Home Case Index All Cases Income Tax Section Wise 1990 1990 (1) This

Law	-- All -- GST Income Tax Benami Property Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA Law of Competition PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Wealth tax Indian Laws
Court	-- Any -- Supreme Court SC Orders / Highlights High Court Appellate Tribunal Tribunal Appellate authority for Advance Ruling Advance Ruling Authority National Financial Reporting Authority Competition Commission of India ANTI-PROFITEERING AUTHORITY Commission Central Government Board DISTRICT/ SESSIONS Court Commissioner / Appellate Authority Other
Citation	--Year-- 2025 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 1958 1957 1956 1955 1954 1953 1952 1951 1950 Upto 1949 - -Volume- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 -
Landmark	Nil - N/A Referred in >= 2 Cases Referred in >= 4 Cases Referred in >= 5 Cases Referred in >= 10 Cases Referred in >= 15 Cases Referred in >= 25 Cases Referred in >= 50 Cases Referred in >= 100 Cases
Order by	TMI Citation Date of Decision

Advanced Search Options

Case Laws

Showing 101 to 120 of 274 Records

• 1990 (1) TMI 206
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Liability to pay interest after payment of duty and issuance of out of charge order.
  2. Period of warehousing permissible under Section 61 of the Customs Act.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Liability to Pay Interest After Payment of Duty and Issuance of Out of Charge Order:
  The appellants argued that they should not be liable to pay interest once the duty on the goods has been paid and an out of charge order has been passed by the Customs authorities. They contended that the interest should be calculated only up to the date of payment of duty, not up to the date of physical removal of the goods from the warehouse. They referred to Section 61 of the Customs Act, which states that interest is payable on the amount of duty on warehoused goods from the expiry of the warehousing period till the date of clearance of the goods from the warehouse.
  
  The Department, on the other hand, maintained that interest is payable until the goods are physically removed from the warehouse. According to them, the interest liability continues to subsist until the actual removal of the goods, as per Section 61(2) read with Section 15 of the Customs Act, which states that the relevant date for payment of duty is the date on which the goods are actually removed from the warehouse.
  
  The Tribunal observed that the term "clearance of the goods from the warehouse" should be read in the context of Section 61(2). It noted that the interest is charged for the period the duty amount is held over by the person who has warehoused the goods. Once the duty is paid, there is no outstanding duty, and thus no interest accrual after the date of payment of duty. The Tribunal concluded that once the duty and other charges are paid, and an out of charge order is passed, the goods should be considered as cleared for home consumption. Any additional interest liability due to subsequent removal of goods would only apply to any further duty that becomes payable.
  
  2. Period of Warehousing Permissible Under Section 61 of the Customs Act:
  The appellants argued that the warehousing period available to them should be one year instead of three months, as provided under Section 61 of the Customs Act. They claimed that their goods should be considered as "non-consumable stores," which are allowed a one-year warehousing period.
  
  The Tribunal examined the definition of "stores" under Section 2(38) of the Customs Act, which refers to goods for use in a vessel or aircraft, including fuel, spare parts, and other articles of equipment. The Tribunal found no merit in the appellants' argument, as the zinc concentrates imported for manufacturing zinc did not fall within this definition. The Tribunal also noted that the goods were allowed to be warehoused for three months initially, and the appellants had not challenged this period. Therefore, the Tribunal found no merit in the appellants' plea for a one-year warehousing period.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal held that the appellants were required to pay interest only up to the date of the out of charge order for clearance of the goods for home consumption. Any additional interest liability would apply only to any further duty payable due to subsequent removal of the goods. The Tribunal also rejected the appellants' plea for a one-year warehousing period, affirming that the permissible period was three months. The appeal was allowed in the above terms.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 205
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the imposition of penalty was invalid.
  2. Whether the Tribunal relied on inadmissible or irrelevant evidence.
  3. Whether the onus of proof was wrongly placed on the applicants.
  4. Whether the Tribunal erred in relying on examination-in-chief evidence over cross-examination.
  5. Whether the Tribunal violated principles of criminal jurisprudence.
  6. Whether the Tribunal ignored vital evidence, including expert opinion.
  7. Whether the Tribunal misinterpreted electric bills and the SASMIRA certificate.
  8. Whether the Tribunal ignored evidence supporting the applicants.
  9. Whether the Tribunal's conclusion was unreasonable.
  10. Whether simultaneous disposal of another appeal prejudiced the Tribunal.
  11. Whether the Tribunal misinterpreted the letter regarding 'R' forms.
  12. Whether reliance on the 'Crystal Picture' notebook was erroneous.
  13. Whether the conclusion about excess production from the 'Crystal Picture' notebook was justified.
  14. Whether there was evidence to correlate production with stock as per RG-1.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Imposition of Penalty:
  The Tribunal confirmed the imposition of penalties on the applicants for clandestine removal of processed fabrics without payment of excise duty. The applicants contended that the penalties were invalid, but the Tribunal found no grounds to support this claim.
  
  2. Reliance on Evidence:
  The applicants argued that the Tribunal relied on inadmissible or irrelevant evidence. The Tribunal, however, found that it had considered all material evidence and had reasonably drawn its conclusions. The Tribunal's decision was based on a comprehensive assessment of the evidence, including witness statements and documents.
  
  3. Onus of Proof:
  The applicants contended that the burden of proof was wrongly placed on them. The Tribunal clarified that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the applicants were required to establish their specific defenses to dislodge the department's case. The Tribunal found no error in its approach to the burden of proof.
  
  4. Examination-in-Chief vs. Cross-Examination:
  The applicants argued that the Tribunal erred in relying on examination-in-chief evidence over cross-examination. The Tribunal noted that it had considered the totality of the witness statements, including cross-examination, and had made a reasoned judgment based on the overall evidence.
  
  5. Principles of Criminal Jurisprudence:
  The applicants claimed that the Tribunal violated principles of criminal jurisprudence by shifting the burden of proof to them. The Tribunal emphasized that the proceedings were quasi-judicial, and even if considered quasi-criminal, the applicants were required to establish their specific defenses.
  
  6. Ignoring Vital Evidence:
  The applicants argued that the Tribunal ignored vital evidence, including expert opinion from SASMIRA. The Tribunal found that the SASMIRA certificate was obtained two years after the relevant period and did not conclusively cover all machinery conditions at the time. The Tribunal's rejection of this evidence was based on reasonable grounds.
  
  7. Misinterpretation of Electric Bills and SASMIRA Certificate:
  The Tribunal discussed the evidence related to electric bills and the SASMIRA certificate, noting that the certificate did not conclusively establish the maximum production capacity. The Tribunal's interpretation was based on the evidence's context and limitations.
  
  8. Ignoring Supporting Evidence:
  The applicants contended that the Tribunal ignored evidence supporting their case. The Tribunal found that it had considered the evidence but had reasonably concluded that the defense theory was not credible.
  
  9. Unreasonable Conclusion:
  The applicants argued that the Tribunal's conclusion was unreasonable. The Tribunal found that its decision was based on a rational assessment of the evidence and circumstances, and no point of law arose from this contention.
  
  10. Prejudice from Simultaneous Disposal:
  The applicants claimed that the simultaneous disposal of another appeal prejudiced the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the applicants' advocate had not objected to the joint hearing and had argued both appeals together. The Tribunal found no evidence of prejudice.
  
  11. Misinterpretation of 'R' Forms:
  The applicants argued that the Tribunal misinterpreted the letter regarding 'R' forms. The Tribunal found that it had used the letter as corroborative evidence and had not misinterpreted its content.
  
  12. Reliance on 'Crystal Picture' Notebook:
  The applicants contended that the Tribunal erred in relying on the 'Crystal Picture' notebook. The Tribunal found that the notebook provided evidence of higher production and was corroborated by other evidence. The Tribunal's reliance on the notebook was reasonable.
  
  13. Conclusion About Excess Production:
  The applicants argued that the conclusion about excess production from the 'Crystal Picture' notebook was unjustified. The Tribunal found that the notebook, along with other evidence, supported the conclusion of excess production.
  
  14. Correlation with RG-1:
  The applicants claimed that there was no evidence to correlate production with stock as per RG-1. The Tribunal found that the evidence, including the 'Crystal Picture' notebook, supported the conclusion of excess production and removal without payment of duty.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal found no justifiable grounds to refer the matter to the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The application was rejected as it sought to reassess factual positions rather than raising points of law. The Tribunal's decision was based on a comprehensive and reasonable assessment of the evidence and circumstances.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 204
  
  Issues:
  1. Shortage of Aluminium sheets in the factory compared to recorded balance.
  2. Allegations of manufacturing name plates without payment of duty.
  3. Discrepancies in stock records and MODVAT credit claimed.
  4. Confiscation and penalty imposed on the appellants.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The case involved an appeal against the order of the Collector of Central Excise regarding a shortage of Aluminium sheets in the factory. The officers found a significant shortfall in physical stock compared to the recorded balance. The appellants, manufacturers of name plates, claimed MODVAT credit for the sheets. The authorities also seized name plates not accounted for in any record. The Managing Director explained the shortage as accumulated defective semi-finished plates over the years. The lower authority upheld the charge of manufacturing name plates without payment of duty and imposed a duty and penalty.
  
  2. The appellants argued that they were manufacturing name plates using Aluminium sheets for which they claimed MODVAT credit. They contended that the shortage was explained by the Managing Director and that an in-house investigation revealed a lesser shortfall. They disputed the ownership of name plates seized from another entity within the factory premises. They emphasized that the burden was on the Department to prove manufacturing from the missing sheets and highlighted the need for proper record-keeping.
  
  3. The Department focused on the appellants' failure to account for inputs on which MODVAT credit was claimed. They argued that the appellants did not provide sufficient evidence to support their claims regarding stock transcription from bank statements. The Department emphasized the discrepancies in the records and the lack of proper documentation.
  
  4. The Appellate Tribunal observed that while the shortage of sheets was established, the explanation provided by the appellants was not substantiated with evidence. The Tribunal acknowledged the possibility of wastage in the manufacturing process and directed the Collector to determine the percentage of wastage. They also recommended an investigation into the ownership of the seized name plates. The lower authority's order was set aside, and the case was remanded for a fresh decision based on the Tribunal's observations.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 203
  
  The appeal was filed against the rejection of a refund claim as time-barred. The refund claim was filed beyond the six-month period specified under Sec. 11B of the Central Excises & Salt Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, stating that a short endorsement on the RT-12 return without a proper refund claim or protest does not save the limitation under Sec. 11B.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 202
  
  Issues:
  - Appeal against the order of the Collector (Appeals) regarding the import of goods.
  - Dispute over the applicability of Sec. 27 of the Customs Act for claiming refund of duty.
  - Consideration of Sec. 74 of the Customs Act in case of re-exported goods.
  - Decision on whether duty paid on goods not delivered can be refunded under Sec. 27.
  
  Analysis:
  The appeal was filed against the order of the Collector (Appeals) concerning the import of goods, specifically an electric typewriter that was missing from a consignment and replaced with print wheels. The appellants sought a refund of duty under Sec. 27 of the Customs Act, which was rejected by the authorities, arguing that the benefit under Sec. 74 should have been claimed since the goods were re-exported. The department did not dispute the facts but contended that the benefit under Sec. 74 should have been availed of instead of claiming a refund. However, the Tribunal noted that the goods were not taken delivery of, remained in Customs custody, and were re-exported without being cleared by the importers, leading to the conclusion that the duty was paid on goods not delivered to them.
  
  The Tribunal analyzed Sec. 27 of the Customs Act, which allows for a refund of duty paid by an importer in cases where the goods were not delivered to them. Since the duty was paid on the package that was not taken possession of by the importers, the Tribunal held that the claim for a refund under Sec. 27 was valid. The Tribunal emphasized that the duty was paid on goods that were not delivered, making it unnecessary to consider Sec. 74 for claiming drawback on re-exported goods. Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, remanding the matter to the Assistant Collector for the consideration of the refund claim and the granting of consequential relief. The decision clarified that in cases where duty is paid on goods but not delivered, Sec. 27 of the Customs Act can be invoked for a refund, as demonstrated in this particular case involving the import of goods with a missing item.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 201
  
  Issues: Eligibility of MODVAT credit for anti-rust and anti-corrosion oil applied on finished tools.
  
  The appeal was made against the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras, regarding the eligibility of taking MODVAT credit for anti-rust and anti-corrosion oil applied on finished tools. The lower appellate authority held that the oil, being applied after the tools are manufactured for preservation, cannot be considered an input used in or in relation to manufacture. The consultant argued that the application of oil is essential for preventing rust and corrosion, is done before the goods enter the market stream, and is accounted for in the statutory Central Excise record only after application. The Department, through the JDR, supported the lower authority's reasoning.
  
  The main issue for consideration was whether the application of oil after the tool's manufacture can be deemed to be in relation to the manufacture of the tool. Referring to a Supreme Court case, it was noted that processes necessary to make a product marketable are considered part of the manufacture, and any material required for this purpose is a component part of the end product. In this case, it was acknowledged that the use of oil is essential for preserving the tools, which are sold only after oil application and accounted for thereafter. Following the Supreme Court's rulings, it was concluded that the application of oil is incidental and ancillary to the manufacture of the tools, making its use in relation to the manufacture. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal of the appellants was allowed.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 200
  
  Issues:
  1. Transfer of credit from R.G. 23 to R.G. 23A account.
  2. Interpretation of Rule 57H(3) of the Central Excise Rules.
  3. Eligibility of credit under Rule 56A before the introduction of MODVAT Scheme.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Madras involved the issue of transferring a credit allowed in refund proceedings from R.G. 23 register to R.G. 23A account for utilization. The Collector of Customs & Central Excise (Appeals) initially denied the transfer request, citing the procedure set out under Rule 56A. However, on appeal, the Collector (Appeals) allowed the transfer, emphasizing that there was a specific provision in Rule 57H(3) of the Central Excise Rules for such transfers. The Tribunal noted that the credit was allowed before the introduction of MODVAT Scheme and held that the credit should be deemed available in R.G. 23 for transfer to R.G. 23A, ultimately dismissing the Revenue's appeal.
  
  2. The interpretation of Rule 57H(3) was crucial in this case. The Collector of Central Excise, Madras argued that only credit available in the R.G. 23 account before the commencement of MODVAT Rules could be transferred to R.G. 23A, with no provision for credit taken after the commencement of the MODVAT procedure. The Tribunal, however, emphasized that the purpose of the Scheme should guide the interpretation of the Rule. It held that the credit allowed under Rule 56A before the MODVAT Scheme came into force should be deemed available for transfer, even if the actual transfer occurred after the Scheme's introduction. This interpretation favored the respondents' position and led to the dismissal of the Revenue's appeal.
  
  3. The eligibility of credit under Rule 56A before the MODVAT Scheme was another key aspect of the case. The respondents had been allowed credit for specific periods by the Assistant Collector under Rule 56A. The Tribunal acknowledged that the credit was rightfully due to the respondents for the period before the MODVAT Scheme was implemented. It noted that the respondents had to await the decision of the authorities to access this credit, and once allowed, it should be considered available for transfer to R.G. 23A. By deeming the credit as available before the MODVAT Scheme's introduction, the Tribunal supported the respondents' claim for transfer and dismissed the Revenue's appeal, emphasizing the importance of advancing the Scheme's purpose through a broad interpretation of the Rule.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal's judgment favored the respondents by allowing the transfer of credit from R.G. 23 to R.G. 23A based on the eligibility criteria under Rule 56A and the interpretation of Rule 57H(3) in line with the Scheme's objectives. The decision underscored the importance of considering the context and purpose of legal provisions in resolving disputes related to credit transfers in excise matters.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 199
  
  Issues:
  Classification of 'White Oil' under Central Excise Tariff, Adjudication based on chemical test report, Appeal against Assistant Collector's decision, Jurisdiction of Collector (Appeals) in classification matters.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment revolves around the classification of 'White Oil' under the Central Excise Tariff. The respondent, a manufacturer, classified the product under T.I. 11-B initially. However, a chemical test by the Central Excise Department revealed similarities with refined diesel oil under T.I. 8-II(a), leading to a Show Cause Cum Demand Notice for duty payment. The Assistant Collector upheld this classification, prompting the respondent to appeal. The Collector (Appeals) overturned the decision, leading to the current appeal by the Revenue.
  
  The first issue addressed in the judgment is the dispute over the classification of the product. The Appellate Tribunal noted the arguments put forth by both parties. The appellant contended that the lower authorities failed to establish differences between duty paid base mineral oil and white mineral oil, suggesting a new product emerged after mixing. The Tribunal acknowledged the complexity of the refining process and upheld the Collector (Appeals) decision regarding classification under T.I. 8.
  
  The second issue pertains to the jurisdiction of the Collector (Appeals) in classification matters. The appellant challenged the Collector's decision to set aside the lower authority's classification without remanding the matter for reclassification. The Tribunal clarified that the Appellate Authority has the power to decide classification matters and supported the Collector (Appeals) decision in this regard. The judgment emphasized that the appeal sought a declaration of the order's legality without requesting reclassification, rendering the Collector's actions within jurisdiction.
  
  Furthermore, the judgment delves into legal precedents cited by the parties regarding the continuation of adjudications initiated under Rule 10 post its omission. While various cases were presented, the Tribunal deemed the discussion on this point as academic for the current appeal's resolution. Additionally, arguments regarding the manufacturing process of the product were addressed, citing relevant court decisions to support the classification under the Central Excise Tariff.
  
  In conclusion, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal after thorough consideration of the arguments presented. The judgment upheld the Collector (Appeals) decision on classification under T.I. 8 and affirmed the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority in classification matters. The detailed analysis provided clarity on the issues raised, ensuring a comprehensive understanding of the legal reasoning behind the judgment.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 198
  
  Issues:
  Classification of imported goods for customs duty assessment under specific tariff items and eligibility for duty concession under relevant notifications.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved the classification of a consignment of Sodium Laurel Sulphate imported by the appellant for customs duty assessment and eligibility for duty concession under Notification No. 33/83 Cus dated 1-3-1983. The appellant claimed that the consignment should have been assessed under Tariff Item No. 29.01/45(13) and should have been given the benefit of the concession. The refund claim was rejected based on the ground that the goods were not of Pharmacopoeial grade and were not considered as a drug. The appellant argued that the substance was used in drug dosage forms and should be classified as a drug or drug aid based on various scientific and technical publications and legal precedents.
  
  The Tribunal considered the arguments presented by both parties. The appellant provided a certificate from the Director of Medical & Health Services, Rajasthan, stating that Sodium Laurel Sulphate is a pharmaceutical aid used in drug dosage forms. The Tribunal analyzed the definition of a drug as per the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and previous legal judgments related to the classification of pharmaceutical products. The Tribunal also reviewed certifications of the sample's standard quality and its usage in pharmaceutical preparations.
  
  Based on the evidence and legal interpretations, the Tribunal concluded that the imported goods, Sodium Laurel Sulphate, were classified as a drug aid or intermediate rather than a drug. The Tribunal referred to specific tariff items and notifications governing the classification of pharmaceutical chemicals for customs duty assessment and duty concession eligibility. The Tribunal determined that the goods did not meet the criteria for exemption under relevant notifications and should be classified under a specific tariff item for customs duty assessment.
  
  Ultimately, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, ruling that the imported goods were rightly classified under a specific tariff item and were not eligible for the benefit of the duty concession notification. The judgment emphasized the importance of proper classification based on the nature and intended use of the imported goods, as well as adherence to the definitions and regulations outlined in relevant legal provisions and notifications.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 197
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Classification of the product (battery tops).
  2. Demand of Central Excise Duty based on the classification.
  3. Imposition of penalty for alleged misclassification.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Classification of the Product
  
  The appellant is a manufacturer of injection-moulded articles, including battery tops used in dry battery cells. Initially, the product was classified under Tariff Item (T.I.) 15A(2) but was later reclassified under T.I. 68 due to changes in the tariff structure and relevant notifications. The Department later contended that the product should be classified under T.I. 42, which led to the dispute.
  
  The appellant argued that the Department had previously accepted the classification under T.I. 68 and granted exemptions accordingly. There was no change in the tariff entry or the manufacturing process that warranted a reclassification. The appellant also contended that the product did not qualify as pilfer-proof caps as defined under T.I. 42. They supported their argument with references to tariff advice, Indian Standard Specifications, and certificates from manufacturers.
  
  The Department relied on an opinion suggesting that the product was pilfer-proof and thus classifiable under T.I. 42. However, the tribunal found that the product did not meet the criteria for pilfer-proof caps as it could be removed without leaving any trace and was not intended to make the container tamper-proof.
  
  Issue 2: Demand of Central Excise Duty
  
  The Department issued a show cause notice demanding duty under T.I. 42 for the period 1983-84. The appellant had cleared goods without payment of duty based on the classification under T.I. 68, which was exempt from duty under Notification No. 182/82. The tribunal noted that the Department had accepted this classification and granted exemptions in previous years.
  
  The tribunal found that the Department had not issued a show cause notice before finalizing the classification list under T.I. 42, which was a procedural lapse. The classification approved by the Assistant Collector was not done in a proper manner and required to be set aside. The tribunal decided not to remand the matter but to resolve it based on the available evidence, concluding that the product should be classified under T.I. 68.
  
  Issue 3: Imposition of Penalty
  
  The Additional Collector had imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,00,000 on the appellant, alleging suppression of facts and mis-declaration. The appellant argued that they had declared the product's manufacture and classification to the Department, which had granted exemptions based on this declaration. The tribunal found no evidence of suppression, fraud, or mis-declaration by the appellant.
  
  The tribunal noted that the Department had the opportunity to verify the classification and product details at the relevant time and had accepted the appellant's classification under T.I. 68. Therefore, the appellant could not be faulted for the Department's later change in interpretation. The tribunal set aside the penalty, stating that there was no basis for demanding duty or imposing a penalty for the period 1983-84.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  1. Appeal No. E/1514/85-C: The tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and confirmed the correct classification of the product under T.I. 68.
  
  2. Appeal No. E/320/86-C: The tribunal allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and granted consequential relief to the appellant, including the setting aside of the penalty and the demand for duty.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 196
  
  Issues:
  1. Confiscation of goods under the Customs Act, 1962.
  2. Validity of penalties imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue 1: Confiscation of Goods
  The case involved an appeal against an Order-in-Original passed by the Collector of Customs & Central Excise, Shillong, regarding the confiscation of Galvanised Steel Sheets seized from the appellant's premises. The appellant contended that the orders passed by the Collector were not in accordance with the law. The Tribunal noted that an earlier order had directed the return of the seized goods to the appellant, but the Collector proceeded with confiscation and imposed penalties despite the Tribunal's order. The Tribunal held that the confiscation was contrary to its orders, invalid, and a flagrant violation of the law. The Tribunal emphasized that the orders of the Tribunal superseded those of the Collector, and the confiscation was set aside based on this ground alone.
  
  Issue 2: Validity of Penalties
  The appellant argued that the penalties imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 were not justified as there was no evidence to prove that the goods were smuggled. The Tribunal agreed with the appellant, stating that the burden was on the department to prove the goods were smuggled, and the mere fact that the goods were of foreign origin was not sufficient. The Tribunal cited previous decisions to support the position that the burden of proof rested with the department, especially when the goods were not notified under relevant sections of the Customs Act. Additionally, the Tribunal noted that the appellant had presented evidence, supported by statements from relevant parties, to show the legitimate purchase of the goods. As there was no clear evidence of smuggling, the imposition of penalties was deemed unjustified and not in accordance with the law.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of confiscation and penalties imposed on the appellant, emphasizing that the appellant was entitled to consequential reliefs.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 195
  
  Issues:
  - Imposition of penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 without affording appellant an opportunity of cross-examination.
  - Violation of principles of natural justice in the adjudication process.
  - Non-availability of witnesses for cross-examination.
  - Consideration of third-party statements without giving appellant a chance to challenge them.
  
  Analysis:
  The appeal in this case was against the order of the Additional Collector of Customs imposing a penalty on the appellant under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. The penalty was imposed in connection with the seizure of foreign-origin pants cloth. The appellant contended that the impugned order was violative of the principles of natural justice as he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were relied upon. The Tribunal had previously remanded the matter to the original authority for re-consideration, but witnesses did not turn up for cross-examination, leading to the decision being made based on third-party statements without the appellant's involvement in the process.
  
  The Adjudicating authority acknowledged that witnesses did not appear for cross-examination, but proceeded with the adjudication without giving the appellant a fair chance to challenge the statements against him. The judgment highlighted the importance of affording the appellant an effective opportunity for cross-examination when penal proceedings are based on third-party statements. It was emphasized that non-availability of witnesses should not be a ground to penalize the appellant when his right to cross-examination is not fulfilled. The judgment also referenced a criminal prosecution where the Public Prosecutor conceded that there was no evidence against the appellant in the same matter, further supporting the appellant's argument regarding lack of evidence.
  
  Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the penalty imposed on the appellant was not sustainable in law due to the procedural irregularities and violation of natural justice. The Tribunal decided to set aside the penalty on technical grounds and allowed the appeal, considering the Department's inability to secure witnesses for cross-examination. The judgment concluded that remanding the matter again would not serve any useful purpose under the circumstances presented.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 194
  
  Issues Involved: Classification of 'gummed paper tapes' under Central Excise Tariff Item 60 or Item 17(2).
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Classification under Tariff Item 60 or 17(2):
  The primary issue was whether 'gummed paper tapes' manufactured by the appellants should be classified under Item 60 of the Central Excise Tariff as "adhesive tapes all sorts..." or under Tariff Item 17(2). The Assistant Collector of Central Excise classified the tapes under Item 60, stating that the gummed paper tapes have adhesive coatings activated by water and are used for holding materials together. This decision was upheld by the Appellate Collector of Central Excise.
  
  2. Argument by the Appellants:
  The appellants argued that they manufacture gummed paper, which is exempt from central excise duty. They contended that slitting gummed paper into tapes does not constitute 'manufacture' and thus, the tapes should remain classified under Item 17(2). They cited several judgments, including the Supreme Court's decision in Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Pio Food Packers, which held that a mere change in physical form does not amount to manufacture.
  
  3. Argument by the Respondents:
  The respondent argued that Item 60 specifically includes paper-backed adhesive tapes and thus, the product should be charged under this item. They relied on the Tribunal's decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Collector of Customs & Central Excise, which stated that intermediate products in a continuous process are liable for excise duty. They also cited the Bombay High Court's decision in Kores (India) Limited v. Union of India, which held that cutting large rolls of paper into specific sizes amounts to manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Central Excises & Salt Act.
  
  4. Tribunal's Analysis:
  The Tribunal considered the records and arguments. They noted that sub-item (2) of Item 17 includes paper subjected to treatments like coating, which applies to the appellants' gummed paper. They also referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-II v. M/s. Kiran Spinning Mills, which held that cutting running lengths of man-made fiber into shorter lengths does not constitute manufacture. They concluded that slitting gummed paper into tapes does not amount to manufacture and thus, the tapes should not fall under Item 60.
  
  5. Definition and Trade Understanding:
  The Tribunal referred to definitions and trade understandings, noting that adhesive tape typically refers to self-adhesive tapes not requiring a solvent. They cited IS:4661-1968, which defines gumming as applying a layer of adhesive to paper for subsequent use after moistening, supporting classification under Item 17(2). They also referenced the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and the Supreme Court's decision in Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur v. Krishna Carbon Co., which classified coated paper under Item 17(2).
  
  6. Conclusion:
  The Tribunal classified the tapes under Item 17(2) of the erstwhile Central Excise Tariff, setting aside the impugned order and allowing the appeal with consequential relief. They noted that the process of slitting does not change the fundamental nature of the gummed paper, and thus, it remains classified under Item 17(2).
  
  Separate Judgment:
  The Senior Vice President agreed with the classification under Item 17(2) and added that the slitting operation is merely for convenience of use and does not change the character of the gummed paper. They emphasized that Item 60 is a residuary item and since gummed paper tape falls under Item 17(2), it is excluded from Item 60. They also noted that trade documents describe the goods as gummed paper, not adhesive paper tapes.
  
  Final Decision:
  The appeal was allowed, and the gummed paper tapes were classified under Item 17(2) of the Central Excise Tariff, with consequential relief to the appellants.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 193
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Fabrication and erection of steel work and sheet roofing.
  2. Supply and erection of boilers for M/s. Kothari (Madras) Limited.
  3. Designing, manufacturing, erecting, and commissioning a steam system for M/s. SAS Chemicals (Madras) Limited.
  4. Invocation of the extended time limit for duty demand.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Fabrication and erection of steel work and sheet roofing
  
  The appellants executed a contract for M/s. Thirumalai Chemicals Limited, raising an invoice for Rs. 57,253.82 but did not pay Central Excise duty of Rs. 2,862.69. The Assistant Collector held that the premises were a factory and the process involved "manufacture" u/s 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act. This decision was confirmed by the Collector (Appeals). The Tribunal referred to previous decisions, concluding that duty cannot be charged on the steel work and sheet roofing erected at the site, but only on materials cleared from the factory prior to 18-6-1977, which were exempt under Notification No. 54/75-C.E.
  
  Issue 2: Supply and erection of boilers for M/s. Kothari (Madras) Limited
  
  The appellants entered a contract for Rs. 3.6 lakhs, clearing boilers on 30-12-1977 and 2-2-1978, paying duty at 2%. The Assistant Collector held that the entire contract price was dutiable at 5%, resulting in a short payment of Rs. 12,940/-. The Tribunal held that duty is payable on the price of boilers as removed from the factory, excluding post-clearance expenses like transportation and erection charges, but including costs related to drawing and designing.
  
  Issue 3: Designing, manufacturing, erecting, and commissioning a steam system for M/s. SAS Chemicals (Madras) Limited
  
  The appellants declared a value of Rs. 4,25,000/- and paid duty of Rs. 21,250/-, while the Department demanded Rs. 49,680/- on the contract price of Rs. 6,21,000/-. The Assistant Collector included all charges in the assessable value. The Tribunal held that duty is payable on the value of the steam system as cleared from the factory, excluding post-clearance expenses but including costs related to drawing and designing.
  
  Issue 4: Invocation of the extended time limit for duty demand
  
  The show cause notice was issued on 28-8-1980, invoking the five-year limitation u/r 10(1) due to non-disclosure of contracts, amounting to suppression of facts. The Tribunal upheld the invocation of the extended time limit.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the Assistant Collector for de novo examination, allowing the appellants to produce evidence and be heard before a final decision.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 192
  
  Issues: Classification of dough moulding compound under Central Excise Tariff (CET) and applicability of duty.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The appeal challenged Order-in-Appeal No. 52/85(H) passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras, regarding the classification of a product called "dough moulding compound" manufactured by the respondent.
  2. The respondent manufactured the compound using duty paid polyester resins and glass fibers, which was tested and found to be composed of synthetic resin (phenolic), inorganic fillers, and cellulosic fibers.
  3. The Assistant Collector classified the goods under Item No. 68 of the CET, denying the benefit of a specific Central Excise Notification. The Collector (Appeals) upheld this classification, stating that the compound was a physically modified resin and not a new product warranting fresh duty levy.
  4. The appellant contested the classification, arguing that the compound should be classified under Item No. 15A(1) of the CET, citing previous Tribunal decisions and legal precedents.
  5. The appellant faced a preliminary objection on the appeal's timeliness, which was resolved in favor of the appellant after verifying the filing date against the stipulated period.
  6. The Tribunal considered previous decisions related to similar products and manufacturing processes, including the addition of fillers to resin and the applicability of duty under specific CET items.
  7. The respondent argued that the addition of fillers and fibers did not constitute "manufacture" attracting duty, and the final product should be exempt under a specific Notification if considered an article of plastic.
  8. The respondent distinguished previous judgments cited by the appellant, stating they were not directly applicable to the current case due to differences in manufacturing processes and legal interpretations.
  9. The Tribunal analyzed various legal judgments, including those from the Bombay High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court, regarding the classification and duty liability of similar products like phenolic moulding powder.
  10. Ultimately, the Tribunal held that the dough moulding compound should be classified under Item No. 15A(1) of the CET, making it liable for duty payment. However, the respondents were granted the benefit of Central Excise Rule 56A, allowing them to credit the duty paid on the resin towards the compound's duty payment.
  11. The appeal was allowed in favor of the appellant, confirming the classification and duty liability of the dough moulding compound under the specified CET item.
  
  This detailed analysis covers the issues of classification and duty applicability concerning the dough moulding compound, addressing the arguments presented by both parties and referencing relevant legal precedents and judgments to reach a conclusive decision.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 191
  
  Issues:
  1. Appeal against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Combatore regarding the count discrepancy in yarn samples.
  2. Allegation of suppression by the authorities leading to a demand for a longer period.
  3. Dispute over the imposition of penalty based on the alleged suppression of facts.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The appeal was filed against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Combatore, concerning the discrepancy in the count of yarn samples. The samples initially declared as 35's count were found to be 37.5's count upon testing. The Chemical Examiner's report confirming this was received on 21-7-1987, following which a show cause notice was issued on 29-12-1987 demanding a total duty of Rs. 40,788 for the period in question.
  
  2. The appellant's representative argued that the Department was aware of the count difference since 21-7-1987, and the delayed issuance of the show cause notice beyond six months was unjustified. They contended that there was no suppression on their part as they had been paying duty based on their own laboratory tests and had no intention to deceive. The appellant offered to pay duty for six months from the notice date.
  
  3. The Revenue's representative stated that the higher count yarn was manufactured and not disputed by the appellants. They argued that since there was no plea regarding the count falling within the permitted tolerance limit, the question of limitation did not apply. The delay in the test result did not bar the demand for duty.
  
  4. The appellant cited a relevant case to support their argument against suppression, emphasizing the need for deliberate concealment for deception. The Tribunal noted that there was no evidence of intentional manipulation by the appellants to show a lower count. The absence of proof that the appellants were aware of the count discrepancy or deliberately withheld information led to the conclusion that no suppression of facts was established.
  
  5. Following the Supreme Court's ruling on the necessity of positive evidence for invoking an extended limitation period, the Tribunal held that no suppression was proven in this case. As a result, the demand was restricted to six months from the date of the show cause notice, and the penalty was set aside. The appeal was partially allowed based on the lack of evidence supporting the allegation of suppression.
  
  This comprehensive analysis of the judgment highlights the key arguments, legal principles, and the Tribunal's decision regarding the count discrepancy in the yarn samples and the alleged suppression of facts.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 190
  
  Issues:
  1. Classification of steel structures under sub-heading 7308.90 for excisability.
  2. Whether the steel structures are considered goods and subject to duty.
  3. Determination of the manufacturing process and the liability of the applicant as a manufacturer.
  
  Analysis:
  1. The main issue in this case is the classification of steel structures under sub-heading 7308.90 for excisability. The applicant argues that these structures are not goods as they only come into existence when incorporated into a factory's structure. The adjudicating authority classified them under sub-heading 7308.90, but the applicant contends that previous judgments have held such structures not liable to duty. The applicant supplied raw materials to another company for fabrication and erection, asserting they are not the actual manufacturers.
  
  2. The Tribunal referred to previous judgments, including Aruna Industries and Steel Authority of India cases, which held that steel structures are not considered goods for excisability. The Tribunal emphasized that the process of erecting or constructing on-site does not amount to manufacturing goods, even if it involves fabrication. It likened the process to constructing a house, stating that the end result is immovable property, not goods. The Tribunal concluded that no manufacturing process occurred in this case, and no goods were manufactured, leading to the dismissal of the duty demand.
  
  3. The issue of whether the applicant is considered a manufacturer was also addressed. The Department argued that the hired laborers who fabricated the structures are excluded from the definition of a manufacturer under the Central Excise Act. However, the Tribunal disagreed, stating that the process involved in this case was construction and erection, not manufacturing. The Tribunal distinguished the facts from previous cases and emphasized that the key factor is whether a particular process constitutes manufacturing, which must be determined based on the specific circumstances of each case.
  
  4. The Tribunal upheld the appeal, setting aside the impugned order and rejecting the duty demand. It relied on previous judgments and the distinction between manufacturing and construction processes. The Tribunal emphasized that the mere fabrication of structures on-site does not amount to manufacturing goods, especially when the end result is immovable property. Following the reasoning in previous cases, the Tribunal concluded that no manufacturing process occurred in this case, leading to the dismissal of the duty imposition.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 189
  
  Issues:
  - Appeal against denial of abatement from duty due to damage to imported goods.
  - Interpretation of Section 22 of the Customs Act, 1962 regarding damaged goods.
  - Compliance with procedural requirements for claiming abatement of duty.
  - Pre-clearance reporting of damage to customs authorities.
  
  Analysis:
  The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi concerned the denial of abatement from duty to the appellants due to damage suffered by imported goods. The appellants had imported Hollow Drill Steels which were found heavily corroded upon arrival, leading to a claim for refund based on the damage. The Customs authorities had rejected the refund claim on the grounds that the damage was not reported before the goods were cleared. The main issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 22 of the Customs Act, 1962, which deals with damaged goods and the procedure for claiming abatement of duty.
  
  The appellants contended that they had indeed reported the damage to the Customs authorities before clearance, as evidenced by a certificate of examination dated prior to the payment of duty. They had also conducted a Marine survey with Customs present, highlighting the damage to the goods. The appellants argued that they were entitled to abatement of duty under Section 22 of the Customs Act, 1962, as the goods were no longer fit for their intended purpose due to the damage incurred during transit.
  
  On the other hand, the department maintained that the damage was not reported before clearance, and thus, no abatement of duty should be granted. However, upon careful consideration, the Tribunal found in favor of the appellants. The Tribunal noted that the appellants had indeed reported the damage to the Customs authorities before payment of duty and clearance of the goods. The certificate of examination and the Survey report supported the appellants' claim of damage, indicating substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 22.
  
  In support of its decision, the Tribunal referenced a previous case where a similar situation had arisen, emphasizing the obligation of Customs to assess damaged goods at a reduced value and charge duty accordingly once damage is reported. The Tribunal concluded that the appellants had fulfilled the requirements of Section 22 by reporting the damage before clearance, and therefore, were entitled to a re-appraisement of the goods and a consequential refund. The appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants, highlighting the importance of complying with procedural requirements for claiming abatement of duty on damaged goods under the Customs Act, 1962.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 188
  
  Issues:
  Delay in filing the appeal, Condonation of delay, Misplacement of papers, Non-action by Chief General Manager, Sufficient cause for delay.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved an appeal filed by M/s. Kanoria Wisconsin Centrifugal Ltd. against an order passed by the Collector of Central Excise, Bolpur. The appeal was presented with a delay of 58 days, beyond the prescribed period of three months from the date of communication of the order. The appellant sought condonation of delay, citing misplacement of papers and non-action by the Chief General Manager as reasons for the delay. The appellant claimed to be a sick unit registered with the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, facing financial difficulties and potential closure, which would impact the employees. The appellant relied on a Supreme Court judgment emphasizing a liberal view towards condonation of delay. The respondent opposed the condonation, arguing that the appellant failed to take proper care in filing the appeal and referring to precedents where misplacement of papers was not considered a sufficient cause for delay.
  
  The Tribunal considered the arguments of both parties and examined the facts of the case. It noted the appellant's claim of misplacement of papers and non-action by the Chief General Manager, leading to the delay in filing the appeal. The Tribunal acknowledged that the appellant was a sick unit but found no evidence of closure during the relevant period. It emphasized the importance of explaining each day's delay after the limitation period expires, as per legal precedent. The Tribunal analyzed a detailed date-wise explanation provided by the appellant for the delay, highlighting the negligence from August 14 to September 21. Referring to relevant case law, the Tribunal concluded that misplacement of papers was not a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It held that the appellant was not prevented by sufficient cause for the late submission of the appeal, leading to the rejection of the application for condonation of delay.
  
  As a result of rejecting the condonation of delay, the Tribunal dismissed the stay application and the appeal itself, as they were hit by limitation. The Tribunal clarified that it would not delve into the merits of the case due to the dismissal on the grounds of delay. The judgment highlighted the importance of timely filing appeals and the need for parties to diligently adhere to procedural requirements to avoid adverse consequences.

  ---

• 1990 (1) TMI 187
  
  Issues:
  1. Adjudication based on non-accountal of excisable goods
  2. Competency of authorities to demand duty under Section 11A
  3. Validity of show cause notice alleging suppression and misstatement
  
  Adjudication based on non-accountal of excisable goods:
  The case involves an appeal against an order by the Collector (Appeals) regarding non-accountal of 15 bags of pigment dyes in a factory. The Central Excise officers found the goods unaccounted for in the RG-I register during a check. The Asstt. Collector initiated adjudication proceedings resulting in confiscation of the goods and imposition of penalties. The respondents appealed to the Collector (Appeals) who set aside the order, citing that the Asstt. Collector lacked the authority to make allegations of fraud and suppression under Section 11A. The Tribunal agreed that duty payment only arises upon removal of goods and observed that the show cause notice was defective in demanding duty before removal, rendering it void ab initio. The Tribunal upheld the Collector's decision to allow the appeal but noted that the department could adjudicate on the non-accountal of goods separately.
  
  Competency of authorities to demand duty under Section 11A:
  The Department argued that the case involved non-accountal of manufactured excisable goods, and duty payment should only occur upon removal, not before. They contended that the Asstt. Collector's order was set aside entirely, potentially absolving the respondents of penalties. However, the Tribunal agreed with the Department's representative that duty demand under Section 11A was unnecessary in this scenario, as goods were still in the factory. The show cause notice issued by the Superintendent demanding duty based on suppression and misstatement was deemed void ab initio, as duty payment was premature before removal. The Tribunal concurred that the Asstt. Collector erred in adjudicating on the defective notice but allowed the department the opportunity to address the non-accountal issue separately.
  
  Validity of show cause notice alleging suppression and misstatement:
  The Respondents argued that the show cause notice contained positive allegations of demanding duty based on suppression and misstatement, rendering it void from the beginning. The Tribunal agreed that the notice was defective, as duty demand was premature before removal of goods. The Asstt. Collector should have rectified the notice before adjudicating on it. The Tribunal concurred that the notice was void ab initio and upheld the Collector's decision to set aside the Asstt. Collector's order. They granted the department the chance to address the non-accountal issue separately, emphasizing the need for a proper notice before adjudication.

  ---

1 ....2345678910........ 14