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1993 (2) TMI 202
Issues: Violation of principles of natural justice in passing order without a personal hearing.
Analysis: The case involves a Stay Petition filed by the applicant against an order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals). The applicant/appellant had filed an appeal against a penalty imposed by the Deputy Collector of Customs. The Collector of Customs (Appeals) directed the applicant/appellant to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000 without granting a personal hearing, which was requested by the applicant/appellant. The applicant/appellant filed an application to vary the order, but it was disposed of without a hearing. The Collector dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the deposit order. The principles of natural justice require that a person should not be condemned before being heard, especially in matters of appeal and stay applications. The Collector's actions were deemed a violation of natural justice as the applicant/appellant was not given an opportunity to represent his case regarding the penalty deposit.
The Tribunal emphasized the importance of granting a personal hearing in such cases. The Collector of Customs (Appeals) should consider two factors in deciding a Stay Petition: prima facie case and balance of convenience, as well as the hardship caused by deposit requirements. The failure to grant a personal hearing before ordering the deposit violates natural justice. The Tribunal cited precedent emphasizing that denial of natural justice is in itself sufficient prejudice, and decisions made without adherence to natural justice principles are derogatory to the rule of law. The Tribunal remanded the case to the Collector of Customs (Appeals) with a direction to grant a personal hearing to the applicant/appellant or their Counsel, consider the balance of convenience and hardship, and pass a speaking order on the Stay Petition before proceeding with the appeal in accordance with the law and principles of natural justice.
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1993 (2) TMI 201
Issues: 1. Time limitation for demands confirmed by the Asstt. Collector. 2. Validity of extended period under Rule 56A(5)(i) for the Department.
Analysis: The judgment pertains to an appeal from the revenue regarding demands confirmed by the Asstt. Collector for specific periods. The main issue is whether the demands fall within the time limit and if the extended period under Rule 56A(5)(i) is applicable. The respondents, manufacturers of transformers, imported duty-paid components under a proforma credit procedure but were found to have taken credit for items without proper permission. The Asstt. Collector confirmed duty demands, alleging wilful misstatement and suppression of facts, justifying the extended period under Rule 56A(5). The Collector (Appeals) agreed that the items were not covered by valid permission but allowed the appeals on the grounds of time bar. The Revenue appealed against this decision.
During the proceedings, it was argued that the items were not covered by permission, constituting a violation of Rule 56A, justifying the application of the extended period. However, it was acknowledged that the disputed inputs were eligible for proforma credit under T.I. 68. The crux of the argument was whether the verification of permission should have been done at the point of taking credit or could be verified at any time. The judgment rejected this argument, stating that the demands should be considered time-barred as the verification was not conducted within the prescribed six-month period. The court emphasized that the intention to evade duty or violate rules must be present to justify invoking the extended period, which was not the case here. As the disputed inputs were eligible for credit and there was no evidence of evasion or suppression, the appeal from the Revenue was dismissed.
In conclusion, the judgment clarifies the importance of timely verification of permissions and the necessity of intent to evade duty for invoking the extended period under Rule 56A(5)(i). The decision highlights that mere absence of permission does not automatically warrant the application of the extended period if there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing or violation of rules.
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1993 (2) TMI 200
The case involved the classification of imported nozzles under Heading 69.03.90 or Heading 98.06.00. The appellants claimed the former, but authorities classified them under the latter. The appellants argued that the nozzles should not be considered part of a machine due to frequent replacement. However, the tribunal upheld the classification under Heading 98.06.00, citing lack of evidence to the contrary. All three appeals were rejected.
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1993 (2) TMI 199
Issues: Rectification of Mistake (ROM) in Tribunal's Order, Violation of Principles of Natural Justice, Setting aside Order of Collector (Appeals), Correctness of Tribunal's Decision, Consideration of High Court Judgment.
Analysis: 1. The case involves an application under Section 35C(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 for Rectification of Mistake (ROM) in the Tribunal's Order setting aside the Order-in-Appeal of Collector (Appeals) and allowing the appeal of Collector of Central Excise, Bhubaneshwar. The ROM application argues that the Tribunal erred in condoning the violation of natural justice by the Assistant Collector without issuing a show cause notice.
2. The ROM application highlights that crucial matters were not brought to the Tribunal's attention during the appeal, including the independence of adjudications related to Classification Lists and existing revised assessments. The application argues that the Tribunal exceeded the appeal's scope by confirming the revision of Classification Lists, which was beyond the Department's prayer.
3. The Senior Counsel representing the applicant contends that the Tribunal's decision to set aside the Order of Collector (Appeals) was erroneous as it went beyond the Department's appeal grounds. The Counsel emphasizes the need to correct the mistake and restore the Order of Collector (Appeals) concerning other Classification Lists.
4. The Tribunal's consideration of the High Court judgment and revised assessments is challenged by the Senior Departmental Representative. It is argued that these documents were not part of the record and cannot be the basis for rectification. The Representative asserts that the Tribunal's decision to set aside the Order of Collector (Appeals) was justified as the Assistant Collector was following the Tribunal's order.
5. The Senior Counsel cites legal precedents to support the argument that obvious mistakes in orders can be corrected. The Counsel maintains that the Tribunal's error in setting aside the Order of Collector (Appeals) is apparent and should be rectified under Section 35C(2) of the Act.
6. The Tribunal, after considering the arguments from both sides, concludes that the judgment of the High Court and revised assessments were not part of the record and cannot be considered for rectification. The Tribunal finds no error in its previous order and rejects the ROM application due to the lack of new material presented during the appeal.
7. The Tribunal emphasizes that the decision-making process must be based on the record before it and not on external documents or judgments not presented during the appeal. The application for rectification fails as the new material was not part of the original record, and no error is found in the Tribunal's decision based on the information available during the appeal.
In summary, the Tribunal rejects the application for rectification of mistake as the new material presented was not part of the original record, and no error is found in the Tribunal's decision based on the information available during the appeal.
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1993 (2) TMI 198
Issues Involved: 1. Classification and duty liability of polyethylene granules and vulcanizable polyethylene. 2. Whether the process of adding dicumyl peroxide to polyethylene granules constitutes "manufacture." 3. Applicability of the "later the better" principle for excise duty collection. 4. Interpretation of relevant case laws and chemical properties.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification and Duty Liability: The primary issue revolves around whether polyethylene granules used in manufacturing vulcanizable polyethylene should be subject to duty. The Assistant Collector initially held that no duty should be paid at the stage of production of polyethylene granules, and the liability should be discharged on the final product, vulcanizable polyethylene. However, the Collector (Appeals) decided that if duty has been paid on polyethylene granules, no further liability arises after mixing the anti-oxidant.
2. Process of Adding Dicumyl Peroxide and "Manufacture": The core question is whether the process of adding dicumyl peroxide to polyethylene granules results in "manufacture" as defined by the Supreme Court in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills case. The Collector (Appeals) concluded that adding an anti-oxidant does not result in the manufacture of new goods, as no new substance comes into existence. The Department, however, argued that the coating of dicumyl peroxide imparts a different property to the polyethylene granules, thus changing their chemical property and resulting in a new product.
3. Applicability of "Later the Better" Principle: The principle of "later the better" for excise duty collection was also discussed. The Department argued that duty should be charged on the final product, vulcanizable polyethylene, rather than at the stage of polyethylene granules. The Tribunal supported this view, stating that the liability of payment of duty arises only at the final stage when the product is commercially distinct.
4. Interpretation of Relevant Case Laws and Chemical Properties: Several case laws were cited by both parties to support their arguments. The Department relied on decisions such as Inarco Ltd., Air Control Systems, and Hindustan Polymers, arguing that the addition of dicumyl peroxide imparts new properties to polyethylene, thus constituting manufacture. The respondents cited cases like Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, Asian Cables Corporation, and Crescent Chemical Corporation, arguing that no new product with a distinctive name, character, or use emerges from merely adding dicumyl peroxide.
Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the process of adding dicumyl peroxide to polyethylene granules does result in the manufacture of a new product, vulcanizable polyethylene, which has distinct properties and uses compared to unvulcanized polyethylene. Therefore, the duty liability should be discharged on the final product. The order of the Collector (Appeals) was set aside, and the appeal of the Department was allowed.
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1993 (2) TMI 197
Issues: Delay in filing appeal, Condonation of delay, Lack of sufficient cause
Analysis: The case involves an appeal filed by the Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi, challenging an order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi. The appeal was filed with a delay of 41 days, and an application for condonation of delay was submitted simultaneously. The appellant argued that the delay was due to the need for detailed scrutiny at the Collector's level to appreciate the technical aspects of the case. The appellant relied on Supreme Court decisions to support the plea for condonation of delay.
Upon review, the Tribunal found that the application for condonation of delay lacked sufficient justification. The only ground provided was the need for detailed scrutiny at the Collector's level. The Tribunal examined the facts and circumstances, noting that the amount involved was Rs. 473.95 with a penalty of Rs. 100. Citing previous Supreme Court judgments, the Tribunal emphasized the importance of proving sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of delay, stating that the appellant was not prevented by sufficient cause in the late filing of the appeal.
The Tribunal referred to various legal precedents, including the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Limited, to highlight the necessity of demonstrating sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Tribunal emphasized that even after showing sufficient cause, condonation of delay is not a matter of right but subject to the court's discretion. Diligence and bona fides of the party play a crucial role in such decisions. The Tribunal concluded that since the appellant failed to establish sufficient cause for the delay, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, leading to the dismissal of the appeal without delving into its merits.
In the final analysis, the Tribunal also considered the case of Bhawan v. Jagdish and reiterated the principles laid down in previous Supreme Court decisions regarding the condonation of delay. By following established legal principles and precedents, the Tribunal held that the appellant's delay in filing the appeal was not justified by sufficient cause. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected, leading to the dismissal of the appeal without further examination of its merits.
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1993 (2) TMI 196
Issues Involved: 1. Confiscation of imported goods under the DEEC Scheme. 2. Denial of exemption under the DEEC Scheme. 3. Alleged violation of principles of natural justice. 4. Classification of imported goods as Ivory Board or Card Board. 5. Interpretation of import licenses and the exclusion of Ivory Board.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Confiscation of Imported Goods under the DEEC Scheme: The appeal challenges the confiscation of 66 bales (14.73 MT) Ivory Board valued at Rs. 2,31,843.18P. by the Collector of Customs, Calcutta. The confiscation was based on the ground that the import of Ivory Board against import licenses issued for Card Board sheets under the Duty Exemption Entitlement Scheme (DEEC) was not permissible. The appellants were given the option to clear the goods on payment of a fine of Rs. 47,000 in lieu of confiscation.
2. Denial of Exemption under the DEEC Scheme: The appellants were denied exemption under the DEEC Scheme on the basis that the "Ivory Board" imported was different from the permitted "Card Board sheets." The Collector relied on the opinions of the Chief Chemist and the Institute of Paper Technology, which were not furnished to the appellants for comments or rebuttal. The appellants argued that both Ivory Board and Card Board are used for packing and should be considered the same for the purposes of the DEEC Scheme.
3. Alleged Violation of Principles of Natural Justice: The appellants contended that the Collector's reliance on external opinions without providing copies for rebuttal violated principles of natural justice. However, the tribunal found that the appellants were aware of the substance of the test reports and had waived the show cause notice, thereby nullifying the claim of violation of natural justice.
4. Classification of Imported Goods as Ivory Board or Card Board: The core issue was whether the imported goods were Ivory Board or Card Board. The appellants argued that there is no significant difference between the two, both being used for packing. The tribunal examined definitions from various sources, including the Dictionary of Paper and the Glossary of Terms used in the Paper Trade Industry. The tribunal noted that "Ivory Board" is specifically defined as a coated board used for printing and writing, characterized by its smoothness, stiffness, and clean appearance. The reports from the Chief Chemist and the Institute of Paper Technology confirmed the goods as Ivory Board, possessing characteristics distinct from Card Board.
5. Interpretation of Import Licenses and the Exclusion of Ivory Board: The appellants argued that the absence of a specific exclusion of Ivory Board in the import licenses allowed them to import all types of Card Board sheets, including Ivory Board. The tribunal found that the description in the licenses ("Card Board Sheet") did not cover Ivory Board unless explicitly mentioned. The tribunal noted that specific exclusion of Ivory Board in a subsequent license (Licence No. 3143794/86) indicated that Ivory Board was not intended to be included under the term "Card Board Sheet" in the earlier licenses. The tribunal concluded that the goods imported were not covered by the licenses submitted by the appellants and were rightly classified as Ivory Board.
Conclusion: The tribunal upheld the Collector's order, rejecting the appeal. It was determined that the imported goods were correctly classified as Ivory Board, not covered by the import licenses under the DEEC Scheme, and the appellants were not entitled to exemption from duty. The tribunal found no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding the violation of principles of natural justice and the interpretation of import licenses.
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1993 (2) TMI 195
Issues: - Entitlement to higher notional credit in respect of special excise duty post-amendment of Notification 175/86.
Analysis: The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, BOMBAY involved the issue of whether the respondents were entitled to claim higher notional credit in respect of special excise duty following the amendment of Notification 175/86. The East Regional Bench had previously considered this issue and held that higher notional credit for special excise duty cannot be claimed. However, the Collector (Appeals) had allowed the appeal of the respondents, leading to the department appealing against this decision.
Shri Mondal, representing the Revenue, relied on previous decisions to support the appeal. He highlighted that the amended notification limited the maximum extent of higher notional credit to 5%, regardless of whether it pertained to basic duty or special excise duty. Therefore, if the respondents had paid duty at 5% basic and 0.25% special excise duty, they could only claim a benefit up to 10.25% as per Notification 175/86, not the 10.5% they claimed. On the other hand, Shri Sindhi, representing the respondents, argued that the special excise duty should also be eligible for higher notional credit, citing specific points from the Finance Act 1988.
After considering both arguments, the Tribunal concluded that special excise duty is indeed eligible for Modvat credit, and the government had allowed for a higher notional credit under Rule 57B for inputs received from the small scale sector. However, the maximum extent for such credit was specified at 5% ad valorem in the amended Notification 175/86. The Tribunal emphasized that the issue was not about denying credit for special excise duty paid but about claiming higher notional credit, which was limited to the maximum of 5%. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the appeal of the Revenue, stating that the respondents could only claim higher notional credit up to 5% and not beyond that, as per the relevant provisions.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal of the Revenue, emphasizing that the maximum extent of higher notional credit for special excise duty, as specified in the amended Notification 175/86, was limited to 5% ad valorem. The decision clarified that while special excise duty is eligible for Modvat credit, the higher notional credit was subject to the prescribed ceiling, and the respondents could not claim credit beyond the specified limit.
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1993 (2) TMI 194
Issues: 1. Rectification of error in appeal memo regarding quantification of demand. 2. Maintainability of appeal due to provisional assessment order. 3. Inclusion of CFC value in assessable value of cigarettes. 4. Interpretation of Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 5. Merits of the case regarding the inclusion of packing cost in the assessable value of cigarettes.
Analysis:
1. The appeal filed by M/s. Masters Tobacco Company challenged the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) confirming a demand of Rs. 25,07,513.79. An error in the appeal memo regarding the quantification of demand was rectified upon the oral prayer of the advocate, with no objection from the respondent.
2. The issue of maintainability arose due to the provisional assessment order. The advocate argued that the judgment in the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. was not considered by the Assistant Collector, leading to the rejection of the appeal. However, the Tribunal found the appeal maintainable as per Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
3. The dispute centered around the inclusion of CFC value in the assessable value of cigarettes. The advocate relied on the Godfrey Phillips case and emphasized that the CFC value should not be included. The Tribunal found merit in the argument, citing relevant judgments and holding that the CFC value should not be considered for excise duty assessment.
4. The Tribunal interpreted Section 35 of the Act, emphasizing that any person aggrieved by an order of a Central Excise Officer lower in rank than a Collector of Central Excise can appeal to the Collector (Appeals). The Tribunal referred to precedents to support the view that the appeal in this case was maintainable.
5. On the merits of the case, the Tribunal found that the inclusion of packing cost in the assessable value of cigarettes was not justified. Citing the Godfrey Phillips case, the Tribunal held that the cost of further packing in corrugated fibre board containers should not be included in the excise duty assessment. Therefore, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellants and dispensed with the predeposit of the duty amount during the appeal's pendency.
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1993 (2) TMI 193
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the impugned order is bad in law in view of the fact that the De novo Adjudication Order had traversed beyond the Remand Order passed originally by the Collector (Appeals)? 2. Whether the application filed by the respondents before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta can be treated as the application for refund?
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the impugned order is bad in law in view of the fact that the De novo Adjudication Order had traversed beyond the Remand Order passed originally by the Collector (Appeals)?
The learned Advocate for the respondents argued that the Assistant Collector (Patna) acted beyond the mandate given by the Collector (Appeals) in the remand order. The remand order had directed the Assistant Collector to consider the date of submission of the refund claim to the Assistant Collector, Calcutta as the date of submission. The Collector (Appeals) had observed that the proper course of action would have been to inform the respondents that the Assistant Collector, Calcutta was not the proper officer to deal with such claims and to forward the papers to the Assistant Collector, Patna. The Assistant Collector, Patna, however, did not follow this directive and instead rejected the claims as time-barred. The Tribunal held that the de novo adjudication should proceed in the light of the remand order and cannot go beyond its scope. Therefore, the impugned orders were not contrary to the terms of the remand order.
2. Whether the application filed by the respondents before the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta can be treated as the application for refund?
The respondents had filed refund claims with the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta within the statutory time-limit. The Assistant Collector, Calcutta, after scrutinizing the claims, directed the respondents to file the claims with the Assistant Collector, Patna. The claims were then filed with the Assistant Collector, Patna, but were rejected as time-barred. The Department contended that the refund claims should have been filed with the jurisdictional Assistant Collector, Patna, and not with the Assistant Collector, Calcutta. However, the Tribunal observed that Rule 97 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, allows for goods to be returned to the same or any other factory for reprocessing. The respondents had complied with the requirements of Rule 97 and had filed the refund claims with the Assistant Collector, Calcutta, under whose jurisdiction the reprocessing was done. The Tribunal held that the filing of the claims with the Assistant Collector, Calcutta, within the prescribed time-limit should be treated as the original claims. The Assistant Collector, Calcutta should have forwarded the papers to the Assistant Collector, Patna, under intimation to the respondents. The Tribunal concluded that the refund claims were not barred by limitation and directed the Assistant Collector, Patna to determine the refund claims on merits after granting a personal hearing to the respondents.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and remanded the matter to the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Patna to determine the refund claims of the respondents on merits. The Tribunal also suggested that the Central Board of Excise and Customs may lay down suitable guidelines to regulate the proper procedure to be followed in such cases involving officers of more than one jurisdiction.
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1993 (2) TMI 192
Issues Involved: 1. Classification of the product "Bleached sheetings of cotton fabrics." 2. Applicability of Notification No. 57/87-C dated 1-3-1987. 3. Interpretation of Heading 59.01 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. 4. Validity of the appeal under Section 35E(4) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
Summary:
1. Classification of the product "Bleached sheetings of cotton fabrics": The assessee classified their product under Heading No. 52.06 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and cleared it at a concessional rate of duty u/s Notification No. 57/87-C dated 1-3-1987. The Revenue argued that the product should be classified under sub-heading 5901.10 due to its stiff finish and characteristics similar to Buckram, as reported by the Chemical Examiner. The Assistant Collector initially dropped the proceedings based on a retest report stating the product may not fall under Chapter 59. However, the Revenue appealed, asserting that the product met the specific description of Heading 59.01.
2. Applicability of Notification No. 57/87-C dated 1-3-1987: The assessee relied on Board's instructions and a letter from the Ministry of Finance, which clarified that such cotton fabrics, even after processing, remained porous and were not liable for classification as coated or impregnated fabrics. The learned Collector upheld the classification under Chapter 52 based on these clarifications.
3. Interpretation of Heading 59.01 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985: The Revenue argued that the product should be classified under Heading 59.01, which covers textile fabrics coated with gum or amylaceous substances, including those used for book binding. They contended that the stiffened fabrics similar to Buckram should be classified under this heading. The assessee countered that the product was not permanently stiffened, and the interstices were not filled, thus not meeting the criteria for classification under Chapter 59.
4. Validity of the appeal under Section 35E(4) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944: The learned Advocate for the assessee argued that the appeal was not maintainable as the department had not initially raised the ground that the goods were Buckram. The Tribunal upheld this contention, noting that the grounds for determination before the Collector (Appeals) did not include the product being Buckram, and thus, this point could not be raised at this stage.
Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the appeal by the Revenue was not maintainable as the grounds raised were not part of the original determination by the Collector (Appeals). On merits, the Tribunal found no evidence to support the classification of the product under Chapter 59 and upheld the classification under Chapter 52, rejecting the Revenue's appeal.
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1993 (2) TMI 191
Issues: 1. Classification of spent bleaching earth under sub-heading 1507.00. 2. Interpretation of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 regarding residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances. 3. Applicability of previous Tribunal decisions on similar issues. 4. Determination of excisability of spent earth residue.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Classification of spent bleaching earth under sub-heading 1507.00 The Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, filed an appeal challenging the order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Ghaziabad, regarding the classification of spent bleaching earth falling under sub-heading 1507.00. The appellant argued that post the introduction of the new tariff, the goods should be classified under sub-heading No. 1507.00, citing a previous Tribunal decision in a similar case.
Issue 2: Interpretation of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 The Tribunal examined the provisions of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, specifically focusing on residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances. Referring to a previous judgment, the Tribunal emphasized that spent earth residue qualifies for assessment under sub-heading No. 1507.00 as excisable, rejecting the argument that it should be classified under a residuary item.
Issue 3: Applicability of previous Tribunal decisions The Tribunal considered a previous decision in the case of CCE, Chandigarh v. M/s. Oswal Vanaspati & Allied Industries, where a similar issue was addressed. The Tribunal found no reason to deviate from the earlier decision, emphasizing that spent earth residue is a consequence of treating fatty substances and thus falls under sub-heading No. 1507.00.
Issue 4: Determination of excisability of spent earth residue After analyzing the facts and arguments presented by both sides, the Tribunal concluded that the activated earth used for decolourisation of oils results in spent earth residue, which qualifies as residue resulting from the treatment of fatty substances. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal filed by the Revenue was allowed based on the excisability of the spent earth residue under sub-heading 1507.00.
This detailed analysis of the judgment highlights the key legal issues addressed by the Tribunal, focusing on the classification and excisability of spent bleaching earth residue under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
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1993 (2) TMI 190
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi gave the Collector of Customs, Calcutta two weeks to implement an order or explain why it had not been implemented. No SLP had been filed against the order in the Apex Court. The Tribunal directed the Collector to act accordingly and appear in the next hearing if the order was not implemented. The case was scheduled to come up on 4th March 1993.
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1993 (2) TMI 189
Issues Involved: 1. Mis-declaration of goods and their classification under Customs Act. 2. Applicability of Notification No. 13/81-Cus., dated 9-2-1981. 3. Applicability of Notification No. 206/76-Cus., dated 2-8-1976. 4. Imposition of redemption fine and confiscation of goods under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962. 5. Examination of conditions stipulated in Notification No. 13/81-Cus.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Mis-declaration of Goods and Classification under Customs Act: The appellants imported 'Bare Image Intensifier Tube' and claimed it as raw material to benefit from Notification No. 13/81-Cus., dated 9-2-1981. The department contended that the goods were finished products, not raw materials, and charged the appellants with mis-declaration under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellants argued that the imported items required several processes before they could be used, thus qualifying as raw materials. The adjudicating authority initially held that the goods were finished products and thus mis-declared, leading to their confiscation.
2. Applicability of Notification No. 13/81-Cus., dated 9-2-1981: The appellants argued that the imported items, being raw materials, should benefit from Notification No. 13/81-Cus., which exempts specified goods imported for production of goods for export or for use in 100% export-oriented undertakings. The adjudicating authority denied this benefit, stating that the items were finished products. However, upon review, it was found that the processes required to make the items usable were significant, indicating they were not finished products. The matter was remanded to examine if other conditions of the notification were fulfilled.
3. Applicability of Notification No. 206/76-Cus., dated 2-8-1976: The appellants contended that they should also be considered under Notification No. 206/76-Cus., which grants exemption for goods imported for exclusive use by Defence Services. The adjudicating authority did not examine this claim. The appellate tribunal remanded the matter to the lower authority to examine the applicability of this notification.
4. Imposition of Redemption Fine and Confiscation under Section 111(m): The adjudicating authority imposed a redemption fine of Rs. 10 lakhs in lieu of confiscation. The appellate tribunal found this excessive, especially since the goods were for Defence use and there was no profit motive. The fine was reduced to Rs. 2 lakhs, subject to further examination by the lower authority regarding the applicability of Notification No. 206/76-Cus. One member of the tribunal disagreed with the imposition of any fine, arguing that the charge of mis-declaration was not sustainable once it was established that the goods were not finished products.
5. Examination of Conditions Stipulated in Notification No. 13/81-Cus.: The notification requires that the importer has a licence for the import, carries out manufacturing in a Customs bond, exports 100% of the manufactured goods, and executes a bond to fulfill these obligations. The appellate tribunal found that these conditions were not fulfilled by the appellants. However, one member disagreed with examining these conditions without a finding from the lower authority and thus remanded the matter for further examination.
Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by remand, with instructions to the lower authority to re-examine the applicability of Notification No. 206/76-Cus. and the conditions of Notification No. 13/81-Cus. The redemption fine was reduced, and the charge of mis-declaration was found unsustainable by one member, leading to a difference of opinion on the imposition of any fine.
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1993 (2) TMI 188
Issues Involved: 1. Interpretation of statements and drawing presumptions. 2. Tests for independent corroboration of evidence. 3. Corroboration of confessional statements. 4. Use of one accomplice to corroborate another. 5. Material particulars for independent corroboration. 6. Applicability of the law in D. Bhoormull's case to penalty under Section 112. 7. Application of in rem proceedings to in personam penalties. 8. Evidence of act or omission leading to confiscation and penalty.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Statements and Drawing Presumptions: The appellant argued that the Tribunal misinterpreted the statement of Shri Rajinder Kumar Sharma, leading to incorrect presumptions. The Tribunal noted that this discrepancy was not raised during the appeal or mentioned in the Memorandum of Appeal. Therefore, it was concluded that this issue does not arise out of the Tribunal's order and cannot be referred to the High Court under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act.
2. Tests for Independent Corroboration of Evidence: The appellant questioned the tests for independent corroboration. The Tribunal referenced Supreme Court judgments in Kashmira Singh and Haricharan Kurmi, which were discussed in the Tribunal's order. As these tests are well-established and covered by numerous decisions, the Tribunal determined that this issue does not require further reference.
3. Corroboration of Confessional Statements: The appellant queried whether corroboration of other evidence should be made to confessional statements or vice versa. The Tribunal found that this issue did not arise from its order and noted that Supreme Court decisions already address the corroboration of confessional statements by other evidence. Hence, no reference was deemed necessary.
4. Use of One Accomplice to Corroborate Another: The appellant raised the issue of using one accomplice to corroborate another. The Tribunal cited the Supreme Court's judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, which clearly states that one accomplice cannot corroborate another except in exceptional circumstances. As this issue is covered by existing jurisprudence, no reference was warranted.
5. Material Particulars for Independent Corroboration: The appellant sought clarification on the material particulars required for independent corroboration. The Tribunal concluded that this issue did not arise from its order and did not merit a reference.
6. Applicability of Law in D. Bhoormull's Case to Penalty under Section 112: The appellant questioned whether the principles in D. Bhoormull's case, which pertain to confiscation, apply to penalties under Section 112. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in D. Bhoormull, which distinguishes between penalties in rem (confiscation) and penalties in personam (individual penalties). The Tribunal found that this distinction was clear and did not require further reference.
7. Application of In Rem Proceedings to In Personam Penalties: The appellant argued that the Tribunal incorrectly applied the principles of in rem proceedings to in personam penalties. The Tribunal reiterated the Supreme Court's clear distinction between the two types of penalties in D. Bhoormull's case. As the law is well-defined, no reference was needed.
8. Evidence of Act or Omission Leading to Confiscation and Penalty: The appellant contended that there was no evidence of any act or omission on their part to justify confiscation and penalty. The Tribunal noted that the appellant did not challenge the confiscation order and that the question of penalty was a factual issue, not a legal one. Therefore, this issue did not warrant a reference.
Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that none of the eight questions raised by the appellant merited a reference to the High Court. The application was rejected as devoid of merit, following the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Meenakshi Mills Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. and C.I.T. v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.
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1993 (2) TMI 187
Issues: - Confiscation of goods under various rules - Allegation of evasion of duty - Failure to maintain proper accounts - Applicability of exemption notification - Imposition of penalties
Confiscation of Goods: The judgment deals with an appeal against the confiscation of goods under Rules 9(2), 52A, 173Q, and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, along with Section 120 of the Customs Act, 1962. The goods, including Polyvinyl Acetate Dispersion (Modified), were seized from different locations and were released provisionally under bond. The appellants were required to fulfill bond obligations, pay penalties, and duty on the seized goods.
Allegation of Evasion of Duty: The appellants were accused of manufacturing and removing goods without paying duty or accounting for them in the RG1 Account. The goods were used for captive consumption and sold to another entity. The allegation was supported by entries in an Exercise Note Book, confirming the production and non-accounting of goods, leading to a duty evasion amounting to Rs. 84,530.04.
Failure to Maintain Proper Accounts: The appellants argued that entries in the Exercise Note Book did not reflect actual production but only the commencement of batches. They claimed eligibility for duty exemption under a notification effective from 1-4-1985, suggesting that goods manufactured after this date should not be denied exemption. The argument also questioned the confiscation of goods eligible for exemption.
Applicability of Exemption Notification: The appellants contended that goods entitled to duty exemption from 1-4-1985 should not be confiscated. The consultant argued that the Collector's order of confiscation conflicted with examining eligibility for exemption under specific notifications, questioning the justification for confiscation in such cases.
Imposition of Penalties: The Departmental Representative argued that the failure to enter goods in the RG1 Account and the breach of Rule 52A warranted penalties. The Collector imposed a penalty of Rs. 50,000 due to the value of goods exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs. The appellants sought leniency based on a previous tribunal decision, highlighting the absence of malafides.
Conclusion: The Tribunal rejected the appellants' arguments, upholding the confiscation of goods and penalties imposed. The judgment emphasized the suppression of production and failure to account for excisable goods, justifying the confiscation under relevant rules and Acts. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the original order of confiscation, penalties, and fines.
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1993 (2) TMI 186
Issues Involved:
1. Demand of duty and imposition of penalties by the Collector, Central Excise. 2. Stay of the operation of the Order-in-Original. 3. Sanction and initiation of prosecution by the Central Excise authorities. 4. Tribunal's inherent powers under Section 35C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Rule 41 of the CEGAT rules. 5. Adjudication proceedings versus prosecution in criminal courts.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Demand of Duty and Imposition of Penalties:
The Collector, Central Excise, Chandigarh, through Order-in-Original No. 29/CE/91 dated 28-10-1991, demanded a duty of Rs. 60,52,808.37 under Section 11A of the Act from the appellants for clearances of excisable goods at a lower assessable value. Additionally, a penalty of Rs. 4,00,000/- was imposed under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and a penalty of Rs. 2000/- under Rule 226 read with Rule 227 of the rules.
2. Stay of the Operation of the Order-in-Original:
Under Stay Order No. 212/92-A, dated 18-5-1992, the Tribunal observed that the merits of the case were contentious and arguable. It dispensed with the pre-deposit of the penalty amount of Rs. 4,02,000/- and ordered the appellants to pay the balance duty amount of Rs. 10,10,870/- within six weeks. During the pendency of the appeal, the Revenue authorities were directed not to pursue recovery proceedings.
3. Sanction and Initiation of Prosecution by the Central Excise Authorities:
The appellants, in their Misc. Application dated 11-1-1993, stated that the Collector, Central Excise, Chandigarh, had sanctioned prosecution of the Chairman/Directors/Officers of the appellant company based on the impugned Order-in-Original. They argued that if the prosecution was based on the adjudication order under appeal, it would prejudice the pending appeal.
4. Tribunal's Inherent Powers under Section 35C of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Rule 41 of the CEGAT Rules:
The Tribunal considered the submissions regarding its inherent powers. Under Section 35B of the Act, any person aggrieved by a decision or Order passed by the Collector, Central Excise, as an Adjudicating Authority may appeal to the Tribunal. Section 35C allows the Tribunal to pass orders confirming, modifying, or annulling the decision or Order appealed against. However, the Tribunal concluded that it had no powers to intervene in matters relating to sanctioning or launching prosecution, as these are administrative acts and not judicial orders.
5. Adjudication Proceedings versus Prosecution in Criminal Courts:
The Tribunal emphasized that adjudication proceedings before departmental authorities are independent of prosecution in criminal courts. It cited various judgments, including those of the Supreme Court and High Courts, to support the view that criminal proceedings and adjudication proceedings are distinct and can proceed independently. The Tribunal noted that there was no statutory provision regarding the sanctioning or approving the launching of prosecution in Central Excise cases, unlike in customs cases.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal rejected the Misc. Application No. E/Misc. 31/93-A, dated 11-1-1993, stating that it had no jurisdiction to intervene in the prosecution matters, which are administrative acts. The Tribunal's powers under Rule 41 of the CEGAT rules are limited to orders passed by the Tribunal and do not extend to preventing prosecution based on adjudication orders under appeal.
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1993 (2) TMI 185
Issues Involved: 1. Classification of Henna Powder and Herbal Shikakai Powder. 2. Determination of whether a process of manufacture is involved. 3. Applicability of Chapter Notes 2 and 4 to Chapter 33 CETA. 4. Consideration of alternative classification as Ayurvedic medicaments.
Summary:
1. Classification of Henna Powder and Herbal Shikakai Powder: The appellants filed a classification list for Henna Powder and Herbal Shikakai Powder under Heading 1401.00 CETA, 1985. The Department issued a show cause notice, proposing reclassification under sub-heading 3305.90 CETA, 1985, which covers "preparation for use on the hair," leading to a higher duty rate. The Assistant Collector confirmed this reclassification and imposed a penalty. The Collector (Appeals) upheld the classification but set aside the penalty.
2. Determination of whether a process of manufacture is involved: The appellants argued that no manufacturing process was involved as they merely cleaned, ground, and mixed the ingredients. The Assistant Collector held that the processes of grinding, mixing, and packing constituted manufacturing, making the products excisable. The Tribunal, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Empire Industries Ltd., concluded that the transformation of Henna leaves into powder and the mixing of various powders for Shikakai powder involved manufacturing processes.
3. Applicability of Chapter Notes 2 and 4 to Chapter 33 CETA: Chapter Note 2 specifies that products suitable for use as cosmetics or toilet preparations, when put up in packings with labels or literature indicating such use, fall under Headings 33.03 to 33.07. Chapter Note 4 deems processes like labelling, repacking, or any treatment to render products marketable as manufacturing. The Tribunal found that Herbal Shikakai Powder, sold in unit packings with labels indicating its use for hair, falls under Heading 33.05 CETA, 1985.
4. Consideration of alternative classification as Ayurvedic medicaments: The appellants' claim for classification as Ayurvedic medicaments was dismissed by the Assistant Collector for lack of evidence. The Tribunal did not find sufficient grounds to consider this alternative classification.
Conclusion: - Herbal Shikakai Powder: Classified under Heading 33.05 CETA, 1985. - Henna Powder: Classified under Heading 14.01 CETA, 1985 when in bulk. However, Henna Powder in unit packings, indicated for use as a hair dye, falls under Heading 33.05 CETA, 1985.
The appeal was disposed of in these terms.
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1993 (2) TMI 184
Issues: Stay petitions, Miscellaneous petitions, Appeals
Stay petitions: The Department filed stay petitions seeking to suspend the impugned orders of the Collector (Appeals) related to Customs Appeal C/646/92 and Appeal No. C/SB/1240/92. The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the stay petitions as they intended to dispose of the appeals promptly with the consent of the parties.
Miscellaneous petitions: The Appellate Tribunal also dismissed miscellaneous petitions filed for early hearing, as the appeals were already scheduled for disposal.
Appeals: The appeals involved the import of used Diesel engines from abroad, with allegations of impermissible import and incorrect valuation. The Assistant Collector of Customs, Madras, addressed the valuation and misdeclaration issues, while the Additional Collector focused on the validity of the import from a licensing perspective. The Collector (Appeals) passed orders remanding the appeals to the Additional Collector without delving into the merits. The Appellate Tribunal held that the Collector (Appeals) was competent to decide both valuation and legality of the import, remanding the matter back for a comprehensive review. The Tribunal directed the lower appellate authority to expedite the case within two months from the date of the order, emphasizing cooperation from all parties involved.
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1993 (2) TMI 183
Issues: Application for rectification of mistake apparent from the record in Tribunal's Order regarding classification of Hopkinsons Parallel Slide Valve as an "Isolating Valve" under Customs Tariff.
Analysis: 1. The application under Section 129B (2) of the Customs Act, 1962 sought rectification of a mistake in the Tribunal's Order rejecting the classification of Hopkinsons Parallel Slide Valve as an "Isolating Valve" under Sub-heading 84.61(2) of the Customs Tariff. The basis for rectification was a subsequent order by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in a different case, which classified globe and gauge valves as isolating valves under the same sub-heading.
2. The applicant's counsel argued that the function of the valves, i.e., to isolate the boiler from the main header, should determine their classification as isolating valves, regardless of design or location. Referring to relevant legal precedents, the counsel contended that the applicants were entitled to rectification based on this principle alone, especially since globe and gauge valves were not described as isolating valves in the case before the Larger Bench.
3. The Departmental Representative countered by highlighting the necessity to establish a mistake apparent from the record before considering rectification. The Tribunal's order had previously noted discrepancies in the descriptions provided by the appellants, indicating that the imported valves were not isolating valves. Citing various Tribunal decisions, the Representative argued against rectification based solely on the subsequent decision of the Larger Bench.
4. The Tribunal, after careful consideration, found that the appellants had failed to prove that the imported valves were isolating valves. Despite the argument for rectification based on the Larger Bench decision, the Tribunal emphasized the need for a clear error in its own order to warrant rectification. Referring to a previous case, the Tribunal reiterated that seeking rectification to benefit from a later decision was not permissible.
5. Ultimately, the Tribunal rejected the application for rectification, concluding that there was no error in its order that would necessitate rectification based on the subsequent decision of the Larger Bench. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of establishing a mistake apparent from the record and upheld its original decision regarding the classification of the valves.
This detailed analysis outlines the legal arguments presented by both parties, the Tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and legal principles, and the ultimate decision to reject the application for rectification based on the lack of a clear error in the original order.
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