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Showing 161 to 180 of 1359 Records
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2015 (4) TMI 1203
Allowable deduction on provision for NPA(Non Performing Assets) - whether claim of the assessee did not qualify under Explanation below section 36(1)(vii) to the effect that a provision will not amount to writing off? - Held that:- As decided in Southern Technologies Ltd. Vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-Tax [2010 (1) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] Section 36(1) (viia) provides for a deduction not only in respect of "written off" bad debt but in case of banks it extends the allowance also to any Provision for bad and doubtful debts made by banks which incentive is not given to NBFCs - even in the case of banks the Provision for NPA has to be added back and only after such add back that deduction under Section 36(1) (viia) can be claimed by the banks - that neither Section 36(1)(viia) nor Section 43D violates Article 14. We further hold that the test of "intelligible differentia" stands complied with and hence we reject the challenge - Provision for possible loss are only notional for purposes of disclosure, hence, they cannot be made an excuse for claiming deduction under the IT Act, hence, "add back".
The point which we would like to make is whether such losses are contingent or actual cannot be decided only on the basis of presentation. Such presentation will not bind the authority under the Income-tax Act. Ultimately, the nature of transaction has to be examined. In each case, the authority has to examine the nature of expense/loss. Such examination and finding thereon will not depend upon presentation of expense/loss in the financial statements of the NBFC in terms of the 1998 Directions. Therefore, in our view, the RBI Directions 1998 and the Income-tax Act operate in different fields. - Decided in favour of the revenue
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2015 (4) TMI 1202
Levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - addition disallowance of additional price for purchase of sugarcane - Held that:- It has been clearly noted that increased prices was never paid to the farmers but adjusted in the share capital account. It is also noted that such increase was granted in the years of profits. If assessee really wanted to give benefit to the farmers, we fail to understand why money was not paid to the farmers. If money was to be adjusted in the share capital account then consent of farmers should have been obtained by way of general body meeting which was never done and the decision to convert to increased price was ratified only on 26.6.1995 These factors clearly shows that assessee has merely tried to evade tax by showing extra expenditure on account of enhance price for sugarcane.
No doubt the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v Reliance Petroproducts Pvt Ltd (2010 (3) TMI 80 - SUPREME COURT ) held that if a disclosure is made then it cannot be said that assessee has concealed particulars of the income.
This is not a case of mere disallowance of expenditure or disallowance of a particular deduction rather it is a case of disallowance of bogus expenditure which has been claimed just to reduce the profits earned by the assessee. Therefore, in our opinion, the Ld. CIT(A) has correctly confirmed the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act and we uphold his action. Appeal of the assessee is dismissed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1201
Transfer pricing adjustment - MAM - whether while adopting the TNMM method, the entity level margin is to be adopted or only the margin of software development activity is to be considered separately from the margins of the Bio-Division which has sustained loss? - Held that:- We are of the opinion that only international transactions with Associated enterprises have to be considered for ALP adjustment. When Bio division does not have any international transactions with AEs, profit or loss from said division should not affect ALP of the international transaction in another division. Since neither the AO nor the CIT(A) have really examined the assessee’s contention that there was no international transactions with AE’s in the Bio division but have just combined the results of both software development as well as bio division for determining the ALP of the international transaction, we deem it fit and proper to set aside the order of the AO/TPO and remand the matter back to the AO with a direction to refer the matter to the TPO for re-consideration. The AO/TPO shall examine the assessee’s contention and after verifying the details, shall recompute the ALP of the international transaction u/s 92CA of the Act. - Decided in favour of assessee for statistical purposes
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2015 (4) TMI 1200
Issues: Non-compliance with pre-deposit order, appeal before the High Court, modification applications
Non-compliance with pre-deposit order:
The judgment pertains to a case where the appellants were directed to deposit certain amounts and report compliance by a specified date. The appellants had filed applications for modification of the order, which were disposed of, granting them six weeks for compliance. However, on the subsequent date set for compliance, the appellants sought more time citing their pending appeal before the High Court. The Tribunal, having granted multiple opportunities, dismissed all appeals due to the lack of compliance and absence of any order from the High Court.
Appeal before the High Court:
The appellants had preferred an appeal before the High Court against the stay order and the dismissal of the modification applications. Despite this appeal, the Tribunal emphasized the importance of compliance with its orders and granted additional time for the appellants to either report compliance or provide a copy of the High Court's order. The Tribunal's decision was based on the absence of compliance and the non-receipt of any order from the High Court.
Modification applications:
The appellants had initially filed modification applications seeking changes to the deposit order. These applications were heard and disposed of, with the Tribunal granting a specific period for compliance. However, the subsequent request for more time based on the pending appeal before the High Court was not considered sufficient, leading to the dismissal of all appeals for non-compliance. The Tribunal's decision was clear and based on the lack of adherence to its directives despite prior opportunities granted to the appellants.
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2015 (4) TMI 1199
Deemed dividend received - dividend received from the companies having accumulated profits in which the assessee himself is a Director and has got substantial or beneficial interest - Held that:- The undisputed fact in this case is that the assessee has received loans from all the four companies on interest and therefore in view of the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Pradip Kumar Mahlhotra (2011 (8) TMI 16 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT) the said loan cannot be treated as deemed dividend. - Decided in favour of assessee
Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) - though the assessee received Form No.15G for non deduction of tax the said form was not submitted to the C.I.T. - Held that:- On identical issue in the case of S.S.Impex (2011 (9) TMI 927 - ITAT KOLKATA), Capital Transport Corpn (2011 (8) TMI 1068 - ITAT KOLKATA) the ITAT Kolkata Benches have held that if the assesse has received form No.15G the same has not been submitted to the appropriate authorities, no disallowance can be made u/s 40(a)(ia) of the Act. In the present case also the issue lies on the same point that Form No.15G for non deduction of tax at source has been received by the assesse but the same was not submitted before the appropriate authority i.e. CIT. Accordingly following the decision of the ITAT, Kolkata Benches (supra) no disallowance can be made u/s 40(a)(ia) of the Act. - Decided in favour of assessee
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2015 (4) TMI 1198
Whether the learned Commissioner (Appeals) have rightly confirmed the Order-in-Original wherein Toyota Alphard vehicle imported vide Bill of Lading dated 01/08/2008, having invoice value of ₹ 6,82,560/- was confiscated under Section 111 (d) of the Customs Act, 1962, absolutely and further penalty was imposed on the appellant - M/s Zubair Ahmed ₹ 50,000/under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 along with penalty of ₹ 50,000, on one, Shri Rehman Shaikh also under Section 112(a) the Customs Act, 1962?
Held that: - the appellant-Shri Jubair Ahmed was only a name lender for monetary consideration. He was the employee of the said Shri Rehman Shaikh. Under the facts and circumstances that the appellant was a person of small means having monthly income of about ₹ 20,000/ only, and evidently all steps for import, etc. were taken by the said Shri Rehman Shaikh. The said Shri Rehman Shaikh is held to be the actual importer. Further, it is evident from the finding of the courts below that the said Shri Rehman Shaikh has resorted to mis-declaration by importing a used vehicle in the guise of a new vehicle. Accordingly, in view of the violation of the provisions of Section 7 of Foreign Trade Development Regulations Act, 1992 read with Rule 2(c), & 12 of Foreign Trade (Regulations) Rules, 1993 and Para 2.12 of the Foreign Trade Policy and also taken notice of the contumacious fraud committed by the said Shri Rehman Shaikh by importing a prohibited vehicle (second hand vehicle and/or used vehicle), the absolute confiscation of the vehicle in question is upheld. - Since the importer have been made in contravention of the import value policy and licensing note, the impugned vehicle clearly falls within the category of prohibited goods as defined under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, 1962 and as such was liable to confiscation under Section 111 (d) of the Customs Act, 1962 and liable to be absolutely confiscated under the provisions of Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2015 (4) TMI 1197
Violation of the provisions of SICA - seeking to take possession of the immovable properties of the petitioner company pursuant to the notice issued under the provisions of SICA Act - Held that:- The present Writ petition is, barred by the principles of res-judicata and is liable to be dismissed on this short ground.
The present Writ Petition has been filed only to drag on proceedings, again prevent the respondent-bank from taking possession of their immoveable properties, and in realising even a part of the mounting debt by putting the secured assets to sale. The present Writ Petition is clearly an abuse of process of Court, and is liable to be dismissed as such.
Though the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the aforesaid two grounds, we shall examine the contentions urged by Sri C.B.Rammohan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the scope of the relevant provisions of SICA and the SARFAESI Act, as these issues would frequently arise.
As the SARFAESI Act came into force on 21.06.2002 the starting point for the third proviso, to Section 15(1) of SICA, to be attracted is on or after 21.06.2002. If proceedings were pending before the BIFR on 21.06.2002, and on the conditions stipulated in the third proviso being satisfied, the reference stood abated. As the petitioners made a reference to the BIFR, under Section 15(1) of SICA, by their application dated 10.10.2013, the question of pendency of a reference before the BIFR, on or after the commencement of the SARFAESI Act, does not arise and the third proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA has no application.
The SARFAESI Act is concerned mainly with the recovery of the debt, by banks and financial institutions, without recourse to any court or tribunal. It permits securitisation of the debt and aims at minimising non-performing assets. The SICA, a pre -existing legislation, provides for timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings and the speedy determination by the BIFR of remedial and ameliorative measures, and enforcement of such measures. The different purposes of the two Acts must be kept in mind while examining the inter -play between the provisions of the two and eschew, if permissible, a readiness to hold that their provisions overlap or tread over each other
While interpreting a provision containing a non-obstante clause it should first be ascertained what the enacting part of the Section provides, on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non-obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in any other law which is inconsistent with the Section containing the non-obstante clause.
While Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act gives over-riding effect of that Act over other laws which are inconsistent therewith, the second and third provisos, which were inserted into the SICA in the year 2002, by the SARFAESI Act itself, cannot be construed as being inconsistent with the SARFAESI Act.
On a reading of Sections 35 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act together it is clear that, in the event of any of the provisions of the SICA not being inconsistent with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the application of both the Acts, namely, the SARFAESI Act and the SICA would complement each other. Since, however, the second proviso, divesting the jurisdiction of the BIFR, has been incorporated in Section 15(1) of SICA itself, in view of Section 41 of the SARFAESI Act and the Schedule thereto, a harmonious construction of the provisions of SICA and the SARFEASI Act, especially where the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA is attracted, does not arise.
From the proceedings of the BIFR dated 21.01.2014, it is evident that the assets of the petitioner, mortgaged to Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. and Axis Bank Ltd were acquired from them by IARC (a securitisation company). The requirement of Section 5(1) of the SARFAESI Act was, therefore, satisfied. Consequently the second proviso to Section 15(1) was attracted, and the petitioner was prohibited from making a reference to the BIFR by their letter dated 10.10.2013, more than a decade after the SARFAESI Act, 2002 came into force on 21.06.2002. The pre-condition for the BIFR to cause an enquiry under Section 16 is, a reference made to it, by the board of directors of a sick industrial company, under Section 15(1) of SICA and its first proviso. As no reference could have been made by the petitioner to the BIFR, in view of the embargo placed on it by the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA, the non-obstante clause under Section 22(1) of SICA has no application, and neither the securitisation company nor the first respondent-bank, are obligated to obtain the consent of BIFR to realise the security in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder.
It is no function of the Court to add words to the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA on the premise that it would, otherwise, defeat the objects of SICA. Hardship if any, which may possibly result, is for the legislative branch of the State to consider.
In view of the bar under the second proviso to Section 15(1) of SICA, the very reference to the BIFR is without jurisdiction, and consequently the subsequent act of registration of the reference as Case No.89 of 2013, or commencement of the enquiry under Section 16(1) of SICA or for that matter remedial measures being taken under Section 17 to 19 of SICA, by the BIFR are also without jurisdiction and a nullity. Once the jurisdiction of the BIFR has been divested by the mandatory impact of the second proviso to Section 15(1), the BIFR cannot pass any orders under SICA.
As the invalidity of proceedings before a Court/Tribunal, which suffer from inherent lack of jurisdiction, can be set up even in collateral proceedings it would suffice for this Court to declare the reference made by the petitioner to the BIFR, by their letter dated 10.10.2013, and registration of the reference as Case No.89 of 2013, as a nullity. As these proceedings are void, it is enough for the Court to declare it so, and it collapses automatically. Viewed from any angle, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for. The Writ Petition must be, and is accordingly, dismissed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1196
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - deduction under section 80IB(10) disallowed - Held that:- The search took place in the instant case on 11th February, 2009 but the return came to be finalized prior to 11th February, 2009. However, the assessee may not have questioned the orders in Quantum Proceedings by filing any appeal, yet, the Tribunal found that the original return of income was filed on 31st October, 2005. That was accepted by the Assessing Officer. The search took place on 11th February, 2009 and the deduction under section 80IB(10) was disallowed by the Assessing Officer on grounds not germane to section 271(1)(c). Meaning thereby, there was no material found during search based on which the disallowance was made. The disallowance was on account of non-furnishing of audit report under section 10 CCB and non-furnishing of certain details as called for by the Assessing Officer. In these circumstances, the penalty as imposed cannot be sustained. We do not find such reasoning to be perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (4) TMI 1195
Addition on account of interest received - addition on basis of AIR information - Held that:- Addition in this case has been made solely on the basis of AIR information and without any corroborative evidence regarding the receipt of any interest by the assessee from the said M/s. Essar Oil Ltd. The assessee has specifically denied the receipt of such an interest income. The Revenue has not made any enquires to find out whether the AIR information was correct or not. It has been held time and again by this Tribunal that the additions made solely on the basis of AIR information are not sustainable in the eyes of law. If the assessee denies that it is in receipt of income from a particular source, it is for the AO to prove that the assessee has received income as the assessee cannot prove the negative.
As Representatives of both the parties have agreed before us that the issue be restored to the file of the AO for consideration afresh in this respect, we accordingly restore it. Appeal of the assessee allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (4) TMI 1194
Penalty u/s 272A(2)(c) - reasonable cause for the delay on the part of the assessee to furnish the required information in response to the notices issued u/s 133(6) - intentional or willful delays - Held that:- The assessee has submitted that the sufficient cause pleaded by the assessee before the Ld. CIT(A) for the delay resulted in furnishing the required information in response to the notice issued under section 133(6) is supported by the correspondence and e-mails exchanged between the two assessee's which are the branches of the State Bank of India with their Head Office/Regional Office.
As contended that proper and sufficient opportunity however was not given to the assessee's either by the A.O. or by the Ld. CIT(A) to produce the said evidence and urged that one more opportunity may therefore, be given to the assessee's to support and substantiate its case of sufficient cause pleaded before the Ld. CIT(A) by producing the relevant evidence. Since the learned D.R. has also not raised any serious objection in this regard, we restore the matter to the file of the A.O. for the limited purpose of giving one more opportunity to the assessee to support and substantiate their case of sufficient case for the delay as pleaded before the Ld. CIT(A) by producing the relevant documentary evidence in the form of correspondence and e-mails exchanged with their Head Office/Regional Office. Appeals of the assessee are treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (4) TMI 1192
Arbitration and Conciliation proceedings - bye-law providing a liberty to the broker to close out the transactions by selling the securities, in case the clients failed to make the full payment to the broker for the execution of the contract - Held that:- Whole purpose of such bye-laws in the Multi Commodity Exchange of India Ltd. is to provide safeguard that there is mitigation of loss and thus it makes mandatory for the broker to square off the transactions immediately upon there being a shortfall which according to the broker had not been paid by the constituent inspite of demand. If the petitioner would have squared off the open position when there was shortfall of margin money prior to 30th March, 2013, the petitioner would not have faced the volatility in the market on 30th March, 2013. In view thereof since the petitioner had not carried out their obligation by squaring up the transactions when there was a shortfall in the margin money and which according to the petitioner was not paid by the respondent though demanded, the petitioner cannot be allowed to make any claim against the respondent constituent for such unauthorised transactions carried out by the petitioner in the account of the respondent.
Considering the said bye-law which provided a liberty to the broker to close out the transactions by selling the securities, in case the clients failed to make the full payment to the broker for the execution of the contract, this court held that the said provision was not mandatory but was discretionary. In view thereof the said byelaw considered by this court and bye-laws which are the subject matter of this petition are totally different. Under bye-laws 8.6.5 to 8.6.6 of the Multi Commodity Exchange, the broker is under an obligation to liquidate/close out any of the position of the constituent if the constituent default in paying the daily margin. Those bye-laws have been interpreted by this court at length in the judgment delivered by this court in case of M/s.BMA Commodities Pvt. Ltd. (2014 (12) TMI 1291 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT) which squarely applies to the facts of this case. The findings rendered by the learned arbitrator are also based on the interpretation of the agreement entered into between the parties which interpretation is a possible interpretation and thus cannot be substituted by another interpretation under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Arbitration Petition dismissed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1191
Condonation of delay - maintainability of review petition - whether calculated from the date when the defendant became aware of the judgment? - Held that:- Be that as it may, anybody pursuing a litigation ought to be aware of the proceedings pending before the Court. It is incumbent upon them to follow it up with their lawyer.
At this stage, Mr. J.S. Bakshi, the learned counsel for the plaintiff states that an appeal was preferred by the defendant/review petitioner vide diary No.14538/12 which was returned under objections. Accordingly, the submission that the defendant became aware of the judgment and the decree in this suit only in August, 2014 is clearly belied.
The review petition suffers from a huge delay. It is not supported by an application for condonation of delay. Hence it is not maintainable. It is accordingly, dismissed as being barred by limitation.
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2015 (4) TMI 1189
Act of oppression and mismanagement - Existence of questions of law - prohibitory and mandatory injunction seeked - Held that:- The questions that have been raised before this court are not purely questions of law, but are only mixed questions of law and fact, which cannot be entertained by this court. Even though, as per the judgement relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, a perverse finding or non-consideration of relevant documents can amount to question of law, this court is of view that there is no perversity in the impugned order of the Company Law Board and therefore, the appeals are not maintainable. The interim relief as sought in this case are in the nature of prohibitory and mandatory injunction for which the Petitioners must satisfy the mandatory tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. This court feels that the 7th respondent cannot be permitted to continue as a director after he has failed in his endeavour to be re-appointed by virtue of an interim order. Any subsequent act(s) of mismanagement would give rise to a fresh cause of action to the petitioners. Hence, the loss if any cannot be held to be irreparable. The Company Law Board has considered the pleadings and the documents and considering the nature of claims, refused to grant interim orders by giving specific findings.
Whether the proceedings held on Annual General meeting on 26.09.2014 is as per law and the implication of the same with regard to allegations of oppression and mismanagement and whether the acts complained constitute independent acts of oppression and mismanagement or not will be determined by the Company Law Board. The Respondents have already filed their counter. Therefore, in the facts and circumstance of the case, the Company Law Board is directed to dispose of the CP.No.62/14 within three months on day to day basis. With the above directions, these Company Appeals are dismissed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1188
Presence of appellant in the office of Senior Intelligence Officer, Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence, Indore - Held that: - learned counsel for the appellant, on instructions given by the appellant, states that he will appear before the Senior Intelligence Officer on 20-4-2015 at 11.00 AM. Under the circumstances, it is not necessary to proceed with the first charge.
Submission of false evidence before Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence, Indore - Held that: - we have gone through the letter dated 29-12-2009 and find that it does not contain any statement which can prima facie be said to be false. All that it states is that the appellant was not looking after the day-to-day affairs of the company relating to duty drawback. These are looked after by Mr. P.K. Vyas, Executive Director of the Company and if any statement is required to be made in this regard, Mr. P.K. Vyas may be summoned and his statement will be equally binding on the Company. Having gone through this letter, we do not find any reason which can even remotely suggest that the second charge can be substantiated.
Appeal allowed - appellant are directed to be present before the concerned Senior Intelligence Officer on 20-4-2015 at 11.00 AM.
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2015 (4) TMI 1187
CENVAT Credit - entitlement of duty drawback - audit team noted that the petitioner had wrongly availed of CENVAT credit of the Excise duty, contrary to Rule 3(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, as the goods were temporarily imported capital goods, meant to be re-exported - Claim of drawback claim was rejected on the ground of period of limitation - the decision in the case of M/s. Vishal Beverages Pvt. Ltd. Versus Union of India And Another [2014 (8) TMI 255 - DELHI HIGH COURT] contested, where it was held that The petitioner cannot be allowed a drawback on the Excise duty as that would tantamount to allowing it to profit from its unjustly derived benefit of the CENVAT credit till May 2012 - Held that: - the decision in the above case upheld - appeal dismissed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1186
Oppression and mismanagement - conduct of EOGM - winding up petition - Held that:- The said transfer of shares in favour of the Respondent Nos. 5 to 12 being contrary to the AOA of the Company is illegal and against the provisions of the Company law and therefore, the impugned transfer of shares In favour of Respondent Nos. 5 to 12 is liable to be cancelled.
As regards mismanagement in the affairs of the company, have also examined the allegation made by the Petitioner. To certain extent they are proved. The Respondents admittedly have not Issued the notices of the meetings to the Petitioner as required in law. They have failed to make compliances as required in law within the statutory period. It is also proved that they have fabricated the documents. They have also denied Inspection of the documents to the Petitioner for no valid reason, although, he was a shareholder and a Director. Therefore, of the view that these acts amounts to mismanagement in the affairs of the Company as defined in section 398 of the Act. All these instances amount to mismanagement in the affairs of the Company.
It is a well established law that to maintain a petition under Section 397/398 of the Act, it must be established that the oppression complained of affected a person in his capacity or character as a member of the company as harsh and unfair treatment in any other capacity, such as a director or a creditor, is outside the purview of the said section; (b) there must be continuous acts constituting oppression up to the date of the petition; (c) the events have to be considered not in isolation, but as part of a continuous story; (d) it must be shown as a preliminary to the application of Section 397 that there are just and equitable grounds for winding up the company; (e) the conduct complained of can be said to be oppression only if it can be said that it is burdensome, harsh and wrongful and the oppression involves at least elements of lack of probity and fair dealing to a member in matters of proprietary right as a shareholder.
Therefore, having regard to the facts of the case in hand, the necessary ingredients of the provision contained in Section 397 which provides that: "to wind up the company would unfairly prejudice such member or members, but that otherwise the facts would justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company should be wound up; also stands proved.
A careful analysis of Section 397 would show that the winding up on just and equitable grounds would be automatic and this Board has to only form an opinion that such winding up would not be in the interests of the Company/shareholders and, accordingly, to mould relief with a view to put an end to the matters complained of.
On a overall analysis of the facts of the case discussed hereinabove, in my opinion the Petitioner has succeeded to prove that the acts of the Respondents is burdensome, harsh and wrongful and lacks in probity and fair deal to the Petitioner. The effect of acts complained of is continuous in nature, the petition therefore deserves to be allowed.
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2015 (4) TMI 1185
Smuggling - Gold - it is alleged that the accused were in one way or the other involved in bringing illegally foreign make gold, kept it in their custody, aided in transportation of the same and thus, helped each other willingly - Held that: - There are no evidences against accused - Babu Madhu Tandel. Despite the fact that the authorities came to know that Babu Madhu Tandel was involved, no statement qua him was taken. The learned Judge therefore, has rightly acquitted the accused - Babu Madhu Tandel and it cannot be said that there was any conspiracy under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. There is no conspiracy and therefore, on the touchstone of the decisions of the Apex Court, the learned Judge has rightly not believed that offences under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code were committed. Hence, Criminal Appeal No. 767/1993 stands dismissed.
From the Boat which was detained, it cannot be said that Babu Madhu Tandel was in the deep seas but in fact, it was in the jetty. Thus, the learned Judge had held against the appellant. I do not find that on the touchstone of the decisions of the Apex Court, this Court can interfere with the well-reasoned judgment and order of the Trial Court.
Appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.
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2015 (4) TMI 1184
In this situation, admit on the following substantial questions of law :
“1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble ITAT erred in law by upholding the order of the CIT(A) deleting the penalty of ₹ 48,00,000/levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?
2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble Tribunal erred in law by considering extraneous factors as basis for surrender of income of ₹ 1,40,00,000/disregarding the fact that unaccounted closing stock of ₹ 1,40,00,000/was found during survey?”
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2015 (4) TMI 1183
Oppression and mismanagement - Held that:- Both the groups cannot jointly participate in the management of the Company. It is further evident that the two groups of shareholders, lack confidence and mutual trust in each other. It is also clear that the two groups cannot run the management of the Company together and the Company cannot function smoothly by these two rival groups, if they continue to hold shares. It would be, therefore, in the fitness of things and just and proper that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 who are admittedly majority shareholders and in control of the affairs of the Company be directed to buyout the shares held by the Petitioners in the Company at a fair price to be determined by an Independent Valuer. This point is answered accordingly.
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2015 (4) TMI 1182
Agricultural income u/s.2(1A)(b)(i) - exclusion of said income u/s.10(1) - Held that:- Appeal raises a substantial question of law, it is admitted on the following substantial question of law:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the ITAT was correct in directing the Assessing Officer to treat assessee's income as agricultural income u/s.2(1A)(b)(i) of the IT Act and to exclude said income u/s.10(1) of the IT Act?”
The Registrar (Judicial)/Registrar, High Court, Original Side, Bombay to ensure that the original record in relation to this Appeal is summoned from the Tribunal and offered for inspection of the parties. This paperbook is treated sufficient for the purpose of admission of this Appeal.
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9911796707
