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2012 (12) TMI 1134
Issues involved: The judgment involves an appeal by the Assessee contesting the Order u/s. 263 of the Income Tax Act 1961 regarding the assessment for the Assessment Year 2005-06.
First Issue - Set off of loss against dividend income: The first issue pertains to the set off of loss on the sale of Units in ICICI Prudential Balance Fund against dividend income. The ld. CIT set aside the assessment as the AO did not examine this claim. The assessee explained that section 94(7) did not apply as the conditions were not met. The AO did not record satisfaction on this matter. The Tribunal found that there was no proper enquiry by the AO and confirmed the direction to redo the assessment.
Second Issue - Claim of interest against short term capital gains: The second issue involves the claim of interest by the assessee against short term capital gains on the sale of three different scrips. The AO did not inquire about this claim during assessment. The Tribunal noted that there was no verification or application of mind by the AO in this matter. The direction to redo the assessment was confirmed, emphasizing that the views expressed during the hearing were not determinative and the matter required further deliberation.
The Tribunal upheld the impugned order and dismissed the assessee's appeal.
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2012 (12) TMI 1133
The Supreme Court condoned the delay and dismissed the case, but granted the petitioners liberty to file a Review Petition before the High Court if certain disputed facts were not seriously considered. The High Court may consider the petition in accordance with the law after a reasonable opportunity of hearing to both parties. No opinion was expressed on the merits or demerits of the case.
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2012 (12) TMI 1132
Issues Involved: Appeals by the Assessee challenging assessments u/s.153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for A.Ys. 2001-02 to 2007-08 dismissed as not maintainable by CIT(A).
Issue 1: Tribunal's Decision on Restoration of Assessments
The Tribunal considered the appeals by the Assessee challenging assessments u/s.153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for A.Ys. 2001-02 to 2007-08. The Assessee argued that the issue was similar to a previous case where the matter was restored to the first appellate authority for a decision on merits. The Tribunal agreed that such a decision was necessary to prevent prejudice to the Assessee in case the assessments were restored. However, the Tribunal clarified that deciding the appeals on merits by the first appellate authority may not be necessary unless the assessments are actually restored, as it may render the decision futile. The Tribunal upheld the dismissal of the appeals by the Assessee, with the condition that if the Assessee succeeds in challenging the section 263 orders, they can pursue the appeals before the first appellate authority for a decision on merits.
Issue 2: Compliance with Legal Parameters
The Revenue acknowledged the Tribunal's decision to protect the Assessee's interests by directing the first appellate authority to decide the appeals on merits. However, the Revenue emphasized the importance of ensuring that such decisions are within the legal parameters. The Tribunal found that the dismissal of the appeals by the CIT(A) as not maintainable was in accordance with the law since the assessments had been set aside by the revision order, and no appellate order had been passed by the specified date. The Tribunal concluded that the dismissal of the appeals was justified under the circumstances.
Issue 3: Dismissal of Assessee's Appeals
In light of the above considerations, the Tribunal decided to dismiss all seven appeals by the Assessee. The Tribunal clarified that if the Assessee successfully challenges the section 263 orders, they would have the opportunity to pursue the appeals before the first appellate authority for a decision on merits. The Tribunal ensured that the Assessee's statutory right to contest assessments under the appellate procedure was preserved. The decision to dismiss the appeals was made with the understanding that the issue subject to adjudication by both the CIT(A) and the revisionary authority was the same, and the assumption of jurisdiction by either authority was maintainable in law.
In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the Assessee's appeals challenging the assessments u/s.153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, with the provision for the Assessee to pursue the appeals on merits if successful in challenging the section 263 orders. The decision aimed to balance the Assessee's rights with legal requirements and precedents set by previous cases.
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2012 (12) TMI 1131
Issues Involved:1. Taxability of interest received on arbitration awards as revenue receipts. 2. Allowance of depreciation on cars in the absence of business activities. Summary:Issue 1: Taxability of Interest Received on Arbitration AwardsIn I.T.A. no.4168/Del./2000 for AY 1997-98, the AO included Rs. 1,96,72,751/- received as interest from the Airport Authority of India as revenue receipt, citing the compensation for delayed payments. Similarly, in I.T.A. no.3443/Del./2001 for AY 1998-99, Rs. 3,33,59,343/- received from Maharashtra State Electricity Board was treated as revenue receipt. The AO relied on decisions such as Govinda Chowdhary & Sons, 203 ITR 881(SC), and others to support this stance. The CIT(A) reversed the AO's decision, holding that the interest was not contractual or statutory but awarded at the discretion of the arbitrator, thus not taxable as revenue receipts. The CIT(A) referenced the ITAT Cuttuck Bench decision in J.C. Budhraja Vs. ITO and other precedents. On appeal, the ITAT initially sided with the Revenue but later recalled the order. Upon re-evaluation, the ITAT upheld the AO's view, emphasizing that the interest awarded was a revenue receipt, citing the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Govinda Choudhury and Sons, 203 ITR 881, which established that interest awarded on compensation amounts is taxable income. Consequently, the appeals for AY 1997-98 and AY 1998-99 were allowed in favor of the Revenue. Issue 2: Allowance of Depreciation on CarsFor AY 1998-99, the AO disallowed depreciation of Rs. 6,62,852/- on cars, arguing no business activity was conducted. The CIT(A) allowed the depreciation, noting the cars were used for business purposes and the assessee earned business income from arbitration awards. The ITAT upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, finding no material evidence from the Revenue to dispute the findings. Thus, the ground regarding depreciation was dismissed, and the appeal was partly allowed for AY 1998-99. Conclusion:The appeal for AY 1997-98 was allowed in favor of the Revenue, confirming the taxability of interest as revenue receipts. For AY 1998-99, the appeal was partly allowed, affirming the taxability of interest but upholding the allowance of depreciation on cars.
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2012 (12) TMI 1130
Whether in exercise of its powers under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’), the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to ignore any one of the reports, where there are two reports by the same or different investigating agencies in furtherance of the orders of a Court? If so, to what effect?
Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘the CBI’) is empowered to conduct ‘fresh’/’re-investigation’ when the cognizance has already been taken by the Court of competent jurisdiction on the basis of a police report under Section 173 of the Code?
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2012 (12) TMI 1129
Whether there can be more than one FIR in relation to the same incident or different incidents arising from the same occurrence? - Held that:- It is true that law recognizes common trial or a common FIR being registered for one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction as contemplated under Section 220 of the Code. There cannot be any straight jacket formula, but this question has to be answered on the facts of each case. This Court in the case of Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar [2001 (3) TMI 1036 - SUPREME COURT], held that the expression ‘same transaction’ from its very nature is incapable of exact definition. It is not intended to be interpreted in any artificial or technical sense. Common sense in the ordinary use of language must decide whether or not in the very facts of a case, it can be held to be one transaction.
It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality and the purpose thereof different and they emerge from different circumstances, it will not be possible for the Court to take a view that they form part of the same transaction and therefore, there could be a common FIR or subsequent FIR could not be permitted to be registered or there could be common trial.
Similarly, for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences “committed in the course of the same transaction”.
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2012 (12) TMI 1128
Issues involved: Application for substitution of Mishapar Investments Limited in place of Sicom Limited in Company Petition No.34 of 2009 pending before the Court.
Summary: 1. The applicant Company filed an application seeking permission to convene meetings of secured creditors for a compromise scheme. Subsequently, Company Petition No.34 of 2009 was filed under Section 391(1) of the Companies Act for sanctioning the compromise scheme approved by secured creditors. 2. Company Application No.1 of 2009 was filed to restrain Sicom Limited, a secured creditor, from legal proceedings under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act. The court stayed Sicom Limited's actions. However, the application was later dismissed, leading to an appeal by the applicant Company.
3. The Division Bench allowed Sicom Limited's appeal against the Company Petition, stating it was not maintainable under Section 391(1) of the Act. The applicant Company then appealed to the Apex Court through Special Leave Petitions.
4. During the pendency of the Special Leave Petitions, Sicom Limited assigned its debts, rights, and interests to Mishapar Investments Limited. The Apex Court, upon settlement between the parties, allowed the substitution of Mishapar Investments Limited in place of Sicom Limited. The matter was remanded to the Company Judge for consideration under Section 391 of the Companies Act.
5. The parties had no objections to the substitution, and the Court allowed the application based on the Apex Court's order. Mishapar Investments Limited was permitted to replace Sicom Limited in Company Petition No.34 of 2009.
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2012 (12) TMI 1127
Business income OR income from other sources - Held that:- Such activities and the agreements entered which ensured that effective management of M/s Ma Foi remained with them would show that these were part of an organized and well thought out plan to get more value for their investments. There was no loss of source of income for the assessee by virtue of 1 Million Euro received from M/s Randstad. In such a situation, in our opinion, A.O. was justified in considering the receipt to be from an adventure in the nature of business. View taken by the ld. CIT(A) that if not business income it will be ‘income from other sources’ is also, in our view, justified. Once it is not a capital receipt, then the income has to be taxed under one or other head of income provided under Section 14 of the Act.
Money received was not for any breach of agreement. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the amount was rightly taxed as revenue receipts. No interference with the orders of the lower authorities are called for.
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2012 (12) TMI 1126
Issues involved: The issue involved in this case is whether the Tribunal was correct in accepting the revised income u/s 139(5) of the Income Tax Act, against the original return filed by a State Government owned company acting as a development financial institution.
Summary: The State Government owned company, acting as a development financial institution, filed a revised return u/s. 139(5) of the Income Tax Act after the Assessing Officer completed the assessment based on the original return, ignoring the revised one. The CIT (A) confirmed the Assessing Officer's order, leading the company to appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to accept the revised return, stating that the company was entitled to file a revised return if any omission was made in the original return. The Revenue challenged this decision, leading to the proposed question of law.
The company, which was a limited company, was involved in the Sale Tax Deferment Scheme initiated by the Government of Gujarat. However, when the scheme was canceled, the company reversed the income in its books of account for the assessment year 2005-06. The Tribunal found that all conditions for filing a revised return u/s. 139(5) were fulfilled by the company, including filing the original return u/s. 139(1) and discovering the omission in the original return. The Tribunal held that the company was within its right to revise the return based on the withdrawal of the government scheme.
The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the company had the right to revise its return after discovering the omission due to the government's scheme withdrawal. The Court found no error in the Tribunal's interpretation and application of the law to the facts of the case, leading to the dismissal of the Tax Appeal.
In conclusion, the High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision to accept the revised income u/s 139(5) of the Income Tax Act, stating that the company was entitled to revise its return based on the factual circumstances surrounding the government scheme withdrawal.
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2012 (12) TMI 1125
Issues Involved: 1. Deletion of addition made u/s 2(22)(e) of the Act. 2. Disallowance of interest expenditure u/s 14A read with Rule 8D.
Summary:
Issue 1: Deletion of addition made u/s 2(22)(e) of the Act
The Revenue argued that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs. 2.99 crores made u/s 2(22)(e) of the Act, which was considered as deemed dividend. The assessee, the Managing Director of M/s. ASL Capital Holdings Pvt. Ltd., received Rs. 4.99 crores from the company, which the Assessing Officer treated as deemed dividend since the company was closely held and had substantial accumulated profits. The assessee contended that the amount was received as a quid pro quo arrangement for providing a personal guarantee for the company's bank loan, a claim the Assessing Officer rejected. However, the CIT(A) accepted the assessee's argument, stating that the arrangement was a case of 'business expedience' and could not be treated as deemed dividend. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, agreeing that the arrangement was commercial expedience and not an advancement of loan or deposit, thus not falling under the definition of deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e).
Issue 2: Disallowance of interest expenditure u/s 14A read with Rule 8D
The assessee challenged the disallowance of Rs. 19,67,681/- u/s 14A read with Rule 8D, upheld by the CIT(A). The Assessing Officer had disallowed the amount, stating that the assessee claimed exempt dividend income of Rs. 38,26,191/- without attributing any expenditure. The Tribunal noted that the Assessing Officer did not record satisfaction regarding the correctness of the assessee's claim before making the disallowance, which is a prerequisite under section 14A(2). Additionally, Rule 8D, prescribing the method for determining such expenditure, was applicable only from the date of its introduction on 24.03.2008 and not retrospectively. The Tribunal remitted the issue back to the Assessing Officer to decide afresh in accordance with the law, considering the correct interpretation of section 14A and Rule 8D.
Conclusion:
The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed, and the Cross Objections of the assessee were accepted for statistical purposes. The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to reconsider the disallowance u/s 14A following the correct legal mandate and after providing adequate opportunity to the assessee.
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2012 (12) TMI 1124
Deletion of Penalty u/s 8-D(6) of U. P. Trade Tax Act - for the month of November 2000 and March 2001, the TDS was not deducted by the petitioner - Held that:- From the record, it appears that the petitioner had deposited the TDS alongwith interest for the delay. Thus, there was no loss to the revenue. When the TDS was deposited alongwith interest and there was no loss to the revenue, then there was no justification for levy of the penalty - There was no malafide intention on the part of the assesee.
There was no justification for levy of the penalty - deletion of penalty upheld - Appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2012 (12) TMI 1123
Grant of deduction u/s 80 IB(10) - Held that:- Thus issue is now fully covered in favor of the assessee for grant of deduction u/s 80 IB(10) of the IT Act because the assessee has acquired dominant right over the land and has developed the housing project by incurring all the expenses and taking all risks involved thereof. The crux of the matter would be that assessee has acquired the land in question and has developed the housing project at its own cost as per the requirement of section 80 IB (10) of the IT Act
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2012 (12) TMI 1122
Issues Involved: 1. Eligibility for exemption under Notification No. 21/2002-Cus. 2. Applicability of extended period u/s 28 of the Customs Act, 1962. 3. Confiscation of goods u/s 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962. 4. Imposition of fine and penalty u/s 125 and 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Summary:
1. Eligibility for exemption under Notification No. 21/2002-Cus: The appellant, M/s. Air India Ltd., imported an aircraft engine claiming exemption under Notification No. 21/2002-Cus., dated 1-3-2002 (Serial No. 347). The condition for exemption required that the parts be used for the manufacture or servicing of aeroplanes. The Commissioner observed that the engine was kept for repairs and re-export, not for servicing any aeroplane in India, thus not fulfilling the exemption conditions.
2. Applicability of extended period u/s 28 of the Customs Act, 1962: The Commissioner concluded that the appellant claimed the exemption under an erroneous understanding and there was no wilful misdeclaration or suppression of facts. Hence, the extended period u/s 28 could not be invoked for confirming the duty demand.
3. Confiscation of goods u/s 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962: The Commissioner held that the goods were liable for confiscation u/s 111(o) as the appellant did not fulfill the conditions for availing the exemption. The goods were confiscated, and a redemption fine of Rs. 5 lakhs was imposed u/s 125, along with a penalty of Rs. 1 lakh u/s 112(a).
4. Imposition of fine and penalty u/s 125 and 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's order, stating that the duty demand arises u/s 125(2) and not u/s 28, with no time limit for duty demand under this section. The fine and penalty were deemed appropriate given the value of the goods and the nature of the violation. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding no infirmity in the Commissioner's order.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's order, confirming the confiscation of goods, imposition of fine and penalty, and the duty demand u/s 125(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. The appeal was dismissed as devoid of merits.
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2012 (12) TMI 1121
Issues involved: Challenge to rejection of rebate claim by Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise on grounds of being time-barred and failure to submit required documents.
Summary: The petitioner exported goods on specific dates and filed a consolidated rebate claim after a considerable delay, resulting in rejection by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise. The rejection was based on the claim being time-barred u/s 11B of CEA, 1944, as it was filed after the prescribed period. The petitioner contested this decision citing a previous court ruling. Another similar case was dismissed by the court due to filing refund claims beyond the prescribed period as per Section 11B of the Act. The court referred to a Supreme Court judgment emphasizing the need to follow the provisions of the Act for refund claims. The petitioner relied on a different case to argue that delays caused by the Department should not lead to dismissal of refund claims. However, since the delay in this case was not due to Departmental reasons, the claim was rejected. The court disposed of the petition based on previous observations without providing separate reasons, similar to a previous case.
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2012 (12) TMI 1120
Revision u/s 263 - Computation of deduction under Section 80-IB - Held that:- May be it is true that every claim, which is allowed to an assessee, need not be elaborately dealt with in an assessment order. However, the chain of events should show that there was application of mind atleast on the veracity of a claim made by the assessee. This is not seen here. It might be true that eligible undertaking need not maintain separate account for claiming deduction under Section 80-IB of the Act, but these were aspects, which were never verified by the Assessing Officer at the time of completing the assessment.
Therefore, of the opinion that the finding of DIT (International Taxation) that the assessment was erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to the interests of Revenue cannot be faulted. We do not find any reason to interfere in such an order of DIT (International Taxation). Appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed.
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2012 (12) TMI 1119
The Delhi High Court allowed the petitioner to withdraw the writ petition and seek statutory remedies for rectification or revision. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn.
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2012 (12) TMI 1118
Issues involved: Remand of appeal for fair opportunity of hearing due to non-compliance with stay order.
Summary:
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT, NEW DELHI, in the case, remitted the matter back to the learned Commissioner (Appeals) for granting a fair opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The Tribunal noted that during the process of adjudication, the tax element, interest, and penalty of 25% of tax demanded were deposited, which was not considered by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal's order dated 17.12.2008 recorded this fact, while the appeal was dismissed for non-compliance with the stay order by the Commissioner (Appeals) in an order dated 29.8.2008.
The Tribunal emphasized that since the aspect of payment was undisputed, and the appeal was not disposed of on merit by the first appellate authority, the appellant should be given a fair opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal directed the appellant to apply for a date of hearing within 4 weeks of receiving the order. It was stressed that the matter, being nearly 5 years old, should not be kept pending at the first appellate stage upon remand, and the appeal should be disposed of expeditiously after the completion of the hearing.
In conclusion, the Tribunal's decision focused on ensuring a fair hearing for the appellant by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and expeditious disposal of the appeal based on the undisputed aspect of payment recorded by the Tribunal.
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2012 (12) TMI 1117
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of Notification No. 14/1997-C.E. (N.T.), dated 3-5-1997. 2. Restriction of Modvat credit to 10% of the Excise duty. 3. Discriminatory treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Summary:
1. Validity of Notification No. 14/1997-C.E. (N.T.), dated 3-5-1997: The petitioners challenged the validity of Notification No. 14/1997-C.E. (N.T.), dated 3-5-1997, arguing that it was arbitrary, unreasonable, and ultra vires the Constitution. The notification restricted the Modvat credit to 10% of the excise duty for certain petroleum products. The petitioners also contested the vires of Section 87 of the Finance Act but did not press this challenge.
2. Restriction of Modvat credit to 10% of the Excise duty: The petitioners sought a declaration that restricting the Modvat credit to 10% of the excise duty as provided in the notification was ultra vires the rule-making powers u/s 37(xvi) and (xvia) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. They argued that they were entitled to avail and utilize the accrued Modvat credit to the extent of the excise duty paid on inputs used, such as specified petroleum products, during the period from 23-7-1996 to 28-2-1999. The Government of India issued the notification dated 3-5-1997 to rectify the undue benefit manufacturers received by availing Modvat credit at 15% while actually bearing a duty incidence of only 10%.
3. Discriminatory treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution of India: The petitioners argued that the notification was arbitrary and discriminatory, thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. They contended that they paid full excise duty at the rate of 15% on non-fertilizer items and should not have their Modvat entitlement curtailed. The court noted that the petitioners paid full duty of excise at 15% directly to the Government, unlike other manufacturers who paid only 10% and had the remaining 5% absorbed by the Oil Pool Account. The court referenced the decision in Gujarat Paraffins Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Secretary to the Government of India, where a similar notification was struck down for being discriminatory.
The court concluded that the impugned notification violated Article 14 as it grouped together manufacturers who paid different rates of excise duty, treating them equally despite their unequal circumstances. The notification was declared illegal insofar as it limited the Modvat credit to 10% for those who paid the full 15% excise duty. The petitioners were entitled to a refund of duty with statutory interest.
Conclusion: The petition challenging the notification was allowed, with the court declaring the restriction on Modvat credit to 10% as illegal for manufacturers who paid the full 15% excise duty. The petitioners were entitled to consequential benefits, including a refund of duty with interest.
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2012 (12) TMI 1116
Issues Involved: 1. Incorrect application and claim of drawback under Rule 6. 2. Rejection of supplementary claims as time-barred. 3. Applicability of Rule 17 for condonation of delay.
Summary:
1. Incorrect application and claim of drawback under Rule 6: The exporter-respondents, M/S Cummins India Ltd., incorrectly applied for, claimed, and received drawbacks under Rule 6 of the Drawback Rules, 1995, despite All Industry Drawback rates being notified for their goods under Rule 3. The Department initiated proceedings for recovery of excess paid drawback under Rule 16 by issuing three Show Cause Notices, which were adjudicated by the Commissioner of Customs, Pune.
2. Rejection of supplementary claims as time-barred: The respondents filed supplementary claims under Rule 15 for the period from May 2005 to February 2010, which were rejected by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, ICD Dighi, as time-barred. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeals, but the applicant department contended that the supplementary claims were not filed within the stipulated time limit and were not covered by the original Show Cause Notices and Order-in-Original dated 21.03.2011.
3. Applicability of Rule 17 for condonation of delay: The respondents argued that the delay in filing supplementary claims should be condoned under Rule 17, which allows the Central Government to exempt exporters from provisions of the rules for reasons beyond their control. However, the Government noted that Rule 17 empowers only the Central Government to grant such relaxation and no such extension was granted in this case. The Government held that the claims were hit by time limitation and set aside the Order-in-Appeal, restoring the Order-in-Original.
Conclusion: The Revision Application succeeded, and the impugned Order-in-Appeal was set aside for not being legal, restoring the Order-in-Original.
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2012 (12) TMI 1115
Issues Involved: 1. Addition u/s 68 of the Act in respect of Deposits and Share application money/capital. 2. Disallowance of insurance expense.
Summary:
1. Addition u/s 68 of the Act in respect of Deposits and Share application money/capital:
The assessee, engaged in Cotton ginning activity, increased share capital and accepted new loans during the year under consideration. The Assessing Officer (A.O.) added Rs. 3.2 lakhs as loan creditor and Rs. 12.5 lakhs as share capital u/s 68 of the I.T. Act due to various defects in the confirmations provided by the assessee. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition, noting that the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of transactions, creditworthiness, and identity of the cash creditors. The CIT(A) emphasized that the appellant could not substantiate its claim with positive evidence, referencing case laws such as M/s. Precision Finance (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT 208 ITR 265 (Cal.), Sumati Dayal Vs. CIT 214 ITR 801 (SC), and Oceanic Products Exporting Co. vs. CIT 241 ITR 497(Ker.).
Upon appeal, the Tribunal examined the evidences but found that the share holders/depositors had not proved the creditworthiness and genuineness in all cases. It was noted that the assessee did not furnish confirmations in a timely manner, leaving no time for the A.O. to issue summons. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order for the limited purpose of verifying the creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions, directing the appellant to cooperate with the A.O. and produce the share holders/cash creditors for examination.
2. Disallowance of insurance expense:
The A.O. observed that the assessee claimed insurance expenses on a payment basis at Rs. 76,530/- and also debited Rs. 62,130/- related to F.Y. 05-06 in the P&L account, despite following the mercantile system of accounting. The CIT(A) confirmed the addition as the assessee could not counter the A.O.'s findings. The Tribunal noted that the case law cited by the assessee pertained to Keyman's Insurance policy, which did not apply to the current case. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order but directed the A.O. to verify the expenses and allow the claim in A.Y. 06-07.
Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, with directions for further verification of the creditworthiness and genuineness of the transactions and the insurance expenses.
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