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Showing 141 to 160 of 383 Records
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2012 (1) TMI 289
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 40A(3) of the Income Tax Act for the financial year 2004-05 regarding deduction of expenditure exceeding Rs. 20,000 not made by crossed cheque or bank draft.
Summary:
The appellate, an assessee, sought exemption of payments made towards transportation of granites under Section 40A(3) of the Income Tax Act for the financial year 2004-05. The Assessing Authority initially disallowed more than 20% of the total expenditure, while the assessee contended that deduction should be allowed up to Rs. 20,000 and 80% of the excess payment made. The provision of sub-Section 3 was examined, which stated that 20% deduction shall not be allowed on expenditure exceeding Rs. 20,000 not made by crossed cheque or bank draft. The credibility of the payment was not in doubt, but the statutory deduction under sub-Section 3 needed to be considered.
Upon close reading of sub-Section 3, it was concluded that deduction should not be allowed only on the amount exceeding Rs. 20,000 not made by crossed cheque or bank draft. Therefore, the assessee was entitled to seek deduction up to Rs. 20,000, and on the excess amount paid, a deduction of up to 80% was permissible. The Assessing authority, Commissioner of Income Tax, and the Tribunal had disallowed deduction on the total expenditure without excluding the permitted payment up to Rs. 20,000. The appellate Tribunal's view was deemed incorrect in law, and the appeal was allowed.
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2012 (1) TMI 288
Issues involved:
The judgment involves appeals and cross objections related to assessments completed under sec.153A read with section 153C read with section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the assessment years 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07.
Assessment of Lease Income:
The Revenue contended that the assessee had not disclosed income earned from leasing buses, leading to assessments based on lease agreements found during a search. However, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) noted that the assessee maintained proper books of account supported by vouchers and bills, directing the Assessing Officer to consider income as per these books rather than the lease agreements.
Validity of Notices and Interest Levy:
The assessee challenged the validity of notices issued u/s 153A, re-assessments, and the levy of interest under sec.234A and 234B. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld the notices and interest levy, leading to cross objections by the assessee on these grounds.
Revenue's Grounds and Assessee's Cross Objections:
The Revenue raised common grounds for all assessment years, questioning the deletion of additions related to lease income and other sources, which the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) had allowed. The assessee's cross objections focused on challenging the legality of the notice u/s 153A and the levy of interest under sec.234A and 234B.
Decision and Rationale:
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner's decision to accept the income returned by the assessee as per her maintained books of account, dismissing the Revenue's appeals. Regarding the cross objections, the Tribunal agreed with the Commissioner's findings on the validity of notices and interest levy, leading to the dismissal of the assessee's objections as well.
Conclusion:
Both the appeals and cross objections were dismissed, affirming the orders of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding the assessment of income and the validity of notices and interest levy.
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2012 (1) TMI 287
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are:
1. Whether the reassessment order passed u/s 143(3)/147 within two years of the service of notice could be annulled?
2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in annulling the reassessment order due to the absence of notice u/s 143(2) served on the assessee?
3. Whether the issuance of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory and not procedural for passing a valid reassessment order?
4. Whether in the absence of notice u/s 143(2) prior to reassessments, assessments should have been set aside rather than annulled?
Judgment Details:
Issue 1:
The respondent, a partnership firm, filed its return of income for the assessment year 1993-94, declaring an income under the head "income from business and profession." The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings under Section 147 of the Act due to discrepancies in the treatment of lease rent income. The reassessment order was passed without issuing notice u/s 143(2) of the Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) annulled the assessment, which was upheld by the Tribunal. The Court held that the order annulling the assessment for want of notice u/s 143(2) did not suffer from any legal infirmity.
Issue 2:
The Counsel for the Revenue argued that the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) failed to consider the effect of Section 292 BB of the Act, inserted by the Finance Act, 2008. This section deems notice to be valid in certain circumstances. However, the Court held that the absence of notice u/s 143(2) before making the assessment under section 147 was a legal requirement, and the provisions of Section 292 BB did not cure this defect.
Issue 3:
The Court referred to the case law where the Supreme Court held that the issue of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory for assessments. The Court also cited a previous decision where deeming provisions to validate notice would not apply if the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer is based on the issuance of notice u/s 143(2). The Court upheld the view that the notice u/s 143(2) is essential for reassessment proceedings.
Issue 4:
The Counsel for the Revenue could not provide any distinguishing factor to deviate from the precedent set by the Court in a previous case. The Court reiterated that the absence of notice u/s 143(2) before reassessment renders the assessment invalid. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision to annul the assessment under sections 147/148 read with Section 143(3) was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.
This judgment emphasizes the importance of following procedural requirements, specifically the issuance of notice u/s 143(2) before conducting reassessment under section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
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2012 (1) TMI 286
Issues involved: Disallowance of expenditure on power purchase, Charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C of the Act.
Expenditure on Power Purchase:
The appellant contested the disallowance of a significant sum representing expenditure on power purchase payable to UPPCL. The Tribunal had previously ruled in favor of the appellant for the assessment year 1994-95, stating that the liability crystallized in that year itself. However, in subsequent years, the Tribunal decided against the appellant, noting that the dispute over the differential rate between the agreement rate and the rate charged by UPSEB remained unresolved, making the liability uncertain. The appellant argued that the treatment of the amount in the profit and loss account did not affect the accrual of liability, citing relevant case law. The Tribunal, in the later decision, considered all available facts, including the recommendation of an independent authority, and ruled in favor of the revenue based on these updated considerations.
Charging of Interest under Sections 234B and 234C:
Regarding the charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C, the appellant relied on a Supreme Court decision in the case of JCIT Vs. Rolta India Ltd, which clarified that assessed tax refers to tax assessed on regular assessment for the purpose of interest levy under these sections. The appellant's arguments were dismissed, affirming the chargeability of interest under sections 234B and 234C even in cases of assessment under section 115JA.
In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the disallowance of the expenditure on power purchase and the charging of interest under sections 234B and 234C, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.
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2012 (1) TMI 285
Issues involved: Difference of opinion between the Ld. Members on two questions referred to Third Member u/s. 255(4) of I.T. Act.
Issue 1: Whether the project executed by the assessee can be considered complete during the assessment year 2004-05.
The Hon'ble Third Member, Shri R.V. Easwar, agreed with the view of the Ld. Accountant Member that the project should be considered complete and concluded upon signing the consent terms on 5th August, 2003, during the assessment year 2004-05.
Issue 2: Whether the sum of Rs. 13.31 crores received by the assessee from MHADA during the year can be assessed as income of A.Y. 2004-05.
The Hon'ble Third Member, Shri R.V. Easwar, agreed with the view of the Ld. Judicial Member that the amount of Rs. 13.31 crores received by the assessee from MHADA cannot be assessed as its income for the assessment year 2004-05.
Therefore, based on the majority view, both the appeal of the assessee and the appeal of the department were dismissed. The order was pronounced in the Open Court in the presence of representatives of both parties on 13.01.2012.
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2012 (1) TMI 284
Issues involved: Appeal against order dated 28-02-2007 for assessment year 2004-05: (1) Disallowance of Carting and Labour charges, (2) Addition of unexplained gifts u/s 68.
Disallowance of Carting and Labour charges:
The assessee claimed &8377; 9,91,080/- as expenses for Carting and Labour charges, supported by self-made vouchers totaling &8377; 7,42,300/-. The AO disallowed &8377; 1,17,620/- of unsupported expenses. The Ld CIT(A) deleted the addition based on the higher net profit declared by the assessee. However, the Tribunal disagreed, stating the burden of proof lies with the assessee. Considering the difficulty in verifying self-made vouchers, a disallowance of &8377; 25,000/- was made to address deficiencies, modifying the Ld CIT(A)'s order.
Addition of unexplained gifts u/s 68:
The assessee received gifts from various individuals, with explanations and documents submitted. The AO added the amounts to total income, which was partly upheld by the Ld CIT(A). The Tribunal emphasized the primary burden of proof on the assessee under sec. 68, requiring proof of creditor identity, transaction genuineness, and creditworthiness. While gifts from two individuals were supported by adequate documentation, the third lacked proof of creditworthiness. The Tribunal confirmed the addition related to the third gift and remanded the others for further evidence submission by the assessee. Ultimately, the appeal of the revenue was partly allowed, and the cross objection of the assessee was dismissed.
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2012 (1) TMI 283
Issues Involved:
1. Deletion of addition u/s 68 of the IT Act.
2. Deletion of addition u/s 40A(2) of the IT Act.
3. Alleged violation of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules.
Summary:
1. Deletion of Addition u/s 68 of the IT Act:
The first issue pertains to the deletion of an addition of Rs. 74,45,000/- made by the Assessing Officer (AO) u/s 68 of the IT Act. The AO questioned the identity, genuineness, and creditworthiness of the creditors who provided unsecured loans to the assessee. Despite the assessee providing confirmations, copies of accounts, income tax returns, and bank statements, the AO found inconsistencies and deemed the transactions non-genuine. However, the CIT(A) deleted the addition, noting that the creditors were family members, assessed to tax, and had confirmed the loans. The CIT(A) emphasized that the AO's selective adverse inference was inconsistent and not legally tenable. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, stating that the assessee had discharged the primary onus and the AO did not bring any contrary material on record.
2. Deletion of Addition u/s 40A(2) of the IT Act:
The second issue involves the deletion of an addition of Rs. 18,57,189/- made u/s 40A(2) of the IT Act. The AO contended that the assessee paid excessive interest at 18% to family members, whereas the prevailing rate was 12%. The CIT(A) deleted the addition, observing that the AO did not provide tangible material to support the allegation of excessiveness and failed to conduct necessary inquiries. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A), noting that unsecured loans typically attract higher interest rates and the creditors had declared the interest income in their returns.
3. Alleged Violation of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules:
The third issue concerns the alleged violation of Rule 46A, where the Revenue claimed that the CIT(A) accepted fresh evidence without giving the AO an opportunity to respond. The Tribunal dismissed this ground, as the Revenue failed to specify which fresh evidence was admitted without due process.
Conclusion:
The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed, and the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decisions on all grounds. The judgment was pronounced in the Open Court on 20th January, 2012.
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2012 (1) TMI 282
Issues involved: Levy of penalty u/s.271(1)(c) for undisclosed income detected during a search u/s.132 of the Income Tax Act.
Summary:
The appeal was filed against the order of the Ld. CIT (A)-III, Ahmedabad regarding the levy of penalty u/s.271(1)(c) amounting to &8377;78,7250. The case involved a search u/s.132 in the Soham Group cases, where the assessee declared additional income of &8377;2,50,000 in a partnership firm during the assessment year 2003-04. The AO levied the penalty based on the undisclosed income detected during the search, which was confirmed by the CIT (A) citing relevant judgments. However, the ITAT Ahmedabad, after considering the provisions of section 153A and the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd., concluded that the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) cannot be levied as there was no finding of inaccurate particulars or concealment in the return filed by the assessee in response to notice u/s.153A. Therefore, the penalty of &8377;78,750 was canceled, and the appeal of the assessee was allowed.
This judgment highlights the importance of accurate disclosure in the return filed in response to a search notice u/s.153A and emphasizes that mere unsustainable claims in the return do not amount to inaccurate particulars. It also clarifies that the penalty u/s.271(1)(c) cannot be levied if there is no finding of inaccurate particulars or concealment in the return filed in response to a search notice u/s.153A.
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2012 (1) TMI 281
Demand of duty - assessee had willfully suppressed and mis-stated the facts to the Department - there was a bona fide doubt on the payment of duty - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BANGALORE-II Versus ITC LIMITED [2010 (7) TMI 331 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that it cannot be said that there was suppression of facts or any wilful intention to evade duty - Held that: - appeal dismissed.
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2012 (1) TMI 280
Incentive scheme - Eligibility Certificate - substantial expansion - Commercial Production - ineligible investment - Held that: - when the unit had started production within the stipulated time period and when there is no doubt with regard to making of investment merely on technical grounds, the denial on the part of the respondent to treat such investment as ineligible for the purpose of tax benefit requires reconsideration. This of course is not to suggest that those investments which are not falling within the stipulations made under the scheme or which are considered ineligible specifically by virtue of government resolution are not to be treated as eligible. However, on technical ground or on nonproduction of the document when eligibility is denied that requires the direction of reconsideration - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2012 (1) TMI 279
Disallowing development expenses - Held that:- It is useful to note that the assessee has used the percentage completion method. When an assessee follows the percentage completion method then at the completion of the project, the assessee has to make up the accounts. At that relevant time, the assessee can offer surpluses from the provisions or may claim the deficit in case the actual expenditure is more than the provisions. Hence, the revenue is not without any remedy in case the provision is excessive.
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2012 (1) TMI 278
Addition of proportionate interest being interest free loan to its subsidiary concern - commercial expediency for assessee to advance such loan - Held that:- Since the ld. CIT(A) while deleting the disallowance has followed the order of his predecessor for A.Y. 2004-05 and since the Tribunal has restored the issue to the file of the A.O. for fresh adjudication, therefore, we deem it proper to restore this issue to the file of the A.O. with a direction to adjudicate the same in the light of the direction of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2004-05 and in accordance with law after giving due opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The ground raised by the Revenue is accordingly allowed for statistical purposes.
Addition of expenditure on corporate club membership fees - Held that:- Respectfully following the order of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case and in absence of any contrary material brought to our noticeby the ld. D.R. we set aside the order of the ld. CIT(A) on this issue and direct the A.O. to delete the disallowance.
Addition u/s 14A - Held that:- We restore the issue back to the file of the A.O. with a direction to adjudicate the same afresh in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Godrej Boye Mfg. Co. Ltd. (2010 (8) TMI 77 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) and in accordance with law after giving due opportunity of being heard to the assessee. We hold and direct accordingly.
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2012 (1) TMI 277
Issues involved: Condonation of delay, substantial questions of law related to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision on cash deposits and Section 40A(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Condonation of Delay: Mr. Siddhartha Chatterjee did not oppose the application for condonation of delay, and the Court, being satisfied with the explanation, allowed the application, thereby condoning the delay.
Substantial Questions of Law: The Court admitted the appeal based on two substantial questions of law. Firstly, whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal erred in considering cash deposits into the payee's bank account as cash payment instead of issuing account payee cheques or bank drafts. Secondly, whether the Tribunal erred in upholding the Appellate Order invoking Section 40A(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, treating the cash deposit as direct cash payment and failing to consider the purpose of the said section.
Direction to Department: The Court directed the department to keep the attached amount separately, taken from the bank, pending the appeal's result. The stay application was disposed of accordingly.
Affidavit-in-Opposition: Since no affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the respondent, the allegations contained therein were not admitted by them.
Operative Order: All parties were instructed to act on a signed photocopy of the order, and the appellant was given four weeks to file the requisite number of paper books. Liberty to mention was granted for any further issues.
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2012 (1) TMI 276
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are u/s 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, enhancement of income, disallowance of premium on Keyman Insurance policy, application of mercantile system of accounting, and the correctness of the order passed by the ld. CIT.
Enhancement of Income u/s 263:
The appeal was filed against the order passed by the ld. CIT u/s 263, enhancing the income of the assessee. The grounds of appeal included the contention that the assessment was completed under scrutiny u/s 143(3) after due application of mind. The appellant argued that the order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue due to lack of proper enquiry and application of mind by the AO.
Disallowance of Premium on Keyman Insurance Policy:
The ld. CIT disallowed a portion of the premium paid on Keyman Insurance policy, stating that the expenses beyond a certain date were not allowable in the relevant assessment year. The CIT held that expenses must be related to the period under assessment for accrual basis accounting. The disallowed amount was added to the total income of the assessee.
Mercantile System of Accounting:
The ld. CIT based the disallowance on the mercantile system of accounting, emphasizing that expenses should be debited to the profit and loss account only if they are related to the period under assessment. The CIT noted that the assessee had followed the mercantile system for other expenses but not for the premium paid on the Keyman Insurance policies.
Decision:
The Tribunal observed that the liability to pay the insurance premium arose and was paid in the year under appeal, in accordance with the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee. As the expenses were recognized in the books of account, the order of the ld. CIT disallowing the insurance premium was vacated, and the appeal filed by the assessee was allowed to that extent.
This judgment highlights the importance of proper application of accounting principles and the necessity for expenses to be related to the relevant assessment year for accrual basis accounting.
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2012 (1) TMI 275
Exemption u/s 54 - utilization of capital gains proceeds in the residential house only within the time provided u/s 139 - Held that:- The exemption should be forfeited for a technical breach does not appear to be the correct proposition particularly since the appellant pleads that he was not aware of the requirement ot invest in the capital gains account scheme and also states that his objective was to invest in a residential house which is apparent from the fact that he has purchased a land and also constructed a house thereon. It is also seen that section 54E (since deleted) and sections 54EC and 54ED which require investment of the proceeds in specified assets, specifically provides that the exemption would be forfeited if the specified asset is given as a security for taking loan. In section 54, we do not find any such provision and therefore in our considered view the purpose of section 54(2) is not to deprive the assessee of an exemption but only to avoid rectification. The ultimate object of the section having been satisfied namely to encourage construction of houses, we are convinced that the utilization of the funds in constructing a residential house should be treated as sufficient compliance of section 54 and therefore hold that the appellant is entitled to the exemption u/s 54 even in respect of the amount invested by way of construction of the residential house - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2012 (1) TMI 274
Issues involved: Appeal by Revenue against ITAT order for assessment years 2005-06 and 2006-07 regarding payment of commission to Managing Director without tax deduction at source.
Issue 1: Tax deduction at source on commission payment
The Assessing Officer disallowed the commission payment to the Managing Director due to non-deduction of tax at source under Section 36(1)(i) read with Section 40A(ia) of the Income Tax Act. The CIT(A) and ITAT found that services were indeed rendered by the Managing Director. The Revenue contended that tax should have been deducted under Section 194H, but the company had deducted TDS under Section 192 at a higher rate considering the commission as part of salaries. The Court held the Revenue's contention as hypertechnical, stating that TDS was deducted at a higher rate under Section 192, and thus rejected the Revenue's argument for applying Section 40(a)(ia).
Issue 2: Application of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act
The Court was required to determine if the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) were attracted and if the Tribunal was correct in deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer. The respondent company, a private limited company, paid commission to its Managing Director based on net profits earned. The Court noted that limited notice had been issued, and therefore did not examine whether the amount should be disallowed under Section 40A(2) of the Act. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Tribunal's decision to delete the addition made by the Assessing Officer.
This judgment clarifies the tax deduction requirements on commission payments and the application of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act in cases involving payments to Managing Directors.
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2012 (1) TMI 273
Issues:
Violation of Flag Code 2002 by public figures, misuse of National Flag for commercial and political gains, request for recovery of monetary sums, seeking amendment of Flag Code through court direction.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner alleged that certain public figures, including Yog Guru Baba Ramdev and Shri Anna Hazare, violated the Flag Code 2002 by insulting the National Flag for personal gains. The petitioner sought recovery of monetary amounts and amendment of the Flag Code. The petitioner had also filed criminal complaints against the respondents. The Court referred to the interpretation of the Flag Code in Union of India v. Naveen Jindal & Anr., AIR 2004 SC 1559, emphasizing the fundamental right to fly the National Flag and the guidelines for its respectful display.
2. The Court highlighted that disrespect towards the National Flag could lead to legal action under relevant statutory provisions. However, determining such disrespect on specific occasions involved factual inquiries best addressed through complaints to authorities. Pursuing remedies simultaneously through writ petitions, as in this case, was not permissible under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. The Court cannot adjudicate factual controversies in such petitions.
3. The petitioner requested the Court to direct the Central Government to amend the Flag Code or issue appropriate directions. The Court noted that it cannot legislate or direct the Executive to exercise its law-making power, citing precedents like Mullikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation. The separation of powers doctrine restricts the Court from encroaching on the legislative domain.
4. The Court reiterated that judicial activism has limits, and the Court's role is to interpret the law, not to legislate. Several judgments, including Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, emphasized that the Court cannot expand the scope of legislation or issue directions for legislative amendments. The Court's function is to expound the law, not to create it.
5. Considering the limited role of the Court in legislative matters, the petition lacked merit, and the facts did not warrant any interference. The Court concluded that in such circumstances, no relief could be granted to the petitioner, leading to the dismissal of the writ petition.
In summary, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition concerning violations of the Flag Code 2002 by public figures for commercial and political gains. The Court emphasized the limitations of judicial activism in legislative matters, citing various precedents, and concluded that the petition lacked merit due to the factual nature of the allegations.
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2012 (1) TMI 272
Whether the parties to an agreement can contract in violation of Sections 23 and 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872?
Whether the parties to an agreement can confer jurisdiction on a Court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain a matter?
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2012 (1) TMI 271
Whether the Government of NCT of Delhi could have invoked Section 17(1) and (4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and dispensed with the rule of hearing embodied in Section 5A(2) thereof for the purpose of acquiring land measuring 80 bighas 15 biswas including 21 bighas 3 biswas belonging to the appellants for a public purpose, namely, establishment of electric sub-station by Delhi Transco Limited (for short, `DTL') at village Mandoli ?
Whether the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court had rightly negatived the appellants' challenge to the acquisition of their land?
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2012 (1) TMI 270
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the Magistrate's order dated 9.2.2011 issuing process against the accused.
2. Validity of the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition.
3. Examination of the defences raised by the accused.
4. Request for further investigation.
5. Propriety of filing the review petition.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Magistrate's order dated 9.2.2011:
The Magistrate issued process against Dr. Rajesh Talwar and Dr. Nupur Talwar for the murders of Aarushi Talwar and Hemraj based on sufficient grounds for proceeding, as per Section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Magistrate's detailed order considered the evidence and circumstances, including the presence of the accused at the crime scene, the lack of forced entry, and the tampering of evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's order, stating that the material placed before the Magistrate was sufficient to proceed against the accused.
2. Validity of the High Court's dismissal of the revision petition:
The High Court dismissed the revision petition filed by Dr. Nupur Talwar, affirming the Magistrate's order. The Supreme Court found no fault with the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the Magistrate's satisfaction was based on the available record and materials. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Magistrate's order was well-founded and based on sufficient grounds for proceeding.
3. Examination of the defences raised by the accused:
The Supreme Court noted that the defences raised by the accused, such as the absence of blood of Hemraj on their clothes and the presence of Hemraj's blood on Krishna Thadarai's pillow cover, were factual in nature and needed to be substantiated through cogent evidence during the trial. The Court emphasized that the Magistrate was not required to consider all possible defences at the stage of issuing process and found no merit in the contention that the defences should have been considered at this stage.
4. Request for further investigation:
The request for further investigation was raised by Dr. Rajesh Talwar in his protest petition and was declined by the Magistrate. The Supreme Court held that the plea for further investigation had attained finality and could not be raised again by Dr. Nupur Talwar. The Court found no merit in the contention for further investigation, emphasizing that the Magistrate's decision to proceed with the trial was justified.
5. Propriety of filing the review petition:
The Supreme Court criticized the filing of the review petition, stating that it amounted to misuse of jurisdiction. The Court noted that the petitioner was repeatedly challenging every order not in her favor, leading to unnecessary litigation and wastage of court time. The Court cautioned the petitioner against such behavior in the future and emphasized the need to abide by the advice of legal counsel to avoid frivolous proceedings.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, affirming the Magistrate's order and the High Court's decision. The Court directed the trial to proceed without being influenced by any observations made by the High Court or the Supreme Court in their respective orders.
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