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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 996 Records
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1973 (12) TMI 14 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Whether a declaration made under section 184(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for continuation of partnership signed by the partners, before the expiry of the accounting period is a valid declaration in law - we find that the question which is referred to us should be answered in the negative
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1973 (12) TMI 13 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Profit on sale of shares - Held that the assessee in the instant case held a number of shares as he had shown Rs. 46,980 as income from dividend in the assessment year in question. A legitimate inference can be drawn from the facts that the assessee entered into contracts for forward sale in respect of 15,000 shares with the sole motive of profit and derived profit therefrom, He also showed the amount in question as business speculation profit in his return - held that the assessee derived the said amount as adventure in the nature of trade, and, as such, it was an income from business, within the meaning of section 2(13) of the Act, liable to be taxed
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1973 (12) TMI 12 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 - whether the payment of Rs. 75,000 which the assessee has made to meet the marriage expenditure of his daughter is covered by the exemption clause (j) of section 5 of the Expenditure-tax Act, 1957 - We find that the whole of the disputed expenditure of Rs. 75,000 is exempted under clause (j) of section 5 of the Act. Our answer to the question referred to us is, therefore, in the affirmative
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1973 (12) TMI 11 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Penalty for concealment - assessee received certain deposits and balances had not been returned to persons entitled to them - " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law in cancelling the penalties levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1963-64, 1964-65 and 1965-66 ? " - So also in the present case, the admission was wrong and it was for the department to prove positively on other material that there was concealment of income. Being a quasi-criminal proceeding, the burden is entirely on the department. Apart from the so-called admission, there is no material to hold that the income was concealed - Question answered in the affirmative
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1973 (12) TMI 10 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Whether the Government or the taxation authorities can retain with themselves amount of tax collected by them when the very basis of that collection has been subsequently held by the highest tribunal in the land to be without any legal basis or without any foundation in law - In the instant case we have based our decision on Tilokchand Motichand's case and the other two decisions of the Supreme Court in Gila Devi Aggarwal's case and Champalal Binani's case . Hence, it cannot be said that the question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Though one requirement, namely, of clause (a) is satisfied, the other requirement of clause (b) of article 133(1) as it stands after the 30th Amendment is not satisfied Under these circumstances, we regret that we cannot certify that this is a case which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the oral application made on behalf of the petitioner
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1973 (12) TMI 9 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Assessee was to acquire property absolutely on the death of his ancestor, according to a trust created by the latter - There was also a provision in the will giving share of commission to the assessee absolutely - In addition, the assessee also received income from ancestral property - Whether the income derived from the property received by Gordhandas under the trust settlement, and/or share income of the managing agency received by him under clause 12 of the will is assessable, in the hands of the Hindu undivided family consisting of Gordhandas and his son as coparceners - whether by his subsequent conduct the assessee had treated these properties as Hindu undivided family properties. - mere fact that the assessee had not kept separate accounts in respect of his income from these two types of properties cannot, in my opinion, be enough or equivalent to having thrown them into the common stock or of having blended them - income from the property received under the trust settlement and share of commission received according to the will are assessable as the assessee's individual income
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1973 (12) TMI 8 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Excess depreciation was allowed due to non-disclosure by assessee of initial depreciation - income chargeable to tax escaping assessment - Whether it can be said that there is under-assessment due to default of the assessee - petitioners challenge these notices under section 148 of the Act of 1961 seeking to re-open assessments under section 147.
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1973 (12) TMI 7 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Gift-tax Act, 1958 - This is a reference arising out of proceedings under the Gift-tax Act, 1958, relating to the assessment of the respondent - Whether creation of trust with power to revocation at any time amounts to a gift
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1973 (12) TMI 6 - DELHI HIGH COURT
This appeal is directed against an order of the District Judge by which the petition of the appellant under section 153A(1)(f) of the Companies Act, 1913, seeking an order providing for payment of certain tax outstandings of respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 1 and/or respondent No. 3 was dismissed on the grounds that the petition was not only not maintainable but was also barred by time and the question that this appeal raises are as to the true construction of the provisions of section 153A(1)(f) of the Act of 1913 and its corresponding provision in the Act of 1956 as also of the provisions of article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Whether application for discharge of tax liability of transferor-company under a scheme of amalgamation by transferee company and/or liquidator of transferor-company would be maintainable
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1973 (12) TMI 5 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Is Chapter XXA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as inserted therein by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, wholly or partly a law enacted "for the purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty" within the meaning of article 31(5)(b)(i) and/or is it a "law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (b) or clause (c) of article 39" within the meaning of the first part of article 31C of the Constitution - Whether provisions for acquisition of property in cases of certain transfers to counteract evasion of tax are valid - Whether they interfere article 14, 19 and 31 of Constitution of India
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1973 (12) TMI 4 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Scope and effect of the provisions in sections 54 and 59B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and sections 137 and 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 - position of law relating to privilege after April 1, 1964 - "What is the effect of the production of certified copies relating to income-tax assessment records, and how far certified copies can be admitted in evidence?" - whether the confidential nature of the aforesaid documents, records, etc., and the prohibition against their being required by a court to be produced or evidence thereof to be given as well as the liability of a public servant to be punished for disclosure of the particulars contained in the documents, records, etc, continued to subsist even after April 1, 1962, with effect from which date the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, had been repealed and the Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force
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1973 (12) TMI 3 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
This is a petition under article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash and set aside an order of rectification of a wealth-tax assessment passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax on the 22nd of February, 1972, pursuant to the amendment effected in section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1971 (Act No. 32 of 1971) as well as for a writ in the nature of prohibition and/or mandamus restraining the respondents from taking any further steps or proceedings for recovery of the tax on jewellery and ornaments in enforcement of the said rectification order dated 22nd February, 1972
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1973 (12) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Section 132 of Income-tax Act, 1961 & Rule 112 of 1962 IT Rules do not violate the fundamental rights under article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution - no substance in the contention that the income-tax authorities could not have possibly entertained the required belief. The search and seizure, therefore, impugned in this writ petition cannot be regarded as illegal
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1973 (12) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Hindu deity can hold property and be in receipt of income and can also sue and be sued in a court of law there is no reason why its income should be held to be outside the ambit of taxation if it can be brought within it without straining the language of the statutory provision - Hindu deity is an "individual" within the meaning of section 3 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922
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1973 (11) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ation of his services, as per annexure A, is invalid. It is no use the University contending that its order is innocuous. It is clear that its annexure A carries a stigma with it since it expresses the unanimous conclusion that the...charges have been established against him and the termination itself is founded on the guilt so made out. We, therefore declare that Annexure A is void but further hold that the respondent has no right to continue in service and the direction to him that he should leave his post as Professor and Head of the Post-Graduate History Department is good. The High Court's order of re-instatement is quashed. 14. There is much in the circumstances of the case to show that both sides have been indifferent to the provisions of the law which changed from time to time and both sides have acted under misapprehensions, which warrant our direction that parties will bear their own costs throughout. The appeal is allowed subject to the above order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 104 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the default continues and as long as there are telephone lines, installed for the benefit of the defaulting subscriber, available for disconnection. In view of the aforesaid reasons I am of the opinion that the petitioner was liable to pay arrears of telephone charges in respect of telephone number 491, installed in the name of his partnership firm Shakti Oil Mills. Since he did not comply with the demand of the Telegraph Department to pay up those arrears and committed default in discharging his liability, it was open to the Telegraph Department under Rule 443 to disconnect his personal telephone line-being telephone No. 184. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the action of the Telephone Department, impugned by the petitioner in this petition, cannot be called in question. The Telephone Department had full powers under Rule 443 to do what they have done. 16. In the result, I find no substance in this petition. The petition fails and is dismissed with, of order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 103 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and heard and not to draw inferences from what they see. The privilege of drawing inferences is given to courts not to witnesses. 11. One of the reasons given by the Sessions Court for rejecting the evidence of the eye-witness was that there was hardly any light at the place where Siba was murdered and therefore Ghanshyam could not have identified the assailants. Both the deceased and Ghanshyam were on their bicycles, the deceased being about 10 cubits ahead of Ghanshyam. The bicycle of the deceased had no light but that of Ghanshyam had a dynamo-light. Apart from that feeble light, the scene of offence was engulfed in rank darkness. The High Court does not seem to have noticed this circumstance while evaluating the testimony of Ghanshyam. 12. These are serious infirmities which make it impossible to accept the testimony of the sole eye-witness. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order of conviction and sentence set aside. The appellant shall be released forthwith.
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1973 (11) TMI 102 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... had not been taken before the courts below. This is not correct. The point was raised in the High Court. But the High Court did not decide the point. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the respondent can; support the decree on grounds raised by him and decided against him by the courts below on the analogy of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22, civil Procedure Code. The respondent, therefore, is entitled to recanvass the point here to support the decree of the High Court on ground rejected by it or even not considered by it. The only limitation in that behalf is that the respondent by relying upon such a ground cannot be allowed to mutilate or destroy the decree. Short of that, within the ambit of the law, he can support the decree on any ground available to him. The objection of the learned Counsel for the appellants is, therefore, of no avail. 12. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
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1973 (11) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... who are familiar with local conditions are agreed that in Bengal a distinction is made between churis and bangles. The explanation of the Circle Inspector that he committed a mistake in describing the articles may or may not be true but the fact that he made a significant error in a material part of the description of the articles seized by him shows that no implicit reliance can be placed on his word. It also seems to us important that the churis, after seizure, were wrapped in a loose sheet of paper and were not kept under Section 1. 7. Thus, the only evidence in support of the seizure of the wrist watch and the churis is that of the Circle inspector. For reasons aforesaid, that evidence fails to inspire confidence. We must therefore set aside the order of conviction and sentence and restore the order passed by the trial court. 8. Crl. M.P. No. 1419 of 1973 was filed on behalf of the State for a re-hearing of this appeal, but we found no substance in it and have rejected.
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1973 (11) TMI 100 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... llant being taken to that room from the lockup. The High Court differed from the trial court by saying that even if the parade-room was visible from the place where the witnesses were sitting, it does not necessarily follow that they could see what was going on inside the room. The point of the matter was that the appellant could be seen while on his way from the lock-up to the parade-room. 13. Thus the trial court had good reasons for discarding the evidence of the alleged eye-witnesses. The reasons given by the High Court for taking a contrary view of that evidence are certainly not of the nature and character as would justify interference with the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We will only add that for the various reasons discussed above the evidence of Ramnath and Bhanushali fails to impress us. 14. We therefore allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court and acquit the appellant. He shall be set at liberty.
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