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Showing 121 to 140 of 592 Records

• 2012 (3) TMI 613
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment involves the issue of limitation in a suit for recovery of a loan, as well as the interpretation of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Limitation in a suit for recovery of a loan
  The appellant/plaintiff filed a Regular First Appeal challenging the trial court's dismissal of the suit for recovery of a loan amount along with interest, on the grounds of being barred by limitation. The loan was given without specifying a repayment date, making it repayable on demand. The appellant issued a notice demanding repayment on 14.12.2001, and the suit was filed on 8.2.2002. The court held that the suit was not barred by limitation under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as the cause of action arose from the notice date. Therefore, the suit was decreed in favor of the appellant/plaintiff.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  The trial court dismissed the suit, citing Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which deals with the computation of fresh periods of limitation based on payments made towards a debt. The court noted that the defendant had paid interest until 10.3.2000, but there was no acknowledgment of payment satisfying the proviso to Section 19. As a result, the trial court held the suit barred by limitation. However, the High Court disagreed, emphasizing that the absence of a fixed repayment date made the loan repayable on demand, and the suit was filed within three years of the demand notice, thus not barred by limitation.
  
  In conclusion, the High Court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and decreed the suit in favor of the appellant/plaintiff for the loan amount along with interest. The appellant was also awarded costs of the appeal, and the trial court record was to be sent back.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 612
  

  Disallowance for "loss on Mark to Market" on trading of Derivatives - The assessee had been engaging in marked to market on daily basis and accordingly provision is made in the P&L Account against anticipated loss. AO disallowed the provision on account of loss in open future contracts debited in the profit & loss account and added it back. - HELD THAT:- Taking into account the guidance note issued by ICAI, which the companies have to follow, we are of the opinion that the assessee has rightly claimed the provision in the Profit & Loss Account. We are of the considered view that the assessee has a strong case to make provision for loss on mark-to-market basis. We therefore delete the disallowance.

  Disallowance w.r.t V-SAT charges and Lease Charges and Transaction charges - TDS Deduction - Dept. appealed on account of deletion of disallowance made in respect of V-SAT and lease line charges - HELD THAT:- CIT held that the VSAT and Lease line charges are not payments which come within the domain of `fee for technical services’ and they are also not for `any work’ done by NSE for the member broker. The TDS is, therefore, not deductible on the same.

  The CIT(A) further observed that in so far as the deductibility of TDS on transaction charges are concerned, the I.T.A.T, Mumbai in the case of KOTAK SECURITIES LTD. VERSUS ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX [2008 (8) TMI 592 - ITAT MUMBAI] has held that the Stock Exchange does not provide managerial services and the fees paid by the member to the Stock Exchange is not for any technical services rendered, so TDS is not deductible on the same.

  We, therefore, refrain ourselves to take any adverse view on the view taken by the CIT(A), we uphold the order of the CIT(A) on both these issues.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 611
  
  Issues involved:
  The interpretation of Section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 regarding pre-deposit requirements for setting aside decrees, awards, or orders.
  
  Judgment Details:
  
  Issue 1: Interpretation of Section 19 of the 2006 Act
  
  The judgment dealt with four Special Leave Petitions challenging the order of the Madras High Court regarding the pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the 2006 Act. The Single Judge and the Division Bench upheld the requirement of depositing seventy-five per cent of the award amount before entertaining an Application to set aside the decree. The Court concluded that the provision does not allow for discretion to waive or reduce the pre-deposit amount, dismissing the original Petition but allowing an extended period for deposit.
  
  Issue 2: Arguments by Petitioner and Respondents
  
  The Petitioner, M/s. Goodyear India Limited, raised questions on the absolute nature of the pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 and the interpretation of the phrase "in the manner directed by such Court." The Petitioner's counsel argued for a more flexible approach, suggesting that the Court could allow alternative forms of securing the amount, such as through a Bank Guarantee. However, it was clarified that the challenge was not against the validity of Section 19 but for a more lenient interpretation to avoid undue hardship on litigants.
  
  Issue 3: Court's Decision
  
  After considering the submissions from both parties, the Court declined to interfere with the views of the Single Judge and Division Bench regarding Section 19 of the 2006 Act. The Court referenced a previous case where similar challenges to Section 19 were dismissed. It was noted that the phrase "in the manner directed by such Court" allows for the Court's discretion in allowing the pre-deposit to be made in installments. The Special Leave Petitions by M/s. Goodyear India Limited were dismissed, but the time for pre-deposit was extended by twelve weeks. The Special Leave Petitions by Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Limited were disposed of with leave to raise objections during the Appeal hearing.
  
  This summary provides a detailed overview of the judgment, focusing on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 2006 Act and the Court's decision on the pre-deposit requirements for setting aside decrees, awards, or orders.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 610
  

  Revision u/s 263 - Disallowance u/s 14A - Held that:- The order of the CIT cannot be justified. For invoking the provisions under section 263, two parameters are to be justified. One that the order is ‘erroneous’ and two it is ‘prejudice to the interests of the Revenue’. As far as the order being erroneous in nature, AO after considering that the assessee had offered some of the share transactions as business income and some of the shares held in investment which yielded short term capital gain of more than ₹ 5.79 crores, has only disallowed a portion of the total expenditure in relation to the exempt income to the total income earned by assessee. This is one way of arriving at a reasonable amount for disallowance under section 14A which cannot be faulted.

  AO had determined the business income at ₹ 14.76 crores and allowed carry forward of losses to be set of thereby determining the business income at Nil. The short term capital gain of ₹ 5.76 crores was to be taxed at 10%. The assessee also had suffered tax on book profit under section 115JB and the Assessing Officer determined the total book profit at ₹ 45.53 crores on which the tax payable at ₹ 7.50 crores worked out at ₹ 3.41 crores. AO had given a finding that the tax payable on book profit is more than the tax payable on the regular income and, therefore, book profit under section 115JB was assessable to tax. The consequential/re-assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer was also placed on record and noticed that the business income was still determined at Nil and the Assessing Officer again accepted the income under section 115JB.

  The fact is that the assessment was done invoking provisions of section 115JB in both the situations. There is no effect on ultimate assessed income/ book profit and therefore, the order of the Assessing Officer does not cause any prejudice to the Revenue. In view of this, we are of the opinion that the order of the CIT under section 263 cannot be sustained as one of the parameters for invoking the jurisdiction has not been fulfilled. Therefore, without analyzing the rival contentions on various judicial principles, which is only academic in nature, we hold that the order of the Assessing Officer passed originally under section 143 has to be upheld and order of the CIT under section 263 has to be cancelled. Accordingly the assessee’s grounds are allowed and the order under section 263 is therefore, cancelled.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 609
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Compliance with Food Safety and Standards Act and Regulations.
  2. Labelling requirements for imported food products.
  3. Authority and procedure for taking samples for testing.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Compliance with Food Safety and Standards Act and Regulations

  The petitioner company, engaged in importing and distributing chocolates, imported 18000 kilograms of dark compound chocolates from Singapore. The second respondent instructed officers to physically examine the goods for compliance with the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (the Act) and its rules. The first respondent refused to draw samples because the date of manufacture, expiry, and other declarations were not printed as required by the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011 (the Regulations), but were instead on a label stuck to the product.

  Issue 2: Labelling requirements for imported food products

  The petitioner argued that the decision not to take samples was arbitrary and illegal, citing Regulation 2.2 of the Regulations, which allows necessary declarations to be made on a securely affixed label. Section 3(1)(z) of the Act defines a label as any tag, brand, mark, etc., attached to a container. The petitioner had previously imported similar products with similar labelling, which were allowed by customs authorities in Bangalore. The respondents contended that the labelling did not meet the mandatory requirements, as the information should be printed directly on the cover or wrapper.

  Issue 3: Authority and procedure for taking samples for testing

  The petitioner cited previous court decisions and guidelines allowing rectification of minor labelling deficiencies in customs warehouses. The respondents argued that deficiencies beyond rectification should not allow the import of such products. The court noted that the main purpose of the regulation is to ensure consumers are aware of the product information and that the nature and quality of the goods can be determined by testing samples. The court found no regulation mandating that information must be printed directly on the cover or wrapper and allowed the use of securely affixed labels.

  Judgment:

  The court set aside the impugned letter of the first respondent, dated 12.1.2012, and directed the respondents to take samples of the imported goods for testing within seven days. The goods shall be released only if they are fit for human consumption, upon payment of the appropriate duty. The writ petition was allowed, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 608
  
  Issues involved:
  The main issues in this judgment involve the eligibility of the assessee for exemption under section 11 of the Income Tax Act and the disallowance of depreciation claimed by the assessee.
  
  Eligibility for Exemption under Section 11:
  The appeal by the Revenue challenges the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax(Appeals) regarding the eligibility of the assessee for claim under section 11 without approval under sub-clause (vi) to section 10(23C). The Tribunal referred to previous cases and the Supreme Court's decisions to emphasize that if donations are received compulsorily for student admissions over and above prescribed fees, the assessee is not entitled to exemption under section 11. The matter was remitted back to the assessing officer for further examination in light of relevant judgments.
  
  Disallowance of Depreciation:
  The Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation claimed by the trust, arguing that since the purchase of capital assets is allowed as application of income, depreciation is not allowable. The CIT(A) allowed the claim, leading to the Revenue's appeal. The Tribunal cited precedents to establish that depreciation on fixed assets is an allowable deduction to determine income available for charitable purposes. The issue was remitted back to the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration based on the value of assets allowed under section 11.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal allowed the Revenue's appeal for statistical purposes, directing a fresh consideration of the issues related to exemption under section 11 and the disallowance of depreciation. The judgment highlights the importance of compliance with legal provisions and previous judicial interpretations in determining tax exemptions and deductions.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 607
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in the judgment include the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator and the release of a sum of money by the respondent company to the petitioner.
  
  Appointment of Provisional Liquidator:
  The Court had previously concluded that the sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- not refunded by the respondent constituted a debt in praesenti, making it an unsecured debt due and payable to the petitioner. Consequently, the Court directed the release of this amount along with any accrued interest to the petitioner by way of an account payee cheque.
  
  Opposition to Release of Amount:
  The respondent's counsel opposed the release of the amount, citing the company's solvency as a reason to not proceed with further orders. However, referencing a Supreme Court judgment, it was highlighted that if a debt is undisputedly owing, it must be paid regardless of the company's solvency status. Solvency should not be a standalone ground for setting aside a notice under Section 434(1)(a).
  
  Judicial Direction:
  In light of the above, the Court directed the matter to be listed before the Registrar General for the handing over of the cheque to the petitioner's counsel against a receipt. The petitioner was also granted liberty to file a civil suit for the recovery of any interest, with a clarification that the rights and contentions of both parties are left open for the trial court to decide without being influenced by any observations made by the High Court.
  
  Conclusion:
  With the observations and liberty granted, the petition was disposed of, and the next hearing date was cancelled. The judgment emphasized the importance of paying undisputed debts and clarified the role of solvency in such matters based on legal precedents.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 606
  
  The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT NEW DELHI in 2012 directed the appellants to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs within 8 weeks, but they failed to comply. As a result, all appeals were dismissed for non-compliance with Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 605
  
  Issues involved: Alleged computation of long-term capital gain in respect of alleged unquoted shares of group companies.
  
  Assessment Year 2005-06:
  The appellant claimed Long Term Capital Gain (LTCG) from the sale of two penny stocks, which the department considered as in genuine due to trading in penny stocks. The broker involved in the deal was suspended for creating an artificial market, raising doubts on the legitimacy of the transactions. The appellant's lack of experience in trading and the companies' lack of fundamentals were highlighted. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) erred in accepting the transactions as genuine. The department's appeal was dismissed.
  
  Assessment Year 2006-07:
  The department disallowed the addition of Long Term Capital Gain, questioning the genuineness of transactions involving penny stocks and brokers creating artificial markets. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) found the transactions legitimate, supported by proper documentation, compliance with tax regulations, and transactions through banks. The department's grounds were dismissed, and the appeal was rejected.
  
  The Appellate Tribunal ITAT Kolkata heard appeals against separate orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) for the assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 regarding alleged long-term capital gains from unquoted shares. The tribunal found the transactions genuine, supported by proper documentation and compliance with tax regulations. The department's doubts regarding the brokers' actions were dismissed, leading to the dismissal of both departmental appeals for the respective assessment years.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 604
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Termination of Arbitrator's Mandate
  2. Waiver of Rights and Conduct of Parties
  3. Time Limit for Arbitration Proceedings
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Termination of Arbitrator's Mandate:
  The Petitioners invoked Section 14(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking a declaration that the mandate of the Arbitrator nominated by the Director (Marketing) of the Respondents stands terminated. The Court noted that the arbitration clause in the agreement mandated that arbitration proceedings should be completed within two years, with a possible extension of twelve months. The Arbitrators appointed initially abandoned or ceased to act, and the Respondents appointed a new Arbitrator after the mandate period had expired. The Court held that the mandate of the Arbitrator automatically terminated after the expiry of the prescribed period, as per the agreement and the Supreme Court's ruling in NBCC Ltd. Vs. J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd.
  
  2. Waiver of Rights and Conduct of Parties:
  The Respondents contended that the Petitioners had waived their rights by not objecting to the continuation of arbitration proceedings and by participating in them. However, the Court emphasized that the concept of "waiver" under the Arbitration Act applies only when there is vagueness in the contract. In this case, the agreement clearly stipulated the time frame for arbitration, and the Petitioners' participation did not constitute a waiver of the basic clause regarding the time limit.
  
  3. Time Limit for Arbitration Proceedings:
  The Court reiterated that the parties had agreed to a specific time frame for arbitration proceedings, which was binding. The arbitration clause stated that the newly appointed Arbitrator should continue from the point at which the predecessor left, indicating that the proceedings should be concluded within the prescribed period. The Court held that there is no provision under the Arbitration Act to condone the delay when the agreement between the parties mandates a specific time limit. The Court concluded that further proceedings after the expiry of the time limit were unsustainable.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Petition was allowed, and the mandate of the Arbitrator, Mr. J. Dinaker, or any other new Arbitrator nominated by the Respondents, was terminated. The Court discharged the rule and did not award any costs.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 603
  

  1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

  The core legal question in this judgment revolves around whether it is appropriate in law to recall an ex parte order passed by the Tribunal due to non-appearance of the respondent, based on the provisions of Rule 25 of the ITAT Rules, 1963, and Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The specific issues include:

  • Whether the application filed by the assessee should be treated under Rule 25 or Section 254(2).
  • Whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the respondent on the date of hearing.
  • Whether the Tribunal's power under Section 254(2) includes recalling an order in its entirety.
  • The interpretation and application of Rule 23 and Rule 25 of the ITAT Rules, 1963.

  2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

  Issue 1: Application Treatment under Rule 25 or Section 254(2)

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 254(2) allows rectification of any apparent mistake, while Rule 25 provides for recalling an ex parte order if sufficient cause for non-appearance is shown.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Third Member concluded that the application should be treated under Rule 25, as the assessee sought to explain the non-appearance rather than pointing out any apparent mistake in the order.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The application focused on the non-appearance due to a mistaken note of the hearing date, supported by an affidavit and diary entry.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The application was considered under Rule 25, allowing for the recall of the ex parte order if sufficient cause is demonstrated.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Judicial Member supported recalling the order based on Rule 25, while the Accountant Member viewed it under Section 254(2), focusing on the absence of an apparent mistake.
  • Conclusions: The application was appropriately treated under Rule 25, allowing for the recall of the ex parte order.

  Issue 2: Sufficient Cause for Non-Appearance

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Rule 25 provides for recalling an order if the respondent shows sufficient cause for non-appearance.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Third Member accepted the explanation of the mistaken date entry as a bona fide error, constituting sufficient cause.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The affidavit from the Chartered Accountant and the diary entry supported the claim of mistaken date noting.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal found that the mistake was genuine and not an afterthought, justifying the recall under Rule 25.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Accountant Member considered the affidavit self-serving, while the Judicial Member and Third Member found it credible.
  • Conclusions: There was sufficient cause for the non-appearance, justifying the recall of the order.

  Issue 3: Tribunal's Power Under Section 254(2)

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 254(2) allows rectification of apparent mistakes but does not explicitly provide for a review or recall of orders.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal's power under Section 254(2) is limited to correcting apparent mistakes, not recalling orders unless there is a manifest error.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The application did not allege any apparent mistake in the Tribunal's order.
  • Application of Law to Facts: The recall was not justified under Section 254(2) as no apparent mistake was identified.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Accountant Member emphasized the limited scope of Section 254(2), while the Judicial Member focused on Rule 25.
  • Conclusions: The recall was not justified under Section 254(2), but Rule 25 provided the appropriate basis.

  Issue 4: Interpretation of Rule 23 and Rule 25

  • Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Rule 23 outlines the hearing procedure, while Rule 25 allows for recalling ex parte orders.
  • Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: Rule 23 requires hearing both parties unless the appeal is to be dismissed. Rule 25 allows recall if the respondent shows sufficient cause for non-appearance.
  • Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal did not hear the respondent before deciding in favor of the appellant (Revenue).
  • Application of Law to Facts: The Tribunal's decision to recall was based on the necessity to hear both parties, as the appeal was decided against the respondent.
  • Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Accountant Member viewed the respondent's hearing as discretionary, while the Judicial Member and Third Member emphasized the necessity of hearing both parties.
  • Conclusions: The Tribunal must hear both parties unless dismissing the appeal, supporting the recall under Rule 25.

  3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

  • Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "The hearing of both the parties is fundamental to the dispensation of justice. No party can be condemned unheard."
  • Core Principles Established: The Tribunal must hear both parties unless the appeal is to be dismissed; Rule 25 allows recall if sufficient cause for non-appearance is shown.
  • Final Determinations on Each Issue: The application was appropriately treated under Rule 25; there was sufficient cause for non-appearance; the recall was justified under Rule 25, not Section 254(2); and both parties must be heard unless the appeal is to be dismissed.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 602
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator
  2. Limitation period for filing claims
  3. Compliance with procedural laws and principles of natural justice
  4. Validity of the award and interest granted
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Arbitrator:
  The principal borrower applied for an enhancement of Cash Credit Facility in 1989. The Cooperative Court returned the plaint to the bank in 2003, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act 2002). The Arbitrator was appointed in 2006, but failed to address the jurisdictional issues. The court emphasized that the Arbitrator must consider jurisdictional aspects before awarding any monetary claim.
  
  2. Limitation period for filing claims:
  The claim was initially filed in 1992 under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (MCS Act 1960). The Cooperative Court returned the claim in 2003, and the bank filed a reference application in 2006. The Arbitrator did not address the limitation period, which is crucial as the cause of action arose in 1989. The court highlighted that the Arbitrator must consider the limitation period as per Section 3 of the Limitation Act before awarding any claim.
  
  3. Compliance with procedural laws and principles of natural justice:
  The Arbitrator rejected the application for framing issues, stating that the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) does not bind him. However, the court noted that the principles of natural justice and fair play must be followed. The Arbitrator failed to provide detailed reasoning for rejecting objections and did not consider various applications and objections raised by the Petitioners, including allegations of fraud and misrepresentation.
  
  4. Validity of the award and interest granted:
  The Arbitrator awarded interest at 17.5% from 1992 to 2003 and 14% thereafter. The court found the award to be illegal and perverse due to the lack of jurisdiction and failure to address the limitation period. The court emphasized that any change in banking documents requires the consent of all parties, which was not obtained in this case.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court quashed and set aside the common award passed by the sole Arbitrator, citing lack of jurisdiction, failure to address the limitation period, and non-compliance with procedural laws and principles of natural justice. The petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 601
  
  Issues involved:
  The issue involves the demand of Rs. 75,28,050/- confirmed against the applicant/appellant for the period October to December, 2008, regarding supplies made to SEZ developers and the applicability of Rule 6 (3) (b) of Cenvat Credit Rules.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Applicability of Rule 6 (3) (b) of Cenvat Credit Rules
  The short issue in the appeal is whether supplies made to SEZ developers should be considered as deemed exports under Rule 6 (6) (i) of Cenvat Credit Rules. The provisions were amended w.e.f. 31/12/2008 to include supplies to SEZ developers, but as the period in question is prior to this date, the demands were confirmed against the applicant.
  
  Issue 2: Precedents and Interpretation
  The Tribunal referred to the case of Sujako Interiors Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Ahmedabad and M/s Ashirvad Pipes Pvt. Ltd. vs. CCE, Bangalore, where it was held that clearances to SEZ developers are to be treated as deemed exports, not attracting the provisions of Rule 6 (3) (b). The Tribunal also considered whether the amendment made on 31/12/08 should be held as clarificatory and retrospective, as discussed in the case of Sujana Metal Products Ltd. vs. CCE, Hyderabad. The Tribunal found that supplies to SEZ developers are to be equated with exports, supported by the Board's Circular issued on 7/1/2009.
  
  Decision:
  Based on the above precedents and interpretations, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order, allowing the appeal and providing consequential relief to the appellant. The Tribunal disposed of the stay petition and appeal accordingly.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 600
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Maintainability of the criminal appeal under Section 372 Cr.P.C.
  2. Interpretation of the term "victim" u/s 2(wa) Cr.P.C.
  3. Applicability of Section 378 Cr.P.C. in the context of the case.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Maintainability of the Criminal Appeal under Section 372 Cr.P.C.:
  The applicants filed an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the order dated 9.2.2012 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad, which rejected their preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a criminal appeal filed by the victim lady, Smt. Asha Srivastava, under Section 372 Cr.P.C. The court held that the victim has a right to prefer an appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal.
  
  2. Interpretation of the Term "Victim" u/s 2(wa) Cr.P.C.:
  The court examined the definition of "victim" as per Section 2(wa) Cr.P.C., which includes any person who has suffered loss or injury due to the act or omission for which the accused is charged. The court emphasized that the term "victim" encompasses those who suffer harm to body, mind, reputation, or property, thus granting them the right to appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.
  
  3. Applicability of Section 378 Cr.P.C.:
  The court discussed the provisions of Section 378 Cr.P.C., which deals with appeals in cases of acquittal. It noted that the amendments made by the Cr.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009) did not alter Section 378 Cr.P.C. The court clarified that the insertion of the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. and the definition of "victim" were intended to provide relief to victims of offenses, particularly in cases of cruelty, dowry demands, and other matrimonial disputes. The court concluded that the victim should not be compelled to seek leave to appeal from the High Court and upheld the Additional Sessions Judge's decision to admit the appeal filed by the victim lady.
  
  Conclusion:
  The application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed, affirming the victim's right to file an appeal against the order of acquittal before the Sessions Court, thereby providing her with a statutory right to seek immediate relief without unnecessary technicalities.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 599
  
  Issues involved: Assessment of unexplained investment and interest income u/s 69 of the Income Tax Act based on seized documents during search and seizure operation u/s 132.
  
  Assessment of unexplained investment and interest income:
  The assessee, an individual, had income from salary and interest from a partnership firm. The assessment order was based on seized documents during a search operation u/s 132 in the case of another individual. The seized documents revealed transactions involving cash loans from investors to borrowers, with entries under the heads "Investors" and "Borrowers" in computerized checklists. The Assessing Officer treated the amount invested by the assessee as unexplained under u/s 69 of the Act, adding the interest amount as unaccounted income. The CIT(A) upheld the decision, but the Tribunal found discrepancies in providing the assessee with necessary documents and opportunities for cross-examination. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A) order and remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer for a fair decision after due opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
  
  Conclusion:
  Both appeals of the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes, with the Tribunal emphasizing the importance of providing a fair opportunity of hearing and due process in tax assessments.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 598
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Addition of Rs. 24 lakhs towards commission income on an estimate basis for AY 2006-07.
  2. Addition of Rs. 11 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from Aboobaker Poothayil for AY 2006-07.
  3. Addition of Rs. 3 lakhs received from Joseph Albert towards rent deposit for AY 2006-07.
  4. Addition of Rs. 16,19,079 as unexplained investment in the building based on the valuation report for AY 2006-07.
  5. Disallowance of Rs. 2,25,000 out of the agricultural income disclosed by the assessee for AY 2006-07.
  6. Estimation of commission income to the extent of Rs. 56 lakhs for AY 2007-08.
  7. Disallowance of four credits totaling Rs. 60 lakhs for AY 2007-08.
  8. Addition of Rs. 10 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from M.M. Abdul Kareem for AY 2007-08.
  9. Addition of Rs. 20 lakhs in respect of credit appearing in the name of M.K. Hamsa for AY 2007-08.
  10. Addition of Rs. 10 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from Aboobaker Poothayil for AY 2007-08.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Addition of Rs. 24 lakhs towards commission income on an estimate basis for AY 2006-07:
  
  The tribunal found that the estimation of commission income for the entire year was unjustified as the business was seasonal, conducted from December to April. The commission was recalculated at Rs. 1,000 per lakh, resulting in an estimated income of Rs. 6,17,917 for the period of 50 days. The tribunal directed the assessing officer to take the income from commission business at Rs. 6,17,917 for AY 2006-07.
  
  2. Addition of Rs. 11 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from Aboobaker Poothayil for AY 2006-07:
  
  The tribunal found that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the source of the Rs. 11 lakhs credit, which was a loan against a fixed deposit. The identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction were established. The addition of Rs. 11 lakhs was deleted.
  
  3. Addition of Rs. 3 lakhs received from Joseph Albert towards rent deposit for AY 2006-07:
  
  The tribunal found that the amount received was a security deposit for lease and not income. The rent agreement and the inclusion of rent in the return of income supported this. The addition of Rs. 3 lakhs was deleted.
  
  4. Addition of Rs. 16,19,079 as unexplained investment in the building based on the valuation report for AY 2006-07:
  
  The tribunal held that without rejecting the books of account, the reference to the valuation officer was misconceived. Following the judgment of the Apex court in Sargam Cinema vs Commissioner of Income-tax, the addition based on the valuation report was deleted.
  
  5. Disallowance of Rs. 2,25,000 out of the agricultural income disclosed by the assessee for AY 2006-07:
  
  The tribunal found that the estimation of agricultural income at Rs. 75,000 was very low. Considering the fertile land in Kerala, the tribunal estimated the income at Rs. 2 lakhs from 5 acres of land, modifying the disallowance to Rs. 1 lakh.
  
  6. Estimation of commission income to the extent of Rs. 56 lakhs for AY 2007-08:
  
  The tribunal found that the business was seasonal and estimated the turnover for five months at Rs. 18,53,75,100. The commission was calculated at Rs. 1,000 per lakh, resulting in an estimated income of Rs. 18,53,751. The assessing officer was directed to take the commission income at Rs. 18,53,751 for AY 2007-08.
  
  7. Disallowance of four credits totaling Rs. 60 lakhs for AY 2007-08:
  
  For the credit of Rs. 20 lakhs from Afsal P.Y., the tribunal found that the source was satisfactorily explained. The addition was deleted. The credit of Rs. 10 lakhs from M.M. Abdul Kareem was set aside for further examination regarding the withdrawal from the NRO overdraft account. The credit of Rs. 20 lakhs from M.K. Hamsa was found to be satisfactorily explained, and the addition was deleted. The credit of Rs. 10 lakhs from Aboobaker Poothayil was also satisfactorily explained, and the addition was deleted.
  
  8. Addition of Rs. 10 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from M.M. Abdul Kareem for AY 2007-08:
  
  The tribunal set aside the issue for further examination regarding the withdrawal from the NRO overdraft account.
  
  9. Addition of Rs. 20 lakhs in respect of credit appearing in the name of M.K. Hamsa for AY 2007-08:
  
  The tribunal found that the credit was satisfactorily explained, and the addition was deleted.
  
  10. Addition of Rs. 10 lakhs as unexplained cash credit from Aboobaker Poothayil for AY 2007-08:
  
  The tribunal found that the credit was satisfactorily explained, and the addition was deleted.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  Both appeals of the assessee were partly allowed. The tribunal modified the orders of the lower authorities and directed the assessing officer to make the necessary adjustments as per the findings.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 597
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against trading addition related to unverifiable purchases in assessment year 2007-08.
  
  Summary:
  The appellant contested the trading addition of Rs. 17,74,349/- due to disallowance of 25% on unverifiable purchases amounting to Rs. 70,97,395/-. The Assessing Officer (AO) rejected the contention of the assessee, suspecting involvement in receiving bogus purchase bills. The ld. CIT (A) upheld the AO's decision. The Tribunal considered the written submissions and held that while rejection of books of account is justified for unverifiable purchases, making additions solely on this basis is not justified. Referring to legal precedents, it was noted that additions should consider past history and current events. Given the significant increase in GP rate from the previous year, an addition of Rs. 1 lac was deemed sufficient to address any revenue leakage. Consequently, the appeal was partially allowed, with the judgment pronounced on 15.3.2012.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 596
  
  Issues involved: Application u/s 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 for Scheme of Amalgamation of two companies.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  1. The Application was filed for the Scheme of Amalgamation of Transferor Company with Transferee Company u/s 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956.
  
  2. The Transferor Company's registered office is in Delhi, within the jurisdiction of the Court, while the Transferee Company is located in Chennai.
  
  3. Information regarding the Transferor Company's date of incorporation, capital details, and financial accounts were provided in the Application.
  
  4. The Application included copies of Memorandum, Articles of Association, audited accounts for the year ended March 31, 2011, and unaudited provisional accounts as of January 31, 2012.
  
  5. It was confirmed that no proceedings u/s 235 to 251 of the Act were pending against the Applicant Company.
  
  6. The Scheme was approved by the Board of Directors of both Transferor and Transferee Companies, with resolutions from board meetings provided.
  
  7. The consent status of Shareholders and Creditors was detailed, showing approvals obtained for the proposed Scheme.
  
  8. A request was made to dispense with the requirement of convening meetings of Shareholders of the Transferor Company.
  
  9. Due to the consents obtained, the need for Shareholders' meetings was waived.
  
  10. As the Transferor Company had no Secured Creditors, convening their meeting was unnecessary.
  
  11. Out of 24 Unsecured Creditors, 23 had given consents to the Scheme, meeting the requirements of Section 391(2) of the Act.
  
  12. Consequently, the necessity of convening a meeting of Unsecured Creditors of the Transferor Company was also waived.
  
  13. The Application was allowed in the mentioned terms, with an order for Dasti.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 595
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in the judgment are:
  1. Whether the supply of food and beverages to international airlines in sealed containers constitutes export of goods out of India for the purposes of section 80HHC of the Act?
  2. Whether the sale proceeds received for the supply of such food and beverages were in convertible foreign exchange within the meaning of section 80HHC of the Act?
  3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the deduction claimed under section 80HHC of the Act?
  
  Issue 1: Supply of food and beverages to international airlines
  
  The Court admitted the appeal based on the substantial questions of law regarding the supply of food and beverages to international airlines in sealed containers. The Senior Advocate submitted that similar points had been decided in another case of the same assessee. The Court noted that the points raised in this appeal were identical to the earlier case. Therefore, based on the decision rendered earlier by the Court, the appeal was disposed of without the need for a separate judgment.
  
  Issue 2: Sale proceeds in convertible foreign exchange
  
  The Court did not delve into the specifics of whether the sale proceeds received for the supply of food and beverages were in convertible foreign exchange. Instead, the Court based its decision on the fact that the points raised in the appeal were identical to those in a previous case involving the same assessee. Consequently, the Court decided to dispose of the appeal following the earlier judgment.
  
  Issue 3: Entitlement to deduction under section 80HHC
  
  The question of whether the petitioner was entitled to the deduction claimed under section 80HHC of the Act was not discussed in detail in the judgment. The Court focused on the fact that the points raised in the current appeal were the same as those in a prior case involving the same assessee. As a result, the Court decided to dispose of the appeal in line with the earlier judgment, without the need for a separate or different judgment.
  
  The High Court of Calcutta, in a judgment concerning the supply of food and beverages to international airlines and the entitlement to deductions under section 80HHC of the Act, disposed of the appeal by following a previous decision involving the same assessee. The Court found the issues raised in the current appeal to be identical to those in the earlier case, leading to the decision to not deliver a separate judgment and to allow the appeal, setting aside the judgment and order under appeal.

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• 2012 (3) TMI 594
  

  Respondent's suit for injunction against the true owner - Here, the respondent filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction, the appellant is the owner of the suit property and has the title and possession of the same which was never challenged by the respondent. The appellant also submitted that apart from the title of the suit property, house tax records and wealth tax records indicate that she was and continued to be the owner of the suit property. She further submitted that the utility bills of electricity, water and telephone were of minimal amount which show that the respondent had never resided in the suit premises. Appellant filed this petition against the order of trial court and High Court.

  HELD THAT:- Truth as guiding star in judicial process In this unfortunate litigation, the Court's serious endeavour has to be to find out where in fact the truth lies. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial process. Truth alone has to be the foundation of justice. The entire judicial system has been created only to discern and find out the real truth. Judges at all levels have to seriously engage themselves in the journey of discovering the truth. That is their mandate, obligation and bounden duty.

  In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the High Court as also of the Trial Court deserve to be set aside and we accordingly do so. Consequently, this Court directs that the possession of the suit premises be handed over to the appellant, who is admittedly the owner of the suit property.

  In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the legal representatives of the respondent are granted three months time to vacate the suit premises. They are further directed that after the expiry of the three months period, the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property be handed over to the appellant. The usual undertaking to this effect be filed by the legal representatives of the respondent in this Court within two weeks.

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