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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 781 Records
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2007 (8) TMI 666 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Non maintenance of books of accounts - Held that:- Admittedly, the applicant has not maintained the manufacturing account in accordance with section 12(2) of the Act. Merely because in the previous years for non-maintenance of manufacturing account, books of account has been accepted the claim of the applicant for acceptance of the books of account cannot be accepted in the years under consideration. Revision dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 665 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Eligibility certificate denied - Held that:- It is now well-settled that where initially the unit was established over land which was taken on lease on the basis of unregistered document but subsequently rectified by a registered lease deed making it effective from earlier date, eligibility would not be denied nor could it be reduced and made effective from the date of the registered deed. The dealer would be entitled to exemption under section 4A of the Act from the date of the first sale or otherwise as the case may be. Reliance has been placed on the various decisions of this court.
In this view of the matter the order of the Tribunal is set aside as also the decision of the Divisional Level Committee granting partial eligibility to the dealer. The Divisional Level Committee may issue revised eligibility certificate or amend the same as the case may be for the entire period admissible to the dealer with effect from the date of the first sale.
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2007 (8) TMI 664 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Whether the view taken by the Tribunal was too technical in rejecting the delay condonation application rather than having exercised its discretion in affording hearing on merits instead of shutting it out on technicalities?
Held that:- Present case relates to imposition of tax. If the dealer is permitted to file second appeal and it is heard on merits, it may succeed and may not be liable to pay tax. Such an opportunity should be given to a party who may be entitled to establish that it was not liable to pay any tax. Liability of unlawful tax is not comprehended in law.
Thus it will be just and proper that the second appeal of the dealer may be decided on merits. The impugned order of the Tribunal rejecting the delay condonation application is set aside. The delay in filing the second appeal is condoned. The Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal on merit
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2007 (8) TMI 663 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fficer for a fresh assessment. Against the order of remand the dealer preferred a second appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal relying upon the decision of this court in the case of Mahabir Prasad Jagdish Prasad v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in 1971 27 STC 337 1971 NTC 337 and in the case of Laxmi Oil Mill, Varanasi v. Commissioner of Sales Tax reported in 1972 UPTC 363 held that the high consumption of electricity alone cannot be a ground for reopening of assessment. The assessing officer must have positive material on record to come to the conclusion that there has been escapement of turnover which alone could justify the proceedings under section 21 of the Act. On mere conjecture that there has been high consumption of electricity reopening of assessment cannot be justified. I do not find any reason to differ with the aforesaid two decisions of this court. The revision lacks merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 662 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s been well considered by the honourable Supreme Court in the case of K. Raheja Development Corporation 2005 141 STC 298. The question as to whether that judgment as per article 141 of the Constitution of India is the law of the land binding on all the courts in the country. Prima facie, we find that the facts and circumstances in that case are almost similar to the present case and as such, the ratio laid down in K. Raheja 39 s case 2005 141 STC 298 and relied upon by the learned single judge is, in our view, just and proper. So far as the other pronouncements are concerned, if the appellant feels that it is necessary to get the pronouncement in K. Raheja 39 s case 2005 141 STC 298 reviewed, it is open for him to approach the apex court and this court cannot substitute its own findings on the questions since the same has already been decided by the apex court in K. Raheja 39 s case 2005 141 STC 298. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the case and the same is rejected.
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2007 (8) TMI 661 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... may, pending enquiry or investigation into the matter by it or by such authority as the Commissioner may authorise or direct, issue such number of waybill forms to the registered dealer as may, in its opinion, satisfy the immediate requirement of such dealer . It, thus, appears that satisfaction of immediate requirement of the applicant is of prime importance so that it can carry on its normal business. Considering, therefore, the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping the spirit of rule 110 in our mind, we dispose of this application by directing the ACST/JB to issue 20 way-bills to the petitioners on submission of an application for way-bills and on furnishing a statement disclosing the names, as far as possible, of the dealers with whom purchase orders have been placed. The application for way-bills, if filed by the petitioner, should be disposed of within 48 hours from the date of submission of the application. R.K. DUTTA CHAUDJURI (Judicial Member). - I agree.
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2007 (8) TMI 660 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Benefit of exemption from tax - Held that:- It is clear from annexure 2 that the District Level Screening Committee has very specifically mentioned in the exemption certificate that the petitioner was entitled to exemption from the tax liability up to the extent of 75 per cent, therefore, the notices issued by respondent No. 5 are just against the exemption certificate. Accordingly this writ petition is allowed and the notice dated May 31, 2005 (annexure 8) as well as notice dated June 7, 2005 (annexure 9) issued by the Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Sriganganagar are set aside. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 659 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Input tax credit on the goods purchased from outside the State - Held that:- The contention of the petitioner cannot be countenanced in law in view of the specific provision under section 19(5)(b) of the Act. Rule 10(3)(b)(i) refers to the purchase of goods other than capital goods, which have been effected on the first seller in the State and therefore, rule has to be read as a whole and 10(3)(b)(iv) cannot be read in isolation. The object of the enactment is if a dealer purchases goods within the State of Tamil Nadu and pays tax to another registered dealer, then he is entitled to take the input credit of the tax paid or payable under this Act and not intended to permit the dealer to avail input credit in respect of tax on the goods brought into the State by purchase effected from outside the State.
Thus the petitioner is not entitled to avail input tax credit on the goods purchased from outside the State. No infirmity or illegality in the assessment order of the respondent and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. However, it is open to the petitioner to make an application seeking refund of excess payment or adjustment of the tax paid under section 19(17) and (18) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006, to the authorities and on receipt of such application, the competent authority shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law.
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2007 (8) TMI 658 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Input tax credit on Low Sulphur Heavy Stock (LSHS) and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) - whether LSHS and LPG are the products falling under section 13(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 read with rule 20(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005?
Held that:- We have been told that LSHS and LPG are obtained from refineries at the last stages of fractional desalination and is therefore called residual petroleum product also. If all the petroleum products were sought to be included in Schedule VI then, in our view, there was no need to have four items. Only one item would suffice to say all petroleum products. Therefore, we are satisfied that the impugned order of the assessing authority cannot be sustained, as LSHS and LPG are not covered by Schedule VI of the Act. W.P. allowed.
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2007 (8) TMI 657 - CESTAT MUMBAI
CENVAT credit - duty paying invoices - denial on the ground that the appellant had availed Cenvat Credit on the invoices issued by one M/s J and J Precision Industries have cleared the final products on payment of duty, by availing irregular and illegible Cenvat Credit on the inputs received by them
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2007 (8) TMI 656 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Whether the State has the power to levy taxes on declared goods at a rate higher than three per cent, when there is deemed sale of such goods in the course of execution of works contract?
Whether the goods, which are declared to be goods of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce and known as declared goods are, even if used in the execution of works contract, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed on the legislative power of the State by section 15 of the Act of 1956, so far as, at least, the rate of tax is concerned?
Held that:- While the State, under the Scheme of the Assam VAT Act, 2003, is competent to levy sales tax on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract at 12.5 per cent, such transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract will not exceed three per cent if the goods involved in the execution of works contract are declared goods. Thus, the impugned order, dated April 10, 2007 which holds that the tax is imposable at 12.5 per cent on both declared as well as undeclared goods is wholly without jurisdiction and not supported even by the scheme of the Act under consideration.
In the result and for the reasons discussed above, these two writ petitions succeed. The impugned order, dated April 10, 2007, is hereby set aside and quashed and it is held that the Assam VAT Act, 2003, does not permit the respondents/authorities concerned to impose tax at 12.5 per cent on transfer of such goods, which have been declared as goods of special importance under section 14 of the Act of 1956, and that on such declared goods, rate of tax cannot exceed three per cent (as amended); whereas transfer of property in goods, which are not declared goods involved in the execution of works contract, would be subject to usual rate of tax of 12.5 per cent.
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2007 (8) TMI 655 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Violation of section 21 of the Punjab VAT Act - Held that:- Multiple taxation as claimed by the respondents would result in hampering the free movement of goods between the States as provided by article 301 of the Constitution and therefore would be prejudicial to freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India, and for the unity and integrity of the country. Therefore, we find that the petitioner has not violated section 21 of the Punjab VAT Act as has been claimed by the respondents.
For the reasons stated above, this petition succeeds. The notice dated day 2, 2007 (annexure P4) is quashed and respondents are saddled with costs of ₹ 10,000 which initially shall be paid by the respondent-State to the petitioner. In view of the fact that the Excise and Taxation Officer, respondent No. 2, is not impleaded in person we direct the respondentState to hold an enquiry and the costs of ₹ 10,000 be recovered personally from the officer who may be found guilty for having committed the lapse of detaining the goods.
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2007 (8) TMI 654 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 007). A reading of section 88(2) together with rule 4(8) shows that a time-limit for submitting an application was fixed not under the statute, but under the subordinate legislation. Neither the Act nor the subordinate legislation prescribed the consequences of the failure of a registered dealer to apply within the time-limit prescribed. If that be so, the first respondent ought not to have issued the impugned order cancelling the registration even if the petitioner had not filed an application on January 18, 2007. Under such circumstances, this writ petition deserves to be allowed. Therefore, it is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the petitioner is directed to submit an application within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Upon the petitioner submitting such an application, the first respondent shall apply the provisions of section 88(2) of the Act and pass appropriate orders. Consequently, connected M.Ps are closed. No costs.
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2007 (8) TMI 653 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n made by the respondents in their return, we hold that the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 53 of the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002 will not apply to appeals made under section 53(2)(i) of the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002 against the orders of the Appellate Board under the Repealed Act of 1994. Since we have held that sub-section (5) of section 53 of the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002 does not apply to appeals filed against the orders of the Appellate Board under the Repealed Act of 1994, there will be no discrimination between dealers who have approached the courts in reference under the Repealed Act prior to coming into force the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002 with effect from April 1, 2006 and dealers who approach this court in an appeal under section 53(2) of the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002 against the orders of the Appellate Board under the Repealed Act, 1994 after coming into force the Madhya Pradesh VAT Act, 2002. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.
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2007 (8) TMI 652 - SUPREME COURT
High Court appointed an arbitrator on a petition filed by the respondent under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Held that:- The order of appointment of Dr. Gita Rawat by the appellant as a sole arbitrator dated 15.5.2006 was passed without jurisdiction. Once Section 11(6) petition is filed by one party seeking appointment of an arbitrator, the other party cannot resurrect the clause of the agreement dealing with the appointment of the arbitrator, in this case Clause 24 of the agreement.Appeal dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 651 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the pawnee, the pawnbroker, on sale could be considered to be a dealer, liable to pay sales tax under the Sales Tax Act?
Held that:- Going by the principles governing the matter, propounded by this Court there cannot be any doubt that the rights of the appellant-bank over the pawned sugar had precedence over the claims of the Cane Commissioner and that of the workmen. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing an interim order to pay parts of the proceeds to the Cane Commissioner and to the Labour Commissioner for disbursal to the cane growers and to the employees.
There is no dispute that the sugar was pledged with the appellant bank for securing a loan of the first respondent and the loan had not been repaid. The goods were forcibly taken possession of at the instance of the revenue recovery authority from the custody of the pawnee, the appellant-bank. In view of the fact that the goods were validly pawned to the appellant bank, the rights of the appellant-bank as pawnee cannot be affected by the orders of the Cane Commissioner or the demands made by him or the demands made on behalf of the workmen. Both the Cane Commissioner and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods.
The High Court ought not to have passed such an interim order of consequence especially in the light of the legal principles settled by this Court. The order of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained and calls for interference. Appeal allowed.
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2007 (8) TMI 650 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it is permissible to strike down an Ordinance which has the same force and effect or an Act of Parliament or an Act of State Legislature on the ground of non-application of mind or malafides or that the prevailing circumstances did not warrant the issue of an Ordinance held that validity of an Ordinance cannot be decided on grounds similar to those on which an executive or judicial action is decided?
Held that:- The court cannot usurp the functions assigned to the legislative bodies under the Constitution and even indirectly require the legislature to exercise its power of law making in particular manner. The court cannot assume to itself a supervisory role for the law making power of the legislature under the provisions of the Constitution. The High Court must ensure that while exercising its jurisdiction which is supervisory in nature it should not over step the well recognized bounds of its own jurisdiction.
The High Court’s directions to make the law in a particular manner are clearly unsustainable. Appeals preferred by the State as well as Municipal Committee, Patiala should be allowed.
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2007 (8) TMI 649 - SC ORDER
Duty demand - exemption under Notificatio No. 2/95-CE - Supreme Court held that the matter is squarely covered by the decision of Virlon Textile Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai [2007 (4) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA].
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2007 (8) TMI 648 - SUPREME COURT
Whether we should interfere with the decision of the High Court holding that the amount awarded by the Awarding Officer itself is more than adequate compensation?
Held that:- On a scrutiny of the relevant materials in the light of the arguments raised that it cannot be said that the High Court has either made an erroneous approach to the claim for enhancement of compensation or that it has so erred as to warrant our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, in an appeal against the award of compensation by the High Court, this Court interferes only if there has been a misapplication of any principle of assessing compensation. In the case before us regarding the lands in Sonakpur, we are not satisfied that any error in principle has been committed by the High Court justifying our interference.
After all, assessment of compensation for lands acquired involves an amount of guess work, no doubt, based on the evidence available regarding comparable sale of lands in the locality and so on. Viewed from that angle, we are in agreement with the finding that the Awarding Officer has been generous in his award of compensation in all these cases. Appeal dismissed.
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2007 (8) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT
Whether State Council of Education, Research and Training is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India ?
Held that:- A court cannot issue a direction which would tend to frustrate the very object with which a society like SCERT is formed or a body like SCERT is created. After all, there may be a point of time in a welfare State where the right of the employees must be subservient to the right of the society. In the matter of education, surely, the interests of the society at large should prevail and issue of any direction that may endanger such interests must be done with extreme caution and only after careful deliberation.
SCERT is not a State or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and normally not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we do not find it necessary to pursue further, these other aspects. Suffice it to say, that the direction issued by the High Court cannot be sustained. Appeals are allowed and the directions issued by the High Court are set aside
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