax authorities could not have possibly entertained the required belief. The search and seizure, therefore, impugned in this writ petition cannot be regarded as illegal
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1973 (12) TMI 1
Hindu deity can hold property and be in receipt of income and can also sue and be sued in a court of law there is no reason why its income should be held to be outside the ambit of taxation if it can be brought within it without straining the language of the statutory provision - Hindu deity is an "individual" within the meaning of section 3 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1973 (11) TMI 105
Issues Involved:
1. Respondent's right to continue in service after statutory cessation.
2. Validity of reliance on the enquiry report in the termination order.
3. Breach of statutory conditions for termination by the University Council.
4. Implied engagement and its validity under statutory provisions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Respondent's Right to Continue in Service After Statutory Cessation:
The University of Kashmir issued a resolution terminating the services of a Professor, which was challenged and deemed void by the High Court. The University appealed, arguing that the respondent's employment ceased statutorily under Section 52(4) of the Jammu and Kashmir University Ordinance, 1969. The Ordinance mandated that all contracts with the University would terminate 60 days post-commencement unless extended by the Chancellor. The High Court found that the respondent was impliedly reappointed, but the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the statutory cessation was clear and the respondent's continuance was not legally valid.
2. Validity of Reliance on the Enquiry Report in the Termination Order:
The University Council relied on an enquiry report to terminate the respondent, which the High Court found unlawful. The Supreme Court noted that the enquiry commenced under the 1965 Act lapsed with the 1969 Ordinance, making the report invalid. The reliance on this report for termination was a statutory violation, rendering the termination order illegal. The Court declared the termination order void due to its reliance on an invalid enquiry report.
3. Breach of Statutory Conditions for Termination by the University Council:
The High Court held that the termination did not comply with statutory regulations, as the enquiry report could not be the basis for punitive action post-1969 Ordinance. The Supreme Court confirmed that the University Council's decision based on the enquiry report was unlawful. The statutory conditions for termination were breached, as the respondent's employment could only be terminated per statutory regulations, which were not followed.
4. Implied Engagement and Its Validity Under Statutory Provisions:
The High Court inferred a fresh appointment by implied contract due to the respondent's continued service. The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasizing that statutory bodies must operate within their defined powers. The University Council alone had the authority to appoint professors, and no such appointment was made for the respondent. The Vice-Chancellor's actions, including extending probation, were beyond his statutory powers and could not legitimize the respondent's continued employment. The doctrine of implied engagement was deemed inapplicable in this statutory context.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent had no legal right to continue in service after the statutory cessation period. The termination order was invalid due to reliance on an unlawful enquiry report, but the respondent's implied engagement was not legally sustainable. The High Court's order of reinstatement was quashed, and both parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 104
Issues Involved:
1. Disconnection of a partner's personal telephone line due to arrears of the partnership firm's telephone charges.
2. Exhaustion of the power to disconnect a telephone line after it has been exercised once.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Disconnection of a Partner's Personal Telephone Line Due to Arrears of the Partnership Firm's Telephone Charges:
The petitioner, a businessman and partner in Shakti Oil Mills, faced disconnection of his personal telephone line (No. 184) due to the firm's arrears on its telephone line (No. 491). The petitioner contended that his personal line should not be disconnected for the firm's arrears.
The court examined the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. Rule 443 allows disconnection of any telephone rented by a subscriber if there is a default in payment. The court clarified that a partnership firm is not a legal entity distinct from its partners, as established by the Supreme Court in Her Highness Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. H. Ramnarain Private Ltd. Thus, the firm's liability is the joint and several liability of all its partners under Section 25 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
The court concluded that the petitioner, being a partner, was jointly and severally liable for the firm's arrears. Therefore, the disconnection of his personal telephone line was justified under Rule 443.
2. Exhaustion of the Power to Disconnect a Telephone Line After It Has Been Exercised Once:
The petitioner argued that once the Telephone Department exercised its power to disconnect a telephone line, it could not do so again. The court found no merit in this argument, stating that the power to disconnect can be exercised as long as the default continues and there are telephone lines available for disconnection.
The court emphasized that a subscriber must pay for all telephone charges, and if in default, all telephone lines rented by the subscriber can be disconnected under Rule 443. The power to disconnect is not exhausted after a single exercise but continues until the default is rectified.
Conclusion:
The court held that the petitioner was liable for the arrears of Shakti Oil Mills and that the Telephone Department acted within its powers under Rule 443 by disconnecting the petitioner's personal telephone line. The petition was dismissed, and the court found no substance in the petitioner's arguments.
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1973 (11) TMI 103
Issues:
Conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code based on eyewitness testimony and approver's evidence.
Analysis:
The case involved the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Penal Code based on the testimony of the sole eyewitness, Ghanshyam, and the approver, Ratnakar Prusti. The High Court upheld the conviction primarily relying on Ghanshyam's testimony, despite discrepancies between his evidence and that of the approver. The Trial Court had acquitted all accused due to disbelief in Ghanshyam and the approver. The High Court's decision was based on the assessment that Ghanshyam's testimony was more reliable, even though the approver's evidence was concurrently discarded. The High Court's reliance on Ghanshyam's testimony was criticized due to serious infirmities in the case, such as the late tendering of pardon to the approver and lack of corroboration for his evidence.
The High Court's evaluation of Ghanshyam's testimony was questioned due to various inconsistencies and omissions in his evidence. Ghanshyam's failure to disclose the names of the accused immediately after the incident, as well as discrepancies in his statements to different individuals, raised doubts about the reliability of his testimony. The High Court's dismissal of these crucial points and its reliance on Ghanshyam's testimony without considering the lack of light at the crime scene, where identification of the assailants would have been challenging, further weakened the prosecution's case.
The Trial Court's reasoning for rejecting the eyewitness testimony was based on the lack of sufficient light at the crime scene, making identification improbable. The discrepancies in Ghanshyam's actions and statements after the incident, along with the absence of immediate disclosure of the accused's names, cast doubt on the credibility of his testimony. These serious infirmities led the Supreme Court to conclude that the evidence of the sole eyewitness was unreliable, resulting in the acquittal of the appellant and his release from imprisonment.
In summary, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Penal Code, emphasizing the inconsistencies and shortcomings in the eyewitness testimony and the approver's evidence. The Court found the prosecution's case lacking in credibility and reliability, leading to the appellant's acquittal and immediate release.
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1973 (11) TMI 102
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the application of the U.P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952.
2. Legitimacy of the requisition of the premises under the Defence of India Rules.
3. Right of the Government to recover arrears of rent or damages under the Act.
4. Whether the premises in question were "Government premises" under the Act.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the application of the U.P. Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1952:
The High Court held that the Act could not be applied to cases where the letting had been done prior to the passing of the Act. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Act's purpose is to provide a summary procedure for the recovery of rent and eviction from government premises. The Act applies to arrears of rent and damages for unauthorized occupation of government premises, regardless of when the letting or unauthorized occupation commenced. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Act's provisions, including Sections 4, 6, and 12, are applicable as long as the premises are "Government premises" and the arrears of rent or damages are within the limitation period.
2. Legitimacy of the requisition of the premises under the Defence of India Rules:
The Supreme Court noted that no valid requisition order under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules was produced. The District Magistrate's purported requisition under Rule 81(2)(bb) was also invalid as the power of requisition under Rule 75A was not delegated to him. Therefore, the premises could not be considered requisitioned property or "Government premises" under Section 2(c) of the Act.
3. Right of the Government to recover arrears of rent or damages under the Act:
The Supreme Court clarified that the Act allows the Government to recover arrears of rent and damages for unauthorized occupation through a summary procedure. Sections 4 and 6 provide for the recovery of arrears of rent, while Section 12 deals with the recovery of damages for unauthorized occupation. The liability to pay arrears of rent or damages must be outstanding and within the limitation period. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court's view that the Act does not apply to cases where the letting occurred before the Act's commencement, as this would defeat the Act's purpose.
4. Whether the premises in question were "Government premises" under the Act:
The Supreme Court found that the premises were not "Government premises" as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act because no valid requisition order was produced. Consequently, the Act did not apply, and the defendants could not recover the claimed amount as arrears of Land Revenue under the Act.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the premises were not "Government premises" under the Act and that the Act did not apply. The defendants were not entitled to recover the amount claimed as arrears of Land Revenue. The decree of the High Court was upheld, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 101
Issues: Conviction based on discovery of stolen items, reliability of evidence, interference with trial court's order of acquittal, credibility of witnesses
In this judgment by the Supreme Court of India, the appellant was convicted under Section 411 of the Penal Code by the High Court based on the discovery of a wrist watch and churis allegedly stolen during a dacoity. The trial court had acquitted all accused, but the High Court convicted the appellant. The Supreme Court analyzed the evidence and found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the trial court's order of acquittal. The discovery of the wrist watch and churis was central to the conviction, but the circumstances of their recovery raised doubts. The wrist watch was produced by someone else, not seized directly from the appellant, and the witnesses did not fully support the seizure. Similarly, the churis were discovered in the appellant's shop, but the witnesses did not adequately corroborate the seizure. The High Court heavily relied on the testimony of the Circle Inspector, but the Supreme Court found discrepancies in his conduct, such as inaccuracies in the seizure memo and mishandling of the seized items. The Court concluded that the evidence provided by the Circle Inspector was not reliable and did not inspire confidence. As a result, the order of conviction and sentence was set aside, and the trial court's decision was restored. Additionally, a Criminal Miscellaneous Petition filed by the State for a re-hearing of the appeal was rejected by the Court.
This judgment raises significant issues regarding the reliability of evidence in criminal cases, the standard of proof required for conviction, and the boundaries of appellate interference with trial court decisions. It highlights the importance of corroborative evidence and the need for meticulous handling of seized items by law enforcement officials. The Court's meticulous analysis underscores the critical role of evidence in criminal proceedings and the high threshold for overturning trial court verdicts. The judgment serves as a reminder of the principles of justice, emphasizing the need for a robust evidentiary foundation to sustain criminal convictions and the judiciary's duty to ensure fair and impartial adjudication.
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1973 (11) TMI 100
Issues:
Interference with order of acquittal by High Court.
Analysis:
The case involved the appellant being acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge of the charge of murdering his wife's brother, Narayan. However, the High Court of Bombay overturned the acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Penal Code, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The main issue in the appeal was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. The Supreme Court highlighted the powers of the appellate court in reviewing evidence in appeals against acquittal, emphasizing that the appellate court should provide substantial and compelling reasons for overturning an acquittal. The Court referred to previous judgments to establish the principles guiding appellate review of acquittal orders, emphasizing the need for the appellate court to consider all evidence and express reasons for disagreeing with the trial court's findings.
The prosecution's case relied on witnesses, including alleged eye-witnesses Ramnath Aurora and Bhanushali Parpia. The Supreme Court scrutinized the testimony of these witnesses to assess the validity of the High Court's decision to convict the appellant. The Court pointed out inconsistencies and discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses, particularly regarding the timing and content of their statements to the police. The Court highlighted the importance of establishing the credibility and reliability of witness testimony in criminal cases, especially in cases where the death penalty is at stake. The Supreme Court analyzed the conflicting statements made by the witnesses and criticized the High Court's reliance on witness testimony that lacked consistency and veracity.
The Supreme Court delved into the specifics of witness testimony, focusing on the statements made by Ramnath Aurora and Bhanushali Parpia regarding the identification of the appellant and the events surrounding the murder. The Court raised doubts about the reliability of the witnesses' accounts, pointing out discrepancies and improbabilities in their testimonies. The Court highlighted the trial court's valid reasons for rejecting the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses and criticized the High Court for not providing sufficient grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. The analysis underscored the importance of thorough scrutiny of witness testimony and the need for clear and convincing evidence to support a conviction in criminal cases.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, ordering his release. The detailed analysis of witness testimony and the lack of substantial reasons provided by the High Court for overturning the acquittal formed the basis for the Supreme Court's decision. The judgment emphasized the critical role of evidence and credibility assessment in criminal trials and reiterated the high standard of proof required for conviction in cases involving serious criminal charges.
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9911796707
