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Showing 141 to 160 of 872 Records
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2009 (4) TMI 928
Issues:
Appeal against High Court order rejecting criminal revision on summoning witnesses from supplementary charge-sheet.
Analysis:
1. Background: The case involved an appeal against the High Court order rejecting a criminal revision filed by the appellant against the order allowing the prosecution to summon witnesses named in a supplementary charge-sheet.
2. Facts of the Case: The case originated from a police report filed against the appellant and others under IPC sections. Subsequently, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted with additional witnesses, leading to an application by the prosecution to summon these new witnesses during the trial.
3. Legal Arguments: The appellant argued that further investigation at this stage would delay the trial and prejudice the defense. On the other hand, the State contended that further investigation is a statutory right of the police, and the prosecution can produce any necessary witness as per Section 231 of Cr.P.C.
4. Interpretation of Section 173: The Court analyzed Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., which allows further investigation even after the submission of a police report. It clarified that further investigation is distinct from fresh or reinvestigation and is aimed at supplementing the existing evidence.
5. Judicial Precedents: Referring to legal precedents, the Court emphasized that the goal of further investigation is to discover the truth and ensure substantial justice, even if it leads to trial delays. The Court highlighted that the hands of the investigating agency should not be tied down due to mere delays.
6. Court's Decision: The Court upheld the trial court's order allowing the summoning of witnesses from the supplementary charge-sheet. It emphasized that further investigation is a statutory right of the police, and the prosecution can produce additional witnesses as necessary, even during the trial.
7. Conclusion: The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that there were no valid grounds for interference. It affirmed the trial court's decision to summon witnesses from the supplementary charge-sheet, as it was in line with legal provisions and aimed at discovering the truth in the case.
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2009 (4) TMI 927
Issues:
1. Clandestine removal of processed fabrics without payment of duty.
2. Confirmation of demand of duty and imposition of penalties on the appellants.
3. Reduction of penalties imposed on individual appellants.
Analysis:
1. The case involves the clandestine removal of processed fabrics without payment of duty by M/s. Suryanarayan Silk Mills. During a visit by Central Excise Officers, discrepancies were found in the recorded balance of grey fabrics. Statements from the partners of the firm and the proprietor of the recipient unit confirmed the unauthorized clearance of processed fabrics. Delivery challans showing transportation of the fabrics further supported the findings of clandestine removal.
2. The Original Adjudicating Authority confirmed the demand of duty amounting to &8377; 6,77,024/- and imposed penalties on M/s. Suryanarayan Silk Mills, Shri Ramesh Gandhi, and Shri Devang R. Gandhi. The Appellate Authority upheld the duty demand and penalty on M/s. Suryanarayan Silk Mills but set aside the penalty on Shri Ramesh Gandhi. The penalty on Shri Devang R. Gandhi was reduced to &8377; 25,000. The Tribunal was approached to challenge this order.
3. The Tribunal, after hearing arguments from both parties, upheld the confirmation of duty demand and imposition of a 100% penalty on M/s. Suryanarayan Silk Mills due to established clandestine removal. The Tribunal reasoned that the penalty cannot be reduced below the duty amount as per legal precedent. Regarding the penalty on Shri Devang R. Gandhi, the Tribunal noted that the fabrics were cleared at the behest of his company, and the penalty had already been reduced to &8377; 25,000, which was deemed sufficient. Therefore, the appeals were rejected, and the penalties were upheld as per the Tribunal's decision.
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2009 (4) TMI 926
The Gujarat High Court admitted the case and issued notice on substantial questions of law regarding the reversal of cenvat credit for claiming remission of duty under Rule 21 of the Cenvat Excise Rules, 2002. The questions also pertain to the reversal of modvat credit despite CBEC's Circular dated 1.10.2004 and the classification of repeated fire occurrences as unavoidable events for consideration of remission under Rule 21 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002.
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2009 (4) TMI 925
Issues:
1. Challenge to the vires of the order dated 8-10-2004 by the appellant.
2. Claim for refund by the importer based on different duty rates.
3. Rejection of the claim for refund by the Customs office.
4. Appeal before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) and subsequent rejection.
5. Appeal before the CESTAT challenging the bar of unjust enrichment.
6. CESTAT's decision on the applicability of the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment.
7. Formulation of substantial questions of law by the High Court.
8. Lack of representation by the first respondent during the hearing.
9. High Court's detailed analysis and confirmation of CESTAT's order.
10. Dismissal of the appeal and direction for refund by the Assistant Commissioner of Customs.
Analysis:
The judgment involves a challenge by the appellant against the order dated 8-10-2004 issued by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) regarding the vires of the order. The case revolves around a claim for refund made by the importer, M/s. Venkateswara Hospitals, Chennai, for the clearance of Shadowless Operating Theatre Lights at different duty rates. The Customs office rejected the claim, leading to an appeal before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), which was also dismissed due to the lack of evidence to rule out unjust enrichment. Subsequently, an appeal was made before the CESTAT, arguing against the bar of unjust enrichment under Section 27 of the Customs Act.
The CESTAT considered various judgments and held that the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment was not applicable to the claim for refund of duty on the capital goods in question. Consequently, the CESTAT allowed the appeal and directed the Assistant Commissioner of Customs to effect the refund. The High Court, after formulating substantial questions of law, analyzed the case in detail, including relevant precedents, and found the reasons given by CESTAT for allowing the appeal to be sustainable. The High Court concluded that there were no substantial questions of law requiring consideration and dismissed the appeal, confirming the CESTAT's order.
Despite the lack of representation by the first respondent during the hearing, the High Court upheld the decision of the CESTAT and directed the Assistant Commissioner of Customs to refund the excessively paid amount to the respondent within three months. The judgment highlights the importance of evidence to rule out unjust enrichment in refund claims and the application of legal principles in customs duty matters.
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2009 (4) TMI 924
Whether the deceased Mr. M.K. Govinda Singh died intestate?
Whether the suit for partition by the daughters of the deceased M.K. Govinda Singh, who died intestate, is maintainable or not?
Whether the alleged will dated 29.11.1995 said to have been executed is genuine one and, if so, who are the beneficiaries?
Whether the D-4 is entitled to have any share in the schedule property? If so what is his share?
Whether the Will of Late M.K. Govinda Singh is true, valid and genuine?
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2009 (4) TMI 923
... ...
... ... ..... lay condoned. Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2009 (4) TMI 922
Issues involved: Challenge to a Notification dated 19.3.2008 imposing restrictions on customs duty for goods imported from Sri Lanka, alleged contravention of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
Details of the Judgment:
Challenge to Notification: The petitioner challenged a Notification dated 19.3.2008 which restricted the import of goods from Sri Lanka to only Calcutta port, requiring payment of basic customs duties if imported through other ports. The Bombay High Court had previously quashed a similar notification, stating that the amendment must be in public interest and lawful. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court rejected the justification for the notification, emphasizing that the restriction to Kolkata port did not serve the intended purpose of preventing misuse of the concession. The Court found that the object of the notification was to deny the benefit of statutory concession under the Customs Tariff Act, which was not a legitimate objective. The Court held that the notification was not issued in public interest as it opposed the law and the India-Sri Lanka Treaty provisions.
Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, making the Rule absolute in terms of the prayer clause (a) and allowed the Writ Petition based on the judgment and reasoning of the Bombay High Court dated 20.10.2008. No costs were awarded in the matter.
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2009 (4) TMI 921
Whether the appellant, whose workshop is situated on the banks of river Zuari, used government riverine land?
Whether the amendments to the Goa, Daman and Diu Port Rules, 1983, by the Amendment Rules, 1992 and 1994, relating to levy of rental charges for the use of government riverine land is ultra vires the provisions of the Indian Ports Act, 1908?
Whether the Goa, Daman and Diu Ports Rules, 1983 confers authority on the Port Authorities to demand and recover rental charges for the use of government riverine land, even before the amendment by the Amendment Rules of 1992 and 1994?
Whether the Port Authorities have the power and authority to claim rental charges for the use of government riverine land, retrospectively for the period 5.4.1984 to 3.3.1994?
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2009 (4) TMI 920
Issues involved: Whether the Turf Clubs are covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act).
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether Turf Clubs are covered by the ESI Act. It was noted that not all establishments are automatically covered by the Act, but only those mentioned in the notification issued by the appropriate Government u/s 1(5) of the Act. The Court observed that the term 'shop' used in the notifications is pivotal, and previous judgments have classified Turf Clubs as shops based on common interpretations. However, the Court expressed disagreement with this classification, stating that a club is not commonly considered a shop. The lack of a specific definition of 'shop' in the Act or notifications led the Court to interpret it based on common understanding, which does not align with the nature of a racing club. The Court emphasized that only establishments notified u/s 1(5) are covered by the Act, contrary to the presumption made in previous judgments.
The Court also addressed the reliance placed on a previous judgment regarding the definition of 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was highlighted that definitions of terms like 'industry' or 'factory' vary across different labor laws, and applying a definition from one Act to another is not appropriate unless explicitly stated. The Court emphasized the need for consistency in interpreting statutory definitions and suggested that the decision classifying Turf Clubs as shops should be reviewed by a larger Bench. Until a reconsideration is made, the Court directed that no demands should be raised against the appellant-clubs. The matter was referred to the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench for further deliberation.
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2009 (4) TMI 919
Exemption u/s 10(22) - engaged in printing, sale of text-books - revenue allowed the exemption in earlier years but assessee - but AY 1995-96, notice issued u/s 143(3) - Corporation stated that the Corporation is fully owned by the Government of Madhya Pradesh which published the text-books only for the students who are imparted education in all sections of Madhya Pradesh - AO did not accept the stand put forth by the Association and came to hold that the Association is only engaged in printing of books and selling of the same and hence, it cannot be said that it is engaged in the activity of education - not entitled for exemption u/s 10(22) - directed initiation of penalty proceeding under the provisions of the statute - CIT(A) concurred with the view expressed by AO - ITAT concluded that the Association was entitled to claim exemption.
HELD THAT:- In Sole Trustee Lok Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], Apex Court was considering the term "education" as has been used in the dictionary clause in section 2(15). Khanna, J while dealing with the said facet has stated thus :-
''"The sense in which the word ‘education’ has been used in section 2(15) is the systematic instructions, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. According to this wide and extended sense, travelling is education, because as a result of travelling you acquire fresh knowledge. Likewise, if you read newspapers and magazines, see pictures, visit art galleries, museums and zoos, you thereby add to your knowledge. All this in a way is education in the great school of life. But that is not the sense in which the word ‘education’ is used in clause (15) of section 2.''
In American Hotel & Lodging Association Educational Institute v. Central Board of Direct Taxes [2008 (5) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT] wherein their Lordships, while dealing with the scope of section 10(22), expressed as follows :-
''Under section 10(22), one had to closely analyse the activities of the institute, the objects of the institute and its source of income and its utilisation. Even if one of the objects enabled the institute to undertake commercial activity, the institute would not be entitled to approval u/s 10(22). ''
In Oxford University Press [2001 (1) TMI 79 - SUPREME COURT] this Court found that the applicant was a branch of Oxford Press which was part of the Oxford University but its activity in India was restricted to publishing books, journals, periodicals, etc. The Tribunal held that because Oxford Press is part of the University its income was exempt u/s 10(22) as it stood at the relevant time.
From a perusal of the decisions, it is lucid that for the entitlement for getting exemption for the assessment year, it is required to see the activities of the assessee. That is the acid test. If the income/profit is applied for non-educational purposes, it is decided only at the end of the financial year. It is to be seen whether the assessee is engaged in any kind of educational activities. The authorities which we have referred to above have laid down the criteria under what circumstances an assessee can claim exemption being involved in educational purposes and how the income is spent.
In view of the aforesaid analysis and regard being had to the concept of educational purpose as is understood in the context of section 10(22), we are of the considered opinion that the forums below have really not applied their mind to the relevant issue. It is worth noting, there has been no dissection of the role played by the Corporation and whether its activity has any nexus with the educational purpose as per the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Apex Court and various High Courts. We are disposed to think that there has to be detailed analysis of the facts pertaining to the activities carried out by the Association from year to year and thereafter arrive at a conclusion whether the assessee is entitled to get the benefit of exemption.
Be it noted, the exemption need not be in entirety or totality. There can be a case where there can be a partial exemption if the income of the previous year falls within the basic conceptuality of section 10(22). Bereft of the aforesaid analysis, the orders are unsustainable. Hence, it would be apposite to set aside the order passed by the forums in all the appeals and remit the matter to the AO to consider the case after affording an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. It would be open to the assessee-Corporation to file requisite documents to bring the case within the parameters of law which we have referred to above.
Consequently, the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein above.
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2009 (4) TMI 918
The Supreme Court dismissed Civil Appeal Nos. 5199, 6133, and 6134 of 2008. Special Leave Petitions were also dismissed after condoning the delay, as no reason to interfere was seen based on the facts of the cases.
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2009 (4) TMI 917
Respondent is recipient of consulting engineer service from abroad - liability of the service recipient - decision in the case of JCB INDIA LTD. Versus CST, DELHI [2008 (8) TMI 65 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] contested, where it was held that recipient of consulting engineer service from outside India is not liable to pay service tax prior to 01.01.2005 - Held that: - decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2009 (4) TMI 916
Petition under Article 226 - Complaint u/s 56 of the FERA r/w sub-sections 3 and 4 of Section 49 of FEMA - failure to comply with statutorily requirements of issuance of notice u/s 61 (2)(ii) of FERA - quashing of proceedings - petitioner points out that no proof of service has been filed along with the complaint - respondents have not cared to cite any of the persons in the list of witnesses. It is contended that so far as the criminal trial is concerned, the respondent would stand precluded from examining any witness who has not been cited as a witness.
HELD THAT:- It would appear that the statutory requirement of issuance of notice under proviso of sub clause (ii) of sub-section 2 of Section 61, its date and manner in the instant case as well as the failure to consider the petitioner's reply or even place it before the court, has resulted in manifest error in the exercise of jurisdiction by learned trial judge. The order taking cognizance in the instant case and directing issuance of summons, is clearly without application of mind and cannot stand in law. In the light of the well settled principles noticed, there is no embargo from quashing the proceedings which are pending before the ld trial court.
Bare perusal of the complaint, it has been found that the complaint has been filed without compliance of the provisions of Section 61 of the FERA, 1973. No further inquiry is necessary or required to be conducted for the purposes. The compliance is mandatory and goes to the root of the matter. There is a statutory prohibition to the filing of a complaint without such statutory compliance. The objection raised by the petitioner to the filing and maintainability of the prosecution against it, is squarely covered under the guideline 6 laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana Vs. Chaudhary Bhajanlal [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT] and Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors [1976 (4) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT].
The respondents have urged at length that the petitioner must be required to undergo the trial and establish his objections as a defence to the prosecution. The present case is one where examination of a statutory prohibition is required to be undertaken. In the light of clear principles laid down by the Apex Court, such an objection has to be held to be wholly misconceived. There would be no warrant for requiring the petitioner to defend a prolonged trial, if the filing of the complaint itself is statutorily prohibited. Continuation of such proceedings against the petitioner would, therefore, be vexatious, useless, serving no purpose and defeating the ends of justice.
Therefore, this writ petition is allowed. It is directed that the proceedings arising out of complaint, entitled Enforcement Directorate v. Sanjay Malviya & Ors. pending in the court of ld Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as against the petitioner alone shall stands quashed. The order of the ld Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of the complaint against the petitioner herein and directing issuance of summons to him shall also stand quashed.
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2009 (4) TMI 915
Issues Involved:
1. Abuse of Process of Law
2. Reasonable Steps for Recovery
3. Adequacy of Opportunity Notice
4. Role of Directors in the Complaint
5. Compliance with RBI Guidelines
6. Application of Section 18 of FERA
Detailed Analysis:
1. Abuse of Process of Law:
The petitioners argued that the complaint filed under Section 56 of FERA was a gross abuse of the process of law, filed hastily to meet the deadline of 31.05.2002. The court found that the respondents had not adequately considered the petitioners' communications and steps taken for recovery, thus constituting an abuse of process.
2. Reasonable Steps for Recovery:
The petitioners demonstrated that they had taken reasonable steps to recover the outstanding export proceeds, including filing civil suits and obtaining decrees against foreign buyers. The court noted that Section 18(2) and (3) of FERA requires exporters to take reasonable steps for recovery, not necessarily to ensure recovery. The court found that the petitioners had fulfilled this requirement.
3. Adequacy of Opportunity Notice:
The petitioners contended that the opportunity notice issued under Section 61(2) of FERA was devoid of material particulars and did not consider the several correspondences exchanged. The court agreed, stating that the opportunity notice is a statutory requirement and not an empty formality. The notice issued was found to be insufficient and lacking in material particulars.
4. Role of Directors in the Complaint:
The complaint lacked material particulars regarding the role of the directors, who were made parties to the complaint. The court referenced the decision in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla & Anr., concluding that the complaint did not adequately specify the directors' involvement, thus failing to meet legal standards.
5. Compliance with RBI Guidelines:
The petitioners argued that the outstanding amount was approximately Rs. 1.40 crores, not Rs. 2.0 crores as mentioned in the complaint. The court noted that the RBI guidelines dated 05.07.2001 stipulated prosecution for non-realization of export proceeds worth Rs. 2.0 crores or more. The court found that the department failed to follow these guidelines, as the outstanding amount was indeed less than Rs. 2.0 crores.
6. Application of Section 18 of FERA:
The court emphasized that Section 18(2) and (3) of FERA requires exporters to take reasonable steps for recovery. The petitioners had provided detailed information and documentation of the steps taken, including legal actions and recoveries made. The court concluded that the petitioners had taken all reasonable steps as required by law.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the complaint bearing No. 361/2002, finding that the petitioners had taken all reasonable steps for recovery, the opportunity notice was inadequate, and the complaint did not comply with RBI guidelines. The court also noted the lack of material particulars regarding the directors' roles and concluded that proceeding with the complaint would be a futile exercise. No order as to costs was made.
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2009 (4) TMI 914
Whether non-compliance of one of the facet of Rule 6 of the Rules would be fatal to the application filed?
Whether the NOC issued to Dr. Madhu Tandon is in order and, therefore, was not justified in contending contrary to their own records?
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2009 (4) TMI 913
Maintainability of appeal - penalty u/r 209A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 - Held that: - the respondent was not concerned with the excisable goods, which was subject matter of dispute in the present case - penalty could be imposed only in respect of excisable goods, which would necessarily mean those goods, which are subject matter of proceedings by issuance of show cause notice. The aforesaid position is further clarified by the order of the Commissioner dated 30-9-2004 (Annexure P-2) where it has been categorically found that in the show cause notice there was absolutely no role of any of three firms in the present case, which were alleged to be managed by inter-alia the respondent-Ashish Gupta.
There is no question of law warranting the admission of the appeal would arise - appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2009 (4) TMI 912
DEPB Scrips obtained by producing forged documents were cancelled - the decision in the case of FRIENDS TRADING CO. Versus UNION OF INDIA [2008 (10) TMI 344 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that documents being forged, the appellant could not be allowed to take advantage of exemption - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - present appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2009 (4) TMI 911
Whether graduate Assistants should be treated equally irrespective of whether they are promotees or direct recruits for considering them for promotion as Deputy Tehsildar?
Whether the difference in the educational qualifications is sufficient to give preferential treatment to one class of candidates against another?
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2009 (4) TMI 910
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of purchasing insurance stamps from outside the State of Uttar Pradesh.
2. Applicability of Sections 420 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 64 and 69 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
3. Scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to quash the FIR.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Legality of Purchasing Insurance Stamps from Outside the State of Uttar Pradesh:
The appellants, former officers of the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India, were accused of purchasing insurance stamps from outside the State of Uttar Pradesh, which allegedly caused a loss of Rs. 1,67,21,520.00 to the state exchequer. The appellants contended that there is no legal prohibition under the Stamp Act or any other law mandating that insurance stamps must be purchased only from a specific state. The Supreme Court examined the relevant entries in the Constitution and the Stamp Act, concluding that the power to prescribe the rate of stamp duty for insurance policies lies with the Parliament under Entry 91 of List I of the 7th Schedule. The State of Uttar Pradesh's rule-making power under Sections 74 and 75 of the Stamp Act cannot override this central legislation. Therefore, the appellants' actions were not inconsistent with any provisions of the Stamp Act or any other rules, making the allegations in the FIR legally untenable.
2. Applicability of Sections 420 and 409 of the IPC and Sections 64 and 69 of the Indian Stamp Act:
The FIR charged the appellants under Sections 420 (cheating) and 409 (criminal breach of trust) of the IPC, and Sections 64 and 69 of the Stamp Act. The Supreme Court noted that Section 64 of the Stamp Act pertains to penalties for failing to comply with Section 27, which requires all facts affecting duty to be set forth in the instrument. Section 69 deals with penalties for unauthorized sale of stamps. The Court found that the appellants were neither stamp vendors nor engaged in unauthorized sales. Furthermore, the appellants were paying the required duties and were not depriving the government of any duty or penalty. Thus, the charges under these sections were not applicable to the appellants' actions.
3. Scope and Power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to Quash the FIR:
The Supreme Court revisited the principles governing the exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash FIRs, citing precedents such as Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. The Court emphasized that FIRs can be quashed if the allegations do not prima facie constitute any offence, are absurd, or are inherently improbable. In this case, the FIR's allegations, even if taken at face value, did not constitute any offence under the IPC or the Stamp Act. The registration of the FIR showed a complete non-application of mind and appeared to be a mala fide attempt to harass the appellants. The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court should have quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants, as the FIR did not disclose any cognizable offence.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court, which had dismissed the writ petitions challenging the FIR. The Court allowed the appeal, quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellants, and held that the purchase of insurance stamps from outside the State of Uttar Pradesh did not violate any provisions of the Stamp Act or any other applicable laws. The FIR, therefore, was legally untenable and a clear case of mala fide intention to harass the appellants.
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2009 (4) TMI 909
Issues involved: Challenge against demand notice for luxury tax exemption u/s 4(1) of Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976 for buildings owned by Devaswom located within temple premises.
Judgment Summary:
Issue 1: Challenge against demand notice for luxury tax exemption
The writ appeal was filed challenging the judgment of the Single Judge regarding a demand notice for luxury tax on rent received from lodging Kalyanamandapam and other facilities provided in buildings owned by the Devaswom. The Devaswom submitted a statement (Ext.P8) stating that all buildings are within the temple premises. Proviso to Section 4(1) of the Act grants exemption to halls and auditoriums within places of worship owned by such institutions. The exemption requires buildings to be within the premises of a place of worship and owned by the religious institution controlling the place of worship. As the buildings were within the temple premises and owned by the Devaswom, they qualified for exemption. The writ appeal was allowed, vacating the Single Judge's judgment and quashing the demand notice. However, the second respondent was given the freedom to conduct an enquiry for buildings located outside the temple premises.
In conclusion, the writ appeal was allowed, and the demand notice for luxury tax was quashed for buildings owned by the Devaswom located within the temple premises, as they qualified for exemption u/s 4(1) of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1976.
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