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Showing 121 to 140 of 1222 Records
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2014 (3) TMI 1105 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Scheme of Amalgamation - dispensation of meetings - Held that:- There are Shareholders in both the Transferor and Transferee Companies and all the Shareholders have given their consents for the proposed amalgamation and the letter of consents have been attached with the application. In view of the same the meetings of the Shareholders of the Transferor and Transferee Companies are dispensed with.
As stated that there are two Secured Creditors with three loan accounts in the Transferor Company and three Secured Creditors with six loan accounts in the Transferee Company. All the Secured Creditors have given their respective consents. In view of the same the meetings of the Secured Creditors of the Transferor Company and Transferee Company are dispensed with.
There are thirteen Unsecured Creditors in Transferor Company and two Unsecured Creditors in the Transferee Company. Out of thirteen Unsecured Creditors of Transferor Company twelve have given their respective consents which constitute 90% in number and 99.79% in value. All the Unsecured Creditors of the transferee company have given their respective consents. In view of the same the meetings of the Unsecured Creditors of the Transferor Company and Transferee Company are dispensed with.
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2014 (3) TMI 1104 - SUPREME COURT
Guilty of commission of the offence under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - accused appellant sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for each of the offence and also to pay a fine of ₹ 1000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months more - complainant approached the accused appellant for release of essential commodities against his shop for the month of November, 1995 and the accused appellant demanded a bribe of ₹ 250/- to issue the release order - Held that:- In so far as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe.
In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P-11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7
In so far as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.
Thus we cannot sustain the conviction of the appellant either under Section 7 or under 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
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2014 (3) TMI 1103 - SUPREME COURT
Commission of offence under Section 323, 380 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC - harassment complaint against sub-broker of Karvy Stock Broking Limited - residence of the accused has been shown at a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate - Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jangipur, Murshidabad on 1st of October, 2011, who after taking cognizance of the same, transferred the complaint to the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Jangipur, Murshidabad for inquiry and disposal - whether in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, inquiry is mandatory or not?
Held that:- The words “and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction” was inserted by Section 19 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f. 23rd of June, 2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the opinion of the legislature, was essential as false complaints are filed against persons residing at far off places in order to harass them.
This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code. In the present case, as we have stated earlier, the Magistrate has examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and the two witnesses and only thereafter he had directed for issuance of process.
In view of what we have observed above, we do not find any error in the order impugned.
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2014 (3) TMI 1102 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Application u/s 12A rejection - Held that:- The only ground on which the DGIT in this case rejected the application u/s 10 (23C) of the Act is that the relief granted in respect of the previous years by virtue of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal’s order, was premised on erroneous grounds. Subsequent developments have rendered the revenue’s position untenable.
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2014 (3) TMI 1101 - ITAT JAIPUR
Disallowance of claim of waiver of Sales Tax Loan claimed as a capital receipt by the assessee by holding it as taxable - Held that:- Mumbai Bench in case of M/s Grasim Industries Ltd.[2011 (3) TMI 1041 - ITAT, Mumbai] with reference to the scheme of the Rajasthan Government has held that the surplus arising out of the pre payment of loan which was credited to the P&L a/c is a capital receipt not liable to tax. In view of these binding precedents of the Special Bench as well as the co-ordinate Bench where this issue has been elaborately dealt with, we hold that the surplus of ₹ 13,30,82,204/- arising on the extinguishment of loan of ₹ 31,74,68,000/- by making pre- payment of the same at ₹ 18,43,85,796/- is a capital receipt on which sec. 41(1) is not applicable. Therefore, we order to delete this addition.
Disallowance of the claim of expenditure incurred on fly ash handling system & expenses for common property work - addition holding that the assessee gets benefit of this facility only for the five consecutive years and the ownership of this property can get transferred to Thermal Station not before five years - Held that:- When the agreement is read as a whole, it becomes evident that the system was installed by the assessee to get the fly ash, which is an important component for manufacturing of cement on a regular basis. Thus, the system is installed by the assessee for the purpose of its business and not for acquiring the capital asset. Further, as per para 2.1 of the agreement, RRVUNL has allowed the assessee to install the system only for collection of fly ash free of cost, initially for a period of 5 years, and as per Para 2.12 of the Agreement, the system becomes the sole property of RRVUNL on the expiry/termination of the agreement. Thus, the entire arrangement has benefited the assessee only by way of free supply of fly ash by incurring the expenditure on installation of the system which become the property of RRVUNL. By allowing 20% of the expenditure, the authorities have accepted that the expenditure is revenue in nature and not a capital expenditure. There is no concept of deferment of expenditure in the I.T. Act. Thus we do not agree with the finding of the ld CIT(A) that the issue is to be approached from commonsense point of view by ignoring the legal provisions of the Act. Therefore, the AO is directed to delete the disallowance made by him. Thus ground no. 2 of the assessee's appeal is allowed.
Disallowance of contribution to District Administration towards construction of hospital at Ramganjmandi by holding that the same cannot be allowed as business expenditure - Held that:- Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sri Venkata Satyanarayana Rice Mill Contractors Co. Vs. CIT [1996 (10) TMI 2 - SUPREME Court] has held that any contribution made by an assessee to a public welfare fund which is directly connected or related to the carrying on of the assessee's business or which results in benefit to the assessee's business has to be regarded as an allowable deduction under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Such a donation, whether voluntary or at the instance of the authorities concerned, when made to a Chief Minister's Drought Relief Fund or a District Welfare Fund established by the District Collector or any other fund for the benefit of the public and with a view to secure benefit to the assessee's business, cannot be regarded as payment opposed to public policy. The mere fact that making of a donation for a charitable or public cause or in public interest results in the Government giving patronage or benefit can be no ground to deny the assessee a deduction of that amount under section 37(1) of the Act when such payment had been made for the purpose of the assessee's business. In view of above, we have no hesitation in deleting the addition - Decided in favour of assessee.
Disallowance of various expenses - AO has made the disallowance by making observation that assessee has failed to produce supporting evidence or expenditure - CIT-A directing the AO to recompute the FBT payable by the assessee on staff welfare expenditure, general expenses, social welfare expenses, gift expenses and sales promotion - Held that:- It is stated that all expenses are duly supported by evidence and therefore such adhoc disallowance is unjustified. It is also pleaded that once FBT is paid on the expenditure claimed, the same cannot be disallowed in the tax computation for which decision of the Co-ordinate Bench is relied upon. We agree with the arguments of the Ld. AR that no adhoc disallowance can be made. We note that assessee has filed the complete details of expenditure as required by the AO. The AO has not specified any particular expenditure which is for personal use or for non business purpose. It is a case of a corporate entity where the contribution made to Gram Panchayat for various welfare measures at a place where the factory of assessee is located as a part of its social obligation is an allowable business expenditure as held in various cases referred in Ground No. 3 above. Further, we agree with the contention of the assessee that once FBT is paid, the expenditure cannot be subject matter of disallowance. The finding of ld CIT(A) that to the extent the expenditure is disallowed, FBT should not be charged is therefore not correct. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (3) TMI 1100 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
Oppression and mismanagement - no information of money the petitioner invested in R-l Company - accountability - Investment of petitioner's money in the form of subscription money - Held that:- Every transaction the management enters with third parties shall be as clear as daylight. This transaction of putting 123.5 crores in R-7 is nothing but changing hands from left to right, because R-7 is wholly owned subsidiary of R-4, this R-4 is in the absolute control and management of Kabul Chawla (R-5), the same R-4 is the holding company to R-2 which is holding 49.90% shareholding in R-1 company. The same Chawla (R-5), who is in direct control of R-4, is the nominee director of R-1 Company, Therefore, it is clear money has gone into R-7 for the benefit of one person that is Mr. Kabul Chawla (R-5). On seeing the picture available in this case, it appears as though R1 was brought into existence and made the petitioner invest money in R1 to make business in R7 Company with the money of the petitioner.
Here, the petitioner put in its money five years ago, nothing has happened in R-1 Company. It has virtually remained a shell company, but whereas the money invested by the petitioner - about ₹ 123.50 Crores, has gone into R-7 company and R-7 company has been carrying its business which is nothing but alter ego of Chawla, who is managing R-1 company. When the petitioner asked for the inspection and audit of the accounts financials of R-7 Company, it has virtually refused to provide any clue as to what has been happening to the investment made by the petitioner.
Since it is abundantly clear that R-4, R-7, R-8 & R-9 and other companies are alter egos of R-5 who is managing R-l Company, he is under obligation to explain to the petitioner as to what is happening with the money the petitioner invested in R-l Company. The conduct of R-5 and R-6 continuing as directors in R1 Company, clearly discloses that they are not inclined to disclose the information relating to the money invested by the petitioner though it is clear that R7 has come into existence for the benefit of Chawla.
The conduct of R5&6, who are running all these companies, is oppressive and prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner. This Bench is of the opinion that the petitioner has prima facie satisfied this Bench that investment of petitioner's money in the form of subscription money of R1 in R-7, as per articles of association, is a related transaction. Though the petitioner agreed to let this money go into R-4 or its subsidiaries, it does not mean the respondents are not under obligation to disclose every information relating to its money, it shall also give assurance to the petitioner that its money is safe and being used for the good of R1 Company. This Bench has not passed any restraint order against the assets of R-7 company because R-10 to R-20 have around 55 acres in the name of them and I believe the value of the land today may be much higher than the investment of the petitioner. If any restraint order is passed against the fixed assets of R-7 company involved in development, it will have further ramifications over the rights of others.
In view of the reasons above mentioned, hereby direct that,
1. Deloitte is hereby appointed to audit R1 and R7 Companies and complete audit within two months hereof, therefore R2-6 are hereby directed to cooperate Deloitte to audit as directed by this Bench.
2. R1 Company is directed to maintain status quo over the shareholding, board pattern and fixed assets if any, pending disposal of the case.
3. The remuneration shall be paid to the Deloitte by R1 company as agreeable to Deloitte, in default, the petitioner is at liberty to pay the remuneration and collect the same from R1 company thereafter.
4. R10 to 20 companies are hereby directed not to create any third party rights over the company land pending disposal of the company petition.
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2014 (3) TMI 1098 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Writ of habeas corpus - Detention order - Jurisdiction of Court to entertain the appeal - proceedings under COFEPOSA - non-placement before the Detaining Authority of vital documents having a bearing on the subjective satisfaction, non-consideration and non-advertence thereto in the grounds of detention by the Detaining Authority - Held that: - in the instant petition, challenge to the impugned detention orders was not considered at pre-execution stage and the petitioners were compelled to surrender to the detention orders. Since the detention orders stand executed as of now, there cannot, therefore, exist any bar in considering the merits of the grounds of challenge urged by the petitioners. The final consideration of the grounds urged is only after execution of the detention orders. Respondents could not show any binding precedent where the Courts have refused to consider the challenge of a detenu in a writ petition despite the execution of the detention order merely because challenge was unsuccessful at pre- execution stage. Even otherwise, the main ground of non-placement, non- consideration and non-advertence to vital documents was not decided earlier on merits in the absence of requisite grounds and documents relied upon. This Court cannot permit the Authorities to take shelter under such technical pleas in the matter of a writ petition in a preventive detention matter.
Territorial jurisdiction - Held that: - the petitioners have also a residence in Karnal in the State of Haryana. Their father resides in Karnal. Their birth place, as evident from their passports, is also Karnal. It is not denied that the attempt to serve the detention order was made at Karnal. The Detaining Authority deputed its representative for the purpose of service of detention order and grounds upon the petitioners in the jurisdiction of this Court and thereupon, the detention orders and grounds were served upon them in the jurisdiction of this Court, albeit after the orders of this Court. The petitioners were thus detained in the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, I hold that merely because the respondents have doubts on the bona-fides of the petitioners in invoking jurisdiction of this Cout, it cannot be said that no part of cause of action has arisen in the jurisdiction of this Court, to consider the challenge to the detention orders, muchless after its execution in the jurisdiction of this Court by compelling the petitioners to surrender to the respective detention orders.
There cannot be any criminal prosecution under FEMA in the absence of any statutory provision for the same. Although consideration of the possibility of adjudication proceedings is reflected in the grounds of detention, however, consideration of the possibility of criminal prosecution of the petitioners under other ordinary laws of land is not even reflected in the grounds of detention. This infirmity alone is sufficient to vitiate the detention orders.
The prayer for quashing of the impugned orders of detention Nos. bearing F. No. 673/09/2010-CUS.VIII dated 2nd June, 2010 and F. No. 673/10/2010-CUS.VIII dated 2nd June, 2010, which were executed upon the petitioners, is allowed and the impugned detention orders against the petitioners are quashed and set aside - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2014 (3) TMI 1097 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Writ of habeas corpus - Detention order - Jurisdiction of Court to entertain the appeal - proceedings under COFEPOSA - Held that: - Since the detention order stands executed as of now, there cannot therefore exist any bar in considering the merits of the grounds of challenge urged by the petitioner even if some were earlier raised in unsuccessful pre detention challenge. The consideration of the grounds urged is only after execution of the detention order. Even otherwise the main ground of non-placement and non-consideration of the said two documents was not raised by the petitioner before the Bombay High Court and thus, there was no reference to these two documents in the entire judgment. The respondents fail to support their contention with any binding precedent where the Courts have refused to consider the challenge of a detenu in a Habeas Corpus Petition after execution of the detention order, merely because some of the grounds were earlier raised without success in any pre execution challenge. The decision of Full Bench in Ram Kumar's case (supra) cited by the learned counsel appearing for the Sponsoring Authority is also not relevant in the present factual scenario. This Court cannot permit the authorities to take shelter of such technical pleas in the matter of a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a preventive detention matter.
Territorial jurisdiction - Held that: - it is seen that the petitioner has a residence in the State of Haryana. The Detaining Authority had deputed its representative for the purpose of service of detention order and grounds upon the petitioner in State of Haryana and thereupon the detention order and grounds were served upon him in the State of Haryana, albeit after the orders of this Court. The petitioner was detainied in preventive detention custody at Central Jail, Ambala in Haryana. He has also received the rejection of his pre detention representation in Haryana. Therefore, merely because the respondents have doubts on the bona-fides of the petitioner in taking a residential premises within the jurisdiction of this court although it has proximity to his factory at Baddi, it cannot be held that no part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the challenge to the detention order even after its execution in Haryana.
The Sponsoring Authority as well as the Detaining Authority had failed to take requisite care that was required to sustain the preventive detention order to curtail liberty of the petitioner without trial. I am unable to ignore that in the instant case despite allegations of being repeated offender, there was no opposition by the Sponsoring Authority to the prayer for grant of immunity from prosecution either before issuance of the detention order or after issuance thereof. Non placement and non consideration of the vital documents which could have revealed this vital aspect shows absolute casualness and vitiate the impugned detention order. It is settled law that the Settlement Authority cannot withhold vital documents from the Detaining Authority.
In the instant case, the Detaining Authority has miserably failed to advert to in the grounds of detention the factual position regarding recourse to ordinary punitive law of the land. She was not aware that the Sponsoring Authority was not even pressing for the prosecution of the petitioner despite he being a repeated offender. The Detaining Authority is also obliged to enquire about the status of the prosecution proceedings, if any, and, if there is none, about the stand of the Sponsoring Authority concerning initiation of prosecution.
The prayer for quashing of the impugned detention order No. PSA-1212/CR-13/SPL-3(A) dated 8.4.2013 executed upon the petitioner Joit Kumar Jain is allowed and the said impugned detention order against the petitioner is quashed and set aside - petition allowed.
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2014 (3) TMI 1096 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Writ of habeas corpus - Detention order - Jurisdiction of Court to entertain the appeal - proceedings under COFEPOSA - detenu was absconding and evading detention - Held that - Since the detention order stands executed as of now, there cannot, therefore, exit any bar in considering the merits of the grounds of challenge urged by the detenu. The final consideration of the grounds urged is only after execution of the detention order as prayed by the Detaining Authority. The respondents could not show any binding precedent where the Courts have refused to consider the challenge of a detenu in a habeas corpus petition after execution of the detention order, merely because challenge was unsuccessful at pre- execution stage. Even otherwise, the main ground of absolute casualness even after judgement dated 16.7.2013 was not raised earlier by the detenu. This Court cannot permit the Authorities to take shelter under such technical pleas in a writ petition filed challenging preventive detention order.
Territorial jurisdiction - Held that: - merely because respondents No.5 & 6 have doubts on the bona fides of the petitioner in taking a leased residential premises within the jurisdiction of this Court, it cannot be held that no part of cause of action has arisen in the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the challenge to the detention order even after its execution in the jurisdiction of this Court. Although certain judgements were cited by the respondents, however, they could not show any precedent where jurisdiction was held as lacking despite such part of cause of action arising in the jurisdiction of the High Court. Moreover, there is a long line of decisions rendered by various High Courts substantiating that these facts would constitute part of cause of action that has arisen in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court - the detenu is still detained in Siliguri Special Jail which is within the jurisdiction of this Court and in the event the said detention is held to be illegal, a writ of habeas corpus may have to be issued; pursuant whereto, the detenu may be released, we are of the opinion, that a part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court and as such the writ application is maintainable.
The Detaining Authority was in fact granted ample opportunity and it could have filed a proper affidavit in a responsible manner dealing with the case on merits as well. However, the Detaining Authority chose not to file any proper affidavit dealing in details with the merits of the case - the prayer for quashing of the impugned detention order No.PSA1200/85/SPL3(A) dated 12.3.2001, executed upon the detenu Nitesh Ashok Sadarangani is allowed - appeal allowed.
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2014 (3) TMI 1095 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Allowability of maintenance expenditure - Business expenditure - similar dis-allowances were made by the assessing officer and were deleted by the said Appellate Tribunal - Held that:- In paragraph 8 of the order under challenge these are the very fact which are referred to by the Tribunal in dismissing the Department's appeal. The findings are essentially factual and rendered in the backdrop of the material produced. They are consistent therewith. The Assessee was maintaining the premises as business centre. The maintenance expenditure required for maintenance of such commercial premises has, thus, been upheld. The quantum of ₹ 60 lakhs was held not to be unreasonable, considering the nature of the business and the total investment of ₹ 5.25 crores.
In the light of the above, we do not see as to how substantial question of law arises for consideration and determination in this appeal. We find that the appeal cannot be entertained because the attempt is to re-appreciate and reappraise the factual material. That is impermissible when the findings are not vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record or perversity.
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2014 (3) TMI 1094 - CESTAT BANGALORE
Waiver of pre-deposit - Non-payment of service tax - financial difficulty - Held that: - in view of the fact that the appellants have accepted the liability, they are required to deposit the entire amount of tax with interest and a portion of penalty even though financial difficulties also pleaded but not supported by evidence - Subject to compliance of above deposit with cost of condonation, there shall be waiver of pre-deposit and stay against recovery in respect of the balance dues during pendency of the appeal.
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2014 (3) TMI 1093 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Maintainability of the arbitral proceedings - Held that:- As the appellant sought liberty to withdraw the appeal and stated that the questions urged with respect to the maintainability of the arbitral proceedings in view of the respondents/defendants failure to follow the conditions and steps prescribed in clause 12.3 of the shareholder’s agreement, would be taken before the Tribunal. In view of the statement made the liberty sought is granted.
The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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2014 (3) TMI 1092 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
Manpower Recruitment agency service - Valuation - inclusion of value of Provident Fund and other statutory dues - the appeals are covered against the appellants/assessees and in favour of Revenue, vide the final order of this Tribunal in M/s. Neelav Jaiswal & Brothers v. CCE, Allahabad [2013 (8) TMI 147 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] - appeal dismissed for reasons alike as recorded in the judgment in Neelav Jaiswal & Brothers.
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2014 (3) TMI 1091 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Tenability of SCN - Section 25 (3) of the VAT Act, 2002 - return has not been filed for the period 1.4.13 to 31.10.13 under Section 9 (c) - Held that: - when the dealer has disputed his liability to pay the tax and when returns are being filed, no order can be passed in the matter of demanding advance tax before the assessment - It is held that without assessment of the tax and computation process, issuing show-cause notice and recovery of tax by coercive method is unsustainable - SCN not valid - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.
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2014 (3) TMI 1090 - SUPREME COURT
Arbitration and Conciliation - Held that:- Dispose of special leave petition by the following order :
(i) The impugned order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is declared to be ineffective from the date the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed the suit and applied for interim relief.
(ii) The suit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 shall be decided on its own merits uninfluenced by any observations made in the impugned order and the present order.
HC ref case - 2011 (6) TMI 926 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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2014 (3) TMI 1089 - ITAT HYDERABAD
Revision u/s 263 - allowability of finance charges - CIT-A took entry under the head “MBB Transactions” as pertaining to third party - Held that:- CIT relied on the documents furnished by assessee before the A.O. during the scrutiny proceedings which indicate that entire details furnished before the A.O. were examined. In our opinion, learned CIT mistook the entry under the head “MBB Transactions” as pertaining to third party whereas, it is internal code given by the bank for the multi branch banking transactions. Since it is misunderstanding of understanding the word “MBB Transactions” lead to the proceedings under section 263, we are of the opinion that order of the Ld. CIT cannot be justified on any reason. Since the entire claim of finance charges has been examined by the A.O. and as he has disallowed the amount to the extent assessee could not furnish the details, any other opinion by the Ld. CIT cannot be justified
Not only that there is nothing else to direct the A.O. to examine again when the claim itself was examined in the course of scrutiny and A.O. has came to a conclusion by disallowing part of the amount. No further purpose would be served by setting aside the order to A.O. to examine afresh, when Ld. CIT order did not indicate that there are any issues on which A.O. has not examined. Just because the invoices furnished by assessee contain the code of ‘MBB transaction’, it does not establish that these are third party transactions. For these reasons, we are unable to uphold the order under 263 passed by Ld. CIT as the order of the A.O. is not prejudicial to the interests of Revenue nor it is erroneous on facts. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (3) TMI 1088 - SC ORDER
Biometric information to CBI for investigation purposes with respect to a criminal trial - Aadhaar number requirement - Held that:- Operation of the impugned order shall remain stayed.
In the meanwhile, the present Petitioner is restrained from transferring any biometric information of any person who has been allotted the Aadhaar number to any other agency without his consent in writing.
More so, no person shall be deprived of any service for want of Aadhaar number in case he/she is otherwise eligible/entitled. All the authorities are directed to modify their forms/circulars/likes so as to not compulsorily require the Aadhaar number in order to meet the requirement of the interim order passed by this Court forthwith.
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2014 (3) TMI 1087 - CESTAT, MUMBAI
CENVAT Credit - input - Furnace Oil used for generating steam for manufacturing Cakes and Pastries - demand barred by time limitation - Held that: - the respondent informed to the department on 07.01.2003 through a letter that they are opting for CENVAT credit facility on furnace oil which in turn used for the manufacture of excisable as well as non-excisable items. When these facts are in the knowledge of the department, SCN dated 16.06.2005 for the period January 2003 to May 2004 is barred by limitation as there is no suppression of facts on the part of the respondent - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2014 (3) TMI 1086 - ITAT MUMBAI
Benefit of exemption to the assessee u/s 11 - AO treating the assessee as mutual concern and not a trust - Held that:- CIT(A) has held that the assessee is entitled for the benefit of exemption u/s 11 of the Act by relying on the decision of the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case for the assessment year 1996-97 to 2000-01 wherein it has held that the assessee is a charitable club and it is entitled to claim exemption u/s 11 of the Income-tax Act in respect of the income under consideration. It is also noted that the said order of the Tribunal has been upheld by the Hon’ble High Court of Bombay. In the absence of any distinguishing fact brought by the revenue during the year under consideration and also in view of the fact that the Tribunal order as upheld by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has not been reversed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the of the Ld.CIT(A) and therefore the same is upheld. - Decided against revenue
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2014 (3) TMI 1085 - SUPREME COURT
High Court Judges entitlement for an addition of 10 years to their service for the purposes of their pension on retirement as appointed from the Bar under Article 217(2)(b) of the Constitution of India - Held that:- When persons holding constitutional office retire from service, making discrimination in the fixation of their pensions depending upon the source from which they were appointed is in breach of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. One rank one pension must be the norm in respect of a Constitutional Office.
When a Civil Servant retires from service, the family pension is fixed at a higher rate whereas in the case of Judges of the High Court, it is fixed at a lower rate. No discrimination can be made in the matter of payment of family pension. The expenditure for pension to the High Court Judges is charged on the Consolidated Fund of India under Article 112(3)(d)(iii) of the Constitution.
In the light of what is discussed, we accept the petitioners’ claim and declare that for pensionary benefits, ten years’ practice as an advocate be added as a qualifying service for Judges elevated from the Bar. Further, in order to remove arbitrariness in the matter of pension of the Judges of the High Courts elevated from the Bar, the reliefs, as mentioned above are to be reckoned from 01.04.2004, the date on which Section 13A was inserted by the High Court and Supreme Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Amendment Act, 2005 (46 of 2005). Requisite amendment be carried out in the High Court Judges Rules, 1956 with regard to post-retiral benefits as has been done in relation to the retired Judges of the Supreme Court in terms of amendment carried out by Rule 3B of the Supreme Court Judges Rules, 1959
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