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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 733 Records
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2009 (9) TMI 937 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n Act 16 of 1995 was in operation. In other words for all purposes what is in force from 1st October, 1995 is the Section as substituted by Act 21 of 1996. That is not the subject matter of the present challenge before us. It is not the case of the petitioners that in terms of Act 21 of 1996 they are entitled to the benefit of the Scheme. In the instant case we are concerned with the Section as it stands from 1st October, 1995 as amended by Act 21 of 1996. That is not the subject matter of challenge before us. In the light of that the main challenge to the petition both on the ground of promissory estoppel and unreasonableness or discrimination cannot be entertained. 8. Considering the above, Rule discharged. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. We, however, make it clear that if the petitioners are entitled to challenge Act 21 of 1996 the disposal of this Petition will not stand in their way and that will have to be considered independently.
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2009 (9) TMI 936 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 935 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion and also the income tax returns filed by them. From the above documents, the identity and genuineness of these companies is clearly established. The only ground for making addition by the AO was that the bank accounts of the three companies revealed that the amounts in cash were deposited in those accounts and thus cheques were issued in favour of the assessee company along with share application money. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Lovely Exports Pvt. Ltd., 216 CTR 195, the ITAT has rightly held that the assessee had discharged its burden. In case those three companies had received certain cash, which were deposited in the bank accounts, it was for the Income Tax Department to take action against the said companies. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no substantial question of law arises for our consideration in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
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2009 (9) TMI 934 - CESTAT DELHI
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... ... ..... e same appellant for the period from October 2001 to March 2003 came before the Tribunal and it has been held by the order dated 04.07.2008 reported in 2009 (235) ELT 850 (Tri. Del.), that the appellant was not eligible for the credit on merits but the duty was demandable only within the normal period of limitation and that no penalty was imposable. In the present case, it is submitted that the duty demand is within the normal period of limitation. The learned Advocate seeks vacation of the penalty imposed on them. 4. Learned DR agrees that the facts of the present case are identical to the facts of their case decided by the Tribunal on 04.07.2008 cited supra. 5. Following the reasons stated in the earlier order dated 04.07.2008 of the Tribunal, we hold that the demand of duty is sustainable but the penalty is not imposable. 6. Accordingly, the appeal is rejected in so far as demand of duty and interest is concerned. As far as the penalty is concerned, the same is set aside.
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2009 (9) TMI 933 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Works contract - expenses incurred by the contractor for providing labour and other services - deduction - principles of interpretation
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2009 (9) TMI 932 - SUPREME COURT
Whether power of revision in Section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be exercised at any time although no time has been prescribed for exercise of such power?
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2009 (9) TMI 931 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there was any negligence of the doctors who treated the appellant?
Whether the death of A was caused by poison. The opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by the poison by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant?
Whether A, at the time of doing a certain act, was by reason of unsoundness of mind, in capable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The opinions of experts upon the question whether the symptoms exhibited by A commonly show unsoundness of mind, and whether such unsoundness of mind usually renders persons incapable of knowing the nature of the acts which they do, or knowing that what they do is either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant?
Whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced which is proved or admitted to have been written by A. The opinion of experts on the question whether the two documents were written by the same person or by different persons are relevant?
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2009 (9) TMI 930 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a statutory School Examination Board comes within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act?
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2009 (9) TMI 929 - SUPREME COURT
Whether no supervening circumstances have surfaced nor shown justifying cancellation of anticipatory bail?
Whether a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial?
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2009 (9) TMI 928 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Expenditure claimed against Meagre income - Disallowance of Expenditure u/s 35D - expenditure included salary paid to the employees, travelling cost and administrative and other operating expenses - expenses incurred before the commencement of the business - AO had not doubted that the expenditure was, in fact, incurred, however, from the huge expenditure against minimal income, only an inference was drawn that the business of the assessee had not commenced during the year as no revenue earning, project had started. On this basis, the expenditure was treated as pre-operative expenditure and, therefore, according to the AO, it should have been, at best, be capitalized as pre-operative expenses.
CIT (A) reversed the finding of the AO and which finding has been confirmed by the ITAT. ITAT has reproduced the relevant portion of the discussion contained in the order of the CIT(A), which would indicate that the assessee is in the business of development of software for various industries and as a policy decision it had decided to pursue only prestigious companies in India and for the purpose of getting orders, it had recruited various skilled personnel.
HELD THAT:- This was clearly a wrong approach, as rightly observed by the CIT(A), who opined that in an industry like software development business activities start with pursuing of the companies to get orders and all activities carried out to get such orders, being incidental to the business activities, would be regarded as for the purpose of business and not for setting up of the business. The CIT(A) also recorded the reasons, on the basis of which it arrived at the finding that the business had, in fact, started.
As to when the activity is deemed to be undertaken as part of business activity and the expenses incurred are to be allowed as business expenses, the CIT(A) referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the case of CIT v. Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd.[1972 (8) TMI 19 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and that of the Calcutta High Court in Tetron Commercial Ltd. v. CIT [2003 (1) TMI 67 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] Referring to Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd.'s case (supra ), the CIT(A) stated that tests were laid down by the Gujarat High Court in that case to determine the commencement of business activities.
Revenue submits that when the expenses were huge, such expenses need to have been amortized under the provisions of section 35D. However, this is clearly a misconceived and erroneous argument inasmuch as it predicates on the premise that the expenditure in question is incurred before the commencement of the business. When a finding of fact is recorded in the instant case that in the relevant assessment year business had already commenced, the provisions of section 35D would not get attracted at all.
We, therefore, find that no question of law arises and dismiss the appeal. In favour of assessee
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2009 (9) TMI 927 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... need be. In the circumstances, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met if the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Cuttack, is directed to hear and dispose of the first appeal pending before him within a period of three months from today. 5. Under the above circumstances the writ petition is disposed of directing the second respondent to consider and pass orders on Exts.P3(a), P4(a), P5(a), P6(a), P7(a) and P8(a) applications for stay, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner taking note of the factual matrix of W.P.(C) No.25370 of 2009 the case and also taking note of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (cite supra), as early as possible, at any rate within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Till orders are passed on the stay petitions as directed above, all further steps for realisation of the amount covered under the impugned assessment orders and orders of penalty shall be kept in abeyance.
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2009 (9) TMI 926 - SC ORDER
Annual Maintenance Contract – valuation – value of materials i.e. spare parts are also supplied in the course of the service of AMC - the decision in the case of WIPRO GE MEDICAL SYSTEMS (P.) LTD. Versus COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX, BANGALORE [2008 (8) TMI 207 - CESTAT, BANGALORE], where it was held that since sales tax is paid on value of goods (spare parts) supplied, service tax is not leviable on them - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed - decided against Revenue.
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2009 (9) TMI 925 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uld be taken on that application within a period of four weeks, if not already taken, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 3. On this statement being made the learned advocate Mr. Paresh Dave for the petitioners does not press this petition at this stage. The petition stands disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. Notice is discharged.
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2009 (9) TMI 924 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... sue relates to whether an amount of 8 /10 is payable in respect of waste and byproduct, arising in the course of manufacture, which are either not excisable or exempted. 3. Shri G. Natarajan, Ld. Advocate, states that this issue has been decided in favour of the appellant assessees by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Rallis India Ltd. vs. UOI - 2009 (233) ELT 301 (Bom.). The department's only contention is that the department has gone in SLP to the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the cited decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay. In view of the fact that the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay has decided the issue in favour of the appellant assessee, and there is no stay on the operation of the said order, following the ratio of the same, we allow the appeals No. E/478/2005, E/265, 935/2006 and E/814/07 filed by the appellant assessee and dismiss the appeal No.E/309/2009 filed by the department. Order pronounced and dictated in the open Court.
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2009 (9) TMI 923 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the flashover and fire was the proximate cause of the damage in question?
Whether the chain of events prove that the fire was the efficient and active cause of the damage?
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2009 (9) TMI 922 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the material on record prima facie constitutes any offences against the accused?
Whether if the allegations made in the complaint and FIR, even if accepted to be true in entirety did not disclose the ingredients of any offence of forgery (sections 467 and 471) or cheating (section 420) or insult (section 504) or wrongful restraint (section 341) or causing hurt (section 323) and there was no other material to show any offence and therefore, their application ought to have been accepted?
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2009 (9) TMI 921 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to remove the encroachers in accordance with law (1) Anbazhagan, (2) Nagappan, (3) Muralikrishnan and (4) Arunachalam who have cultivated lands in S.Nos.32/2 and 33/2 and other such encroachments of cultivation. (ix) In so far as, 15 encroachers mentioned in Para-110, Respondents 3 and 6 and 7 are directed to provide them alternate place in the nearby vicinity for putting up their residence. (x) In the alternate place so provided to the above 15 persons, Respondents 3,6 and 7 are directed to put up houses/sheds with galvanised sheets under any of the available Government scheme. (xi) Respondents 3,6 and 7 are directed to put up houses/sheds in those alternate place within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. And until such alternate arrangements are made, with regard to 15 encroachers status quo shall be maintained. 118. Contempt Petition is dismissed and the Writ Petition is disposed on the above lines. Consequently, all the M.Ps. are closed. No costs.
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2009 (9) TMI 920 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... udge had no reason to alter the Appointed Date proposed in the scheme of amalgamation. We have perused the judgment of the learned Company Judge. We do agree with the learned Company Judge that the Company Court has discretion to make modification in the proposed scheme of compromise, arrangement, etc. However, such discretion is required to be exercised for cogent reasons. We do agree with Mr.Soparkar that the learned Company Judge had no reason to modify the Appointed Date proposed in the scheme of amalgamation. We also agree that the alteration in the Appointed Date would affect the calculations and would have financial implications. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow these Appeals. The modification made by the learned Company Judge in respect of the Appointed Date proposed in the scheme of the amalgamation is set-aside. The scheme of amalgamation as proposed is sanctioned. Civil Applications stand disposed of. Registry will maintain copy of this judgment in each Appeal.
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2009 (9) TMI 919 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
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... ... ..... f the company including the liability and/or payment of dues of the employees as well as the Government or Statutory bodies should not be halted by this order. However, that is also subject to accounts. 82. I do not deny the right of the respondents to raise appropriate plea or defence before the Arbitral Tribunal, if so constituted. They are at liberty to file application for appropriate reliefs/orders. It is made clear that the observation/reasoning so given is a prima facie and not final. 83. No order as to costs. 84. At this stage, the learned counsel for respondent no.3 submits that prayer (c) has become infructuous. However, considering the reasoning already given, at this stage, I am inclined to retain the same also. It is made clear that the shares as contended and recorded stood transferred. However, in view of the present order and as already mentioned, it will be subject to the final decision of the Arbitral Tribunal, including all actions arising out of the same.
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2009 (9) TMI 918 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Expenditure incurred on advertisement and publicity - Business Expenditure or not ? - as per AO trademark Adidas belonged to the assessee’s parent company and since the assessee was already paying royalty at the rate of 5 per cent of sales, it was to promote the brand name of the licensor company and on this ground held that it was not allowable u/s 37(1) - Tribunal has reversed the decision of the CIT(A) as confirming the addition -
HELD THAT:- We find from the order of the ITAT that it has discussed in detail the terms of Technical Assistant Agreement dated 14-2-1997, as per which the assessee was provided the technical know-how and was also allowed to use the brand name ‘Adidas’ on the products manufactured by the assessee, which are to be sold in India, Nepal and Bhutan.
Tribunal observed that merely because the assessee was paying royalty at the rate of 5 per cent to M/s. AIPL would not mean that the assessee could not incur the expenditure on advertisement to popularize the products dealt with by it in Indian market. No doubt, brand name of ‘Adidas’ is already a well-known brand which belongs to the parent company of the assessee. However, to popularize the said product in India and to promote its sale in the Indian territories, it became essential for the assessee to incur expenditure on advertising to propagate the aforesaid brand name.
The benefit thereof had to necessarily accrue to the assessee as well as the main purpose of the advertisement is to augment the sales. The contention of the assessee that it was a commercial practice and commercial expediency has rightly been accepted by the Tribunal. We, therefore, do not find any substantial question of law that arises for our consideration. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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