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Showing 21 to 40 of 848 Records

• 2010 (10) TMI 1239
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Deduction u/s 80IB on profit derived from goods manufactured by loan licensees.
  2. Levy of interest u/s 234A, 234B, and 234C.
  3. Exclusion of profit on contract work and interest income from the computation of deduction u/s 80IB.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Deduction u/s 80IB on profit derived from goods manufactured by loan licensees:
  The assessee's appeal was dismissed as the learned AR sought permission to withdraw it, which was not objected to by the learned DR. Therefore, the appeal filed by the assessee in ITA no.4374/Ahd/2007 was dismissed.
  
  2. Levy of interest u/s 234A, 234B, and 234C:
  This issue was not specifically addressed in the judgment as the assessee's appeal was dismissed upon withdrawal.
  
  3. Exclusion of profit on contract work and interest income from the computation of deduction u/s 80IB:
  The Revenue's appeal focused on the CIT(A)'s direction to not exclude profit on contract work and interest income from the computation of deduction u/s 80IB. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision regarding the job work income of Rs.6,90,693/-, stating it was derived from the activities of the industrial undertaking and thus eligible for deduction u/s 80IB. The Tribunal cited several precedents supporting this view, including CIT vs. J.B. Kharwar & Sons and CIT v. Northern Aromatics Ltd.
  
  Regarding the interest income of Rs.14,09,265/-, the Tribunal found no material establishing the nexus of any expenditure with the interest income. The CIT(A) had allowed the deduction on the entire interest income without proper findings. The Tribunal upheld the deduction for interest recovered from debtors on delayed payments (Rs.13,274/-) based on the decision in Nirma Industries vs. DCIT. However, for the interest recovered from M/s Clarion (Rs.5,22,233/-), the Tribunal remanded the issue back to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision with a speaking order.
  
  For the remaining interest income (interest on FDRs, recurring account, and other interest), the Tribunal found no evidence of a direct nexus with the business of the industrial undertaking. Citing several Supreme Court decisions, including Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. and Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, the Tribunal concluded that such interest income does not qualify for deduction u/s 80IB. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the AO's order denying the deduction on these receipts.
  
  Conclusion:
  The assessee's appeal was dismissed, and the Revenue's appeal was partly allowed for statistical purposes. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision on job work income but remanded the issue of interest income from M/s Clarion for a fresh decision. The Tribunal denied the deduction u/s 80IB on interest from FDRs, recurring accounts, and other interest, restoring the AO's order.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1238
  
  Issues involved: Denial of natural justice by Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and non-admittance of submissions and evidences by the assessee under Rule 46A.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Denial of natural justice
  The appeal by the assessee was against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for assessment year 2005-06. The first issue raised was that the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) did not provide the assessee with an opportunity to submit various documents and took the same view as the Assessing Officer, thus denying natural justice. It was argued that the Assessing Officer erred in law by rejecting statements and submissions, making untenable observations in the assessment order, and not properly appreciating documentary evidence.
  
  Issue 2: Non-admittance of submissions and evidences under Rule 46A
  The assessee declared an income of Rs. 1,45,517/- with the return filed on 30.3.2006. The Assessing Officer, due to non-compliance by the assessee, completed the assessment u/s 144(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to the best of his judgment, determining the total income as Rs. 5,53,050/-. The assessee submitted under Rule 46A(1)(b) & (c) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962, requesting an opportunity for submission and production of books of account. However, the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) confirmed the additions made by the Assessing Officer, stating that there was no basis for submission of fresh evidence under Rule 46A.
  
  Judgment:
  After considering the submissions, the Tribunal found that natural justice would be served by remitting the issue back to the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) for reconsideration after admitting the submissions and evidences filed by the assessee. The Tribunal emphasized that the assessee should be given an adequate opportunity to be heard. Citing a precedent, the Tribunal highlighted that the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had no discretion to refuse to admit additional evidence after calling a remand report from the Assessing Officer. As the issue was remitted, the Tribunal did not decide on the merit of the case, and the appeal by the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1237
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against High Court judgment, grant of bail, remission of sentence, constitutional powers for pardon or remission.
  
  The Supreme Court heard the appeal against the High Court of Gujarat's judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 812 of 1995. The Court found no infirmity in the High Court's decision, upholding the appellant's conviction. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's bail was cancelled, with orders to be taken into custody to serve the remaining sentence.
  
  Regarding the appellant's request for remission of sentence, the Court clarified that remission can only be granted by the executive authorities. The appellant was advised to seek redress from the appropriate Government through representation under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution of India. It was emphasized that the constitutional powers of the President or Governor for pardon or remission cannot be restricted by Section 433A Cr.P.C., as the Constitution holds precedence over statutes. The appellant was also permitted to petition the High Court for any benefits under State Government rules or orders for sentence remission.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1236
  
  Issues involved: Appeal by Revenue against deletion of commission disallowances by AO.
  
  Ground 1 - Commission Disallowance: The assessee, a manufacturer, claimed deduction of commission in the current year, which was higher than the previous year. The AO disallowed the claim due to lack of evidence of services rendered by recipients and abnormal increase in commission. The CIT(A) allowed the claim stating that expenditure was for business purpose and not necessarily for profit. The Revenue appealed, arguing lack of confirmations and evidence of services rendered.
  
  Ground 1 Decision: The ITAT found that the assessee failed to provide confirmations and evidence of services rendered by most commission recipients. It was emphasized that payments must be for services rendered to be deductible. The CIT(A) did not assess whether services were actually provided, leading to the decision to set aside the order and remand for a fresh decision with proper examination of services rendered by each recipient.
  
  Ground 2 and 3: These grounds were dismissed as they were general prayers without specific adjudication required.
  
  Conclusion: The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, with the order pronounced on 11-10-2010.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1235
  
  Issues involved: Assessment order u/s 25(1) of KVAT Act, rectification application, challenge to order rejecting rectification.
  
  Assessment Order u/s 25(1) of KVAT Act:
  The petitioner was issued Ext.P1 assessment order for the assessment year 2005-06 under Section 25(1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The petitioner appealed against Ext.P1, as shown in Ext.P3, and also filed an interlocutory application for stay (Ext.P4). The appeal and stay petition are pending before the 2nd respondent for consideration and disposal.
  
  Rectification Application:
  The petitioner filed Ext.P2 seeking rectification of certain defects in the Ext.P1 order. In a previous judgment (Ext.P7), the 1st respondent was directed to consider and decide on Ext.P2. Ext.P8, the subsequent order, rejected the rectification petition stating that the defects did not fall under Section 66 of the KVAT Act. However, Ext.P8 was found to lack proper consideration and reasoning, leading to the conclusion that it is not sustainable in the eye of the law.
  
  Challenge to Order Rejecting Rectification:
  In light of the deficiencies in Ext.P8, the writ petition was disposed of by quashing Ext.P8. The 1st respondent was directed to issue a fresh speaking order after giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. Additionally, the 2nd respondent was instructed to decide on the Ext.P4 stay petition within one month of receiving a copy of the judgment, while halting any further recovery steps based on Ext.P6 notice until the directed orders are issued by the respondents.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1234
  
  The High Court of Allahabad granted bail to the applicant in Court Case No. 7/2010, Crime No. RC-8(A)/2007 under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. The applicant had no previous criminal history and was considered a law-abiding person. The bail was granted on the condition of filing a personal bond and two sureties.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1233
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality of the sale of car garages by members of the Society.
  2. Rights of purchasers of flats on a power of attorney basis.
  3. Transferability of car garages along with flats.
  4. Validity of the resolutions passed by the General Body of the Society.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Legality of the sale of car garages by members of the Society:

  The Nav Nirman Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. ('the Society') was allotted 4.4 acres of land for constructing residential flats. The Society had 264 members but only 118 covered car garages were available. A draw of lots was held on 24.02.1991 to allot garages. Some members sold their flats and garages. R-1 to R-4 challenged the sale of garages by filing a claim petition u/s 60 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972. The arbitrator dismissed these petitions on 10.06.2004. However, the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal allowed the appeal on 08.06.2007, directing the Society to take legal action against original allottees who sold their garages and to allot them to waitlisted members. The Society's review application was dismissed as time-barred on 24.03.2008.

  2. Rights of purchasers of flats on a power of attorney basis:

  The sale of flats through power of attorney basis received judicial and statutory recognition as per Section 91 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003. This section allows persons who acquired property through power of attorney or agreement for sale to become members of the cooperative housing society by converting the property from leasehold to freehold and paying the transfer fee.

  3. Transferability of car garages along with flats:

  The court held that garages are incidental to the allotment of flats and cannot be sold separately. The enjoyment of the garage is incidental to the flat, and purchasers of flats on a power of attorney basis cannot be deprived of the enjoyment of the parking space. The General Body of the Society passed a resolution on 30.09.2007 treating the allotment of covered car and scooter garages on an ownership basis with heritable and transferable rights at par with the flats.

  4. Validity of the resolutions passed by the General Body of the Society:

  The decision to allot garages was taken in a General Body Meeting, binding on all members. The subsequent resolution on 30.09.2007 to treat covered car garages as heritable and transferable at par with flats is also binding. The court noted that the restriction on transfer is to "any other person or organization," implying that garages cannot be transferred separately from the flats. The court also referenced a Supreme Court judgment, distinguishing it from the present case as it dealt with statutory provisions in Maharashtra and conflicts between promoters and societies.

  Conclusion:

  The court set aside the impugned orders dated 08.06.2007 and 24.03.2008 of the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal, directing that in case of sale of flats on a power of attorney basis, rights in the car parking can also be transferred but not to an outsider who is not an owner of the flat. The petitions were allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1232
  
  Issues Involved:
  The judgment involves the interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding vicarious liability of individuals in a company for offenses under Section 138 of the Act.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Vicarious Liability of Company Secretary
  
  The petitioner, accused No. 5, sought to quash proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, arguing that he had resigned from the company before the cheques were dishonored and was not in charge of the company's affairs. The petitioner's counsel relied on precedents to support the argument that liability arises from being in charge of the business at the relevant time.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 141 of the Act
  
  The court analyzed Section 141 of the Act, emphasizing that every person in charge of the company's business at the time of the offense is deemed guilty. The court highlighted the importance of strict compliance with the provision and the need for specific allegations to hold individuals responsible post-resignation.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court allowed the criminal petition, quashing the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C. No. 750 of 2000, as he was not in charge of the company at the time of the offense and had resigned before the dishonor of the cheques. The judgment reaffirmed that vicarious liability under Section 141 requires individuals to be responsible for the company's affairs at the relevant time of the offense.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1231
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act for assessment year 2006-07 based on fall in GP rate and disallowance of expenses.
  
  Summary:
  The appeal challenged the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act amounting to Rs. 1,34,843 imposed based on a decline in GP rate and disallowance of expenses. The Assessing Officer made additions on an estimate basis due to discrepancies in the GP rate and expenses claimed by the assessee. The CIT(A) upheld the penalty, citing lack of explanation for the fall in GP rate and agreement for disallowance of expenses. However, the High Court rulings emphasized that penalty is not applicable when additions are made on an estimate basis without concrete evidence of concealment.
  
  The assessee argued that penalty was unjustified as additions were made on an estimate basis. The High Court rulings in similar cases were cited to support the argument that penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is not applicable when income is assessed on an estimate basis without evidence of concealment. The Tribunal found that the additions were made without concrete evidence against the assessee, leading to the reversal of the penalty imposed by the CIT(A).
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, directing the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act based on the lack of concrete evidence supporting the additions made. The decision was in line with the legal precedent set by the High Court rulings mentioned in the case.
  
  Judges: Shri G.S.PANNU, Accountant Member and Ms. Sushma Chowla, Judicial Member.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1230
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to order of Tribunal denying benefit of capital expenditure on R&D and depreciation.
  
  Capital Expenditure on R&D:
  The assessee, engaged in manufacturing drugs, filed return declaring income for asst. year 2002-02. Assessing Officer disallowed capital expenditure on R&D and depreciation, making significant additions to total income. Commissioner (Appeals) found massive additions unjustified, allowing only disallowance of depreciation due to non-production of bills. Tribunal held R&D capital expenditure not justified, disallowing it. Tribunal directed verification of depreciation claim, ultimately finding assessee not entitled to it. Appellant challenged Tribunal's order.
  
  Revenue Expenditure for R&D:
  Commissioner (Appeals) found disallowance of revenue expenditure for R&D not justified, allowing it. Tribunal remanded this matter back to Assessing Officer, not subject of current appeal.
  
  Depreciation Disallowance:
  Assessing Officer disallowed depreciation due to non-production of bills and invoices, which was partly upheld by Commissioner (Appeals). Tribunal found depreciation claim infructuous, as bills and invoices for new assets were allowed. Tribunal set aside depreciation disallowance. Appellant challenged Tribunal's decision.
  
  Judgment:
  The High Court set aside Tribunal's decision on capital expenditure for R&D and depreciation disallowance, remanding the matter back for fresh consideration. The Tribunal's decision on revenue expenditure for R&D was left undisturbed. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1229
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Service of statutory notice u/s 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. Validity of prosecution without individual statutory notice to the petitioner.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Service of statutory notice u/s 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act

  The petitioner contended that the learned Magistrate should not have taken cognizance of the complaints due to the absence of service of statutory notice u/s 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner argued that there was no averment in the complaints indicating that individual statutory notice was sent to him demanding payment for the dishonoured cheques.

  The court referenced several decisions to support the necessity of serving statutory notice to the petitioner. In (2006) II M.L.J. 134, it was established that no prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be launched without the issuance of statutory notice. Similarly, in (2001) M.L.J. 519, it was held that the presumption of guilt arises only when a notice is served under Section 138(b) of the Act, and in the absence of such notice, there cannot be a cause of action against the directors.

  The court also considered the decision in (2006) 2 MLJ 990, where it was concluded that statutory notice to every person, including the director, who is sought to be prosecuted, is mandatory.

  Issue 2: Validity of prosecution without individual statutory notice to the petitioner

  The respondent argued that notice sent to the company should be considered as notice to the petitioner, who was the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the company. The respondent relied on the decision in (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 236, which suggested that if the petitioner did not make the payment within 15 days of receiving the summons from the court, he could not contend that there was no proper service of notice.

  However, the court found that the facts of the case did not align with the decision cited by the respondent. The court emphasized that in the complaints, it was not stated that the statutory notice was sent to the petitioner. Therefore, the question of complying with the demand within 15 days from the date of receipt of the summons from the court did not arise.

  The court concluded that the contention that notice to the company amounts to notice to the petitioner could not be accepted. The court referred to multiple judgments, including (2006) II M.L.J. 134 and (2001) M.L.J. 519, which affirmed that individual statutory notice to the petitioner is mandatory.

  As a result, the court quashed all further proceedings in C.C. Nos. 6360 and 6358 of 1997 on the file of the XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai, against the petitioner. The proceedings against the other accused were allowed to continue. The Criminal Original Petitions were allowed, and the connected Crl.M.Ps were closed.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1228
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against penalty imposed u/s 271E for violating provisions of section 269T of the Income Tax Act.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Violation of Section 269T - Appellant's contention and AO's penalty imposition
  The appellant, a partner in a firm, made repayments to the firm, which were reflected as "Loans & Advances" in the balance sheet. The Assessing Officer (AO) imposed a penalty u/s 271E for contravention of section 269T due to these repayments.
  
  Issue 2: Arguments before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
  The appellant argued that the transactions were related to capital account, not loan account, citing the firm's balance sheet and the absence of separate capital and loan accounts. The appellant relied on legal precedents to support the argument that transactions between partners and the firm did not constitute loans.
  
  Issue 3: Decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)
  The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) noted that similar penalty under section 271D imposed on the firm was quashed by ITAT Ahmedabad. The Commissioner held that the transactions were of capital account nature, not loans, based on the firm's balance sheet and the appellant's clear intention regarding the nature of transactions. Citing legal precedents, the penalty of Rs. 16,00,000 imposed on the appellant was deemed unjustifiable and was directed to be deleted.
  
  Issue 4: Tribunal's decision on the penalty imposition
  The Tribunal confirmed the Commissioner's decision to delete the penalty under section 271E, as it found no error in the Commissioner's order. The Tribunal agreed that the transactions were of capital account nature, following the precedent set by ITAT Ahmedabad in similar cases.
  
  In conclusion, the penalty imposed under section 271E for violating section 269T was deleted based on the nature of the transactions being deemed as capital account transactions, not loans, as per the firm's balance sheet and legal precedents.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1227
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in this case are the validity of a resolution debarring a member from holding any post in a trust for 10 years, the authority of the General Body and Governing Body to pass such a resolution, the power of the Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, and the impact of delay in filing a writ petition.
  
  Validity of Resolution Debarring Member:
  The Petitioner, a member of a Trust, was debarred from holding any post for 10 years by a resolution of the General Body. The resolution was challenged through writ petitions. The learned Single Judge held that the resolution was illegal as the Trust's bye-laws did not empower debarring any person from holding a post. The Judge found the resolution to be without legal sanction, and the Petitioner continued to be a member of the Trust. The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order due to delay in challenging the resolution.
  
  Authority of General Body and Governing Body:
  The Trust's bye-laws did not provide for debarring a member from holding a post for a specified period. The Governing Body's resolution debarring the Petitioner was found to be invalid. The Court noted that the power to remove a member does not include the power to debar the member from holding an office. The Single Judge rightly quashed the resolution, and the power to mould relief is available to the Court issuing prerogative writs.
  
  Court's Power to Grant Relief:
  The Court can grant relief depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the specific relief claimed is not granted. Delay and laches do not bar the Court's jurisdiction, as it is a matter of discretion. The Single Judge correctly considered the relevant facts and did not dismiss the writ petition based on delay.
  
  Impact of Delay in Filing Writ Petition:
  The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order due to delay in challenging the resolution. However, the Single Judge's decision to grant relief was justified as the resolution debarring the Petitioner was still in force. The Court clarified that delay does not render the relief claimed in a writ petition in fructuous if the effect of the order continues.
  
  Separate Judgment:
  The Division Bench's decision was set aside, and the Single Judge's order was restored. The Court emphasized that the Respondents could proceed against the Appellant for removal of membership in accordance with the law. The appeal was allowed, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances of the case.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1226
  
  Issues involved:
  The issues involved in this case are the quashing of a criminal complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and the summoning order based on the complaint.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Quashing of Criminal Complaint u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code
  
  The petitioner filed a petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to quash the criminal complaint and summoning order issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The complaint alleged that the accused fraudulently prepared a sale deed and issued a post-dated cheque which was dishonored twice. The petitioner argued that the cheque was issued as security and the debt was not legally enforceable. However, the court held that the matter should be decided during trial and dismissed the petition, stating that the judgment relied upon by the petitioner did not support their case.
  
  Key Points:
  - The complaint alleged fraudulent preparation of a sale deed and issuance of a dishonored cheque.
  - The petitioner claimed the cheque was issued as security and the debt was not legally enforceable.
  - The court dismissed the petition, stating the matter should be decided during trial.
  

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1225
  
  The Appellate Tribunal ITAT Mumbai upheld the cancellation of a penalty of Rs. 21,36,155/- imposed under section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 2003-04. The penalty was cancelled as the disallowance on which it was based had been deleted by the Tribunal earlier. The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed. (Case citation: 2010 (10) TMI 1225 - ITAT MUMBAI)

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1224
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) u/s 14A of I.T. Act read with rule 8D of Income Tax rules for Assessment Year 2006-07.
  
  Summary:
  The revenue appealed against the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) regarding the addition of Rs. 23,75,000/- u/s 14A of the Income Tax Act read with rule 8D. The Assessing Officer disallowed the sum of Rs. 23,75,007/- as expenses after applying Rule 8D. However, the CIT(A) deleted the disallowance stating that the appellant had sufficient funds for investments and no interest expenses were incurred on the amount in question. The AO's dissatisfaction with the working of disallowance given by the assessee was not demonstrated. The Bombay High Court held that Rule 8D is applicable only from Assessment Year 2008-09, overruling the decision of the Special Bench of ITAT in a previous case. The Tribunal rejected the revenue's ground, stating it had no merit based on the current legal position.
  
  In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal, emphasizing the inapplicability of Rule 8D for the relevant assessment year and the lack of demonstrated dissatisfaction by the Assessing Officer with the assessee's working of disallowance u/s 14A.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1223
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the Plaintiff is required to pay ad valorem Court fee on the sale consideration shown in the sale deed.
  2. Whether the sale deed is null and void due to non-payment of the full sale consideration.
  3. Whether the Plaintiff's suit for declaration is maintainable without seeking cancellation of the sale deed.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Ad Valorem Court Fee Requirement
  The Plaintiff challenged the order directing the payment of ad valorem Court fee on the sale consideration shown in the sale deed. The trial court observed that since the Plaintiff is a party to the sale deed and received part of the sale consideration, he is required to pay ad valorem Court fee. The High Court upheld this view, stating that the Plaintiff is seeking relief of annulment of the sale deed in the garb of a declaration and thus must pay ad valorem Court fee.
  
  Issue 2: Validity of Sale Deed Due to Non-Payment
  The Plaintiff argued that the sale deed is null and void as the full sale consideration was not paid, citing Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act. The Defendant contended that the sale deed is not void even if part of the sale price is unpaid, referencing the judgments in Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal and Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao. The High Court agreed with the Defendant, noting that the sale deed did not contain any recital that it would be revoked upon dishonour of cheques. Thus, the sale transaction was deemed complete, and the sale deed was not void.
  
  Issue 3: Maintainability of Suit for Declaration
  The Plaintiff sought a declaration that the sale deed is null and void without seeking its cancellation. The High Court held that if the executant of a deed wants it annulled, they must seek cancellation. Since the Plaintiff's real relief was the annulment of the sale deed due to fraud and non-payment, the suit for declaration alone was not maintainable. The Plaintiff must pay ad valorem Court fee as the relief sought was essentially for cancellation of the sale deed.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court dismissed the petitions, affirming the trial court's order that the Plaintiff must pay ad valorem Court fee on the sale consideration shown in the sale deed. The sale deed was not void due to non-payment of the full consideration, and the Plaintiff's suit for declaration without seeking cancellation was not maintainable.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1222
  
  Legal judgment by Supreme Court of India in 2010 (10) TMI 1222 - SC. Justices Mukundakam Sharma and Anil R. Dave dismissed the appeal.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1221
  
  Issues involved: Application for restoration of a company to active status under Section 560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956 read with Rule 6, 9, 92, 93, and 94 of the Company (Court) Rules, 1959.
  
  Judgment Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Restoration of Company to Active Status
  The application was filed under Section 560(6) of the Companies Act, seeking restoration of the company to its active status and in the Register maintained by the Registrar of Companies, Shillong. The Registrar of Companies had no objection to the restoration, as confirmed by the instruction received by the learned Asstt. Solicitor General of India. The Court directed the revival of the company to 'Active' status from the 'strike off' status. The petitioners were instructed to comply with the provisions of Rule 92 and 93 of the Rules for necessary steps to be taken.
  
  The petition was allowed, and the petitioners were directed to provide a certified copy of the court's order to the Registrar of Companies within 7 days. Upon receipt, the Registrar of Companies was to take steps to restore the company to its original status by advertising the Court's order in the Gazette. The case record was to include a copy of the instruction from the Registrar of Companies dated 30.7.2010.
  
  This judgment highlights the process and requirements for restoring a company to active status as per the relevant provisions of the Companies Act and Company (Court) Rules.

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• 2010 (10) TMI 1220
  
  Issues involved: Request for extension of interim relief, consideration of interim relief request.
  
  Request for extension of interim relief: Mr. A.S. Vakil, counsel for respondent nos. 11 to 14, requested to extend the order of status quo till the next date of hearing. He argued that the interim relief granted in this matter was crucial for extending the interim relief in his case. However, Mr. S.N. Soparkar, representing the petitioner, stated that he is not pressing for any interim relief.
  
  Consideration of interim relief request: As the petitioner's counsel did not press for interim relief, the Court could not entertain Mr. Vakil's request to extend the interim relief. Consequently, the interim relief was not extended. Mr. R.A. Rindani, the learned AGP for the respondent State, requested for more time, which was granted until 26.10.2010.
  
  This judgment by the Gujarat High Court addressed the conflicting requests for extending interim relief in a legal matter. The Court's decision was based on the petitioner's stance of not pressing for interim relief, leading to the denial of the extension request made by the counsel for respondent nos. 11 to 14.

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