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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 781 Records
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2009 (2) TMI 813
Whether Sections 47(3) and 47(4) of the Andhra Pradesh Shops & Establishments Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as `the Shops Act') are unconstitutional, discriminatory and violative of the Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India?
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2009 (2) TMI 812
Whether the matter providing for collection of IDC is a matter of procedure and not a substantive provision?
Whether the State of Tamil Nadu is correctly directed to file an affidavit before the High Court to justify the levy of fee?
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2009 (2) TMI 811
The Gujarat High Court remanded a case back to the Tribunal for reconsideration due to failure to consider a relevant full Bench decision. The Tribunal's decision was set aside, and the matter was directed to be reexamined in accordance with the law. The Tax Appeal and Civil Application for service of summons were disposed of.
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2009 (2) TMI 810
Execution of detention order - the said detention order has remained unexecuted mainly for the reason that the proposed detenu has remained outside India - whether the detenu or anyone on his behalf is entitled to challenge the detention order without the detenu submitting or surrendering to it?
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2009 (2) TMI 809
Issues:
1. Interpretation of ancillary or incidental proceedings under Section 48(7) of U.P. VAT Act.
2. Determination of the nature of goods in the context of irrigation sprinkler systems.
3. Assessment of the intention behind the sale of goods to government agencies and availing subsidies.
4. Justification of the order passed by the Commercial Tax Tribunal regarding seizure and security demand.
Issue 1 - Interpretation of ancillary or incidental proceedings under Section 48(7) of U.P. VAT Act:
The revision was filed against the order passed by the Commercial Tax Tribunal, challenging the seizure and detention of goods being transported by two trucks. The Tribunal had reduced the security amount demanded for release of goods. The appellant raised concerns regarding the authority's power to decide the tax liability in ancillary proceedings. The Court referred to previous judgments emphasizing that the Assessing Authority can determine the nature of transactions while framing assessment orders. The Court held that discrepancies in goods description do not necessarily justify detention orders.
Issue 2 - Determination of the nature of goods in the context of irrigation sprinkler systems:
The goods were seized due to discrepancies between the description in the delivery memo and the actual goods found. The appellant argued that the sprinkler systems were exempted items under agricultural implements. The Court noted that the delivery memo mentioned a "complete set" of sprinkler systems, but only pipes and joint items were found. The Court directed the Assessing Authority to examine the goods and determine their nature, emphasizing that the detention order was based on presumption and assumptions.
Issue 3 - Assessment of the intention behind the sale of goods to government agencies and availing subsidies:
The appellant contended that the pipes found were integral parts of sprinkler systems meant for government departments. The Court highlighted the importance of pipes in the system and noted the specific code assigned by the Bureau of Indian Standards. It directed the authorities to release the goods, emphasizing that the power of seizure should not be used to harass genuine dealers.
Issue 4 - Justification of the order passed by the Commercial Tax Tribunal regarding seizure and security demand:
The Court found that discrepancies in goods description did not indicate an intention to evade tax. It noted that the dealer was registered, accompanied by relevant documents, and there was no evidence of tax evasion. The Court emphasized the need for cautious exercise of seizure and detention powers to prevent tax evasion without harassing legitimate dealers. The revision was allowed, and the detention order and seizure orders were set aside, with directions to release the goods and provide a sample for assessment.
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2009 (2) TMI 808
The High Court of Gujarat remanded the case to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and decision in accordance with the law, based on the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Dharamendra Textile Processors, 2008 (231) E.L.T. 3. The Tribunal must decide the issue within three months from the date of receipt of the order. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
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2009 (2) TMI 807
Whether in holding the departmental proceeding the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders were violated?
Whether in a case of this nature where violation is alleged as regards compliance of principles of natural justice either on common law principles or in terms of the statutory Regulations framed by the appellant - Corporation, which is a fundamental right in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a civil suit will be maintainable or not?
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2009 (2) TMI 806
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal due to delay and lack of merit as no question of law arose for consideration.
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2009 (2) TMI 804
Issues Involved:
1. Conversion of Post Diploma Programme to Advance Diploma Programme.
2. Upgradation to a five-year Engineering Degree Programme (B.Tech).
3. Approval of a one-year bridge course for diploma holders.
4. AICTE's refusal to approve the bridge course.
5. Court orders directing AICTE to approve the bridge course.
6. Eligibility criteria for the bridge course (10+1 vs. 10+2 entry qualification).
7. AICTE's challenge to the High Court's decisions.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Conversion of Post Diploma Programme to Advance Diploma Programme:
The YMCA Institute of Engineering, Faridabad, initially conducted a four-year Post Diploma Course with an entry qualification of 10+1. In 1995, the Institute sought and received approval from AICTE to convert this course into a four-year Advance Diploma Programme, subject to raising the entry level to 10+2 and modifying the course content as suggested by AICTE.
2. Upgradation to a Five-Year Engineering Degree Programme (B.Tech):
In 1997, the Institute received approval from the Director of Technical Education, Haryana, and AICTE to upgrade the four-year Advance Diploma Course to a five-year B.Tech programme. Consequently, the Institute began offering the B.Tech programme from the academic year 1997-98 and discontinued the Advance Diploma Course.
3. Approval of a One-Year Bridge Course for Diploma Holders:
To enable students who completed the four-year Post/Advance Diploma Course to acquire a B.Tech degree, the Institute proposed a one-year bridge course. The Government of Haryana approved this bridge course, and the Director of Technical Education recommended AICTE to grant approval for the bridge course for students who completed the diploma courses during the sessions 1992-96, 1993-97, and 1994-98.
4. AICTE's Refusal to Approve the Bridge Course:
AICTE rejected the request for the bridge course on several grounds:
- No provision in AICTE Rules for such a course.
- Approval would involve a major policy shift and affect technical education nationwide.
- It would defeat the purpose of diploma level education.
- Existing provisions allowed diploma holders to be admitted to the second year of the engineering programme.
5. Court Orders Directing AICTE to Approve the Bridge Course:
102 students of the Institute filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court, which quashed AICTE's rejection and directed it to approve the bridge course. Subsequent petitions by other students were also allowed, extending the benefit of the bridge course to Post Diploma holders with entry qualifications of 10+2.
6. Eligibility Criteria for the Bridge Course (10+1 vs. 10+2 Entry Qualification):
The Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed petitions from post diploma holders with a 10+1 entry qualification, ruling that the criterion for admission to the bridge course should be the possession of a four-year post or advance diploma, irrespective of whether the entry qualification was 10+1 or 10+2.
7. AICTE's Challenge to the High Court's Decisions:
AICTE challenged the High Court's decisions, arguing that permitting candidates with a 10+1 entry qualification to take the bridge course would lower academic standards and jeopardize the technical education system. AICTE contended that such decisions should be within its exclusive jurisdiction as they involve technical education policy.
Judgment Analysis:
The Supreme Court held that AICTE, being a statutory body with professional and technical expertise, is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining norms and standards in technical education. The Court emphasized that educational policy decisions, such as the approval of bridge courses, fall within AICTE's exclusive jurisdiction and should not be interfered with by courts. The Court noted that the High Court's decisions led to an unintended dilution of educational standards and emphasized the importance of maintaining uniform entry qualifications for engineering degree courses.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's orders, and dismissed the writ petitions. However, it clarified that candidates who had already been admitted to and completed the bridge course pursuant to the High Court's orders would not be affected by this judgment.
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2009 (2) TMI 803
The Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeals with no order as to costs based on its judgment in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai v. Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd., dated 14th January, 2009. (Citation: 2009 (2) TMI 803 - SC)
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2009 (2) TMI 802
Issues involved: Impugning orders of Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal regarding addition of Rs. 7,00,000 to appellant-assessee's income.
Summary:
The appellant-assessee challenged orders of various authorities regarding the addition of Rs. 7,00,000 to his income from the sale of agricultural land. The appellant claimed the amount was earnest money forfeited due to the buyer's non-compliance with the sale agreement. However, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal concluded that the forfeiture claim was fabricated to evade tax liability. The authorities found discrepancies in the transaction, such as the buyer not requesting an extension for the registration deed and financial inconsistencies of the buyer, indicating the agreement was a sham. The Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), and Income-tax Appellate Tribunal concurred that the agreement was bogus based on factual investigations and statements from the buyer.
The High Court upheld the decisions of the Revenue Authorities, stating that the agreement was indeed a sham transaction. The Court found no legal issue warranting intervention and dismissed the appeal.
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2009 (2) TMI 801
The High Court Delhi dismissed the appeal concerning "dividend stripping" as the issue was already decided in previous cases. No substantial question of law arose for consideration.
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2009 (2) TMI 800
The High Court of Bombay discharged the rule in an application regarding the classification of Ammonium Sulphate as a by-product or final product, citing a previous judgment where the issue was decided against the revenue. The application was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2009 (2) TMI 799
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2009 (2) TMI 799 - SC. Judges S.H. Kapadia and Aftab Alam presided over the order.
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2009 (2) TMI 798
Issues Involved
1. Validity of the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Locus standi of the appellant to challenge the notification under Section 48 of the Act.
3. Compliance with principles of natural justice in the issuance of the notification under Section 48.
4. The doctrine of approbation and reprobation in the context of consent orders.
Detailed Analysis
1. Validity of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
The appellant, an educational institution, faced eviction due to default in rent payment. Subsequently, it sought acquisition of the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were issued but later challenged by the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The High Court quashed these notifications, citing that the acquisition did not meet the criteria under Section 40(1)(a) of the Act, which restricts acquisition to purposes directly connected with the provision of amenities for workmen. The court emphasized that the acquisition for school expansion did not fall under this provision, rendering the acquisition unsustainable and thus quashed the notifications.
2. Locus Standi of the Appellant to Challenge the Notification under Section 48 of the Act
The appellant argued it had the locus standi to challenge the notification under Section 48, which denotified 6,000 sq. ft. of the land. The appellant contended that the notification was issued without adherence to principles of natural justice, thus making it a nullity. The High Court dismissed the writ application, and the appellant's claim was that the judgment of the Supreme Court did not indicate any consent or role by the appellant in the issuance of the notification.
3. Compliance with Principles of Natural Justice in the Issuance of the Notification under Section 48
The Supreme Court observed that principles of natural justice must be followed before issuing a denotification under Section 48. The court cited precedents like Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees' Association v. State of Karnataka, which mandated an opportunity for the beneficiary of the acquisition to be heard before such a decision. However, the court also noted that the appellant had implicitly consented to the denotification process, evidenced by the lack of protest and the acceptance of the proceedings.
4. The Doctrine of Approbation and Reprobation in the Context of Consent Orders
The court invoked the doctrine of approbation and reprobation, stating that a party cannot accept the benefits of a consent order while simultaneously challenging parts of it. The appellant had accepted the benefits of the order protecting its possession of 17,000 sq. ft. of land. The court held that the appellant's conduct indicated implicit consent to the denotification of 6,000 sq. ft., and thus, it could not challenge the notification while retaining the benefits derived from the consent order.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the appellant could not challenge the denotification while enjoying the benefits of the consent order. The court held that the principles of natural justice were adhered to, given the appellant's implicit consent, and the doctrine of approbation and reprobation applied, preventing the appellant from contesting the notification. The appeal was dismissed without any order as to costs.
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2009 (2) TMI 797
Issues involved: Interpretation of penal interest u/s 23(3A) of KGST Act for failure to include turnover in return; Applicability of penal interest when return was filed correctly as per law existing at the time.
The judgment by the Kerala High Court dealt with a case where the petitioner, a company engaged in manufacturing automotive tyres and tubes, filed its return for the assessment year 1995-96 under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. The petitioner had a dispute regarding whether rubber purchased should be included in the purchase turnover, which was resolved in their favor by a Full Bench decision. However, a subsequent Supreme Court judgment reversed this decision, leading to a demand being raised in 2000, which the petitioner paid.
The main issue revolved around whether the petitioner was liable to pay penal interest u/s 23(3A) of the KGST Act. The section in question stipulates that interest accrues on tax due when turnover is not included in the return. The petitioner argued that this section, inserted in 1998, was not applicable to their 1996 return. They relied on a Supreme Court decision emphasizing that if a return is filed correctly as per the law at the time, subsequent changes should not apply retrospectively, especially if the assessee has not committed any fault.
The court considered the contention that penal interest should not be charged when the return was filed correctly as per the law at the time. The government pleader argued that the relevant section, now re-numbered as 23(3B), only applies when there was a stay of demand, which was not the case here. The court noted that the assessment for the year 1995-96 was made in 2000, and since the return was correct as per the law at the time of filing, penal interest should not be charged. Interest would be payable from the date of demand, even if the department allowed installment payments.
In conclusion, the court allowed the writ appeal, ruling in favor of the petitioner and holding that penal interest under section 23(3A) of the KGST Act was not applicable in this case where the return was filed correctly as per the law existing at the time.
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2009 (2) TMI 796
Whether only because a mistake has been committed by or on behalf of the appellants in approaching the appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances, the same would mean that the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which is otherwise available, should not be taken into consideration at all?
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2009 (2) TMI 795
The Kerala High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Customs against a judgment regarding Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984. The court upheld the decision to give the respondent another chance for an oral examination by a specified date. The appeal was dismissed, and the court agreed with the reasoning of the learned single Judge.
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2009 (2) TMI 794
Whether the appointment of a the retired Judge of the High Court as sole Arbitrator should be set aside and an Arbitral Tribunal should again be constituted in the manner provided in terms of clause 64?
Held that:- A provision for serving officers of one party being appointed as arbitrator/s brings out considerable resistance from the other party, when disputes arise. Having regard to the emphasis on independence and impartiality in the new Act, government, statutory authorities and government companies should think of phasing out arbitration clauses providing for serving officers and encourage professionalism in arbitration.
Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (2) TMI 793
Surgical gloves - petitioner filed sales tax returns declaring its turnover taxable at eight per cent under entry 145 - the assessing officer assessed the turnover under entry 125 of the First Schedule to the Act which provides for tax at 12 per cent - Held that:- The position with regard to examination gloves is different because these items are not earmarked as surgical gloves. It is used for the examination of patients and is not of the quality required for use as surgical gloves. The relative lower value reflects the quality of the item and so much so that examination gloves cannot be treated as surgical gloves. Since examination gloves are made of rubber the petitioner is liable to pay tax on this item as rubber product under entry 125 of the First Schedule to the KGST Act.
The S.T. revision is consequently allowed in part to the extent indicated above with a direction to the officer to revise the assessment of turnover of surgical gloves both sterilized and non-sterilized at eight per cent under entry 145 and retain the turnover of examination gloves at 12 per cent under entry 125 of the First Schedule to the KGST Act.
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