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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 910 Records
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2008 (8) TMI 887 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a Government Company falls within the compendious expression "any public sector undertakings or corporation established by or under any Central or State Act" in Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 ("Rent Act" in short)?
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2008 (8) TMI 886 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant fulfills the requisite academic qualification for appointment to the post of Reader in Public Administration in Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa?
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2008 (8) TMI 885 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Exemption u/s 11(i)(d) of the IT Act, 1961 - Reopening of Assessment.
Applicability of the provisions under ss. 11, 13 and section 12AA - charitable trust - granted registration u/s 12AA - Whether the Tribunal is justified in allowing the exemption u/s 11(i)(d) of the IT Act, 1961, ignoring the fact that the objects of the trust providing benefit to Maheshwari community was hit by the provisions contained in clause (i) of section 13? - HELD THAT:- We have gone through the judgment in Ghulam Mohidin Trust vs. CIT [2000 (11) TMI 99 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT], and a look thereat, makes it clear that the beneficiaries of the trust were confined to Muslim community intelligentsia. In the case in hand, even from reading of two clause 6 and 13, as quoted by learned CIT, it does not show, that the trust was created or established for the benefit of any particular religion, community, or caste. At best, clause 13 shows to be providing for some preference, in favour of the persons belonging to a particular community. So far clause 6 is concerned, that does not talk anything about as to for whose benefit the trust has been created.
On perusal of trust deed shows a detailed list of objects of the trust, and all those objects in categorical terms state, about the beneficiaries being the society at large, and does not confine to any particular caste, community, or even religion.
In that view of the matter, to say the least, the ineligibility provided in section 13(1)(a) or (b) is not attracted. The question is accordingly answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee.
Reopening of Assessment - Whether the Tribunal is justified in setting aside the assessment order, ignoring the provisions of section 147 of the IT Act, 1961 the AO validly issued notice u/s 148 of the Act? - Applying the views taken in the case of Lakhmani Mewaldas's case [1976 (3) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] and Ganga Saran's case [1981 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT], it has been found by the Tribunal that one of the conditions necessary for issuance of notice u/s 148, being under statement of income of the assessee, is not fulfilled. It has been held, that in order to bring an item within the purview of section 147, it is of utmost importance, that the AO should have reason to believe, based on relevant and cogent material, that such income has escaped assessment. It has been found, that there was no material direct or indirect, available with the AO, which could show that the receipt of donations was without any specific direction of corpus fund. The assessee has shown the receipts, as having been received in the corpus fund, coupled with the report of the auditor. The AO had not inquired into the nature of the receipts, before issuing notice u/s 148, and in earlier years also, the amount was held to be received in the corpus fund.
Therefore, Tribunal has rightly examined the controversy. It is significant to note that the Tribunal has further found that AO cannot initiate reassessment proceedings, simply to verify the contents of the return, unlike before it was vested in him in making regular assessment. It was found that the time-limit available for issuance of notice and making assessment u/s 143(3) had expired, but then, on that count, he cannot assume the jurisdiction by venturing to make assessment u/s 148. Even after hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, we are satisfied that the reasons given by the Tribunal are in accordance with law - Accordingly, question is also answered against the Revenue.
The net result is that the appeal therefore has no force and is dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 884 - SC ORDER
Demand - Limitation - The only issue in this case is whether the appellant could have invoked the extended period of limitation as mentioned in the proviso to Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944? - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF C. EX. Versus WONDERAX LABORATORIES, IPL. [2007 (10) TMI 388 - DELHI HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that assessee acted bonafide in making its clearance and claiming exemption even using other's brand name. extended period of limitation not invocable - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 883 - SC ORDER
Condonation of delay - DTA clearance - the decision in the case of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, SURAT Versus SANJARI TWISTERS [2007 (9) TMI 369 - CESTAT, AHMEDABAD] contested - Held that: - delay dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 882 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ot; 8.3 Therefore, on facts and circumstances of the case, we do not see any good ground to restore the disallowances under various heads made by the AO. All the disallowances were arbitrarily made without any basis and were rightly deleted by the learned CIT(A). It was open to the Revenue authorities to plead and show that higher net profit rate should have been applied in this case having regard to material available on record. But no such ground is raised and relevant observation of learned CIT(A) had not been challenged in the grounds of appeal. We are, therefore, not called upon to consider whether net profit rate applied in the case is reasonable or not. We, therefore, do not find any error in the approach of the learned CIT(A) in deleting various disallowances/ additions made by the AO. The action of learned CIT(A) is confirmed in all the four years. 9. In the light of above discussion, all the appeals of the Revenue and cross-objections of the assessee are dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 881 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit properties were originally Wakf Properties or alternatively whether they ceased to be Wakf properties as the defendants/appellants and their predecessors had perfected their title by way of adverse possession?
Whether the suits filed by the Wakf/respondents were barred by limitation and, if so, whether Section 107 of the Wakf Act could have the effect of reviving a barred claim?
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2008 (8) TMI 880 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the case of the appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT)?
Is it a case where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467 and 120B IPC?
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2008 (8) TMI 879 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd in law, the Hon’ble ITAT was justified in holding that the cost of production of the abandoned film "DEVAA" is trading loss.? (b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble ITAT was justified in not appreciating the fact that the character of negative film which cannot be exhibited is that of the capital nature and not as stock-in-trade?" 3. After hearing the parties for some time, the learned Counsel for the appellant concedes that there is no question of law involved in the above appeal and the appeal is actually misconceived and especially in view of the fact that the film in question was admittedly not released and hence it is merely a stock in trade and there is no question of the same being capital asset. Mr.Shivram also pointed out that the Assessing Officer has given effect to the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax. Hence the above appeal is totally misconceived and therefore, stands dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 878 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in Central Excise Appeal No. 6 of 2005 M/s. Arora Products v. Addl. Commissioner Central Excise. In that view of the matter, for the same reasons this appeal is also dismissed summarily
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2008 (8) TMI 877 - SUPREME COURT
Whether respondent No.1 had intimated the company and whether there was any resolution accepting his resolution are matters in respect of which evidence has to be led?
Held that:- Under Scheme of the Act, if the person committing an offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, by application of Section 141 it is deemed that every person who is in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company as well as the company are guilty of the offence. A person who proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence is exempted from becoming liable by operation of the proviso to sub-section (1). The burden in this regard has to be discharged by the accused.
Therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings so far as respondent No.1 in the first case is concerned. The appeal is allowed.
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2008 (8) TMI 876 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the order of the High Court is a non speaking order and it upholds the preliminary objection of the respondent without assigning any reason?
Whether a writ petition under Article 227 was maintainable against the order of the Civil Judge, Senior Division (designate of the Chief Justice) and the High Court was wrong in assuming that the writ petition was not maintainable?
Held that:- Reference to section 11(6) of the Act includes reference to section 11(4) of the Act and reference to a District Judge as designate, will also include reference to Civil Judge, Senior Division, as designate. his Court has repeatedly stressed that Article 136 is not intended to permit direct access to this Court where other equally efficacious remedy is available and the question involved is not of any public importance; and that this Court will not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136, unless the appellant has exhausted all other remedies open to him. Therefore the contention that the order of the Civil Judge, Sr. Division rejecting a petition under section 11 of the Act could only be challenged, by recourse to Article 136 is untenable. Appeal allowed and set aside the order of the High Court.
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2008 (8) TMI 875 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Additional security demanded and cancellation of registration both provincial and Central - Held that:- Security, as per terms of section 8C can be demanded for proper realization of tax or penalty. It may be true that the dealer has deposited the admitted tax along with the return for the month of July 1999. This is one aspect of the matter.
Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the fact that the applicant is not a resident of Farrukhabad, the interest of justice would be sub-served if the applicant is required to furnish the additional securities of two registered dealers of ₹ 3 lakhs instead of ₹ 5 lakhs. In other respects the order demanding the additional security remains intact. Six weeks time is granted to furnish the additional security from the date of order.
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2008 (8) TMI 874 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... the same assessee 39 s case being order No. A/70/WZB/Ahd/08 dated December 5, 2007/January 15, 2008 wherein the Tribunal has held that in respect of the electricity used for non-manufacturing activity, the assessee is required to reverse the credit in respect of inputs used for manufacture of fuel which in turn is used in the manufacture of electricity. However, we find that the Commissioner, in para 3.10 in his order, has held that the assessee has already paid duty on the fuel which was used in the manufacture of electricity which was further used for the exempted product. As such, the credit availed of in respect of inputs used on fuel stands utilized on payment of duty on fuel. As such, the question of reversal of credit of duty paid on the inputs used in the manufacture of fuel does not arise at the time of utilization of electricity in the exempted final product. The Revenue 39 s appeals on this ground are also rejected. All the appeals are disposed of in above manner.
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2008 (8) TMI 873 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to hold the taxability of the dealer on the Central sales against form C in the third year of the exemption of the new unit at the rate of ten per cent of the four per cent despite the fact in the third year of the exemption tax was liable to be paid at the rate of ten per cent of the ten per cent as per provisions of the Act?
Held that:- The view taken by the Tribunal that the dealer opposite party is liable to pay the tax on Central sales at the rate of 10 per cent of four per cent as prescribed under Central Sales Tax Act in the present case and not 10 per cent of 10 per cent as prescribed under the U. P. Trade Tax Act, is legally correct.
Viewed as above, the order of the Tribunal is on terra firma and does not call for any interference in the present revision. The question of law as raised by the Department is, therefore, decided against it and in favour of the dealer-opposite party. Revision dismissed.
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2008 (8) TMI 872 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... arned advocate for the petitioner that in the present case no mala fide intention of the transporter-petitioner behind contravention of the provision of the Act and the Rules has been manifested to attract the penalty provision of the Act. In the result, the application merits to be allowed in part and though the impugned order of seizure is found legal and valid, the impugned order of penalty appears not valid and proper and hence it is liable to be set aside. The order of seizure dated November 20, 2007 is thus confirmed but the order of imposition of penalty dated December 1, 2007 and the confirming order dated December 5, 2007 thereof stands set aside. The respondents are directed to refund the amount of penalty paid, i.e., Rs. 2,50,000 to the petitioner within 90 days from the date of communication of the order by the learned State Representative. The instant case thus stands disposed of but with no order as to costs. DEB KUMAR CHAKRABORTI (Technical Member). - I agree.
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2008 (8) TMI 871 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to hold that inward freight is not part of turnover, only on the ground that it was charged separately?
Held that:- Following items are excluded from the sale price:- Cash discount allowed to buyers according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade, Cost of freight or delivery, if it is separately charged in the sale bill, When the cost of installation is separately shown in the sale bill.
Even for the applicability of the case of Vinod Syndicate [1987 (10) TMI 354 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA9] necessarily a finding that freight was separately charged in the bills is required for its exclusion from "turnover". Neither the Tribunal nor the first appellate authority have examined this aspect of the case, therefore, it is desirable that the matter should go back to the Tribunal to re-examine the matter again and to record a finding with regard to the question of charging of freight separately, also. Revision allowed. Matter is restored back to the Tribunal to rehear and redecide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above in accordance with law
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2008 (8) TMI 870 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his court passes a similar order in the present writ petition. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has no objection for this court passing such an order. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioner, as well as the respondents, the impugned order of the respondent in CST. No. 365604/1997-98, dated March 31, 2000, is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the respondent to be considered afresh and for passing appropriate orders after considering the objections submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner is permitted to make necessary objections, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this (1)Sri Ranga Textiles P. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer order and on such objections being made, the respondent is directed to pass appropriate orders thereon, on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of twelve weeks thereafter. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
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2008 (8) TMI 869 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to quash the tax imposed on the sale of ₹ 6,58,316 without recording no reason for the same?
Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to exempt the amount of freight and handling charges?
Held that:- Coming to the facts of the case, the authorities below have excluded ₹ 68,69,873 from the sale price which were charged towards the freight and handling charges separately. However, it was found that, as a matter of fact, in the bills the dealer-opposite party has charged much more amount than the amount spent by it towards the freight and handling charges. This excess amount was considered by the assessing officer as the charges made by the dealer-opposite party under the other heads and shall form part of the sale price. Without setting aside the finding recorded by the two authorities below to it, the Tribunal assumed that the said amount of ₹ 6,58,316 was towards the labour charges/insurance. The order of the Tribunal is far from satisfactory as it does not contain any reason as to whether the freight charged by the dealer-opposite party amounting to ₹ 6,58,316 was charged towards the labour charges/insurance charges. Revision allowed.
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2008 (8) TMI 868 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether the Tribunal was legally justified in holding that the transaction relating to 1,02,944 was a purchase for and on behalf of ex-U.P. principals despite the fact that evidence on record does not indicate that the purchases in question have been made in compliance with the orders from ex-U.P. principals and the despatches of such goods had occasioned the said purchases?
Held that:- Keeping in view the facts of the present case, it would be clear that the Tribunal has committed an error of law in reaching the conclusion that the purchases by the dealer-opposite party were made on behalf of ex-U.P. principals in the course of inter-State purchases. The dealer-opposite party has failed to establish that the purchase of goods and dispatch outside State of U.P., were parts of the same transaction. In this regard, the Tribunal has not set aside the contrary findings recorded by the two authorities below it. Purchase orders may be oral but nonetheless the dealer is required to maintain a record of such orders to establish that it made the purchases as agent on behalf of a particular principal and the purchased goods have been dispatched to the principal at the earliest opportunity.
Thus the order of the Tribunal is indefensible and is liable to be set aside. Both the revisions succeed and are allowed and the common order of the Tribunal is set aside.
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