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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 229 Records
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1985 (3) TMI 90 - ITAT BANGALORE
Assessment Order, Original Assessment, Original Order, Prejudicial To The Interests Of Revenue, Weighted Deduction
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1985 (3) TMI 89 - ITAT AMRITSAR
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... ... ..... I have not referred to any of the arguments addressed to me by the ld. Departmental Representaive, Shri Kapila, it was not because those arguments are not entitled to respect or deserved commendation but because in the view that I have taken that the order passed by the ITO following an order of the Tribunal could not be said to be erroneous, those arguments became unnecessary to be dealt with specifically. As I have mentioned earlier, the attempt of the Departmental Representaive is to equate the jurisdiction under s. 263 with the reopening of assessment under s. 147 by correlating the meaning of the expression consider used in s. 263 with the expression reason to believe used in s. 147. But the major difference is that there must be an error committed by the ITO before the CIT could exercise his jurisdiction. The ITO did not commit an error when he followed an order of the Tribunal. This being the distinguishing feature, it became unnecessary to deal with those arguments.
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1985 (3) TMI 88 - ITAT AMRITSAR
Bench Of Tribunal, Deduction In Respect, Export Business, In This Behalf, Orders Prejudicial To Interests, Weighted Deduction
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1985 (3) TMI 87 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... acquiring or buying an excluded asset, such as a fixed deposit, cannot be deducted from the value of the assets in terms of s. 2(m) of the Act. Our finding, therefore, is that the assessee are not entitled to the deduction of the debts of Rs. 70,000 and Rs. 60,000 respectively. The ld. Departmental Representative referred to some of the authorities, including that of Allahabad High Court in the case of Jewan Lal Virmani vs. CIT (1967) 66 ITR 338 (All). In our opinion, those authorities are not relevant on the point as they relate to debts which are secured on any property in respect of which wealth-tax is not chargeable. That is, however, not the case here. As discussed above, the case of the Department is covered by the other segment of cl. (ii) of s. 2(m) of the Act. We, therefore, reverse the orders of the AAC in this regard and restore those of the ITO, though for reasons different from those adopted by him for the purpose. 6. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 86 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Assessment Year, Income From Business, Money Lending Business, Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... wal had been assessed with reference to the same very incomes which were subsequently assessed as the income of the assessee. Whatever might be the position in the quantum assessment, certainly those findings cannot be followed in the penalty proceedings when there is an additional evidence, as discussed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in his order to show positive that it could not be conclusively said that those businesses were either run with the funds of the assessee or actually belonged to it. The Commissioner (Appeals) has also given various other reasons to effectively answer the reasons and grounds taken by the ITO in support of the levy of the penalty. We do not consider necessary to repeat them here as we are in full agreement with his findings. In view of these facts and the legal principles, we agree with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained in law. 23. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (3) TMI 85 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Annual Value, Income From House Property, Income From Other Sources, Let Out ... ... ... ... ..... ing and cannot be separated nor can be let out separately from the building. There is only one thing which attracts our attention, i.e., a booster pump. However, in our opinion, even a booster pump in the modern age is an essential part of the building. As in olden days, a well could be treated as a part of the building so in the modern times, a booster pump is necessary for a building without which it would remain incomplete or inhabitable. We, therefore, hold that the entire rent of Rs. 4,500 should be treated as income from the property. This was also the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case referred to above. We do not attach any importance to the recitation in the lease deed, that might be for the convenience of the parties or for some other reasons but certainly it cannot deviate us from the correct principles of law or the interpretation of section 22. The finding of the AAC on this issue is, therefore, upheld. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 84 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Annual Value, Income From House Property, Income From Other Sources, Let Out ... ... ... ... ..... ing and cannot be separated nor can be let out separately from the building. There is only one thing which attracts our attention, i.e., a booster pump. However, in our opinion, even a booster pump in the modern age is an essential part of the building. As in olden days, a well could be treated as a part of the building so in the modern times, a booster pump is necessary for a building without which it would remain incomplete or inhabitable. We, therefore, hold that the entire rent of Rs. 4,500 should be treated as income from the property. This was also the view taken by the Kerala High Court in the case referred to above. We do not attach any importance to the recitation in the lease deed, that might be for the convenience of the parties or for some other reasons but certainly it cannot deviate us from the correct principles of law or the interpretation of section 22. The finding of the AAC on this issue is, therefore, upheld. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 83 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Assessment Order, Assessment Year, Income Tax Authorities ... ... ... ... ..... would have been in time, it was held that the assessment order passed on 31-3-1977 would be in time. 16. Our decision in short, thus, is that once concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on the IAC under section 125A, he is deemed to have exercised the powers vested in him under section 125A even if he allows the ITO to exercise all the powers of assessment by himself inasmuch as sub-section (2) of section 125(1)(a) circumscribes the powers of the ITO, within the parameter of the directions that the IAC may give. In any event, so far as the present case is concerned, the IAC, Allahabad has, as a matter of fact, exercised the powers vested in him under section 125A. Therefore, the provisions of section 144B are not applicable in this case in view of sub-section (7) of section 144B thereof. The order of assessment has been made on 25-9-1980 and is, thus, clearly barred by limitation. Such an order requires to be annulled and not set aside. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 82 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Debt Owed, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... iring or buying an excluded asset, such as a fixed deposit, cannot be deducted from the value of the assets in terms of section 2(m). Our finding, therefore, is that the assessees are not entitled to the deduction of the debts of Rs. 70,000 and Rs. 60,000, respectively. The learned departmental representative referred to some of the authorities, including that of Allahabad High Court in the case of Jiwan Lal Virmani v. CWT 1967 66 ITR 338. In our opinion, those authorities are not relevant on the point as they relate to debts which are secured on any property in respect of which wealth-tax is not chargeable. That is, however, not the case here. As discussed above, the case of the department is covered by the other segment of sub-clause (ii) of section 2(m) as discussed above. We, therefore, reverse the orders of the AAC in this regard and restore those of the ITO, though for reasons different that adopted by him for the purpose. 6. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 81 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
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... ... ..... lable in smaller denomination notes. 2. The CIT(A) has agreed with the order of the ITO which is in accordance with the IAC s approval. That is why the assessee is in appeal. 3. At the time of hearing before us the assessee s counsel made one single point which in our view is the winning point and that is that the H. D. Notes when they were exchanged, were legal tender and no one is bound to identify the person with whom exchange had occurred or produce proof thereof. He also pointed out that at the relevant date the assessee had sufficient balance with Paras to support his case. 4. The ld. Departmental Representative relied upon the ITO s order and the CIT(A) s order. 5. There is hardly and need for us to say anything more. We fully accepted the arguments of the assessee s advocate. The fact that the assessee is unable to produce any evidence to prove the exchange, is no ground for making the addition because that proof is not necessary. In the result the appeal is allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 80 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
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... ... ..... he case of CIT vs. Kanpur Coal syndicate (1984) 53 ITR 225 (SC). At. p. 229 their Lordships observed thus If an appeal lies, s. 31 of the Act describes the powers of the AAC in such an appeal. Under s. 31 (3) (a) in disposing of such an appeal the AAC may, in the case of an order of assessment, confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, under cl. (b) thereof he may set aside the assessment and direct the ITO to make a fresh assessment. The AAC has, therefore, plenary powers in disposing of an appeal. The scope of his power is conterminous with that of the ITO. He can do what the ITO can do and also direct him to do what he has failed to do. If the ITO has option to assess one or other of the entities in the alternative, the AAC can direct him to do what he should have done in the Circumstances of a case . Therefore, on all counts, the action of CWT for invoking the provisions of s. 25 is bad in law and is accordingly quashed. 6. The assessee s appeal is fully allowed.
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1985 (3) TMI 79 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB
Special Excise Duty
... ... ... ... ..... xcise Act and fastens itself to them. I do not think it is correct to go beyond this stage to enquire whether the goods had been manufactured before the special excise duty started to be operative because that is not relevant for its purposes. What might be said to be so relevant to the basic central excise duty cannot be said to be so relevant to the special excise duty the date of the manufacture of the goods is not relevant to the purpose of the special duty the only relevant thing is the liability of the goods to the basic central excise duty. If they are, then the principle comes into operation and the duty is increased, by the formula provided under Section 37 of the Finance Act, namely 5 of that duty. 52. In view of the above, I consider that this appeal deserves to be rejected and I reject it. TRIBUNAL S ORDER 53. In accordance with the judgment of the majority of the Members who have heard the matter, the appeal is allowed with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (3) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Import and Export - Imprest licence ... ... ... ... ..... the return in the trial Court did not raise this contention in the return. This contention also was not made before the learned trial Judge and, in our opinion, it would not be proper to entertain such a new contention in this appeal. We, therefore, do not wish to refer to that part of the argument based on paragraph 185(7) of the Import and Export Policy 1982-83. After taking into account the provisions contained in paragraph 185(4), we are of the opinion that the respondents are entitled for the reliefs as prayed for in prayer clause (b) of the writ petition. 8. There is no substance in any of the contentions raised before us. The appeal is accordingly summarily dismissed. 9. Shri Bulchandani at this stage orally applies for stay of the order for six weeks. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we grant the stay for four weeks on condition that the appellants give four days notice in the event they intend to move the Supreme Court for any interim relief.
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1985 (3) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... ivil Application No. 4357 of 1984. By our judgment dated 6-3-1985, we had allowed that petition. The powers under the Central Excise Rules, as they were then, could not be exercised after the said Rule had been omitted without there being any express saving. We accordingly allow this petition on that solitary ground without going into other grounds agitated here also (as they were agitated in that petition) and declare that the proceedings at Annexures E and K are ultra vires the authority of the Central Government and they are quashed. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no orders to costs. 4. We refuse the oral application made by Mr. S.D. Shah under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India because the point is covered by the Supreme Court s judgment in the case of M/s. Rayala Corporation Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, New Delhi-A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 494. 5. At the request of Mr. S.D. Shah, stay of the operation or our judgment is granted for a period of six weeks from today.
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1985 (3) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Polyurethane foam excisable goods - Produced by one shot process in ship ... ... ... ... ..... uced by the petitioner through one-shot process insitu in the ship is an excisable article. 9. The Judgment of the Punjab High Court in M/s Jiwan Singh v. The Senior Superintendent of Central Excise, referred to in Re Ajay Enterprises (P) Ltd. (6), is a case where the question that had been considered was whether steel chairs fixed to a bus is furniture within the meaning of Item 40 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Act? On the reasoning that furniture s essential quality is its mobility, the Punjab High Court held that fixed chairs cannot be called furniture. We, therefore, find that the above cases which have been cited by the petitioner will be of no avail to the main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner is liable to pay excise duty at the appropriate rate on Polyurethane Foam produced or manufactured by the petitioner insitu by one-shot process. 11. Accordingly, we dismiss this writ petition with costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Refund - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... idavit is filed and there is also no denial by the respondents to the averments made by the petitioners in the petition regarding the practice normally followed. There is ample material on record to show that the goods exported contained iron ore fines. The analysis at the time of loading and destination also shows that the goods the petitioners actually exported contained iron ore fines. There is a power under the Customs Act to make provisional assessment and this practice was agreed upon. 9. The writ petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The orders, dated 7-7-1967, 27-4-1968 and 20-11-1970 passed by respondents Nos. 3, 2 and 1 respectively are quashed and a mandamus is issued directing the respondents to refund to the petitioners the amount which may be found on verification to be due. Since the refund applications were made as far back as in the year 1967 the refund amount will be paid within a period of four months from today. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Cotton Fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... here other operations have been carried on the cloth to convert it into stiffening collar or collar linings, the courts have taken the view that the material continues to retain it characteristics as cotton fabric. This position would be a fortiori in this case, where apart from braiding the cotton threads or fibres into wicks for use in stoves, no other operation has been carried on. On a due consideration of the facts and the circumstances as well as the principles laid down in the several decisions referred to earlier, we are clearly of the view that the cotton stove wicks sold by the assessee would squarely fall within cotton fabrics in item 19 of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and consequently would fall within item 4 of the Third Schedule of the Act and exempt from sales tax under section 8 of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in the view it took. Accordingly, we dismiss this tax revision case. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 73 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Cotton nylon duck (twisted yarn) made from duty paid cotton/nylon yarn ... ... ... ... ..... o excise duty has also not been considered. In this view of the matter the show cause notice proposing to initiate action for contravention of Rules 173 and 175 has to be quashed with a direction to the appellant to consider the question of liability of the respondent for excise duty on twisted yarn in the light of what has been stated above within two months from today and to take such action as is necessary in the light of the said decision. Thus, though we have not accepted the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, the ultimate order quashing the show cause notice has to be upheld. However, the direction given by the learned Judge for refund of the amount of excise duty paid within three months is made subject to the decision to be rendered by the appellant in the light of what has been stated above as to whether excise duty is leviable under tariff 18E as it stood at the relevant time. The writ appeal is ordered accordingly. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 72 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Valuation - Discounts ... ... ... ... ..... tain trade discount, by whatever name it is called, is allowed by the manufacturer to its customers under the terms of sale or agreement, the amount has got to be deducted from the sale price before arriving at the assessable value of the product provided the allowance and the nature of the discount should be known at or prior to the removal of the goods. In the present case, the price list prepared by the respondent discloses that a particular percentage of the total price will be allowed as discount if the payment is made in cash or within certain time and, therefore, it should be taken that the purchasers are aware of the said discount allowed depending upon when the payment of the price is made. Therefore, cash discount is also admissible irrespective of whether each customer avails of the said discount or not. 7. Thus all the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants fail and the writ appeals are, therefore, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1985 (3) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Value of clearances - Plant and Machinery - Capital Investment - Manner of computation ... ... ... ... ..... 10 lakhs as per the above discussion and the petitioner is entitled to necessary relief accordingly. In the view that we are inclined to take as regards the above two questions, it is clear that the conditions laid down by the Government in Notification No. 89/79, dated 1-3-1979 are satisfied, so far as financial year 1979-80 is concerned and the conditions laid down in Notification No. 105/80, dated 19-6-1960 are satisfied for Financial Year 1980-81 and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to the refund for the aforesaid two financial years. The Assistant Collector is hereby directed to calculate the amount of refund accordingly without going into any other questions, in the light of the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and the findings recorded in this judgment. The refund should be calculated and the amount should be refunded as clearly as possible but not later than six weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ from this court. Rule is made absolute with costs.
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