|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 421 to 440 of 6071 Records
-
2002 (12) TMI 55
Transfer of Cases - opportunity of hearing - Before transferring the case of an assessee, a notice, containing reasons for the proposed transfer should be given to the assessee concerned ; an opportunity of hearing should be granted and there after a speaking order considering the objections raised is to be passed. Besides, such an order has to be communicated to the assessee concerned disclosing the reasons for the transfer. - Commissioner should grant a proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before taking a fresh decision whether her income-tax cases are required to be transferred
-
2002 (12) TMI 54
Recovery of tax – demand of interest - Whether the period of thirty-five days has to be counted from the date of actual calculation and service of demand notices on the petitioner and not from the date of the order of the Settlement Commission? - In view of the nature of the order passed by the Settlement Commission, we are of the view that the period of thirty-five days has to be counted from the date of actual calculation and service of demand notices on the petitioner and not from the date of the order of the Settlement Commission, which can not be given effect to in the absence of the actual calculation having been made in the order. Accordingly, the demand of interest for the period May 1999, to October 1999, in our view, is not permissible in the facts of this case. However, the assessee-petitioner is liable to pay interest for delayed payment of tax after expiry of the statutory period from the service of demand notices on him. - In the result, the writ application is allowed
-
2002 (12) TMI 53
By this writ petition the petitioner, seeks to impugn an orderpassed by the Income-tax Officer, declining to waive/reduce the interest charged under section 215 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 as also passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, affirming the order passed by the Income-tax Officer. – The mere fact that the delay in completion of the assessment was occasioned because of the search conducted by the Revenue at the premises of the assessee would not per se show that the assessee was responsible for the delay. How and in what manner the assessee was responsible for delaying the proceedings must be indicated in the order refusing to reduce or waive the interest charged. It is also evident from the afore-extracted portion of the order of the Commissioner that he has also laid emphasis on an irrelevant fact that there was no delay in completion of the assessment, which could be attributed to the Department. - Held that application of the assessee for waiver of interest on account of delay in completing assessment in accordance with law and liable to succeed
-
2002 (12) TMI 52
Offences and Prosecution - The case of the petitioner is that the opposite party misrepresented the facts that the assessment order in respect of the firm in appeal has been set aside but the fact is that the assessment order of the firm of opposite party for the block period comprising of the assessment years 1987-88 to 1997-98 which formed the basis of the complaint petition is still valid and has not been cancelled or modified by any income-tax authority or by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal or any court of law - A prayer has been made for cancellation of bail granted to the opposite party by this court on April 30, 2001. - The petitioner admitted that the assessment order in respect of the opposite party in his individual capacity for the assessment year 1996-97 has been set aside but according to the petitioner it is independent assessment from the assessment of the firm and therefore cancellation of this assessment order is no way connected with the present complaint petition.
-
2002 (12) TMI 51
This is a petition for quashing an order dated March 15, 1982 (annexure P6), passed by the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Jullundar (respondent No. 1), declining the petitioner's prayer for waiver of penalty in terms of section 18B of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 - It is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had filed returns after issuance of notice under section 14(2) of the Act or that the same had not been filed voluntarily and in good faith or that he had not co-operated in the assessment proceedings or that he had not paid or made satisfactory arrangement for payment of tax and/or interest in pursuance of the assessment order. Therefore, it must be held that there was no legal justification to reject the application of the petitioner. - the writ petition is allowed.
-
2002 (12) TMI 50
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances, the Tribunal is right in holding that the appellant is not eligible for relief under section 80HHC in respect of the income of Rs. 14,35,756 claimed by the appellant as eligible for deduction under section 80HHC? - 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that in an assessment under Chapter XIV-B, relief under section 80HHC cannot be allowed?" - Tribunal had no opportunity to decide the said question. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Appellate Tribunal to decide the question whether the assessee is eligible to claim deduction under section 80HHC of the Act on the merits of the case.
-
2002 (12) TMI 49
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Central Government's refusal to grant a declaration under section 72A(1) of the Income-tax Act.
2. Adherence to the scheme of amalgamation by the amalgamated company.
3. Compliance with the guidelines issued by the Central Government, particularly Condition No. 7.
4. Public interest and revival of the sick unit.
5. Validity of Condition No. 7 under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the Central Government's Refusal:
The Central Government declined to grant a declaration under section 72A(1) of the Income-tax Act, stating that the amalgamation did not satisfy the conditions enumerated in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 72A. The reasons included the closure of the sick unit within the revival period and the initiation of a new business by a subsidiary rather than the amalgamated company itself.
2. Adherence to the Scheme of Amalgamation:
The amalgamated company continued the business of manufacturing steel tubes until January 24, 1983, which was about four years after the amalgamation took effect. However, the Central Government noted that the closure of the sick unit within the revival period indicated non-adherence to the scheme of amalgamation for a reasonably long time. The court upheld this reasoning, stating that the primary purpose of section 72A was to ensure the revival and continuation of the business of the amalgamating company.
3. Compliance with Guidelines, Particularly Condition No. 7:
Condition No. 7 specified that rehabilitation should be without modification of business and as per the existing product line and industrial license held by the amalgamating company. Diversification to unconnected fields could only be considered in special cases where the amalgamating company already had a license for the new items. The court found that the amalgamated company did not fulfill this condition as the new business was started by a subsidiary, not the amalgamated company itself, and the amalgamating company did not have a license for the new industry.
4. Public Interest and Revival of the Sick Unit:
The Central Government concluded that the revival of the sick unit was not achieved, and the amalgamation was not in public interest. The court agreed, noting that most of the employees of the amalgamating company were retrenched and the machinery of the amalgamating company was not utilized in the new project. The court emphasized that the object of section 72A was to ensure the revival of the business of the amalgamating company and the welfare of its workers, which was not met in this case.
5. Validity of Condition No. 7 Under Article 14:
The petitioner challenged Condition No. 7 as being arbitrary and unreasonable, having no nexus to the object sought to be achieved by section 72A. The court rejected this argument, stating that Condition No. 7 was in furtherance of the object of section 72A, which was to ensure the revival of the business of the amalgamating company. The court held that the condition was valid and not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the Central Government's decision to refuse the declaration under section 72A(1) of the Income-tax Act. The court found that the amalgamated company did not adhere to the scheme of amalgamation for a reasonably long time, did not comply with Condition No. 7, and did not achieve the revival of the sick unit in public interest. The court also upheld the validity of Condition No. 7 under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
-
2002 (12) TMI 48
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the value of the work-in-progress has to be treated as part of the capital employed for the purpose of relief under section 80J of Income-tax Act, 1961?" - "2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the deduction under section 80-O of the Act should be calculated on the gross fees received by the assessee-company?" - The reference is accordingly disposed of, by answering both the questions in the affirmative that is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue
-
2002 (12) TMI 47
Finding of fact - Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in treating the share application money as explained even though the major share investing companies were non-existing? - Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the assessee had discharged its onus of proving the identity and creditworthiness of both the creditors as well as the genuineness of the transactions? - Admittedly, the aforenoted finding of the Tribunal is factual. Therefore, the only question for consideration is whether the said finding could be said to be without any evidence or material or is it contrary to the evidence on record or there is no direct nexus between the conclusion of fact and the primary fact upon which that conclusion is based. It is only under any one of these circumstances, a finding of fact may be interfered with. Otherwise, a bare question of fact cannot be turned into a question of law by asking whether as a matter of law the authority came to a correct conclusion upon a matter of fact.
-
2002 (12) TMI 46
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to relief Under section 80HHC relying upon the Board's Circular No. 729, dated November 1, 1995, which was not applicable for the assessment year under consideration, i.e., 1987-88? - 2. Whether having regard to the fact that depreciation on fork lifts has been granted at a higher rate applicable to road transport vehicles, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that fork lifts are also entitled to investment allowance?" - the first question of law referred to us is answered in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. - the second question of law referred to us is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue
-
2002 (12) TMI 45
The assessee is a registered firm carrying on business as a dealer of Hindustan Motors Limited. - "Whether, Tribunal is correct in law in holding that the amount of excise duty collected by the assessee formed part of the excise duty deposit and it cannot be included in the assessee's total income?" - Though counsel for the assessee submitted that to insulate against the possible liability, in the event the purchaser of the car had failed to produce the necessary certificate within the prescribed period and also failed to pay the balance amount, the deposit was collected, we are of the view that the amount was collected as part of the sale price of the vehicle. The fact that it was collected at the time of sale with an undertaking to return the amount subject to fulfilment of certain conditions would not change the nature of the receipt. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the differential excise duty collected by the assessee cannot be included as part of the assessee's income. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
-
2002 (12) TMI 44
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is right in law in allowing depreciation on the capitalised amount payable in instalments, in respect of capitalised assets under the deferred payment scheme?" - we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
2002 (12) TMI 43
"Whether, Tribunal was right in law in holding that no tax was to be deducted at source on payment made by the assessee to AVL-Gesselschaft Fur Verbrennungskraftmachlan M.B.H. Austria for the feasibility study of improving the performance of the existing diesel engine 265 DI as the payment represented fees for technical services and not royalty?" - In the circumstances, without going into the merits of the impugned order which is under section 195, since payment has already been made to the Austrian company, both the above appeals are dismissed as infructuous.
-
2002 (12) TMI 42
1. Whether, Tribunal was right in holding that the lands held by the assessee had not been converted into stock in trade? - 2. Whether Tribunal was right in rejecting the alternate claim of the assessee regarding the computation of capital gains on transfer of lands?" - When the final fact-finding authority has recorded a finding that there is no material to prove that the sale consideration has been paid for discharge of the mortgage amount, we have no material to go against that finding – Both questions are answered in the affirmative
-
2002 (12) TMI 41
"Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in view of the admitted position that the assessee has been following the mercantile system of accounting in respect of its business activities, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the export duty drawback and cash assistance from the Government is assessable in the hands of the assessee on receipt basis and not on accrual basis and consequently holding that the addition of Rs. 2,26,227 and Rs. 5,34,255 made by the Income-tax Officer are not warranted?" - we answer the above question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
-
2002 (12) TMI 40
1. Whether, Tribunal was legally correct in upholding the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) directing the Income-tax Officer to assess the income? - 2. Whether, it was not the case of mere change in the constitution of the firm within the meaning of section 187(2) of the Income-tax Act?" - if one or more partners cease to be partners, or one or more new partners are admitted, then it would be a case of reconstitution and not dissolution of the firm, provided that at least one of the partners prior to the change in the firm is a partner after the change. In the present case two members, namely, Smt. Shakuntala and Smt. Urmila, are common, three members have gone and five new members have come in. It is thus covered by section 187(2)(a) of the Act and hence it is a case of reconstitution and not dissolution of the firm. Hence, only one assessment is to be made. In view of this we answer both the questions in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee.
-
2002 (12) TMI 39
Amounts received by the assessee as subsidy – capital or revenue receipt - Government of Tamil Nadu has framed a special component plan for employment of persons from Adi Dravida community and to provide employment to persons coming from Adi Dravida community, the Government has granted the subsidy with the object and intention to benefit the persons coming from Adi Dravida community by providing them employment. - The amount received by the assessee has nothing to do with the trade or business of the assessee. It is not a reimbursement of salary; it is not made for the normal working of the mill ; it is not made for the benefit of the assessee, but paid with a social objective in mind to achieve a social purpose – Thus, amount received by way of subsidy under the scheme was capital in nature
-
2002 (12) TMI 38
"1. Whether, Tribunal was right in holding that the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 263, is valid? - 2. Whether, Tribunal was right in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax could validly invoke the provision of section 263 of the Act, even though the same does not accord to the instructions given by the CBDT in similar situations ?" Tribunal was correct in holding that the Commissioner has exercised his jurisdiction on proper and valid grounds and he has exercised his jurisdiction properly when he found that the Assessing Officer had granted deduction under sections 80HH and 80HHC without verifying the same. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal and accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue
-
2002 (12) TMI 37
"1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in cancelling the order passed under section 263 of the Income-tax Act? - 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to revenue deduction amounting to Rs. 14,27,799 on account of revaluation of securities, when such securities are to be classified in 'investment account' in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Vijaya Bank Ltd. v. Addl. CIT ?" - Hence, without answering the question of law referred to us, we remit the matter back to the Tribunal and the Tribunal is directed to consider the questions afresh in accordance with law
-
2002 (12) TMI 36
"1. Whether, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that there was certain amount of ambiguity over the expression '15 days from the close of the month' as defined in section 38 of the Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, vis-à-vis month in which salary becomes due to the employees and the salary is paid to the employee? - 2. Whether the Tribunal was right in law in reckoning the date of payment of salary (viz.) seventh of the succeeding month as the date from which the due date of payment to the Government of ESI and EPF dues and the delay thereon is to be considered? - 3. Whether, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that section 36(1)(va) yields to section 43B when the second proviso to section 43B is to be reckoned as defined in Explanation to clause (va) of sub-section (1) of section 36 ?" - The first two questions of law referred to us are answered in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. - Third question also has to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee
............
|
9911796707
