|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 886 Records
-
2013 (3) TMI 793
Issues:
The judgment involves issues related to the disposal of appeals by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal within the statutory period, the obligation to decide appeals within a specified timeframe, and the extension of interim protection granted to petitioners.
Disposal of Appeals by Tribunal:
The petitioners filed writ petitions due to their appeals not being heard by the Tribunal within the statutory period of 180 days as required under Section 129B(2A) of the Customs Act. The Tribunal had issued notices for hearing on applications seeking extension of time. The delay in disposal of appeals could not be attributed to the petitioners, and they relied on a relevant judgment to support their case. The Tribunal's inability to decide the appeals within the stipulated time should not result in the automatic vacation of the stay granted. The petitioners' bank guarantee had not been encashed, and the Court directed the department not to proceed with invoking the bank guarantee until the Tribunal decides on the application for extension of interim protection.
Legal Obligations and Observations:
The Tribunal is obligated to decide appeals within specified timeframes under the Customs Act. The petitioners argued that they should not be deprived of their legitimate rights due to delays in Tribunal proceedings. Reference was made to a judgment emphasizing that assessees should not be punished for matters beyond their control. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the application for extension of interim protection and the main appeal expeditiously in accordance with the law. The judgment emphasized that the observations made by the Court should not influence the Tribunal's decision on the pending application for extension of interim protection.
Conclusion:
The writ petitions were disposed of with a direction to the respondents not to proceed with the demand/recovery notice until the Tribunal decides on the application for extension of interim protection. The Tribunal was expected to expedite the decision on the application and the main appeal in accordance with the law to ensure the petitioners' rights are protected.
-
2013 (3) TMI 792
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition after hearing Mr. Mohan Prasaran, the Additional Solicitor General for the petitioner.
-
2013 (3) TMI 791
Issues involved: Appeal against CIT(A) order on disallowance u/s 14A, depreciation rate on moulds, and application of section 145A.
Disallowance u/s 14A:
The issue was restored to the AO for re-computation based on relevant facts and circumstances. The Tribunal directed the AO to compute the disallowance consistently with the preceding years. The CIT(A) order was set aside with directions to the AO. Ground no. 1 was allowed for statistical purposes.
Depreciation on moulds:
The CIT(A) had confirmed the AO's decision to restrict depreciation on moulds to 15% instead of the claimed 30%. The Tribunal noted that in previous years, the CIT had proposed a reduction to 25%, but this was overturned by the coordinate Bench. Following this consistency, the Tribunal directed the AO to allow depreciation at 30% as claimed. Ground no. 2 was allowed accordingly.
Application of section 145A:
The issue related to the calculation of closing stocks as per the ICAI method under section 145A. The Tribunal observed that in the previous year, the coordinate Bench had restored a similar issue to the AO. It was deemed appropriate to maintain consistency in calculating closing stocks for the current year as well. The CIT(A) order was set aside with directions to the AO to compute closing stock as per ICAI provisions. The appeal was treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
Separate Judgement by Judges:
No separate judgement was delivered by the judges in this case.
-
2013 (3) TMI 790
Issues involved: Special Leave Petitions filed against orders passed by Aurangabad and Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court regarding admissions to institutions teaching Indian form of medicines for academic years 2011-12 and 2012-13.
Issue 1: Refusal by Government of India, u/s AYUSH, to grant permission to colleges for admitting students for academic year 2011-12 due to deficiencies in infrastructure and teaching staff.
The Supreme Court noted that the refusal of permission was based on deficiencies in infrastructure and teaching staff not meeting minimum standard norms. The Court referred to a previous case where it was observed that the proliferation of ill-equipped and under-staffed educational institutions had caused problems for students. The regulations governing medical colleges, including the 1970 Act and subsequent amendments, required colleges to seek permission from the Central Government and meet specified criteria, such as minimum bed strength for undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
Issue 2: Lack of response from institutions in rectifying deficiencies and seeking permission for admissions.
Despite being given time to address deficiencies, many institutions did not take adequate steps to meet the required standards. The Court observed that institutions only took action when faced with closure notices, prompting them to seek relief from the courts. While some institutions were allowed to accept admission forms, final decisions were pending the outcome of the Special Leave Petitions.
Issue 3: Arguments presented by Petitioners and Additional Solicitor General regarding permission for admissions.
Petitioners argued that deficiencies had been rectified, and permission should be granted for the academic year 2011-12 to avoid disruption in courses. The Additional Solicitor General emphasized the importance of maintaining professional standards in medical education and highlighted that permission had been granted for the subsequent academic year once deficiencies were addressed. The Court noted that while sympathy towards students was acknowledged, it could not override the need for adherence to standards.
Issue 4: Court's decision and rationale for dismissing the Special Leave Petitions.
The Court declined to interfere with the High Court's orders, stating that the institutions were not equipped to conduct classes for the academic year 2011-12. It deemed impractical the proposal of providing extra classes to new entrants to catch up with ongoing courses. The Court emphasized that the privilege granted to candidates to file applications did not guarantee admission, especially considering the advanced stage of the academic year. Ultimately, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.
-
2013 (3) TMI 789
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of including bone meal in Entry 57(V) of the first schedule to the K.G.S.T. Act.
2. Whether bone meal should be classified under Entry 17 of the third schedule as organic manure.
3. Arbitrariness and reasonableness of the legislative classification of bone meal.
Summary:
Issue 1: Constitutional Validity of Including Bone Meal in Entry 57(V) of the First Schedule to the K.G.S.T. Act
The appellants argued that bone meal should be classified under Entry 17 of the third schedule as organic manure, claiming that its inclusion in Entry 57(V) of the first schedule as fertilizers is repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The learned single Judge concluded that there is no arbitrariness in including bone meal in Entry 57(V) of the first schedule of the K.G.S.T. Act, and it cannot be treated as organic manure as mentioned in Entry 17 of the third schedule. The classification made by the legislature was found reasonable, and the petitioners were not entitled to the declaration or consequential reliefs sought.
Issue 2: Classification Under Entry 17 of the Third Schedule as Organic Manure
The counsel for the petitioners argued that bone meal involves a manufacturing process similar to neem cake and crushed neem fruit, which are classified as organic manure and granted exemption. The learned Government Pleader countered that the legislature's decision to exclude bone meal from the exemption was not arbitrary or unreasonable. The Court noted that bone meal, though it may grammatically fall under organic manure, has acquired commercial importance and is used similarly to chemical fertilizers, justifying its inclusion in Entry 57(V).
Issue 3: Arbitrariness and Reasonableness of Legislative Classification
The Court emphasized that the legislature has the power to classify items differently for taxation purposes, provided the classification is not unreasonable or discriminatory. The Court referred to various precedents to support the view that the classification of bone meal as a fertilizer in Entry 57(V) is not arbitrary or unjust. The Court found that the legislature might have intended to promote the use of organic manure listed in Entry 17 by granting exemptions and to treat bone meal differently due to its commercial significance.
Conclusion
The Court upheld the classification of bone meal under Entry 57(V) of the first schedule and found no grounds to declare it as organic manure under Entry 17 of the third schedule. The legislative classification was deemed reasonable, non-arbitrary, and not discriminatory. Consequently, the Writ Appeals were dismissed, affirming the learned single Judge's judgment.
-
2013 (3) TMI 788
Issues Involved:
1. Alleged mistake apparent on record in the interim order.
2. Whether the AO's actions constituted perjury.
3. Whether the Tribunal's interim order was justified.
Summary:
1. Alleged Mistake Apparent on Record:
The Department filed a miscellaneous application u/s 254(2) of the IT Act, claiming that the interim order dated 10th April 2013 contained a mistake apparent on record. The senior Departmental Representative argued that the order should be recalled as it suffered from errors apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal noted that the Department's application was an attempt to reargue the case and seek a review of the interim order, which is not permissible under law. The Tribunal emphasized that the power to rectify an order under s. 254(2) is limited to correcting manifest and apparent mistakes, not for reviewing the order.
2. Whether the AO's Actions Constituted Perjury:
The assessee contended that the AO committed perjury by suppressing the fact that an alternative remedy was available and had been availed of by filing an application u/s 254(2). The Tribunal observed that the AO's actions and assertions, including the claim that the bank guarantee was returned on 8th April 2013, were factually incorrect. The Tribunal noted that the AO's conduct, including the collection of funds in violation of the stay order, was high-handed and arbitrary, and such actions could not be justified as bona fide.
3. Whether the Tribunal's Interim Order was Justified:
The Department argued that judicial propriety required the Tribunal to await the final order before directing a refund. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating that no such argument was advanced during the hearing leading to the interim order. The Tribunal emphasized that the interim order was passed to address the high-handed actions of the Department in collecting funds in violation of a valid stay order. The Tribunal concluded that the Department's attempt to seek a review of the interim order was not permissible under law and dismissed the miscellaneous application filed by the Department.
-
2013 (3) TMI 787
Issues involved:
Appeal by Revenue against additional deduction for provisions u/s 36(1)(vii)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and Cross Objections by assessee regarding provision for investment depreciation reserve.
Details of the judgment:
1. The Co-operative Bank filed returns for the Assessment Years (A.Y.) 2007-08 and 2009-10 with certain provisions claimed. Assessing Officer disallowed these provisions as not eligible for deduction. However, allowed deduction u/s 36(1)(vii)(a) at 7.5% of total income.
2. Assessee appealed, claiming entitlement to provisions under section 36(1)(vii)(a) including 10% of average advances by rural branch. CIT(A) accepted the claim based on the branch classification as rural.
3. Revenue contested, arguing provisions were not for bad debts and doubtful debts, a prerequisite for deduction u/s 36(1)(viia). Also, disputed the rural branch classification claim not raised before Assessing Officer.
4. Assessee's representative argued that provisions for NPA and standard assets were akin to bad debts. CIT(A) failed to address the claim on investment depreciation and fluctuation reserves.
5. Revenue contended that fresh claims cannot be made post-assent to additions. Assessee's representative cited legal precedents to support their position.
6. The Tribunal noted the provisions of Sec. 36(1)(viia) and the requirement for bad and doubtful debts for allowance. The maximum allowable amount was determined based on this provision.
7. The Tribunal highlighted the need for a fresh assessment by the Assessing Officer to verify the nature of provisions made by the assessee and their eligibility for deduction u/s 36(1)(viia).
8. The Tribunal emphasized the importance of considering provisions representing actual diminution in asset value and directed a reevaluation by the Assessing Officer.
9. The Tribunal set aside the previous orders and remitted the issues back to the Assessing Officer for a fresh assessment in accordance with the law.
10. Both the Revenue's appeal and the assessee's Cross Objections were allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced on Thursday, the 21st March, 2013 at Chennai.
-
2013 (3) TMI 786
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition after condoning the delay. Mr. Harish Chandra represented the Petitioner in the case.
-
2013 (3) TMI 785
The Bombay High Court heard a case regarding the cancellation of the appellant's registration under section 12A of the Income Tax Act. The appellant argued that they were not involved in any commercial activities and that the grounds for withdrawal of registration did not apply. The High Court admitted the case based on substantial questions of law related to the cancellation of registration.
-
2013 (3) TMI 784
Issues involved: Disallowance of depreciation on car and disallowance of interest paid for purchase of car.
Disallowance of depreciation on car: The assessee claimed depreciation on a motor car purchased during the relevant year. The car was purchased in the name of the Director of the assessee company, and the assessee also paid interest on the loan taken for the car purchase. The Assessing Officer disallowed both amounts, stating that the assessee was not the owner of the car. The disallowance was based on a Supreme Court decision. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance, stating that the car should have been registered in the name of the company, not the director, to avoid evasion of state taxes. The assessee appealed against this decision.
The issue was resolved in favor of the assessee by referring to a Bombay High Court decision which clarified that the Motor Vehicle Act does not impose restrictions on the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle. The section in question only requires reporting of transfer to the registration authority within a specified time. Non-compliance with this section does not affect the transfer of ownership. Therefore, the assessee, who purchased the vehicle and used it for business, was entitled to depreciation, regardless of the registration details. The court emphasized that ownership should be determined based on the facts of each case. The court cited another case where depreciation was allowed even though the vehicle was registered in the vendor's name. Consequently, the disallowance of depreciation on the car was deemed unjustified and was deleted.
Disallowance of interest paid for purchase of car: The same reasoning applied to the disallowance of interest on the loan taken for the car purchase. The disallowance was also deemed unjustified and was deleted.
In conclusion, the disallowances made by the CIT(A) were found to have no justification, and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed.
-
2013 (3) TMI 783
Issues Involved:
1. Disallowance of interest u/s 36(1)(iii).
2. Non-allowance of claim of expenditure in revised return of income.
Summary:
Issue 1: Disallowance of interest u/s 36(1)(iii)
The Revenue appealed against the deletion of an addition on account of disallowance of interest u/s 36(1)(iii) amounting to Rs. 49,37,388/-. The assessing officer observed that the assessee made investments in overseas companies, which were not for business purposes and did not generate income. Consequently, interest expenses related to these investments were disallowed. The Ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting that similar disallowances in earlier years were overturned by ITAT Ahmedabad and confirmed by the jurisdictional High Court. The Tribunal upheld the Ld. CIT(A)'s order, finding no infirmity in it. Thus, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Issue 2: Non-allowance of claim of expenditure in revised return of income
The assessee contested the Ld. CIT(A)'s confirmation of the A.O.'s action in not allowing an expenditure claim of Rs. 90,97,554/- in the revised return. The assessee argued that the revised return was filed to account for expenses that were mistakenly omitted in the original return. The Ld. CIT(A) rejected this submission, stating that the revised return was filed after the time limit and was therefore non-est. The Ld. CIT(A) also cited the Supreme Court's decision in Goetze India Ltd. vs. CIT, which restricts the assessing officer from entertaining claims outside a revised return. However, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that appellate authorities have the power to adjudicate such claims, referencing the jurisdictional High Court's decision in CIT vs. Symphony Comfort Systems Ltd. Consequently, the Tribunal restored the matter to the Ld. CIT(A) for a decision on the merits. The assessee's C.O. was allowed for statistical purposes.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal regarding the disallowance of interest and allowed the assessee's C.O. for statistical purposes, remanding the issue of non-allowance of expenditure in the revised return back to the Ld. CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
-
2013 (3) TMI 782
The appeal and stay application were directed against Order-in-Appeal No: P-I/MMD/220/2012 passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Pune - I. The bench remanded the matter to the lower appellate authority to consider whether the service can be classified under "Business Support Service." The appeal was allowed by way of remand, and the stay application was disposed of.
-
2013 (3) TMI 781
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of ex parte assessment orders u/s 16(5) r.w.s. 17(1) of the Wealth Tax Act.
2. Inclusion of specific lands under the definition of "assets" u/s 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act.
3. Rate of valuation for specific plots of land.
Summary:
Issue 1: Legality of Ex Parte Assessment Orders
The assessee challenged the legality of the ex parte assessment completed u/s 16(5) r.w.s. 17(1) of the Wealth Tax Act, arguing that no notice u/s 16(4) was issued and no opportunity of hearing was provided. The Ld.CIT(A) found that the notice issued u/s 16(4) was not a legal notice and concluded that the assessment was null and void due to non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 16(5). The Tribunal concurred, noting that the Assessing Officer did not provide the required opportunity to the assessee before passing the best judgment assessment. Accordingly, Ground No. 1 was dismissed.
Issue 2: Inclusion of Lands as "Assets"
The Ld.CIT(A) held that the land at Survey No. 148/1 and Survey No. 510/A/1 (Part) did not fall within the definition of "asset" u/s 2(ea) of the Wealth Tax Act. The land at Survey No. 148/1 was considered stock-in-trade and agricultural land, thus not an "asset" under the Act. This finding was supported by the decision in the case of Radheshyam R. Jhunjhunwala (HUF), where agricultural land under cultivation was excluded from "urban land" as defined in Section 2(ea). The Tribunal upheld the Ld.CIT(A)'s decision, dismissing Ground No. 2.
Issue 3: Valuation of Plots
The Ld.CIT(A) accepted the valuation rates of Rs. 107/- and Rs. 91/- per Sq.Mtrs. for the lands at Survey No. 101 and Survey No. 510/A/1, respectively, based on evidence of actual sale transactions provided by the assessee. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the Ld.CIT(A)'s findings and confirmed the valuation rates. Consequently, Ground No. 3 was dismissed.
Conclusion:
The revenue's appeals were dismissed, and the Tribunal upheld the Ld.CIT(A)'s findings on all grounds. The judgment was pronounced in open court on 26-03-2013.
-
2013 (3) TMI 780
The Delhi High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the main petition due to a settlement agreement dated 26th February 2013. The disputes have been settled, and the application and petition are disposed of accordingly.
-
2013 (3) TMI 779
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 50 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 regarding treatment of depreciable assets as short-term assets for capital gains tax purposes.
Summary:
1. The respondent sold a factory shed and earned long-term capital gains, but as the asset was depreciable, gains were computed under Section 50 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent claimed deduction under Section 54EC by investing the gains, which was disallowed by the assessing officer and upheld by the Commissioner of Income Tax (A).
2. The Tribunal allowed the respondent's claim for exemption under Section 54EC, citing a previous decision of the High Court in the matter of CIT v. Ace Builders (P) Ltd. The Tribunal applied the principles from the Ace Builders case, stating that the deeming fiction of treating long-term gains as short-term gains under Section 50 does not apply to other provisions like Section 54EC.
3. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, reasoning that the deeming fiction in Section 50 is limited to that section and does not extend to provisions like Section 54EC. Therefore, the appeal by the Revenue was dismissed, with no costs awarded.
-
2013 (3) TMI 778
The Gujarat High Court directed the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation to issue a No Objection Certificate to the appellant as the development charges were deposited as demanded. The court set aside the previous order and instructed the Single Judge to reconsider the deposit made by the appellant. The Civil Application was disposed of.
-
2013 (3) TMI 777
Issues involved: Trademark infringement, well-known trademark protection, domain name usage, corporate name usage, ex parte proceedings.
Trademark Infringement: The plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendant from using the domain and corporate names with the word AGILENT, claiming ownership of multiple trademarks under different classes. The defendant, a construction company, incorporated after the plaintiff, was found to be using a domain name similar to the plaintiff's trademark. The court held that the plaintiff's trademark AGILENT qualified as a "Well Known Trademark" and granted a permanent injunction against the defendant from using the trademark or any deceptively similar mark.
Well-Known Trademark Protection: The plaintiffs established the reputation and extensive use of the trademark AGILENT globally, with numerous registrations in various countries. The court acknowledged the plaintiff's long history of innovation, global presence, and social responsibility efforts, concluding that AGILENT qualified as a well-known trademark under the Trademarks Act, 1999.
Domain and Corporate Name Usage: Despite the defendant's business falling in a different class than the plaintiff's registrations, the court found that the defendant's use of the word AGILENT would provide an unfair advantage detrimental to the plaintiff's distinctive character and reputation. The defendant's conduct of not responding to legal notices or the suit indicated an attempt to benefit from the plaintiff's goodwill, leading to the grant of a permanent injunction.
Ex Parte Proceedings: The defendants failed to appear in court, leading to ex parte proceedings. Citing a previous judgment, the court emphasized that in such cases, suits can be disposed of based on the plaintiff's evidence when the defendant chooses not to contest. The court granted a decree for permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs due to the defendant's non-contestation.
Companies Act Compliance: The court noted that Section 20 of the Companies Act, 1956 prohibits registration of a company name identical or resembling an existing registered trademark. In this case, the court found the defendant's name and domain usage infringing on the plaintiff's trademark rights, justifying the injunction granted against the defendant.
Conclusion: A decree for permanent injunction was passed in favor of the plaintiffs, restraining the defendant from using the trademark AGILENT or any deceptively similar mark in its business name, domain name, or any other trade name. The defendant was given three months to rectify its name, failing which compulsory steps for name change would be initiated. The plaintiffs were also granted liberty to inform the Registrar of Companies about the court's order for necessary actions.
-
2013 (3) TMI 776
The High Court of Calcutta dismissed a writ petition challenging a notice issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The court ruled that the petition was misconceived as borrowers must first respond to the notice before questioning the jurisdiction of the authorized officer. The court cited relevant Supreme Court decisions and dismissed the writ petition without costs.
-
2013 (3) TMI 775
Issues Involved:
1. Definition and scope of the term "victim" under Section 2(wa) read with proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
2. Right of the complainant in a private complaint case to appeal under proviso to Section 372 or Section 378(4) CrPC.
3. Whether the rights of a victim under the amended CrPC are auxiliary to those of the State.
4. Whether the presentation of appeal against acquittal is a right or an obligation of the State.
5. Appellate forum for a victim's appeal under proviso to Section 372 when the State also appeals under Section 378(1)(a) or (b) CrPC.
6. Prospective or retrospective application of proviso to Section 372 CrPC and conversion of pending revision petitions.
7. Period of limitation for a victim to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
Summary:
Issue (A): Definition and Scope of "Victim"
The term "victim" under Section 2(wa) includes all categories of legal heirs for the purpose of engaging an advocate under Section 24(8) or to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section 372. However, only the wife, husband, parent, and child of a deceased victim are entitled to compensation under Section 357(1)(c), and only dependents requiring rehabilitation are eligible for compensation under Section 357-A.
Issue (B): Right of Complainant in Private Complaint Case
A complainant who is also a victim in a private complaint case must seek special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) against acquittal. However, if the complainant succeeds in establishing guilt but is aggrieved by conviction for a lesser offense or inadequate compensation, they may appeal under proviso to Section 372. Victims other than the complainant in such cases are governed by Section 378(4) for appeals against acquittal.
Issue (C) & (D): Rights of Victim vs. State
The rights of a victim under the amended CrPC are substantive and independent, not contingent upon the State's appeal. Consequently, a victim does not need to seek leave or special leave to appeal under proviso to Section 372.
Issue (E): Appellate Forum for Victim's Appeal
An appeal by a victim against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable offense shall lie to the Court of Session. The State's appeal under Section 378(1)(a) against the same order shall also be entertained by the Sessions Court.
Issue (F): Prospective or Retrospective Application
The proviso to Section 372 CrPC, inserted w.e.f. December 31, 2009, is prospective. Only orders passed on or after this date are appealable by a victim. Revision petitions against orders of acquittal passed before December 31, 2009, cannot be converted into appeals.
Issue (G): Period of Limitation
The period of limitation for a victim to prefer an appeal under proviso to Section 372 is:
- In case of acquittal: 90 days to the High Court, 60 days to the Sessions Court.
- For any other sentence or order: 60 days to the High Court, 30 days to the Sessions Court from the date of knowledge of the order.
Conclusion:
The judgment clarifies the rights and procedural aspects for victims under the amended CrPC, ensuring their substantive rights to appeal are independent and not auxiliary to the State's rights.
-
2013 (3) TMI 774
Issues involved: Interpretation of proviso to Section 372, Cr.P.C. in relation to Section 378(4), Cr.P.C.
Summary:
In the matter at hand, the appellant challenged an acquittal order in a Criminal Case under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881. The amended proviso to Section 372, Cr.P.C. allows victims to appeal against acquittal orders, with such appeals to be heard by the Sessions Court. While Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. grants the High Court jurisdiction over appeals against acquittals, the proviso to Section 372 confers this jurisdiction on the Sessions Court. The appellant should have first approached the Sessions Court before coming to the High Court, unless exceptional grounds exist. The trend of directly filing appeals before the High Court is discouraged.
The amended proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. was not considered in previous judgments, including one by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and another by the Rajasthan High Court. A judgment by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dalip Singh of the Rajasthan High Court supports the view that appeals against magistrate acquittals should be directed to the Sessions Court. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal is returned to the petitioner to be presented before the Sessions Judge, Bhilwara. Any delay caused by this process will not affect the appellant under the law of limitation.
The petition for leave to appeal is disposed of accordingly.
............
|
9911796707
