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Showing 181 to 200 of 272 Records
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1993 (7) TMI 92
The High Court of Bombay quashed a show cause notice issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs challenging the legality of importing Polyester Filament Yarn. The court found that the notice was issued under misconception as the industrial license allowed such imports. The petition was successful, and the bond was discharged with no costs. (Case citation: 1993 (7) TMI 92 - High Court of Bombay)
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1993 (7) TMI 91
The High Court of Judicature at Madras set aside the proceedings in the writ petitions and allowed the respondents to issue fresh orders based on a clarification from the Central Board of Excise and Customs. The petitioner in W.P. 882 of 1990 will be entitled to any relief from the Appellate Authority in addition to the relief granted under the Order. Both writ petitions were ordered accordingly with no costs. (1993 (7) TMI 91)
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1993 (7) TMI 90
The High Court of Bombay ruled in favor of the petitioners who held an import license revalidated for the policy period April 1983 to March 1984. Customs Authorities queried the import but took no further action. The court admitted the petition, allowing the consignment to be cleared with a bank guarantee. The court held that the petitioners were entitled to relief without expressing an opinion on the merits. The rule was made absolute, discharging the bank guarantee and bond with no costs awarded.
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1993 (7) TMI 89
Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the redemption fine imposed by the Additional Collector of Customs.
2. Proper exercise of powers u/s 129D of the Customs Act, 1962 by the Collector of Customs.
3. Requirement of a hearing before exercising powers u/s 129D.
4. Correct date for determining the market price for quantifying redemption fine.
Summary:
1. Legality of the Redemption Fine:
The Additional Collector of Customs imposed a redemption fine of Rs. 8,00,000/- for each of the five bills of entry and a penalty of Rs. 80,000/- on each consignment without providing any calculation method. The court found that the Additional Collector failed to consider the market price on the date of importation, which is crucial for assessing the assessable value and quantifying the redemption fine. The court emphasized that the redemption fine should mop up the profit to the maximum extent possible, taking into account all relevant factors, which was not done in this case.
2. Exercise of Powers u/s 129D:
The Collector of Customs exercised his power u/s 129D(2) to file an application to the Collector (Appeals) for enhancing the redemption fine. The court noted that the Collector's action was based on the market price prevailing on the date of adjudication, which is incorrect. The correct date for determining the market price is the date of importation. Consequently, the order dated 18th June 1993 by the Collector for filing an application before the Collector (Appeals) was set aside.
3. Requirement of a Hearing:
The court held that before exercising powers u/s 129D, a notice of hearing must be given to the concerned party. This ensures that the party has an opportunity to present their case. The court found that a draft notice was prepared but not sent to the importer, which is a procedural lapse.
4. Correct Date for Market Price Determination:
The court clarified that the date of importation is the crucial date for assessing the assessable value and quantifying the redemption fine. The Additional Collector erred by considering the market price on the date of adjudication instead of the date of importation.
Order:
The court set aside the order dated 15th June 1993 by the Additional Collector and the subsequent action taken by the Collector u/s 129D(2). The Additional Collector was directed to adjudicate the matter afresh, taking the retail price of the goods on the date of importation (19th May 1993). The Additional Collector must provide reasonable opportunities for the importer to present relevant documents and must disclose any documents relied upon by the Customs Department. A reasoned order must be passed within three weeks, detailing the calculation process for the redemption fine. If any party is aggrieved by the new order, they may file a supplementary affidavit in the pending appeal.
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1993 (7) TMI 88
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of phenolic formaldehyde moulding powder, urea formaldehyde moulding powder, and melamine formaldehyde moulding powder under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Legality of excise duty recovery on these moulding powders.
3. Applicability of Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 for refund claims.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for refund claims.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of Moulding Powders:
The petitioners, a company engaged in manufacturing phenolic resins, urea formaldehyde resins, and melamine formaldehyde resins, argued that the modification of these resins into moulding powders does not amount to manufacture. The Government of India's circulars dated May 5, 1982, and October 6, 1982, supported this view, stating that such modifications do not create a new or distinct product and thus are not subject to excise duty. This position was also upheld by the Division Bench in Industrial Plastic Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India.
2. Legality of Excise Duty Recovery:
The company paid excise duty on these moulding powders under protest, believing the duty was wrongly assessed. The petitioners claimed that the recovery of Rs.1,83,28,537.57 was without authority of law as the moulding powders were not excisable. They sought a writ of mandamus for the refund of this amount plus interest. The court acknowledged that the excise duty was paid under a mistaken belief and supported by the circulars and judicial precedents, thus deeming the recovery unconstitutional.
3. Applicability of Section 11B for Refund Claims:
Section 11B of the Act, amended on September 20, 1991, prescribes a six-month limitation for refund claims. The petitioners argued that this limitation should not apply as the excise duty recovery was unconstitutional. The court noted that the limitation under Section 11B binds the Excise authorities but not the High Court under Article 226. The court concluded that the petitioners must seek a refund under Section 11B but directed the authorities to process the claim without applying the limitation period.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court:
The court debated whether it could grant relief under Article 226, bypassing Section 11B. The court held that the Excise authorities had jurisdiction to initially assess whether the process amounted to manufacture. The erroneous assessment did not equate to a lack of jurisdiction. The court cited several Supreme Court decisions, including M/s. Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay and Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. City of Jabalpur Corporation, to support this view. The court ultimately decided that the petitioners must follow the statutory refund process under Section 11B but ensured that no part of the claim would be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
Conclusion:
The petition partly succeeded. The court directed the respondents to examine the refund claim on merits within 12 weeks, allowing the petitioners to produce requisite documents and ensuring no part of the claim is barred by limitation. The previously withdrawn amount was not subject to reconsideration. No costs were awarded.
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1993 (7) TMI 87
Issues: Interpretation of Import-Export Policy 1982-83 regarding import of cars by physically handicapped persons; Examination of petitioner's application for import of a car; Validity of rejection of petitioner's application by Screening Committee based on grounds of application timing, income proof, and extent of disability.
In this case, the petitioner, a physically handicapped individual, applied to import a car under the Import-Export Policy of 1982-83, which allowed importation for physically handicapped individuals without the need for an import license. The petitioner submitted an application supported by a certificate from the Civil Surgeon detailing the nature of the disability and the need for a specially designed car. The Government later informed the petitioner to satisfy certain conditions outlined in a Notification dated May 25, 1983. Despite not approaching the Supreme Court, the Government decided to review the petitioner's application based on the Supreme Court's directive to dispose of such applications filed before December 27, 1982. The Screening Committee rejected the petitioner's application citing reasons such as late submission, lack of income proof, and insufficiency of disability to justify a specially designed car. The petitioner then filed a writ petition challenging the rejection.
The petitioner argued that the Screening Committee erred in considering the application based on the conditions in the May 25, 1983 Notification instead of the conditions in the Import-Export Policy of 1982-83. The Court agreed with this argument and proceeded to assess whether the petitioner met the conditions of the Import-Export Policy. The key issue was whether the petitioner's disability justified the import of a specially designed car with disability control devices. Upon reviewing the medical certificate, the Court found that the petitioner's amputated fingers did not significantly impair the use of the right hand, and there was no other physical disability present. Consequently, the Court concluded that the loss of two fingers did not warrant the importation of a specially designed car as per the policy's criteria. Therefore, the Screening Committee's decision to reject the application was upheld, and the petitioner's claim for relief was denied.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Screening Committee's decision, and discharged the rule with no order as to costs.
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1993 (7) TMI 86
The High Court of Judicature at Bombay ruled in favor of a company importing steel coils for re-rolling, stating that the coils fall under Entry No. 73.08 for a 60% duty rate, not Entry No. 73.13 for a 100% duty rate. The court allowed the petition, directing discharge of the bank guarantee as the goods were already cleared. No costs were awarded. (Case citation: 1993 (7) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY)
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1993 (7) TMI 85
Issues:
1. Interpretation of exemption notifications for Caprolactum import duty.
2. Refund of excess duty paid by petitioners.
3. Show-cause notice for short levy of duty.
4. Power of Collector of Central Excise to call for appeal.
Analysis:
1. The petitioners imported Caprolactum between September 1979 and February 1980 and paid duty at the rate of 25% ad valorem, ignoring an exemption notification dated December 4, 1979. The Central Government had issued notifications providing exemptions on the duty leviable on Caprolactum. The appellate authority allowed the petitioners' appeals for refund of excess duty, acknowledging the error in levying duty at 25% instead of the correct rate of 23% ad valorem as per the exemption notification.
2. While the refund applications were pending, a show-cause notice was issued by the Superintendent for alleged short levy of duty. However, the Collector of Appeals held that the duty payable was only 23% as per the exemption notification, leading to the withdrawal of the show-cause notice. The petitioners had already received the refund based on the appellate authority's order, which had attained finality, making the demand notice redundant.
3. Subsequently, the Collector of Central Excise directed the Assistant Collector to file an appeal against the withdrawal of the demand notice, citing reasons related to the manufacturing process of Caprolactum. The court found this action unnecessary and held that since the duty rate issue had been settled and the refund paid, there was no basis for the Collector to call for an appeal, leading to the setting aside of the Collector's order.
4. The court concluded that the Collector's order directing the appeal was unwarranted, as the duty rate issue had been resolved through the refund process based on the appellate authority's decision. The court set aside the Collector's order, noting that no purpose would be served by pursuing an appeal in this case, and clarified that the decision did not delve into the merits of the reasons provided by the Collector for reopening the demand notice.
In summary, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, setting aside the Collector's order and the appeal initiated based on that order, emphasizing that the issue of duty rate had been conclusively addressed through the refund process, making the appeal redundant.
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1993 (7) TMI 84
Issues:
1. Whether additional customs duty is payable on Foley Balloon Catheters.
Analysis:
The petitioners imported Foley Balloon Catheters and contested the imposition of additional customs duty, arguing that the goods are not subject to excise duty under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, hence no additional duty should be levied under Section 3 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Assistant Collector of Customs initially ruled in favor of imposing additional duty, but the High Court disagreed, stating that Foley Balloon Catheters are classifiable under Tariff Item 9018.39 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Court noted that previous decisions by the Central Excise and Gold (Control) Tribunal and the Bombay High Court had classified Foley Balloon Catheters as suction catheters, exempting them from duty. However, an amendment to Notification 208 in 1991 excluded Foley Balloon Catheters from the exemption, subjecting them to customs duty.
The Court delved into the provisions of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, which mandates additional duty equal to the excise duty on a like article produced in India. The Court highlighted that Notification 339/86-C.E. exempted certain medical instruments, including suction catheters, from excise duty. The Court drew parallels between items listed in the Customs and Excise notifications, emphasizing that the exclusion of Foley Balloon Catheters from the excise duty exemption did not automatically subject them to additional customs duty. The Court reasoned that despite the exclusion from the excise duty exemption, Foley Balloon Catheters were not liable to pay additional duty under the Customs Tariff Act.
The Court also addressed a situation where a sister concern of the petitioner had a similar dispute in Madras, resulting in conflicting decisions by the Assistant Collector and the Collector. The Court emphasized the need for consistency and upheld the Collector's decision as superior. Additionally, the Court noted that Foley Balloon Catheters were freely importable under the Import and Export Policy, further supporting the exemption from additional duty. Consequently, the Court allowed the writ application, set aside the Assistant Collector's order, and directed the issuance of necessary writs without costs.
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1993 (7) TMI 83
The State Bank of Saurashtra advanced a loan to respondent No. 2 for a vessel, which was later confiscated by Customs for smuggling activities. The Bank's claim for auction proceeds was dismissed by the High Court of Bombay in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court ruled the petition as without substance and discharged the rule without costs. (Citation: 1993 (7) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY)
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1993 (7) TMI 82
Issues:
The judgment involves issues related to the refund of customs duty paid on imported goods, the application of the rule of limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act, and the entitlement of the petitioners to the refund amount.
Refund of Customs Duty:
The petitioners, a body corporate constituted under the Major Port Trust Act, held an actual users import license for spare parts for a dredger. After discovering that certain items were short landed in the original consignment, they sought a supplementary license for the missing items. Despite protesting against the demand for customs duty on the supplementary items, the petitioners paid the duty under protest and cleared the consignment. Subsequently, they applied for a refund, which was rejected by the Assistant Collector, upheld in appeal by the Collector of Customs, and dismissed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. The petitioners challenged these decisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Application of Rule of Limitation:
The authorities rejected the refund application on the grounds that it should have been sought in respect of duty paid initially and not on the supplementary items. They also held that if the application was made for the initial duty paid, it would be barred by the rule of limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act. The petitioners argued that the refund application for duty paid on the supplementary items was maintainable, citing a previous judgment. However, the court disagreed, stating that the right of refund accrued because duty was recovered for items not shipped by the foreign suppliers, and the duty on the supplementary items was justified.
Entitlement to Refund:
The court found merit in the petitioners' argument that the application for refund should be treated as in respect of duty paid initially. It held that the bar of Section 27 of the Customs Act would not apply when duty is recovered for items not imported. Therefore, the court set aside the decisions of the lower authorities and directed the respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 66,452.13 to the petitioners within four weeks, with no order as to costs.
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1993 (7) TMI 81
Issues:
1. Refund of duty paid on import of specific items claimed as drug intermediates under a notification.
2. Dismissal of refund applications by Assistant Collector of Customs on grounds of items not being drug intermediates and being time-barred.
3. Partial allowance of appeal by Appellate Collector in favor of sorbitol but against propylene glycol and paraphenetidine.
4. Dismissal of appeal by Customs Tribunal on limitation grounds without examining the merit of the claim.
5. Challenge of Tribunal's order in High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
6. Consideration of limitation in refund applications before authorities versus writ jurisdiction.
7. Requirement to determine if propylene glycol and paraphenetidine are drug intermediates and entitled to exemption benefits.
8. Remittance of the matter back to the Tribunal for fresh decision on the above issues.
The High Court of Bombay heard a case where petitioners sought refund of duty paid on import of specific items, claiming them as drug intermediates under a notification. The Assistant Collector of Customs rejected the applications as the items were deemed not to be drug intermediates and were beyond the time limit specified in the Customs Act. The Appellate Collector partially allowed the appeal, granting refund for sorbitol but not for propylene glycol and paraphenetidine. The Customs Tribunal dismissed the appeal solely on limitation grounds, without assessing the merit of the claim. The High Court noted that the limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act does not apply when approaching the court in writ jurisdiction. The court agreed to remit the matter back to the Tribunal to determine whether propylene glycol and paraphenetidine qualify as drug intermediates entitled to exemption benefits. The Tribunal was instructed to decide the matter promptly without considering the limitation, aiming for a resolution within six months. The court set aside the Tribunal's order and did not award any costs in the case.
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1993 (7) TMI 80
Issues involved: Challenge to legality of show cause notice and corrigendum regarding import of Cod Liver Oil; Delay in completion of adjudication proceedings; Imposition of penalty after a lapse of ten years.
Challenge to legality of show cause notice and corrigendum: The petitioners challenged the show cause notice and corrigendum regarding the import of Cod Liver Oil, which was covered by Appendix 9 of Import Policy, 1984. The learned Single Judge observed that the import was not covered by canalising or ban notifications. The petitioners were allowed to clear the consignment by an interim order, and despite directions, the adjudication proceedings were not completed by the respondents for about ten years. As the goods were already cleared, the show cause notice seeking confiscation no longer had relevance. The court did not permit the completion of adjudication proceedings due to the unreasonable delay and the unjust nature of imposing penalties after such a long time.
Delay in completion of adjudication proceedings: The respondents failed to complete the adjudication proceedings for ten years without providing any explanation for the delay. The court found it unjust to allow the proceedings to continue after such a significant lapse of time, especially for the purpose of imposing penalties. The petitioners were granted relief as a result of the unreasonable delay and lack of justification for the prolonged inaction by the respondents.
Imposition of penalty after a lapse of ten years: The court refused to permit the completion of adjudication proceedings for the purpose of determining any penalty amount, considering the lengthy delay of ten years and the lack of justification provided by the respondents for the delay. It was deemed unfair and unjust to impose penalties after such a prolonged period, leading to the petitioners being entitled to relief. The petition succeeded, and the rule was made absolute without any order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
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1993 (7) TMI 79
Issues:
1. Confiscation of imported goods under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act.
2. Interpretation of import licence conditions and DGTD certificate requirements.
3. Authority of Customs to determine the permissible end-products for imported goods.
Analysis:
The judgment by the High Court of Bombay involved a case where a petitioner firm imported Polyester Metallised film against an import license issued to another entity. The Customs Authorities issued a show cause notice alleging that the imported goods were not required for the end-product specified in the license, leading to confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act. The Additional Collector of Customs imposed a fine for redemption of goods, citing that the imported goods were mainly used for manufacturing textile threads, not the specified end-product. The petitioners challenged this decision before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the need for imported goods to align with actual consumption and end-product requirements.
The petitioners argued that the confiscation orders were unsustainable as they were actual users requiring the imported goods for the manufacture of end-products covered by the license. The court agreed, stating that once it is established that the importer is an actual user and the goods are needed for the specified end-products, Customs Authorities cannot question the end-product's alignment with the DGTD certificate. The court rejected the Department's argument that the Customs could insist on goods being used for end-products specified in the certificate, emphasizing that the import license clearly permitted the import of items for manufacturing specified end-products, which the petitioners intended to do.
The court determined that Customs Authorities cannot confiscate goods based on assumptions about the end-products not aligning with the DGTD certificate, as long as the imported items are intended for the end-products mentioned in the license. Therefore, the court found the orders of confiscation by the lower authorities unsustainable and set them aside, ruling in favor of the petitioners. The court directed the discharge of the bank guarantee and issuance of the detention certificate, as the goods were permitted to be cleared by interim order.
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1993 (7) TMI 78
Issues:
1. Refund of excise duty and interest claimed by petitioners.
2. Alleged deliberate flouting and disobedience of court's writ by respondent No. 2.
3. Impact of amendment to Section 11B of Central Excise Act on refund claim verification process.
4. Legal implications of Division Bench's refusal to pass orders on respondent's motion.
5. Contempt of court allegations against respondent No. 2.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The petitioners sought a refund of Rs. 20,66,760.21 along with 15% interest per annum from July 30, 1991, based on a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court, through a judgment dated July 30, 1991, directed respondent No. 2 to verify the refund claim within twelve weeks and grant the refund. Failure to comply would result in the respondents being liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the refund amount. The petitioners alleged that respondent No. 2 deliberately flouted and disobeyed the court's writ.
2. The Parliament later amended Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, requiring an assessee to prove that the excise duty paid was not passed on to purchasers to claim a refund. Respondents filed a motion seeking direction for the petitioners to produce documents to establish this fact. However, the Division Bench declined to pass any order on the motion, which became final as the respondents did not appeal to the Supreme Court. Despite the refusal of relief by the Division Bench, respondent No. 2 did not take steps to comply with the court's writ, leading to the petitioners filing a new motion.
3. Counsel for respondents argued that the amendment to Section 11B released them from the obligation to honor the court's writ. The court rejected this argument, stating that once the Division Bench declined relief due to the amendment, respondents could not ignore the writ. The court found that respondents had disobeyed the writ by not making the payment within the stipulated period, despite the alleged futility in seeking a review of the judgment.
4. Referring to a decision of the Gauhati High Court, respondents argued that the amendment to Section 11B absolved them of contempt for not obeying court orders. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the writ could not be nullified in such a manner, especially when the department's request for modification was denied. The court reiterated that respondents had clearly disobeyed the court's writ.
5. The court directed respondent No. 2 to deposit the refund amount within one week, failing which further orders would be passed. The court indicated its intention to give one more opportunity to respondents to refund the excise duty before considering contempt of court action.
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1993 (7) TMI 77
Whether "Projection Television sets" manufactured by the respondent are the same as the "Broadcast Television receiver sets" for the purpose of earning exemption under the central excise laws?
Held that:- We agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Projector Vision - Projection television sets are capable of receiving television broadcasts as is being done by any other broadcast television receiver set but at the same time the two are not the same. An ordinary television set has a fixed image in the mind of the consumer in this country. One never visualises a television set having a projection-unit and a head-screen mounted at a long distance. A television set - in the imagination of the consumer - is a compact set with inbuilt screen which adores the drawing room and bed room. A television set in the market costs about ₹ 15,000/- to ₹ 25,000/- whereas the respondents' product costs between ₹ 1,20,000/- to ₹ 1,50,000/-. We, therefore, agree with the view taken by the Assistant Collector and the Collector.
We, further, agree with the Assistant Collector that the product of the respondent fully answers the description of "Video Projectors" in terms of the Notification No. 160/86. It is not disputed, rather it is the case of the respondent that the "projection television set" manufactured by them receives the televised image. 'Video' is the transmission and reception of a televised image.The product of the respondent-company projects on a screen the video signals transmitted from the television station and received by it. The Assistant Collector has, thus, rightly reached the conclusion that the product of the respondent answers the description of a 'video projector'. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (7) TMI 76
Whether Sections 110 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 are inter se independent, distinct and exclusive or are they inter-woven, inter-connected and inter-playing?
Held that:- In clear terms, it has thus been held that the period angle causing affectation under Section 110(2), would only pertain to the seizure of goods. The validity of notice under Section 124, for which no period has been laid within which it is required to be given is not affected. The seizure may have, after the expiry of six months or after the expiry of extended period of six months entitled the owner or the person concerned the possession of the seized goods. This obviously is so because the matter at that stage is under investigation. On launching proceedings under Chapter XIV, Section 124 enjoins issuance of a notice for which no period has been fixed within which notice may be given. The difference is obvious because this goes as a step towards trial. The ratio of this Court afore-quoted in Charandas Malhotra's case [1971 (2) TMI 41 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA] thus settles the question afore-posed and the answer is that these two Sections 110 and 124 are independent, distinct and exclusive of each other, resulting in the survival of the proceedings under Section 124, even though the seized goods might have to be returned, or stand returned, in terms of Section 110 of the Act, after the expiry of the permissible period of seizure.
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1993 (7) TMI 75
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 4(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. Refund of excess excise duty paid under a mistake of law.
3. Applicability of the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
4. Retrospective application of amended Section 11B of the Act.
5. Limitation for claiming refund of excise duty.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Section 4(a) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
The respondent had paid excess excise duty under the mistaken belief that the basis for assessment should be the price at which wholesale dealers sold to secondary wholesalers, rather than the price at which the respondent sold to wholesale dealers. This interpretation was corrected by the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Limited, which held that the assessable value should be based on the price at which the manufacturer sells to the wholesale dealers.
2. Refund of Excess Excise Duty Paid Under a Mistake of Law:
The respondent filed for a refund of the excess duty paid during the period September 1, 1970, to February 28, 1973. The Assistant Collector initially rejected the refund applications, but the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) allowed the refund for the period February 20, 1972, to February 28, 1973, and rejected the applications for the earlier periods as time-barred. The High Court, however, directed the refund of the entire amount of Rs. 49,90,043.01, noting that the excess excise duty was paid due to a mistake of law and that the government had a legal obligation to return it.
3. Applicability of the Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment:
The appellants argued that the respondent had passed on the burden of the excess excise duty to consumers and thus was not entitled to a refund. The respondent failed to provide satisfactory evidence to rebut this presumption. The court emphasized that under Section 12B of the Act, there is a rebuttable presumption that the incidence of duty has been passed on to the buyer unless proven otherwise by the claimant.
4. Retrospective Application of Amended Section 11B of the Act:
The amended Section 11B, which came into effect on September 20, 1991, stipulates that no refund shall be made unless the claimant proves that the incidence of duty was not passed on to any other person. The court held that the amended provisions apply retrospectively to all pending claims, including the present case, as the order of the High Court had not acquired finality when the amendment came into force.
5. Limitation for Claiming Refund of Excise Duty:
The High Court found that the respondent could not be barred by limitation as the excess duty was paid due to a mistake of law, and the respondent had approached the authorities soon after the Voltas judgment. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, noting that the respondent was not guilty of laches.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order directing the refund of Rs. 49,90,043.01. The court held that the respondent failed to establish that it had not passed on the burden of the excess excise duty to any other person. The court directed the respondent to refund the amount received under the interim order with 12% interest per annum from the date of receipt within eight weeks. The court left the parties to bear their own costs.
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1993 (7) TMI 74
Whether the facts and circumstances of this case warrant a total or partial waiver of the redemption fine? - Held that:- The importers' contention that the redemption fine should be wholly waived or substantially reduced as their action in importing the goods under OGL was bona fide is not well founded. Even if the transaction has in fact resulted in a loss (we cannot delve into it for the first time in this Court) it will not make any difference. We feel that taking cover under the earlier orders passed in the case of M/s. Jain Shudh Vanaspati Ltd., and the letter of the STC, the importers have tried to create the impression that they were innocent victims of the subsequent interpretation put on the relevant entry, ignoring the fact that the licences were revalidated on certain terms and conditions which did not permit import except through the STC. We are, therefore, satisfied that the import under OGL was not a bona fide act. We, therefore, dismiss both the appeals as well as the writ petition with costs
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1993 (7) TMI 73
The High Court of Madras directed the Tribunal to refer a question of law regarding the treatment of capital subsidy for depreciation and investment allowance under the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court held that a referable question of law arises from the Tribunal's order.
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9911796707
