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1995 (7) TMI 185
Issues Involved: 1. Classification and excisability of marble/granite tiles. 2. Classification of slabs worked beyond the normal quarry product stage. 3. Excisability of marble/granite crazy and claddings. 4. Appropriate relief or remand based on the above issues.
Summary:
1. Classification and Excisability of Marble/Granite Tiles: The appellants argued that cutting marble and granite blocks into slabs and tiles does not amount to manufacture, citing previous Tribunal and Supreme Court decisions. The Tribunal in the case of Fine Marble & Minerals Pvt. Ltd. held that marble slabs sawn from marble blocks were not manufactured goods as there was no transformation into a commercially distinct commodity. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal in the case of Associated Stone Industries (Kotah) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur also concluded that cutting, edging, trimming, and polishing of marble blocks did not amount to manufacture. The Tribunal's decision in the case of Indian Granite Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad, which held that polished granite slabs were classifiable under T.I. 68, was distinguished by the Tribunal in the case of Associated Stone Industries.
2. Classification of Slabs Worked Beyond Normal Quarry Product Stage: The Tribunal noted that slabs produced by mere sawing of blocks are not excisable. However, slabs worked beyond the stage of the normal quarry product, involving processes such as machining and polishing, would become excisable. The Tribunal referred to the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) which classifies worked stone under Heading 68.02.
3. Excisability of Marble/Granite Crazy and Claddings: There was insufficient material on record to determine the excisability of marble/granite crazy and claddings. The Tribunal directed that this aspect be examined afresh with sufficient material to show that these items are "goods" in their own right, bought and sold in the market.
4. Appropriate Relief or Remand: The Tribunal, considering the majority opinion, held that marble tiles are non-excisable, granite tiles are classifiable under Item 68 CET, and the exigibility of marble/granite crazy and claddings is to be determined afresh. The case was remanded to the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise for de novo consideration.
Final Order: In view of the majority opinion, it is held that marble tiles are non-excisable; granite tiles are classifiable under Item 68 CET; and the exigibility of marble/granite crazy and claddings is to be determined afresh with sufficient material to show these are "goods" in their own right, bought and sold in the market. The case is remanded to the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise.
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1995 (7) TMI 184
Issues Involved: 1. Validity of the summons issued u/s 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973. 2. Requirement to specify the nature of investigation in the summons. 3. Application of mind by the respondent in issuing the summons. 4. Nexus between the documents demanded and the object of the investigation.
Summary:
Issue 1: Validity of the Summons Issued u/s 40 of FERA, 1973 The petitioner challenged the summons issued u/s 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, claiming it was illegal and did not comply with mandatory requirements. The court examined Section 40, which empowers any Gazetted Officer of Enforcement to summon any person whose attendance is considered necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document during the course of any investigation or proceeding under the Act. The court found that the respondent had the authority to issue such summons and that the petitioner was bound to attend.
Issue 2: Requirement to Specify the Nature of Investigation in the Summons The petitioner argued that the summons should specify the nature of the investigation and the proceedings under the Act. The court held that it is not always feasible for the authority to reveal the nature of the investigation in the summons, as it could compromise the investigation. The summons indicated that the petitioner's attendance was necessary to give evidence and/or to produce documents, which the court found sufficient.
Issue 3: Application of Mind by the Respondent in Issuing the Summons The petitioner contended that the summons was issued without proper application of mind, as it did not specify whether the petitioner's attendance was necessary to give evidence or to produce documents. The court observed that the summons clearly stated that the Enforcement Officer considered the attendance of the petitioner necessary, indicating the application of mind. The non-striking of the words "and/or" did not invalidate the summons.
Issue 4: Nexus Between the Documents Demanded and the Object of the Investigation The petitioner argued that the documents requested (passport, bank account passbooks, and property details) had no nexus with the investigation. The court found that the documents were related to the petitioner and could be relevant to the investigation under FERA. The court noted that the investigation might pertain to the petitioner or a third party connected to him, and the authorities were empowered to summon him for inquiry.
Conclusion: The court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the summons issued u/s 40 of the FERA Act was valid and did not violate any legal requirements. The petitioner was required to comply with the summons and assist in the investigation.
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1995 (7) TMI 183
The petitioner challenged a notice to pay a penalty of Rs. 35,000 imposed by the third respondent under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973. The petitioner filed an appeal and an application to dispense with the penalty, but the appellate authority did not dispose of it. The court directed the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal within twelve weeks and ordered that no proceedings be taken to recover the penalty until then. The Writ Petition was ordered accordingly.
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1995 (7) TMI 182
Issues: Challenge to orders of Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board dated December 6, 1993 and March 28, 1994 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The case involved a petition challenging the orders of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board. The respondents, exporters of agricultural equipment, failed to realize export proceeds, leading to penalties imposed under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The Board directed the respondents to deposit penalty amounts for hearing the appeal. The petitioner contended that subsequent orders reducing the penalty amounts were illegal. However, the respondents argued that the pre-deposit order was interim and did not affect the case's merits. The Court examined the provisions of Section 52 of FERA, which empower the Board to dispense with penalty deposits in cases of hardship. The Court clarified that such orders are procedural and not final decisions on the case's merits.
The Court emphasized that the Board's discretion to waive penalty deposits must be exercised judiciously and in the interest of justice. It noted that such orders are meant to prevent undue hardship and ensure the appellant's right to appeal is not lost due to circumstances beyond their control. The Court clarified that the Board can modify interlocutory orders regarding penalty deposits based on valid reasons or supervening events affecting the appellant's ability to pay. The Court held that the Board's order to waive a portion of the penalty amount was justified in this case to prevent undue hardship to the respondents.
The petitioner argued that there were no supervening events justifying the Board's order to waive a portion of the penalty amount. However, the Court found that the respondents' initial request was only for an extension of time, and the request for waiving the amount came later due to their inability to raise a loan. The Court upheld the Board's decision to waive a portion of the penalty amount, considering the respondents' financial situation. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the challenge to the Board's orders.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board's power to waive penalty deposits in cases of hardship and clarified that such orders are procedural and not final decisions on the case's merits. The Court found the Board's decision to waive a portion of the penalty amount justified based on the respondents' circumstances, ultimately dismissing the petition challenging the Board's orders.
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1995 (7) TMI 181
Issues: 1. Challenge to the order levying Central Excise duty on wooden railway sleepers and sawn sizes. 2. Determination of whether railway sleepers and sawn sizes are excisable goods. 3. Conflict of opinion between two coordinate Benches regarding the levy of Central Excise duty on wooden sleepers and sawn sizes.
Analysis: 1. The petitioner, M/s. Orissa Forest Corporation, filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to quash the order dated 29-12-1989, which imposed Central Excise duty on wooden railway sleepers and sawn sizes manufactured and removed during a specific period. The petitioner contended that the goods in question were not excisable as they did not involve transformation of raw materials through the manufacturing process. However, the Opp. Party No. 1 disagreed, citing that the goods fell under Heading Nos. 44.02 and 44.03 of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The validity of this finding was challenged in the petition.
2. A previous Bench of the Court had determined in O.J.C. Nos. 4524, 2525, 4528, and 4529 of 1990 that railway sleepers and sawn timber were distinct marketable products falling under specific headings in the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The Bench emphasized that legislative intent was crucial in determining the levy of excise duty on goods like wooden sleepers and sawn sizes. Another coordinate Bench had held in O.J.C. Nos. 3151, 3153, and 3154 of 1989 that timber produced through sawing did not attract excise duty, relying on a Supreme Court judgment. However, the subsequent Bench, aware of the conflicting opinions, declined to interfere with the Excise authority's decision to levy excise duty on railway sleepers and sawn sizes. The matter was deemed fit for consideration by a Larger Bench to resolve the conflict of opinions.
3. The conflicting opinions between the coordinate Benches regarding the levy of Central Excise duty on wooden sleepers and sawn sizes necessitated a referral to a Larger Bench for resolution. The disagreement stemmed from differing interpretations of legislative intent and the applicability of excise duty to goods produced through specific processes like sawing. The need for a comprehensive review by a Larger Bench was deemed necessary to provide clarity on the issue and ensure consistency in judicial decisions.
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1995 (7) TMI 180
Issues: Classification of bare aluminium strips under Tariff Item 27(b) of the Central Excise Tariff and the applicability of the proviso to Section 11A regarding suppression of facts.
Analysis: The appeals arose from an order by the Collector (Appeals) concerning the classification of bare aluminium strips under Tariff Item 27(b) of the Central Excise Tariff. M/s. Dak Alloys contended that they were merely shaping aluminium rods into rectangular strips for manufacturing DPC Aluminium Strips, not carrying out manufacturing activities like extrusion or rolling. The department appealed the Collector's decision, alleging suppression as the assessee did not mention bare aluminium strips in their declaration. The Collector confirmed the demand, leading to the appeals.
The main issue was whether the bare aluminium strips constituted goods classifiable under Tariff Item 27(b). M/s. Dak Alloys argued that the product was a flattened wire rod, not a strip, citing precedents and the ISI Glossary of Terms. However, the department relied on a Supreme Court decision involving copper and aluminium strips, asserting that even insulated strips fall within the respective categories. The Tribunal, following the Supreme Court's ruling, held that the bare aluminium strips were classifiable under Tariff Item 27(b) as a manufacture of aluminium.
Regarding the proviso to Section 11A, the department claimed suppression based on the assessee's failure to disclose manufacturing of aluminium strips in their declaration. However, the Tribunal found that the department was aware of the manufacturing process from a letter dated 4-4-1983, negating the suppression allegation. As the department was uncertain about the classification at that time and the final product was declared as DPC Aluminium Strips, the charge of suppression was not established. Consequently, the proviso to Section 11A was deemed inapplicable.
In conclusion, the Tribunal rejected both appeals, affirming the classification of bare aluminium strips under Tariff Item 27(b) and dismissing the invocation of the proviso to Section 11A due to the lack of suppression of facts by the assessee.
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1995 (7) TMI 179
Issues: - Duty liability on goods cleared for export but not exported. - Interpretation of Rule 97A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. - Application of conditions for allowing goods to be returned to the factory under Rule 97A.
Analysis: 1. The case involved an appeal against an order passed by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) concerning duty liability on polished granite slabs cleared for export but not exported due to damage in transit. The appellants contended that duty should not be recoverable as the damaged goods were allowed to be returned to the factory under Rule 97A for reprocessing. The Collector (Appeals) upheld the duty liability.
2. The appellants argued that the jurisdictional Assistant Collector's approval for returning the damaged goods under Rule 97A implied that the goods were to be remade or subjected to similar processes in the factory. They claimed that duty should only be recoverable if the goods were disposed of otherwise than for production of goods of the same class as per Rule 97A(3). The appellants sought to set aside the Collector (Appeals) order on this basis.
3. The respondent, represented by the JDR, supported the findings of the Collector (Appeals) and urged the rejection of the appeal. The respondent maintained that duty was rightly demandable on the goods that were cleared for export but not actually exported, despite being allowed to return to the factory for reprocessing under Rule 97A.
4. Upon examination of the case record and submissions from both parties, the Tribunal noted the appellants' reliance on the Assistant Collector's letter directing the return of goods under Rule 97A. However, the Tribunal found ambiguity in whether a final order allowing the return under Rule 97A was issued. Notably, the conditions of Rule 97A, including the value of the goods upon return, were crucial for determining duty liability.
5. Rule 97A permits goods cleared for export to be returned to the factory under specific conditions. The Tribunal highlighted the importance of ensuring compliance with Rule 97A requirements, such as the value of the goods not being less than the duty originally paid. Lack of evidence regarding the satisfaction of these conditions led the Tribunal to remand the matter for re-adjudication by the original authority.
6. As the lower authorities' orders did not address whether the disputed goods met Rule 97A conditions for return to the factory, the Tribunal set aside the Collector (Appeals) order and instructed a re-adjudication with a personal hearing for the appellants. The case was remanded for further examination in line with the law and the Tribunal's observations.
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1995 (7) TMI 178
Issues Involved:
1. Denial of Modvat credits availed by the appellants. 2. Determination of whether the process of converting duty-paid Nylon chips into plain, coloured, or compounded chips constitutes 'manufacture' under the Modvat scheme. 3. Eligibility of Modvat credit for compounded chips.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Denial of Modvat credits availed by the appellants:
The appellants are engaged in the manufacture of excisable goods and availed Modvat credits for Nylon chips returned for reprocessing. The Department objected to these credits, arguing that the returned duty-paid final products did not qualify for Modvat credit under Rule 57G because no new manufacture was involved. Show cause notices were issued, and the Collector confirmed the demands for recovery of the Modvat credits. The appellants challenged these orders.
2. Determination of whether the process of converting duty-paid Nylon chips into plain, coloured, or compounded chips constitutes 'manufacture' under the Modvat scheme:
The Tribunal referred to a similar case, "Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I v. Sigma Paints Ltd.," where it was held that the Modvat scheme is not intended to reimburse the duty element for returned materials subject to reprocessing unless such materials can be construed as inputs used in manufacture. The Tribunal emphasized that for a process to be considered 'manufacture,' it must result in a new and distinct product with a different name, character, or use. The Tribunal found that the returned Nylon chips were not scrap or defective but were returned for reasons such as market requirements or quality adjustments. Therefore, the process of converting plain chips to plain or coloured chips did not amount to 'manufacture' as it did not bring into existence a new product.
3. Eligibility of Modvat credit for compounded chips:
The Tribunal considered the plea regarding the conversion of plain or coloured chips into compounded chips. The appellants argued that this process involved 'manufacture' and produced evidence, including an approved classification list showing Nylon Chips - 6 as eligible for exemption under Notification 217/86-C.E. for compounding. The Tribunal acknowledged that there might be a case for Modvat credit if the process constituted 'manufacture' as per the Supreme Court's test. However, since the evidence was presented only at the appeal stage, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the Collector for de novo consideration. The Collector was directed to consider the evidence from both sides and determine whether the process of converting plain/coloured chips into compounded chips amounted to 'manufacture' based on market parlance and technical opinions.
Conclusion:
The appeals were dismissed regarding the eligibility of Modvat credit for plain or coloured chips used in reprocessing to obtain plain or coloured chips, as no 'manufacture' was involved. The same view was held for compounded chips returned and reprocessed into compounded chips. However, the case was remanded to the Collector for reconsideration of whether the process of converting plain/coloured chips into compounded chips constituted 'manufacture,' with the appellants bearing the burden of proof.
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1995 (7) TMI 177
Issues Involved: 1. Classification and duty liability of intermediate products. 2. Marketability of the intermediate products. 3. Invocation of the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 4. Imposition of penalty under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. 5. Consideration of evidence provided by the appellants.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification and Duty Liability of Intermediate Products: The appellants were issued a show cause notice invoking the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, demanding Rs. 2,89,02,653 for intermediate products (CMCB, DFDTP, and Sodium Salt of DEDTP) used in manufacturing insecticides/pesticides. The department classified these intermediates under Chapter sub-heading No. 2942.00, chargeable to duty at 15% ad valorem (BED) and SED 5% of BED from 1-3-1988 onwards. The Collector confirmed the duty and imposed a penalty of Rs. 25,000/- under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
2. Marketability of the Intermediate Products: The appellants contended that the intermediate products were not of standard grade, not chemically pure, had a short shelf life, and were not stored or preserved except during breakdowns. They argued that these intermediates were not known in the market and had no buyers, thus not qualifying as "goods" for excise purposes. The Collector, however, held that the products were identifiable organic compounds and required to be classified under Chapter Heading 29.42, irrespective of their purity or shelf life. He rejected the appellants' evidence, stating it only established a limited shelf life, not marketability.
3. Invocation of the Extended Period under Section 11A: The department alleged that the appellants did not notify the manufacture of intermediate products, did not discharge duty liability before captive consumption, and contravened various provisions of the Central Excise Act. The appellants argued there was no suppression of facts, as they had applied for an L6 license and furnished the complete manufacturing process and flow chart. They claimed departmental officers had visited their factory and never informed them about the product's exigibility, thus invoking the extended period under Section 11A was unjustified. The Collector rejected this plea and confirmed the duty invoking the larger period.
4. Imposition of Penalty under Rule 173Q: The department imposed a penalty of Rs. 25,000/- under Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, for the appellants' failure to notify the manufacture of intermediate products and discharge duty liability. The appellants argued they were under a bona fide belief that the intermediates were not excisable and had no motivation to evade duty. The Collector upheld the penalty, asserting the appellants' actions contravened excise provisions.
5. Consideration of Evidence Provided by the Appellants: The appellants produced evidence, including letters from the Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, Pesticides Association of India, and P.R.K. Agencies, stating the intermediate products were not known in the market, had limited shelf life, and were not traded or sold. The Collector dismissed this evidence, stating it did not prove non-marketability. The Tribunal noted the Collector had not applied his mind to the evidence and the department had not shown the goods were marketable or had a shelf life. The Tribunal found the impugned order suffered from non-application of mind and remanded the matter for de novo adjudication, instructing the Collector to consider the evidence and pass a detailed order as per law.
Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the matter to the original authority for de novo adjudication, instructing the Collector to consider the evidence provided by the appellants and pass a detailed order as per law. The department was also instructed to provide any additional evidence to the appellants for countering before the personal hearing.
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1995 (7) TMI 176
Issues Involved: 1. Eligibility for Modvat credit on inputs used in the intermediate product. 2. Compliance with Chapter X procedure. 3. Relevance of procedural compliance versus substantive compliance. 4. Consideration of new legal pleas at the appellate stage. 5. Remand for de novo adjudication.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Eligibility for Modvat Credit on Inputs Used in the Intermediate Product: The appellant argued that they were eligible for Modvat credit on inputs used in the intermediate product, dipped tyre cord fabrics, which were transferred from their Madras factory to their Calcutta factory under Notification No. 217/86 without following the Chapter X procedure. They cited decisions from the West Regional Bench (Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Pune) and the North Regional Bench (M/s. Lupin Laboratories Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Indore) to support their claim that Notification 217/86 allows for such credit to avert payment of duty at each intermediate stage.
2. Compliance with Chapter X Procedure: The respondent contended that the appellant was not eligible for the benefit of Notification 217/86 due to non-compliance with the Chapter X procedure. The Tribunal acknowledged that observance of Chapter X procedure is a condition stipulated in Notification 217/86. However, the appellant argued that substantial compliance with the law should suffice, citing precedents that procedural lapses should not defeat substantive relief.
3. Relevance of Procedural Compliance versus Substantive Compliance: The Tribunal considered the principle that substantial compliance with legal provisions should not be denied for procedural lapses. The North Regional Bench's view, supported by various rulings, emphasized that non-observance of technical requirements should not negate the substantive benefits of the Modvat Scheme, provided the inputs were used for the declared finished product.
4. Consideration of New Legal Pleas at the Appellate Stage: One member of the Tribunal (Member (T)) argued against considering new legal pleas at the appellate stage, especially when the appellant had not raised these arguments before the lower authority and had admitted their mistake in availing Modvat credit. The member highlighted that the appellant did not provide bona fide reasons for not claiming the benefit earlier and had voluntarily reversed the Modvat credit.
5. Remand for De Novo Adjudication: The Vice President (Member (J)) suggested remanding the matter for reconsideration in light of the various pleas and case laws cited by the appellant. However, Member (T) opposed this, arguing that it would require fresh investigation into compliance with Chapter X from 1986 onwards, which was not substantiated by the appellant. The majority decision, influenced by Member (T) and supported by another member, concluded that no indulgence should be shown for urging a fresh plea requiring factual investigation.
Final Judgment: The appeal was dismissed based on the majority decision, upholding the lower authority's order and denying the appellant's claim for Modvat credit under Notification 217/86 due to non-compliance with Chapter X procedure and the absence of substantive reasons for reconsideration.
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1995 (7) TMI 175
Issues: Classification of product as cement under Tariff Item 23, necessity of gypsum in cement manufacturing, definition of cement, determination of duty liability, imposition of penalty.
Classification of product as cement under Tariff Item 23: The appeal was filed by the department against the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) regarding the classification of the product manufactured by the respondents. The department contended that the product, a regulated clinker binder, was similar to cement and should be classified under Tariff Item 23 of the Central Excise Tariff. The respondents argued that their product was not cement as gypsum was not used in its manufacture.
Necessity of gypsum in cement manufacturing: The department argued that while gypsum is commonly used in cement manufacturing to regulate the setting of the product, its use is not essential. The Collector (Appeals) relied on definitions of cement from scientific sources to establish that the presence of gypsum is not a mandatory requirement for a product to be considered cement.
Definition of cement: Various definitions of cement were presented, emphasizing that gypsum is not a prerequisite for a product to be classified as cement. The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology defined cement as a dry powder made from silica, alumina, lime, iron oxide, and manganese that hardens when mixed with water. The Concise Chemical Dictionary provided insights into different types of cements, further supporting the argument that gypsum is not indispensable.
Determination of duty liability and penalty imposition: The Tribunal found that since gypsum was not used in the manufacturing process of the product in question, it could not be classified as portland cement under Tariff Item 23(1). However, it was classified under Tariff Item 23(2) as a type of cement other than portland cement, such as Sagol or Ash Moh. The matter was remanded to the Assistant Collector for redetermination of duty liability. The Assistant Collector was directed to consider the seriousness of the offense in light of the duty liability for potential penalty imposition.
This detailed analysis of the judgment from the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi, highlights the key issues surrounding the classification of the product as cement, the necessity of gypsum in cement manufacturing, the definition of cement, and the subsequent determination of duty liability and potential penalty imposition.
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1995 (7) TMI 174
Issues: Classification of plaster of paris under Central Excise Tariff - Applicability of exemption notifications - Rate of duty for goods cleared before a specific date
In this case, the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi, heard an appeal against the order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Madras, regarding the classification of plaster of paris under the Central Excise Tariff. The issue revolved around whether the product should be classified under Heading 2505 as claimed by the appellants or under Heading 3005.90 as claimed by the Department. The appellants argued that their product fell under Heading 2505, excluding products of Chapter 30, while the Department contended that it should be classified under Heading 3005.90, as it was of medicinal grade and not specifically meant for dentistry. The Department supported its argument by stating that the plaster of paris was manufactured according to Indian Pharmacopoeial Standard and was only intended for orthopaedic use, not for dentistry. They also highlighted that the product did not meet the criteria for patent or proprietary medicines under Chapter Note 2 of Chapter 30. Additionally, the Department pointed out that the exemption claimed by the appellants under Notification No. 185/86 was not applicable as it only covered goods under a specific tariff item. Moreover, the Department emphasized that the rate of duty applicable was determined by the date of clearance, citing a precedent set by the Supreme Court in a previous case. After considering the submissions, the Tribunal agreed with the Department's arguments. They noted that the product, being of medicinal grade and solely for orthopaedic use, did not meet the criteria for patent or proprietary medicines under Chapter 30. The Tribunal concluded that the plaster of paris should be classified under Heading 3005.90. Consequently, the benefit of Notification No. 185/86 was deemed inapplicable, and the duty rate was determined based on the date of clearance. Therefore, the appeal was rejected by the Tribunal.
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1995 (7) TMI 173
Issues Involved: (a) Jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector, Kota (b) Limitation period for issuing the show cause notice (c) Classification of the imported goods under the Customs Tariff
Detailed Analysis:
(a) Jurisdiction of the Assistant Collector, Kota: The appellants contended that the Assistant Collector of Kota lacked jurisdiction to reassess the goods initially assessed at Bombay. The Tribunal referenced the case of Ferro Alloys Corporation Ltd. and the Larger Bench decision, which held that the jurisdiction for raising a demand for short levy lies with the proper officer having jurisdiction over the EOU, not the Customs House where the goods were initially assessed. The Tribunal agreed with this precedent, confirming that the Assistant Collector, Kota, had jurisdiction for reassessment due to the structural change in the customs tariff aligning with the HSN.
(b) Limitation Period for Issuing the Show Cause Notice: The appellants argued that the show cause notice issued on 11-11-1986 was time-barred, asserting that the limitation period should start from the date of the initial assessment (21-10-1985). However, the Tribunal found that the relevant date for determining the limitation period is the date of actual payment of duty (6-6-1986), as per Section 15 and Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962. Since the show cause notice was issued within six months from the date of payment, it was deemed timely and not hit by the limitation.
(c) Classification of the Imported Goods: The core issue was whether the imported goods should be classified under Chapter Heading 8504.40 as static converters or under Heading 8543.80 as electrical machines and apparatus having individual functions. The appellants argued that the principal function of the equipment was the conversion of electricity, thus classifiable under 8504.40. They emphasized the principal function criterion from Section Note 3 and Note 5 of Section XVI of the Customs Tariff.
The department contended that the imported equipment was a sophisticated uninterrupted power supply system, not merely static converters. The Tribunal examined the HSN Explanatory Notes and found that the imported system was a composite equipment designed for uninterrupted power supply, involving more than just conversion of electricity. It included additional components like rectifiers, inverters, output assembly, and static bypass, making it more complex than a simple static converter.
The Tribunal concluded that the goods did not qualify as static converters under Heading 8504.40. Instead, they were appropriately classifiable under Heading 8543.80 as electrical machines and apparatus having individual functions, not specified elsewhere in Chapter 85. This classification was supported by the understanding of the equipment in trade/common parlance and the HSN Explanatory Notes.
Applicability of Notification No. 134/86: The Tribunal held that since the imported goods were classified under Heading 8543.80, they were eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 134/86, dated 17-2-1986, which applies to electrical appliances and apparatus having individual functions falling under Heading 85.43.
Conclusion: The Tribunal modified the impugned order to classify the imported goods under Heading 8543.80 and granted the benefit of Notification No. 134/86. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (7) TMI 172
Issues Involved: 1. Determination of the correct assessable value of imported goods. 2. Rejection of invoice value. 3. Acceptance of additional evidence. 4. Relationship between buyer and seller. 5. Applicability of transaction value under Rule 4 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988. 6. Confiscation and imposition of redemption fine.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Determination of the Correct Assessable Value of Imported Goods: The primary issue was whether the declared value of US $12500 per unit for the imported phototype setting/photo composing system was accurate. The adjudicating Collector compared this with another import of identical goods by M/s. Bhavana Creations at US $34850 per unit and a quoted price of US $46460 per unit from the same supplier. The Collector concluded that the correct price for assessment under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, should be US $34850 per unit, rejecting the higher quoted price of US $46460.
2. Rejection of Invoice Value: The appellants contended that their declared price was based on verbal negotiations and that there was no written evidence of these negotiations. However, the Collector found that the appellants had not produced any substantial evidence to support the reduced price. The Tribunal upheld this finding, stating that the appellants did not meet the burden of proving that the declared price was fair and consistent with prices of similar goods imported by third parties.
3. Acceptance of Additional Evidence: The appellants submitted additional evidence in the form of letters from their foreign suppliers and an affidavit. However, these documents were not presented before the lower authorities. The Tribunal rejected the additional evidence, stating that the letters from third parties did not establish that the price at which assessments were made in the case of M/s. Bhavana Creations was not genuine.
4. Relationship Between Buyer and Seller: The appellants argued that they were not related persons under Rule 2(2) of the Customs (Valuation) Rules, 1988. However, evidence showed that the appellants had entered into a distributorship agreement with the suppliers, indicating a business relationship. The Tribunal concluded that the appellants did not approach the supplier as a normal buyer in an arm's length transaction, which influenced the price.
5. Applicability of Transaction Value Under Rule 4 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 1988: The Tribunal emphasized that for the transaction value to be accepted under Rule 4, the conditions set out in sub-rule (2) must be satisfied. The appellants failed to provide documentary evidence of negotiations or any other basis for the declared price. The Tribunal cited previous cases where the absence of such evidence led to the rejection of the transaction value.
6. Confiscation and Imposition of Redemption Fine: The goods were liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act. The Tribunal agreed with the Collector's decision to impose a redemption fine but reduced the amount from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 1 lakh, considering all relevant factors.
Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the Collector's decision to reject the declared invoice value and assess the goods at US $34850 per unit. The additional evidence submitted by the appellants was not accepted, and the relationship between the buyer and seller influenced the price determination. The appeal was rejected, with a reduction in the redemption fine from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 1 lakh.
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1995 (7) TMI 171
Issues: 1. Eligibility of the appellants to claim exemption under Notification 118/75 for steel tanks manufactured within their sugar factory.
Analysis: The appeal before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, New Delhi revolved around the question of whether the appellants were entitled to claim exemption under Notification 118/75 for steel tanks produced within their sugar factory for storing molasses, a by-product. The notification exempts goods manufactured in a factory and intended for use in the same factory or another factory of the same manufacturer from excise duty. The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Surat-II Division initially denied the exemption, stating that the molasses tank was not a component part or intermediate product used in the manufacture of final excisable goods. This decision was upheld by the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay.
Upon review, the Appellate Tribunal found the lower authorities' interpretation of the exemption terms to be incorrect. The Tribunal highlighted that the tanks were indeed manufactured in the appellants' factory and intended for use within the same factory as storage for molasses. The notification did not require the tanks to be used as a component part in the production of final goods. The proviso to the notification excluded only complete machinery meant for producing or processing goods, which did not apply to the storage tanks in question. The tanks were not involved in production activities or manufacturing processes. Consequently, the denial of exemption by the lower authorities was deemed unjustified based on the exemption's conditions. Therefore, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.
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1995 (7) TMI 170
Issues: Appeal against denial of duty-free clearance under Notification No. 208/81 for imported Linen Sutures claimed as Cardio Vascular Sutures.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Imported Goods Classification: The appellants imported Linen Sutures seeking duty-free clearance under Notification No. 208/81 for Cardio Vascular Sutures. The issue arose when the Deputy Collector determined the goods were not Cardio Vascular Sutures as they were non-sterile. The Collector (Appeals) upheld this decision, emphasizing the standard requirement of such sutures to be sterile and non-traumatic. The appellants contested this classification.
2. Appellant's Contentions: The appellant's representative argued that the goods qualified as Cardio Vascular Sutures as per a letter from the Director General of Health Services, stating that Silk and Linen Sutures are used in Cardio Vascular Surgery. He also highlighted a previous order by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) classifying similar goods as Cardio Vascular Sutures eligible for exemption under a different notification. The appellant requested a remand for re-adjudication, considering the conflicting decisions and the detention period of the goods.
3. Respondent's Position: The respondent, while supporting the Collector (Appeals) findings, did not object to the remand for a fresh adjudication due to the contradictory orders issued by the Collector (Appeals).
4. Tribunal's Decision: After reviewing the case records and submissions, the Tribunal found that the Collector (Appeals) did not disclose the specific literature or medical texts relied upon for the classification of Cardio Vascular Sutures. Additionally, the Tribunal noted the oversight of the previous order classifying similar goods differently. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the Collector (Appeals) order and remanded the case to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs for a fresh adjudication. The Tribunal directed a personal hearing for the appellants and urged expedited resolution within two months due to the goods' detention.
5. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed by remanding the case for re-evaluation, emphasizing the need for a thorough review of relevant literature and previous decisions for accurate classification of the imported goods as Cardio Vascular Sutures under the applicable notification.
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1995 (7) TMI 169
The Appellate Tribunal CEGAT in New Delhi granted early hearing for an appeal due to revenue involvement over Rs. 10 lakhs and the need to determine product classification with potential recurring revenue impact. The appeal was scheduled for hearing on 22nd December 1995. (1995 (7) TMI 169 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI)
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1995 (7) TMI 168
Issues: - Classification of product under Central Excise Item 68 - Allegation of excess recovery of transportation charges - Application of extended period of limitation for demand of excise duty - Imposition of penalty under Rule 173Q(1) - Interpretation of Section 4(2) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 - Applicability of Supreme Court decision in Collector of Central Excise v. Indian Oxygen Ltd. - Justification for invoking the larger period for demand and penalty - Consideration of correct sale pattern in assessing excess recovery of transportation charges - Time-barring issue for demand beyond six months
Detailed Analysis:
The appeal concerns a dispute arising from the classification of a product under Central Excise Item 68 and the alleged excess recovery of transportation charges by the appellants. The Additional Collector of Customs & Central Excise, Rajkot, confirmed a demand for differential Excise duty and imposed a penalty on the appellants under Rule 173Q(1) for the period in question. The appellants contended that the recovery of transportation charges was in line with equalized freight and should be deductible under Section 4(2) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944. They cited the Supreme Court decision in Collector of Central Excise v. Indian Oxygen Ltd. to support their argument that the excise duty is on the manufacture, not on profit from transportation charges. The Department, however, argued that the excess recovery of transportation charges should be included in the assessable value of the product.
The Tribunal examined the submissions and records, noting that the appellants recovered more in transportation charges than they actually incurred. It was determined that the freight charges were directly attributable to the product and should be included in the assessable value. The Tribunal distinguished the case law cited by the appellants, stating that the recovery of carting charges was not a profit or gain of an ancillary venture. Additionally, the Tribunal found that the Department was justified in invoking the larger period due to the appellants' failure to disclose the excess recovery of carting charges and comply with Notification No. 120/75 requirements.
Regarding the time-barring issue, the Tribunal considered the earlier order by the Assistant Collector, where the demand was dropped based on the separate disclosure of carting charges. Given this history and the lack of examination by the Department within the statutory period, the Tribunal concluded that the demand beyond six months was barred by time. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of in favor of the appellants, emphasizing the importance of timely and thorough examination of relevant issues in excise duty assessments.
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1995 (7) TMI 167
Issues: 1. Barred by limitation - Show cause notice issued in 1990. 2. Provisional assessment - Assessment based on High Court orders. 3. Differential duty calculation - Additional Duty on assessable value. 4. Jurisdiction of High Court - Clearance of goods without fresh Bill of Entry. 5. Time-barred demand - Recovery of differential duty. 6. Interpretation of Customs Act provisions - Section 28 and Section 17.
Analysis:
1. Barred by limitation - Show cause notice issued in 1990: The appellant argued that the notice issued in 1990 for recovery of differential duty was time-barred. The appellant contended that the initial objection raised by the Department was only regarding duty rates and landing charges, not the calculation of Additional Duty. The appellant disputed the Collector's findings on the limitation issue, citing Section 28 of the Act. The Tribunal held that the demand for differential duty was indeed time-barred, considering the circumstances and the legal provisions.
2. Provisional assessment - Assessment based on High Court orders: The Superintendent argued that the assessment was provisional due to the High Court's interim orders. However, the Tribunal found no basis for holding the assessment as provisional. The Tribunal noted that the duty was paid, and the bill of entry was completed on a specific date, indicating final assessment. The Tribunal emphasized that the High Court's orders did not make the assessment provisional, and the demand for additional duty was not stayed by the Court's orders.
3. Differential duty calculation - Additional Duty on assessable value: The Superintendent contended that the appellant incorrectly calculated the Additional Duty on the assessable value without including Customs Duty. The Tribunal observed that the issue of Additional Duty was not raised during the initial objection by the Department. The Tribunal concluded that the demand for differential duty was not valid based on the Superintendent's argument.
4. Jurisdiction of High Court - Clearance of goods without fresh Bill of Entry: The Vice President highlighted the distinction between the High Court's constitutional authority and the Customs Act provisions. The High Court's interim orders did not amount to clearance under the Customs Act. The Vice President emphasized that the High Court's orders did not bind Customs authorities for assessment purposes. The Tribunal clarified that the High Court's orders did not result in a provisional assessment under the Customs Act.
5. Time-barred demand - Recovery of differential duty: The Tribunal ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that the demand for differential duty was time-barred. The Tribunal considered the legal aspects, including the completion of assessment and the High Court's orders, in determining the limitation period for the demand.
6. Interpretation of Customs Act provisions - Section 28 and Section 17: The Vice President interpreted the Customs Act provisions, emphasizing that the assessment was done under Section 17, requiring the appellant to pay the legally due amount, including full duty and charges. The Vice President rejected the appeal, stating that the assessment was not subject to time limitations under Section 28.
In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, considering the issues of limitation, provisional assessment, differential duty calculation, High Court's jurisdiction, and the interpretation of Customs Act provisions. The majority decision favored the appellant, granting consequential relief.
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1995 (7) TMI 166
Issues Involved: 1. Classification and dutiability of petroleum jelly as an intermediate product in the manufacture of Boroline. 2. Marketability and excisability of the intermediate product. 3. Invocation of the extended period of limitation under Section 11A for demand of duty. 4. Request for re-testing of the intermediate product. 5. Allegation of wilful suppression and intent to evade duty.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification and Dutiability of Petroleum Jelly:
The appellant, M/s. G.D. Pharmaceuticals Ltd., was held by the Collector of Central Excise to have manufactured petroleum jelly used captively in the manufacture of Boroline without paying the required duty. The appellant argued that the intermediate product in the hot liquid stage is not petroleum jelly as it is not marketable and does not meet the criteria stipulated under Heading 27.12 of the Central Excise Tariff. The process described involves melting various types of paraffin, microcrystalline wax, and lanolin, which do not solely constitute petroleum jelly, as it must be composed only of hydrocarbons. The appellant requested a re-test to confirm the product's composition, which was ignored.
2. Marketability and Excisability of the Intermediate Product:
The appellant contended that the intermediate product is not marketable in its hot liquid form and does not meet the specifications of petroleum jelly as described in various technical dictionaries and the Explanatory Notes to the HSN. The Departmental Representative argued that the product need not be in gel form to be classified as petroleum jelly and relied on the Calcutta High Court judgment in Bata Shoe Co. v. Union of India. However, the tribunal noted that the product must conform to specific characteristics such as congealing point and cone penetration, which were not demonstrated by the test report.
3. Invocation of the Extended Period of Limitation:
The appellant claimed that the demand was barred by limitation, citing that the Sector Officer was informed in August 1982 of the raw materials and manufacturing process. The tribunal observed that the exceedingly brief description provided by the appellant was insufficient to conclude the emergence of an intermediate product. The tribunal distinguished the present case from the Supreme Court decision in Padmini Products, noting that the failure to declare the manufacture of petroleum jelly indicated an intent to evade duty, justifying the invocation of the extended period under Section 11A.
4. Request for Re-testing of the Intermediate Product:
The appellant's request for re-testing the sample at the Indian Institute of Petroleum was ignored. The tribunal highlighted that the provision for re-test exists to address grievances regarding test results. The appellant's request was reasonable and should have been considered, especially since the test report was the sole basis for the demand. The failure to re-test the sample vitiated the Collector's Order.
5. Allegation of Wilful Suppression and Intent to Evade Duty:
The tribunal noted that the appellant had declared the final product Boroline and its ingredients, and the process of manufacture was within the Department's knowledge. The allegation of wilful suppression and intent to evade duty was not substantiated by the Department. The tribunal emphasized that the burden of proving suppression lies with the Department, which had not been discharged.
Judgment:
The tribunal allowed the appeal by way of remand, directing the Collector to re-test the sample to determine whether the appellant manufactures petroleum jelly as chemically known. The Collector was instructed to adjudicate the case afresh, providing the appellant an opportunity to rebut the test report and argue its case. The majority opinion favored remand for re-examination of the classification, marketability, and excisability of the intermediate product, while the Vice President dissented, accepting the appeal outright due to the Department's failure to establish its case and the lack of evidence of suppression.
Conclusion:
The appeal was accepted by way of remand, with directions for fresh adjudication and re-testing to conclusively determine the classification and dutiability of the intermediate product. The tribunal emphasized the need for fair consideration of the appellant's grievances and the Department's burden to prove allegations of suppression and intent to evade duty.
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