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Showing 141 to 160 of 1967 Records
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2014 (1) TMI 1829
Criminal complaint with allegations of medical negligence - MCI under the 2002 Regulations jurisdiction - Held that:- It is clearly admitted by the Respondent that it has no jurisdiction to pass any order against the Petitioner hospital under the 2002 Regulations. In fact, it is stated that it has not passed any order against the Petitioner hospital. Thus, need not go into the question whether the adequate infrastructure facilities for appropriate post-operative care were infact in existence or not in the Petitioner hospital and whether the principles of natural justice had been followed or not while passing the impugned order. Suffice it to say that the observations dated 27.10.2012 made by the Ethics Committee do reflect upon the infrastructure facilities available in the Petitioner hospital and since it had no jurisdiction to go into the same, the observations were uncalled for and cannot be sustained.
Since the MCI had no jurisdiction to go into the infrastructure facilities, need not also go into the aspect that in the year 2011, the facilities available in the hospital were inspected and were found to be in order.
The petition therefore has to succeed. Hereby issue a writ of certiorari quashing the adverse observations passed by the MCI against the Petitioner hospital highlighted in Para 1 above.
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2014 (1) TMI 1828
Validity of the disallowance of the deduction u/s.10A - assessee relying on Master Circular No. 10/2011-12 (dated 01.07.2011/PB pgs.19-23), which clarifies that no specific time limit has been prescribed in respect of units in SEZs for realization and repartition of the export proceeds - Held that:- Law does not provide an inflexible condition in the matter; leaving it to the competent authority, the RBI, whose decision, besides being binding on the Revenue, would presumably only be with regard to and on an assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case, apart from being consistent with any policy guideline it may have framed in the matter, also having regard to any other law, if any, that may have a bearing or which impinges thereon.
Once, therefore, the RBI has clarified that it has not stipulated any time period for the realization of the sale proceeds for the SEZ units, as the assessee, it can only be considered as having allowed an indefinite time period for the same. Consequently, it cannot be said that the condition of section 10A(3) is not satisfied. The objection of the Revenue is, in our view, not valid.
The non-stipulation of any time frame by the RBI for the realization and repatriation of the export proceeds for the units located in SEZs does not per se lead to any conflict or inconsistency between the same and the provisions of the Act. Tax implication may though arise where the sale proceeds are either received otherwise than in convertible foreign exchange or, though received as so, is not brought into India inasmuch as sec. 10A(3) gets attracted. These aspects, however, do not arise for consideration in the facts of the present case. - Decided against revenue
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2014 (1) TMI 1827
Concessional rate of duty - absence of declaration form (Form C) - petitioner says that he has now obtained the photocopy of the counter part of the declaration forms from its seller together with a certificate appended thereto to be the true copy of the original - Held that: - There is no dispute raised by the respondents authorities that no legality can be attached to such certificate issued by a competent authority. This Court, therefore, does not find any impediment on the part of the respondent authorities in taking into consideration the photocopy of the counter part of the declaration form when admittedly the original declaration have been destroyed in fire.
The petitioner is permitted to submit the photocopy of the declaration forms issued by seller together with the certificate issued by the sales tax authority at New Delhi before the Revisional Board - petition allowed.
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2014 (1) TMI 1826
Failure to inform the stock exchanges about acquisition of shares thereby depriving the public of the information regarding acquisition of shares to the tune of 5.22 per cent instead of 5% - marginally crossed the limit prescribed by the regulations in respect of their shareholding in Murli Industries Limited (MIL), i.e. the company in question - Held that:- Regulation 7 of the SAST Regulations, 1997 read with Regulation 35(2) of the SAST Regulations, 2011 clearly points out that not only the company, but an acquirer is also required to inform the stock exchanges at every stage of aggregate of the shareholding or voting rights in the company. The object underlying these regulations is, therefore, unequivocally to bring more transparency by dissemination of complete information to the public as well as shareholders at large not only by the concerned company but by the individual acquirer as well. To this extent, the appellants, though inadvertently and without any intention, have defaulted in complying with the regulations regarding disclosures in question in our considered view and in the facts and circumstances of the present cases. The infraction, although venial in nature, is an infraction nonetheless. This Tribunal has held time and again that the penalty levied on any wrong-doer ought to be commensurate with the gravity of the deviation effected. Therefore, we feel that for this lapse a penalty of ₹ 1 lac on each of the appellants would suffice to meet the ends of justice.
Accordingly, the impugned order in each case is upheld with a modification of the penalty to ₹ 1 lac per appellant, to be paid within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order failing which the respondent would be at liberty to recover the same with interest by taking appropriate steps as per law. Ordered accordingly.
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2014 (1) TMI 1825
Arbitration and Conciliation - order and direction seeked against respondents to deposit monies to the extent of the claims of the petitioner under Share Subscription Agreement and Share Holders Agreement including the investment of approximately US$ 60 million and cost and/or in the alternative to provide adequate and satisfactory security in regard to the claims of the petitioner - Petitioner seeks injunction restraining the respondents from dealing with their assets including bank accounts with Corporation Bank - Held that:- Having taken a view that law of Singapore would apply to the parties in this proceedings and under laws of Singapore, respondents would have remedy of challenge the interim awards before the appropriate court at Singapore and the respondents not having challenged the said jurisdictional award and interim award, in my view the said jurisdictional award and interim award made by the arbitral tribunal between the same parties arising out the same agreement in the arbitration proceedings have become final and conclusive on the issue of jurisdiction and the respondents are barred by the principles of estoppel in re-agitating the same issue in this proceedings.
Learned senior counsel is right in his submission that the question as to whether the arbitral tribunal being less suitable or it would be more convenient or appropriate for a civil court to decide allegations of fraud etc., is not a ground available under Section 48 (2)(a) of the Arbitration Act. In my view, only such cases which cannot decided by the arbitrators can be covered by Section 48(2)(a). The dispute raised by the petitioner before the arbitral tribunal related to the rights of the petitioner in personam and could be considered by the arbitral tribunal and there is no bar contemplated under Section 48 (2)(a) in the arbitral tribunal adjudicating upon such dispute. Petitioner has made out a case for interim measures. In one of the arbitration proceeding out of the two arbitral tribunal has already rendered a final award. In my view petitioner has good chances of succeeding in the arbitration proceedings. If the interim measures are not granted in favour of the petitioner, even if petitioner succeeds in arbitration proceedings, petitioner would not be able to recover any amount from the respondents. Thus balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.
Pursuant to the ad interim order passed by this Court, respondents have been already restrained from withdrawing the amount lying in the account of the respondents with Corporation bank other than the amount allowed to be withdrawn. The said order is in force since 3/8/2012. Respondents have not filed any appeal against the said order. The respondents have rendered an undertaking to return the amount allowed to be withdrawn by this Court in this proceedings. Respondents have also not paid fees of the arbitral tribunal. Pursuant to the order passed by Division Bench on 30/01/2013, respondent No.1 has been directed to deposit ₹ 1.40 cores equivalent to 3,35,000 Singapore dollars with the Corporation bank in a separate fixed deposit towards arrears of contribution of arbitration fees to be paid by respondent No.1 and has directed that the said order is passed without prejudice to rights and contentions of the parties keeping all contentions open.
Respondents are restrained from withdrawing the amounts retained by the Corporation Bank in the accounts of the respondents to the extent of USD 60 million. In the event of the balance in the said accounts with the Corporation bank of the respondents less than USD 60 million, respondents are directed to deposit the shortfall in the said account so as to maintain the balance of USD 60 million within four weeks from today.
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2014 (1) TMI 1824
Offence of cheating against the appellant which led to the pregnancy of Nagal - Offence under section 193 of the IPC - Proceedings against the respondent on the basis of the complaint - Punishment for false evidence - Held that:- In the light of the language of section 195 Cr.P.C. we do not find fault with the conclusion of the learned Magistrate in dismissing the complaint of the appellant herein for the reason that the complaint is not filed by the person contemplated under section 195 Cr.P.C. It may be mentioned here that as a matter of fact the Court before which the instant complaint was lodged is not the same Court before which the appellant herein was prosecuted by the respondent.
Under section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C., it is stipulated that whenever it appears that any one of the offences mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195 appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding before a Court, that Court either on an application made to it or otherwise make a complaint thereof in writing to the competent Magistrate after following the procedure mentioned under section 340 of the Cr.P.C.2
Admittedly, the appellant herein did not make an application to the judicial magistrate No.1, Pollachi under section 340 to ‘make a complaint’ against the respondent herein nor the said magistrate suo moto made a complaint. Therefore, the learned judicial magistrate No.2 before whom the private complaint is made by the appellant had no option but to dismiss the complaint.
But the High Court, in our view, is not justified in confining itself to the examination of the correctness of the order of the magistrate dismissing the said private complaint. Both Section 195(1) and Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. authorise the exercise of the power conferred under Section 195(1) by any other court to which the court in respect of which the offence is committed is subordinate to.
The High Courts not only have the authority to exercise such jurisdiction but also an obligation to exercise such power in appropriate cases. Such obligation, in our opinion, flows from two factors – (1) the embargo created by Section 195 restricting the liberty of aggrieved persons to initiate criminal proceedings with respect to offences prescribed under Section 195; (2) such offences pertain to either the contempt of lawful authorities of public servants or offences against public justice.
In the case on hand, when the appellant alleges that he had been prosecuted on the basis of a palpably false statement coupled with the further allegation in his complaint that the respondent did so for extraneous considerations, we are of the opinion that it is an appropriate case where the High Court ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 195 Cr.P.C.. The allegation such as the one made by the complainant against the respondent is not uncommon. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The matter is remitted to the High Court for further appropriate course of action to initiate proceedings against the respondent on the basis of the complaint of the appellant in accordance with law.
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2014 (1) TMI 1823
Scheme of amalgamation - Held that:- The Applicant Transferee Company being a private limited company, all the Equity Shareholders of the Applicant Company have given their approval to the Scheme in form of consent letters, which are placed on record as Annexures ‘D’ to the application. A certificate from the Chartered Accountant confirming the status of the Equity Shareholders of the Company as well as receipt of written consent from all the Shareholders is also placed on record as Annexure ‘E’ to this application.
Considering all it is hereby ordered that the meeting of the Equity Shareholders of the Applicant Company, as required to be held under the provisions of Section 391(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 is not necessary to be held and is hereby dispensed with.
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2014 (1) TMI 1822
Scheme of amalgamation - Held that:- All the Equity Shareholders of the Applicant Transferor Company (there being no Secured Creditors) have given their approval to the Scheme in form of consent letters, which are placed on record as Annexures ‘D’ to the application. The certificates from the Chartered Accountant confirming the status of the Equity Shareholders and Secured Creditors of the Company as well as receipt of written consent from all the Shareholders are also placed on record as Annexure ‘E’, collectively. In view of the same, the dispensation of the meeting of the Equity Shareholders is sought and is hereby granted.
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2014 (1) TMI 1821
Scheme of Arrangement in the nature of Amalgamation - Held that:- All the Equity Shareholders and sole Preference Shareholder of the Applicant Transferor Company have given their approval to the Scheme in form of consent letters, which are placed on record as Annexures ‘D’ and ‘E’ to the application. The certificates from the Chartered Accountant confirming the status of the Equity Shareholders and sole Preference Shareholder of the Company as well as receipt of written consent from all the Shareholders are also placed on record as Annexure ‘F’, collectively. In view of the same, the dispensation of the meetings of the Equity Shareholders and sole Preference Shareholder is sought and is hereby granted.
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2014 (1) TMI 1820
Winding up petition - Held that:- The claim of the respondent that the material supplied by the petitioner other than the material supplied under bill No. 057 dated 08.10.2011, on account of defects therein, had caused huge loss to the respondent, the responsibility for which should be taken by the petitioner, is clearly an afterthought. The contention of the respondent that the legal notice issued by the petitioner was a counter blast to the legal notice sent by the respondent on 07.03.2012 seeking recovery of ₹ 20,00,000/- from the petitioner is not acceptable, since even according to the respondent, the notice dated 07.03.2012 could not be served on the petitioner and was returned with the noting "no such person at this address". It has been admitted so in para 8 of the counter filed by the respondent. If the notice dated 07.03.2012 was not served on the petitioner I do not see how the steps taken by the petitioner commencing with the legal notice dated 21.05.2012 can be a counter blast to the same.
In the course of the arguments as requested the learned counsel for the respondent to produce the copies, if any, of other debit notes said to have been sent by the respondent to the petitioner to substantiate its claim that the material supplied under disputed bills were actually returned to the petitioner. Till the close of the hearing, the respondent who was present in Court through its authorised representative, could not produce any of the debit notes though it was asserted that the respondent did send those debit notes.
Therefore, it seems to be a case where the defence put up by the respondent is not bona fide, is mere moon-shine. Except one debit note and return of the goods to the petitioner, for which credit was given by the petitioner, no other goods were returned. The other goods supplied by the petitioner were used by the respondent for manufacture of cables. There is no evidence adduced by the respondent to prove that the alleged defects in the cables manufactured by it were on account of defective materials supplied by the petitioner, particularly when admittedly the respondent was getting material also from other suppliers. It seems to me that the respondent raised the bogey of loss recoverable from the petitioner only to ward off the claim of the petitioner with regard to the balance amount outstanding in the ledger account. The defences raised by the respondent do not have any substance. Accordingly admit the winding-up petition.
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2014 (1) TMI 1819
Scope and extent of the powers of the courts under the criminal justice system to arraign any person as an accused during the course of inquiry or trial as contemplated under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - power to proceed against any person after summoning him on the basis of any such material as brought forth before it - What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised? - Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial?
Held that:- Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the chargesheet. In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.
Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? - Held that:- Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination.
What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? - Held that:- Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial - therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.
Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not chargesheeted or who have been discharged? - Held that:- A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.
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2014 (1) TMI 1818
Scheme of demerger - Held that:- The observations made by the Regional Director, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, do not survive as we have come to the conclusion that the present scheme of arrangement is in the interest of its shareholders and creditors as well as in the public interest and the same deserves to be sanctioned. However considering the objections of the Regional Director as noted in paragraph 11(d) above and considering the fact that the Petitioners have, as noted in paragraph 13(d) above, also no objection for deletion of the proviso to Clause 40 of the Scheme, direct that the modified Scheme after deletion of the proviso to Clause 40 is hereby sanctioned.
The Reduction of share capital of the Resulting Company and reduction in the share premium account of the Demerged Company and the Resulting Company as envisaged in their respective Petitions are approved and the Minutes dealing with respective reduction of the Petitioner Companies being Annexures U and R are hereby approved.
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2014 (1) TMI 1817
Offence made out under Sections 42 and 45 (12) of the Prisons Act - Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition to quash the FIR? - Held that:- The appellant was not a prisoner at the date of the commission of the offence. He could thus, not have committed a ‘prison offence’ as defined under Section 45 of the Act. Hence, no offence is made out under Section 45 of the Act. Insofar as Section 42 of the Act is concerned, it provides that only that communication, which is contrary to the rules made under Section 59 of the Act is prohibited.
The FIR for the offence was dated 24.09.2009. This notification will obviously not apply to the case in hand as the alleged offence was committed in 2009, and retrospective effect will not apply in the case of criminal laws. Hence, there is no offence made out against the appellant and we cannot accept the reasoning of the High Court in the impugned judgment. We hereby hold that this section cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.
The case of the appellant clearly falls under category (1) of the grounds of quashing of FIR mentioned in the case of Bhajan Lal (1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT). On the date of the offence, mobile phone was not listed as one of the prohibited articles under the Punjab Prison Manual. Thus, no offence is made out under Section 42 of the Act, as there was no communication which was done or was attempted to being done contrary to the rules. Further, the appellant was not a prisoner on the date of the offence. Hence, he could not have committed a prison offence as defined under Section 45 of the Act.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The FIR dated 24.09.2009 and the proceedings against the appellant are quashed.
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2014 (1) TMI 1816
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(b) - assessee did not comply with the notices issued during the assessment proceedings - assessment in all these appeals was completed u/s 143(3) r/w section 153A - Held that:- From the assessment orders, we clearly observe that Shri Dinesh Jain, CA and authorized representative of the assessee attended the assessment proceedings and also filed necessary details and documents as per requirement of the Assessing Officer. In this situation, mere single instance of absence which occurred due to outstation visit of the AR to Mumbai does not attract penalty u/s 271(1)(b). From the assessment and penalty orders, we also observe that the Assessing Officer has not recorded any finding of fact that the assessee was habitual of non-compliance of notices issued by the department and moreover, we also observe that the assessments were completed on 27.12.2011 on the returned document without making any disallowance or addition. In this situation, we are inclined to hold that the authorities below wrongly imposed and confirmed the penalty u/s 271(1)(b) - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (1) TMI 1815
TPA - rejection/selection of comparables by TPO - selection criteria - Held that:- Assessee is engaged in software development services. Assessee can be termed as a captive service provider, thus companies functionally dissimilar with that of assessee need to be deselected from final list of comparability.
Reduce the communication expenses attributable to delivery of software outside India both from the export turnover and total turnover for the purpose of computing deduction u/s 10A of the Act. See CIT vs. Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. (2010 (6) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT )
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2014 (1) TMI 1814
Application for framing additional substantial questions of law - What is the effect of omission of Rules 96ZO and 96 ZP with effect from 01.03.2001 alongwith omission of Section 3A of the Act by the Finance Act,2001 w.e.f. 11.05.2001 on the pending proceedings out of which this appeal arises? - In the absence of any saving clause provided in the Finance Act, 2001 while omitting Section 3A of the Act and Rules 96ZO and 96ZP, whether it will have any effect on the pending proceedings and if so, in what manner? - misc. application is allowed and additional substantial questions of law are framed.
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2014 (1) TMI 1813
Application to grant bail under Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. after sixty-days of the examination of first witness - Held that:- The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Gangapur City has granted bail to the accused respondent Nos.2 to 4 primarily on the ground that they are in custody in a case of magisterial trial from last 7/8 months, and prosecution having cited twenty-five witnesses had only examined one witness.
Delay in conclusion of the trial by the Magistrate in a magisterial trial vests right in the accused to seek bail. Legislature in its wisdom has enacted Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. for grant of bail to the accused in case of delay in conclusion of the trial. In ordinary circumstances, the trial Court is bound to follow the mandate of Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. it can only deviate from the above provision in exceptional circumstances.
Section 437 (6) Cr.P.C. has been enacted to grant bail, where there is a delay in conclusion of the trial. It recognizes the right of speedy trial.
Article 21 of the Constitution of India grants personal liberty to the citizen. Furthermore, Magistrate of 1st Class can only award three-years sentence, therefore, accused cannot be kept behind the bars for an indefinite period as lateron, if accused is acquitted, nobody will be able to compensate the loss caused to the accused.
It is to be appreciated that the Court below has not granted bail on merit, therefore, has not observed anything contrary to the order passed by the High Court.
The Court below had only taken into consideration the period of custody already undergone by the accused and slow lengthy and tardy conduct of the trial, therefore, this Court find no reason to cause interference to cancel the bail granted to the accused-respondent Nos.2 to 4. Present application dismissed.
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2014 (1) TMI 1812
Rejecting Application in Form 10G - Renewal of exemption for donations u/s80G - Held That:- Due to pendancy of some procedural requirements in the application we can't deny renewal of exemption u/s80G. Therefore we hold that the assessee has filed the valid application on 02-11-2011 and for considering the approval u/s. 80G the same date is to be taken into consideration.
Examining the nature of the activity - Held That:- As per the case of Sonepat Hindu Educational & Charitable Society (supra) submits that so far as the nature of the activities of the assessee are concerned, the assessee cannot be refused the approval u/s. 80G as admittedly in the preceding years on the same activities and objects, the assessee has been granted approval u/s. 80G and the registration u/s. 12A is still valid. Moreover, the assessee’s case is also squarely covered by the decision of Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of N.N. Desai Charitable Trust Vs. CIT, 246 ITR 452 (Guj). We, therefore, allow the appeal filed by the assessee and direct the CIT-II, Pune to grant the approval u/s. 80G w.e.f. 02-11-2011.- Decided in favor of assessee.
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2014 (1) TMI 1811
Permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from proceeding before Singapore International Arbitration Centre for arbitration - violation of Shareholders Agreement dated 6th October , 2011 and Master Agreement dated 24th August, 2012 - Held that:- This Court held that no suit for such a relief can be entertained by the court when defendant No. 1 had prior thereto elected to refer the disputes for arbitration in the manner envisaged in the Shareholder Agreement.
The legal position that follows aforesaid is that the issues that are raised by the plaintiff, namely, non –compliance of Clause 12.3(a) and Clause 12.3(b) are issues which have to be gone into by the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 5 of the said Act takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court. The said statutory provision has to be given effect to.
The present suit does not lie and is barred under Section 5 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act and Section 34 and 41(i) (h) of the Specific Relief Act in terms of Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC, the present suit is barred by law and hence, the plaint is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, the application is allowed and the present suit is dismissed.
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2014 (1) TMI 1810
100% EOU - Refund claim - whether the respondent is eligible for refund of accumulated CENVAT credit arising because of deemed exports made to 100% EOUs within India? - Held that: - the issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of CCE Vs Shilpa Copper Wire Industries [2010 (2) TMI 711 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], where it was held that the deemed exports have to be treated at par with physical exports for granting refunds of accumulated credit under N/N. 5/2006 - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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