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Showing 141 to 160 of 1288 Records
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2014 (9) TMI 1154
Consolidation of holdings - exemption from obligation to make public announcement - doubtful acquisitions of shares - collective shareholding of the noticees in the Target Company - Held that:- The noticee's who were already in control of the Target Company did not acquire 5% or more in the financial year 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 when the acquisitions described in the SCN took place. Further, both the conditions of the second proviso of 11(2) {i.e. the acquisitions were through open market purchase in normal segment on the stock exchange and post acquisition shareholding of the noticees remained below 75%} were complied with in this case. The most of the acquisitions had happened when the doubts and ambiguities as mentioned above were prevailing in the market and such acquisitions were under bona fide belief rather than as an attempt to consolidate their shareholding in violation of Takeover Regulations,1997. Further, the acquisition with regard to which fault is found in this case is only for 27,633 shares (0.40%) of share capital of the Target Company
The noticees are now entitled to avail the benefit of further creeping acquisition of 5% in every financial year. In this case, the noticees had acquired the shares which are found to be in violation of regulation 11(2) of the Takeover Regulations, 1997 at an average price of ₹ 97.14 per share. If the public announcement were to be directed under regulation 44 read with regulation 11(2) of the Takeover Regulations, 1997, the open offer would be at price of ₹ 129.05 per share (calculated in terms of regulation 20 of the Takeover Regulations, 1997 alongwith interest @ 10% per annum thereon) whereas the present average market price of the shares of the Target Company considering the trading on BSE and NSE in the last six months is ₹ 280/per share. Thus, the public announcement, if made now would be a mere formality.
Direction to sell 27,633 shares of the Target Company in small lots on the concerned stock exchange and transfer of the entire proceeds of such sale of shares to the Investor Protection and Education Fund established under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Investor Protection and Education Fund) Regulations, 2009 would be commensurate with the violation as found in this case. Since the Investor Protection and Education Fund is utilised for the purpose of protection of investors and promotion of investor education and awareness, this case the above directions would be in the interest of investors.
In exercise of powers conferred upon under sections 19, 11 and 11B of the SEBI Act, 1992 and regulations 44 and 45 of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 read with regulation 32(1)(h) of the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, hereby issue following directions to the noticees:-
i. The noticees shall, jointly and severally, disinvest 27,633 shares of Sarla Performance Fibres Ltd. through sale to parties not connected/ related to them in small lots in trenches on the BSE and NSE ensuring that such sale does not disturb the market equilibrium; and transfer of the entire proceeds of such sale of shares to the Investor Protection and Education Fund established under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Investor Protection and Education Fund) Regulations, 2009.
ii. The noticees shall complete the sale of shares as directed above within 3 months from the date of this order and file a report to the SEBI detailing the compliance of the above directions within two weeks from the date of such compliance.
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2014 (9) TMI 1153
Additions made to trading profit - rejection of books of account - Held that:- gross profit rate declared by the assessee for the year under consideration was at 13.61% in comparison to the gross profit rate in the immediately preceding year at 13.32% - thus the GP rate for the year under consideration was better in comparison to the immediately preceding year - hence the trading addition sustained by the Ld. CIT(A) on account of gross profit rate was not justified, accordingly, the same is deleted - Decided in favor of assessee.
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2014 (9) TMI 1152
Refund claim - rejection on the ground that appellant failed to substantiate the CENVAT credit details and the lower authorities also have taken the view that it is not possible to verify the refund claims - Held that: - At present, there is no statutory requirement or format for maintenance of CENVAT credit account and therefore it becomes necessary for the authority to say what exactly the omission and why he is not able to verify the correctness of the claim. In the absence of any clear cut conclusion that CENVAT credit was availed wrongly or taken wrongly or the claim that it could not be used was not correct, rejection on this ground is not valid and this matter requires reconsideration - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2014 (9) TMI 1151
Termination of pregnancy - abortion resulting to death - Rape Offence - legality of evidences - Section 10 of the Evidence Act - Held that: - there must be prima facie evidence to give rise to reasonable believe that conspiracy existed between the accused persons in the first place before any act done or said by a conspirator would bind the other. Secondly, such act must be done or words spoken by the conspirator in the course of conspiracy and not after the same had been snapped, e.g., a conspirator having been caught and is in the custody of the police.
No charge of conspiracy has been framed against the appellant. Even if such charge is presumed (as he is charged with the substantive offence while others having been charged with conspiracy to commit such offence) there is absolutely no independent evidence on record (except the purported aforesaid statement of the other accused persons) to show that the appellant had met the other accused persons or there was any agreement halted amongst them and the appellant to commit the crime. In the absence of such evidence it cannot be said that the first condition, namely, there are reasons to believe that there was a conspiracy between the appellant and other accused persons is established.
In the instant case as prosecution had failed to establish prima facie existence of conspiracy between the appellant and the other accused persons, namely, Premananda & Jashomati, the statement of such accused persons before villagers after being caught cannot be admissible under Section 10 of the Evidence Act against the appellant.
It is settled law that confessions of a co-accused is a corroborative piece of evidence and cannot be the sole basis of conviction - There is no evidence on record connecting the appellant to the abortion of the victim resulting in her death. Hence, he cannot be convicted on the basis of statement of a co-accused which has been retracted by them during trial.
The prosecution case has not been proved at all on the basis of legally admissible evidence. No doubt there exists a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of proof - the appellant acquitted of the charges levelled against him due to lack of cogent evidence - appeal allowed.
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2014 (9) TMI 1150
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Suppression of closing stock - Held that:- Assessee made the AO sweat, to compile the correct quantity of production, sale and closing stock, while all along it gave only workings based on tin numbers. Even if we consider the whole of the opening stock of 11696 tins as consisting of 11.34 Kgs, the closing stock was grossly understated by he assesee. It is not a question of any arithmetical mistake. Assessee agreed to the addition, finding no other way before it.
Furnishing insufficient particulars, in a manner calculated to put the revenue at a disadvantage and gain out of it, is nothing but furnishing inaccurate particulars. Giving a break-up of number of tins with different quantities, so as to fit its valuation of closing stock, is nothing but an after thought. In our opinion, it was only an effort to suppress the income which it otherwise had.
Assessee had concealed its true income and levy of penalty was justified. However, we have in the quantum appeal filed by the assessee, reduced the addition due to stock valuation to ₹ 70,75,882,36 against ₹ 1,03,23,724/- considered by the AO. Hence, the penalty leviable has to be re-worked. AO is directed to re-work the penalty. But for the quantification aspect against penalty order is sustained. - Decided against assessee.
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2014 (9) TMI 1149
Validity of assessment - notice u/s 143(2) not been served on the assessee within the specified time - revenue submitted for hand delivery of notice - Held that:- A perusal of the tear of acknowledgment slip which was shown at page 23 of the paper book shows that there is no signature to identify as to who has served the said notice. The Revenue has also not been able to place before us any record or register to prove the hand delivery of the said notice. Admittedly when a notice under section 143(2) is prepared, there is the original and the carbon copy. The original is sent to the assessee.
The assessee has placed before us the copy of the original 143(2) notice served on the assessee through the Postal Authorities through Speed Post. If this notice has been served through the Speed Post , where is the second copy which could have been served through the tear of acknowledgment , because there is only one original and one copy which is in the assessment records. This clearly shows that no notice under section 143(2) has been served on the assessee on 30.09.2009 through the tear of acknowledgment slip.
Even on merits, it is not iced that the Assessing Officer has blindly disallowed the figures from the Balance sheet and the Prof it & Loss Account without giving any specified reason. The assessee has specifically vide a letter dated 16.12.2010 served on 22.12.2010 intimated that the notice under section 143(2) had been served beyond the prescribed time. Still the Assessing Officer had proceeded with the assessment fully knowing that the assessment would get quashed. As no reasons have been given by the Assessing Officer for disallowing the various figures in the Balance-sheet and the expenses claimed in the Profit & Loss A/c - Decided in favour of assessee
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2014 (9) TMI 1148
Benefits of original license by legal heirs of deceased - petitioner (legal heir) stepping into the shoes of deceased - Held that: - The benefit of the order of the Tribunal was available to the deceased Mr. Prakash Gawde. There is no material on record to indicate that he has availed of the same. Unfortunately, after his demise, the heir has to comply with the requirement of the regulations and only then, will he get an independent licence.
We cannot in our writ jurisdiction displace the regulations and direct that a licence which was not operative could be revived in the manner sought by the petitioners.
Petition dismissed.
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2014 (9) TMI 1147
Transfer of right to use - sale or service - Whether in facts and law, the FAA is correct in deciding that the transactions between the appellant-company and the CBUs is one of technical service activity and does not involve the transfer of right to use the trademark or there is no deemed sale of trademark?
Held that: - he appellant-company has granted only permission to use the trademark which means to say it is only the licence to manufacture the beer as per the terms and conditions of the appellant-company. The permission to use the trademark is inevitable as the beer so manufactured is for the appellant-company only as the label clearly stipulates that it is 'For United Breweries only' i.e., for the appellant-company only.
The agreements are of composite nature which involves rendering of services, technical consultancy, monitoring of production and marketing and distribution of the beer manufactured on behalf of the appellant. It is the contention of the AA that there is transfer of right to use the trademark - the necessary concomitant of the plain language of the agreement proves that it is merely the licence to use the goods rather than the transfer of right to use as envisaged under the Act. This is explicitly laid down under Clause 2.2 which states that 'UBL hereby grants to BDL i.e. CBL's, the non-assignable, non-transferable and non-exclusive right during the term of the agreement. The sub-clauses 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 makes it clear that it is only the licence to use the trademark in the composite contract transactions.
The FAA is correct in deciding the issue that the transactions between the appellant and the CBUs does not involve the transfer of right to use the trademark or brand name and thereby the brand franchisee fee is not liable for tax - decided in affirmative.
Whether, the State in cross appeals has established in facts and law that there is transfer of right to use the trademark as per the agreements and the FAA has erred in allowing the appeals in part? - Held that: - the trademark is first of all an intellectual property right and permission to use the trademark amounts to intellectual property services. The appellant-company has adduced copies of the returns in Form ST-3, the prescribed form under Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994 to demonstrate that the service tax has been paid on the payments realised by way of economic surplus in the form of marketing fee during the impugned tax periods - the cross appeals of the State do not sustain and liable to be dismissed - decided in negative.
Whether, the FAA is correct in deciding that the royalty realised by the appellant amounts to transfer of right to use the brand name "Kingfisher" to the licensees to manufacture and sale of packaged mineral water with that brand name? - Held that: - the law is clear to the effect if royalty received by the appellant has been offered to the service tax under Finance Act, 1994 then it cannot be construed as transfer of right to use the trademark 'Kingfisher' in favour of water bottling units. As the appellant-company has adduced proof by furnishing the copies of Form ST-3, the prescribed form under Section 70 of the Finance Act, 1994 wherein the entire royalty has been admitted to service tax right from April 2006 to March 2011 i.e. during the impugned tax periods of financial years 2005-2006 to 2010-2011 (six financial years) - decided in negative.
There is no need to restore the orders of the AA - appeal allowed in part.
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2014 (9) TMI 1146
Whether the provisions of Mines and Minerals Act explicitly or impliedly excludes the provisions of Indian Penal Code when the act of an accused is an offence both under the Indian Penal Code and under the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act?
Held that: - It is well known principle that the rule against double jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct.
There cannot be any two opinions that natural resources are the assets of the nation and its citizens. It is the obligation of all concerned, including the Central and the State Governments, to conserve and not waste such valuable resources. Article 48A of the Constitution requires that the State shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and safeguard the forests and wild life of the country. Similarly, Article 51A enjoins a duty upon every citizen to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for all the living creatures. In view of the Constitutional provisions, the Doctrine of Public Trust has become the law of the land. The said doctrine rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and forests are of such great importance to the people as a whole that it would be highly unjustifiable to make them a subject of private ownership.
There is no complete and absolute bar in prosecuting persons under the Indian Penal Code where the offences committed by persons are penal and cognizable offence.
Considering the principles of interpretation and the wordings used in Section 22, it can be said that the provision is not a complete and absolute bar for taking action by the police for illegal and dishonestly committing theft of minerals including sand from the river bed.
The ingredients constituting the offence under the MMDR Act and the ingredients of dishonestly removing sand and gravel from the river beds without consent, which is the property of the State, is a distinct offence under the Indian Penal Code. Hence, for the commission of offence Under Section 378 Code of Criminal Procedure, on receipt of the police report, the Magistrate having jurisdiction can take cognizance of the said offence without awaiting the receipt of complaint that may be filed by the authorized officer for taking cognizance in respect of violation of various provisions of the MMRD Act.
Appeal disposed off.
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2014 (9) TMI 1145
Disallowance of deduction u/s 801B(10) - Gram Panchayat as competent authority for issuing completion certificate - project was not approved by Local Authority i.e. CIDCO as housing project but as residential building in shop line as there was no provision for commercial area in housing project prior to 01/04/2004 - Held that:- In the present case the project was approved for commencement vide letter of CIDCO dated 05/03/2004. Thus, the project was approved for commencement before 31/3/2005 and old law will apply when it was not a condition precedent to submit completion certificate. Deduction u/s. 80 IB (10) cannot be denied to the assessee for want of completion certificate from CIDCO.
In common parlance “housing project” would mean constructing the building or group of buildings consisting of several residential units. In fact the explanation in section 80 IB(10) supports the contention of the assessee that approval granted to housing project. Therefore, it is clear that construction of even one building with several residential units of size not exceeding 1000 sq.fts. “E” Building in that case would constitute a housing project under section 10 IB(10) of the Act. Project constructed by the assessee was a separate project different from the project carried out by M/s. Sai Leela Developers. Therefore, such passing observations of AO cannot be held to be a ground for rejection of assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80 IB (10) of the Act.
For the aforementioned reasons we set aside the order passed by Ld. CIT(A) and hold that assessee is entitled to get deduction under section 80 IB(10) and accordingly the AO is directed to allow the deduction to the assessee under section 80 IB(10). Ground No.1 to 5 are allowed in the manner aforesaid.
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2014 (9) TMI 1144
Admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the NRI category quota - scope and interpretation of term "NRI".
Held that: - The schedule relating to admissions to the professional colleges should be strictly and scrupulously adhered to and shall not be deviated under any circumstance either by the courts or the Board and midstream admission should not be permitted - When a candidate does not exercise or pursue his/her rights or legal remedies against his/her non-selection expeditiously and promptly, then the Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate in the form of securing an admission.
There was total lack of diligence displayed by the contesting Respondent right from the stage when the submission of the application was made. We have noted that the prospectus which was issued in April, 2013 and the offending clause in the prospectus was not challenged promptly while knowing full well that under the said clause the candidate was not eligible, but yet for reason best known to her, an application was filed and that to three days prior to the last date notified for submission of such application. There was no reason, much less justifiable reason, for not challenging the relevant clause before the filing of the application. There was no reason for the contesting Respondent to wait for any reply from the Chandigarh Administration.
Such a recalcitrant attitude displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other candidates for the year 2014-15 against whom the contesting Respondent had no axe to grind - Appeal allowed.
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2014 (9) TMI 1143
Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) - claim of bad debts under section 36(1)(vii) r.w.s.36(2) rejected - Held that:- When the issue is debatable and substantial question of law has been accepted by the Hon’ble High Court, no penalty is leviable. This issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of M/s Nayan Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. (2014 (7) TMI 1150 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) wherein it was categorically held that mere admission of appeal by the High Court is sufficient to debar the penalty levied u/s.271(1)(c) of the Act.
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2014 (9) TMI 1142
Reopening of assessment - reassessment was pursued by the Assessing Officer on the other issues for which reasons were not recorded - Held that:- Since the reassessment proceedings could not be carried on the original grounds, the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the appeal as it was not open for the Assessing Officer to expand the scope of reassessment by including some other issues. Therefore, no substantial question of law arises.
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2014 (9) TMI 1141
Additional claim for exclusion from the total income on the ground that the receipt had been disputed by the project authorities - Held that:- Before determining the tax liability of the assessee for the year under consideration both the agreements have to be taken in to consideration. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we are remitting back the matter to the file of the AO for fresh adjudication with a limited purpose of deciding the year of taxation and amount to be taxed in the respective year/years after considering the above referred two agreements. The AO is directed to decide both the issues only after hearing the assessee. With these observations, ground no.2 is allowed in favour of the AO, in part.
Prior period expenses - Held that:- We find that while deciding the issue the AO had not considered the method of accounting adopted by the assessee. It is a fact that the assessee was following completed contract method and reconginsing the revenue in a particular manner. It was showing all the expenditure in the work in progress till it got the bills from contractee in the year under appeal. The assessee had shown that both the expenditure had arisen during the year only. Considering the above, we are of the opinion that the FAA was justified in deleting addition of ₹ 90.02 lakhs.
Addition of retention money - Held that:- We find that the disputed amount has direct nexus with the agreement entered between the assessee and the Contractee, that at the time of passing the assessment order the AO the agreement was not in existence. We are of the opinion that without considering the same proper taxability of the assessee cannot be determined. Therefore, in the interest of justice matter is being restored back to the file of the AO for deciding the issue in light of the agreement dated 11.11.2009.He is directed to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee before deciding the assessment-year in which the income has to be taxed. Ground no.4 is allowed in favour of the AO, in part.
Insurance reimbursement in respect of assets destroyed in flood - Held that:- We find that the FAA had directed the AO to verify two facts about the claim made by the assessee, before taking final decision. While giving effect to the order of the FAA, the AO had allowed relief after verification. If the AO was not convinced he would have not allowed the relief to the assessee. The FAA had only indicated the principles that were to be followed for deciding the issue, but facts were to be verified by the AO. Considering these developments, we are of the opinion that the ground has become infructous and needs on adjudication.
Addition of delayed PF contribution - Held that:- It is found that the assessee had paid the disputed sums before the due date of filing of return as envisaged by the provisions of section 139(1)of the Act. Therefore, confirming the order of the FAA, we decide ground against the revenue.
Contribution to superannuation fund (SF) - allowable expenditure in the hands of the assessee - Held that:- We find that the AO had not given any reason for rejecting the claim made by the assessee except referring to the audit report. He did not call for any explanation from the assessee in this regard. The FAA while deciding the appeal has considered all the facts that were necessary to adjudicate the issue. It is a fact that assessee is an AOP and employees from HCC had joined it till the completion of the JV project. As per the service agreements contribution had to be made to SF and the assessee made payment to HCC SF. - Decided against revenue
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2014 (9) TMI 1140
Income from sale of shares - capital gain or busniss income - Held that:- There was no motive of the appellant to take advantage of concessional tax rate applicable to capital gains and also the various ratios worked out in the above manner, clearly establish that appellant was an investor and not a trader in respect of shares held by it and therefore the assessing officer was not justified in computing the income under the head business as against capital gain shown by the appellant.
Claim of deduction u/s 37(1) - CIT(A) set aside the disallowance - Held that:- We are of the view that the order passed by the CIT(A) does not call for any interference. It deserves to be noticed that it is the primary duty of an appellant to point out the errors in the order passed by the CIT(A) and merely relying upon the order passed by the AO, without bringing on record any material to contradict the findings of the CIT(A), could not serve any purpose except indicating the casual approach of the Revenue in dealing with such matters.
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2014 (9) TMI 1139
Winding up petition - Held that:- This Court unhesitatingly holds that the company is liable to pay the balance sum of ₹ 6,53,097.77p, as claimed by the petitioning creditor in the statutory notice. Since the company has failed to make payment in terms of this statutory notice, it is liable to be wound up.
The petition is, therefore, admitted for a sum of ₹ 6,53,097.77p along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum, to be calculated from the date of statutory notice till date of actual payment. If the company pays the principal amount together with interest within a period of 12(twelve) weeks from the date of communication of this order, either by way of single instalment or by means of spread over payment within the aforementioned timeframe, this winding up petition shall remain permanently stayed.
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2014 (9) TMI 1138
Exemption u/s 80 P (2)(a)(i) eligibility - assessee regarded to be a primary co-operative bank - whether the Assessee is hit by the provisions of Sec. 80P(4) which was introduced in the statute by the Finance Act, 2006 w.e.f. 1.4.2007? - Held that:-Section 80P(4) clearly excludes primary agriculture credit society from its domain. Therefore this decision will not assist the assessee. As gone through the decision of Pune Bench in the case of ITO vs Jankalyan Nagri Sahakari Pad Sanstha Ltd [2012 (9) TMI 288 - ITAT, PUNE]. This we have already stated that section 80P(2)(a)(i) nowhere talks of co-operative credit society and therefore the distinction made under the Banking Regulation Act cannot be imported u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). This decision in our opinion will not assist the assessee
Also gone through the decision of Tararani Mahila Cooperative Credit Society Ltd [2014 (3) TMI 293 - ITAT PANJI] to which the undersigned is the author similar finding as has been given in this are given in that case also. The decision of Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT vs Sri Biluru Gurubasava Pattana Sahakari Sangh Niyamitha [2015 (1) TMI 821 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] relates to an appeal filed against the order passed u/s 263 and the question involved was whether the Revisional Authority was justified in invoking his power u/s 263 without the foundational fact of the assessee being co-operative bank. Therefore, this decision is not applicable.
Thus hold that the Assessee has to be regarded to be a primary co-operative bank as all the three basic conditions are not complied with, therefore, it is a co-operative bank and the provisions of Sec. 80P(4) are applicable in the case of the Assessee and Assessee is not entitled for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i). We, therefore, confirm the order of the CIT(A) not allowing deduction to the assessee u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) on the income generated for providing banking or credit facilities to its members. - Decided against assessee.
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2014 (9) TMI 1137
Withdraw the present suit - Held that:- In view of the settlement, the plaintiff wishes to withdraw the present suit. As prayed, the same is dismissed as withdrawn. The parties shall be bound by the terms and conditions of the settlement as mentioned in the application. The application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC being I.A. filed by the plaintiff is also disposed of.
Another prayer is made in the application for refund of the Court fee paid by the plaintiff on the plaint. In view of the fact that the matter has been resolved between the parties and the plaintiff has withdrawn the suit at the initial stage, the plaintiff is entitled for refund of half of the Court fee amount under Section 16A of the Court- fees Act, 1870. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to issue requisite certificate to the plaintiff through counsel, for refund of half the amount of the Court fee from the Collector, within eight weeks from today.
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2014 (9) TMI 1136
Order of acquittal - Section 378 of NI Act - whether an acquittal order can be challenged under Section 372 Cr.P.C. or special leave is required to prefer an appeal under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C.? - Held that: - the 'complainant' in the proceedings under Section 138 N.I.Act cannot be considered 'victim' in the letter and spirit of the definition of Section 2 (wa) of the Code and definition of 'injury' under Section 44 IPC cannot be imported into Section 138 N.I.Act. In every such proceedings at first instance, every complainant considers / claims himself / herself a 'victim'. The complainants in these proceedings cannot be taken at par with those who put criminal law into motion to bring the offenders to book at whose hands, they have sustained 'injury' as defined in Section 44 IPC. The changes in Cr.P.C. were for 'victims' who were the worst sufferers in a crime and did not have much role in the Court proceedings.
The remedy available to the complainants under Section 138 N.I.Act against order of acquittal is only to seek special leave before filing an appeal under Section 378 (4) Cr.P.C. before the High Court. In the instant case, the appellant has not sought any such leave - appeals filed by the appellant are dismissed as not maintainable.
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2014 (9) TMI 1135
100% EOU - Refund claim - whether the services are taxable in India or the same are export of service outside India in terms of Service Rules, 2005 and for this reason are not taxable in India? - Held that: - Even though the services have been performed in India, the service being business auxiliary service, the same are in respect of the business of the principal located abroad - services are covered by clause (iii) of Rule 3(1) of Export Services Rules 2005.
CVD taken on inputs - Held that: - a 100% EOU need not have to pay the CVD at all - CVD taken on inputs is not eligible.
The impugned orders are set aside and the matters are remanded to the original adjudicating authority to consider the refund claims - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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