|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 782 Records
-
2007 (3) TMI 815
Issues involved:
The issue involves the denial of exemption u/s 11(4A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to a Trust for the Assessment Year 1989-90 to 1991-92, leading to a demand being raised on the entire income. The Trust challenged the assessment orders, which were initially quashed by the High Court, but later reinstated by the Supreme Court. The Trust sought a waiver of interest u/s 234-D based on a notification issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
Judgment Details:
Denial of Exemption and Fresh Assessment Orders:
The High Court initially allowed the Trust's writ petitions and declared the Trust as not assessable for the mentioned assessment years. However, the Supreme Court later set aside this decision, leading to fresh assessment orders and the raising of fresh demands by the Income Tax Department.
Waiver of Interest and Notification:
The Trust sought a waiver of interest under Section 234-D, citing a notification by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The Trust argued that there was no willful default on their part and that the liability to pay tax only arose after the Supreme Court's decision, making them eligible for the waiver.
Rejection of Waiver and Judicial Review:
The first respondent rejected the Trust's plea for waiver, leading to the Trust filing a writ petition. The Trust contended that the fresh assessment orders post the High Court's decision did not amount to restoring the original order, and therefore, the benefit of the notification should apply for the waiver.
Consideration of Notification and Bona Fides:
The Trust argued that the first respondent erred in not considering the notification and the facts properly, and wrongly denied the benefit of the waiver on extraneous reasons. The Trust emphasized that they acted based on the High Court's decision and that the first respondent's view on bona fides was unsustainable.
Judicial Review and Remand:
After considering the arguments, the High Court set aside the first respondent's order and directed a fresh consideration of the Trust's case for the waiver of interest in accordance with the law and the relevant Board's circular. The writ petition was allowed, remanding the matter back to the first respondent for further review without any order as to costs.
-
2007 (3) TMI 814
Issues involved: Reduction of penalty under Section 76 of the Finance Act and Section 77, justification for penalty imposition, gravity of the offense, intention to evade tax.
The judgment addressed the reduction of penalties under Section 76 and Section 77 of the Finance Act. The Revenue supported the original adjudication order, arguing that penalties should be upheld for breaches of the law. The Appellate Authorities had reduced the penalties without providing reasons, leading to a reduction from Rs. 2171 to Rs. 1146 under Section 76 and from Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 3,000 under Section 77. The lack of explanation for the reduction by the Commissioner (Appeals) was highlighted, questioning the basis for such adjustments.
The Respondents' counsel contended that the Appellate Authority erred in law by not waiving the entire penalty despite challenges to the quantum of penalty in the Cross Objection. It was emphasized that the imposition of penalties should be governed solely by the statutory mandate, without considerations of mercy or favor. Proper treatment under the law was deemed essential, suggesting that even penalties imposed by the Commissioner (Appeals) could not be sustained if the appellant's rights were upheld.
Upon hearing both sides, the judgment considered the legal proposition presented by the authorized representative, shedding light on the leviable penalty amount. It was observed that the gravity of the offense was not severe, making the penalties of Rs. 1146 and Rs. 3,000 appear harsh. The absence of compelling reasons for penalty imposition by the lower Appellate Authorities rendered the reduction unjustifiable, as authorities are bound to act strictly within the confines of the law. Notably, there was no evidence indicating an intention by the assessee to evade tax or knowingly breach the law. Consequently, the Cross Objection was allowed, absolving the Respondents from any penalty. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, emphasizing the necessity for penalties to be imposed based on legal grounds rather than mercy.
(Separate Judgment by Judge D.N. Panda)
The judgment, delivered by Judge D.N. Panda, underscored the importance of upholding penalties in accordance with legal provisions and without undue leniency. The decision to dismiss the Revenue's appeal and absolve the Respondents from penalties was based on the lack of substantial reasons for penalty imposition and the absence of evidence indicating intentional tax evasion or deliberate legal violations by the assessee. The ruling emphasized the significance of acting within the framework of the law and refraining from imposing penalties arbitrarily or without legal justification.
-
2007 (3) TMI 813
Issues involved: Appeal u/s 260-A of Income Tax Act, 1961 against ITAT order for assessment years 1988-89.
Summary:
The appellant, engaged in cotton ginning and oil extraction, claimed to conduct business on behalf of 21 parties, transferring profits to them. However, authorities found the claim ingenuine, adding Rs. 3,06,802 to the appellant's income. The Tribunal allowed adjusting speculation loss for three parties but upheld the addition. The High Court noted lack of physical delivery, absence of advance payments, and transactions in appellant's name, concluding the profits belonged to the appellant. The appellant's plea that transactions were genuine was rejected. The Court found no merit in the appeal, as the appellant failed to prove the genuineness of the transactions or the diversion of profits. The findings were based on evidence and not considered perverse. The appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law was found.
This judgment highlights the importance of substantiating claims and providing evidence in tax matters, emphasizing the need for proper documentation and transparency in business transactions to avoid tax implications.
-
2007 (3) TMI 812
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the orders passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) and Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT).
2. Interpretation of "admission" u/s 19(20) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and Rule 12(5) of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993.
3. Limitation period for filing the original application before the DRT.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Orders Passed by DRT and DRAT:
The petitioner challenged the orders dated 16-12-2003 by the DRT and 22-3-2006 by the DRAT, which directed the petitioner and respondents to pay a debt amount based on an admission in the balance sheet. The petitioner argued that the application was misconceived and that the admission should be made during the proceedings, not at the interim stage. The Tribunal, however, held that the admission in the balance sheet constituted an admission of liability, and the application was allowed. The DRAT upheld this decision, interpreting that admissions need not be made during the proceedings but could be made before the institution of proceedings.
2. Interpretation of "Admission" u/s 19(20) and Rule 12(5):
The court examined whether an admission in the balance sheet/profit and loss account, not in pleadings or before the Tribunal, could be considered an admission warranting an order for payment. The court referred to Order XII, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows for judgment on an admission either in the pleading or otherwise. The court concluded that an admission could be in any document or mode provided u/s 17 of the Indian Evidence Act. The balance sheet and profit and loss account, being statutory requirements under the Indian Companies Act, were deemed admissions of liability. The court found no material or explanation from the petitioner to displace this admission.
3. Limitation Period:
The petitioner contended that the original application was barred by limitation, as the cause of action arose from the Profit and Loss Account of 31st March 2000, and the application was filed on 16-6-2003. The court dismissed this argument, noting that the profit and loss account was signed on 1-9-2000, making the application within the limitation period.
Conclusion:
The court found no merit in the petition, upheld the orders of the DRT and DRAT, and discharged the rule. The interim order, if any, was vacated, and there was no order as to costs.
-
2007 (3) TMI 811
Issues involved:
The issues involved in this case are related to the rectification of orders under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the rejection of miscellaneous applications seeking rectification of previous orders.
Rectification Application Dismissal (1st Application):
The assessee initially moved an application for rectification of the order dated 18-8-1983, which was subsequently dismissed on 24-12-1983.
Rectification Application Dismissal (2nd Application):
Subsequently, the assessee filed another application for rectification of the same order dated 18-8-1983, which was dismissed on 30-11-1984.
Question of Law Framed:
The question of law framed for consideration was whether the Tribunal erred in rejecting the miscellaneous applications filed against the order dated 30-11-1984, which modified deductions allowed earlier under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment years 1975-76, 1976-77, and 1977-78.
Court's Opinion:
The Court opined that the issue at hand did not present a question of law warranting consideration. It was noted that since one application had already been dismissed, the subsequent application seeking the same relief was bound to be dismissed as well. Consequently, the Court concluded that no question of law arose for their opinion.
Conclusion:
In light of the above analysis, the Court decided to return the reference unanswered, indicating that no legal question merited further deliberation in this matter.
-
2007 (3) TMI 810
Issues involved: Interpretation of u/s 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and rule 6DD(j) of the Income-tax Rules.
In this case, the assessee made a cash payment exceeding the limit specified in u/s 40A(3) of the Act to a partner of a firm. The provision prohibited cash payments exceeding a certain amount unless by crossed cheque or bank draft. An exception under rule 6DD(j) allowed cash payments in specific circumstances, such as exceptional or unavoidable situations. The genuineness of payment and payee's identity must be established, along with reasons for cash payment. The Tribunal found no exceptional circumstances necessitating cash payment, as the payee did not insist on cash. The assessee failed to demonstrate any valid reasons for the cash payment, as required by the law. All statutory authorities agreed that there were no special reasons for the cash payment, leading to a concurrent finding against the assessee. Consequently, the questions referred were answered in favor of the revenue regarding the disallowance under u/s 40A(3) and the sustainability of the addition, as the assessee did not meet the criteria specified under the law.
-
2007 (3) TMI 809
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2007 (3) TMI 809 - SC. Judges were Mr. S.H. Kapadia and Mr. Altamas Kabir.
-
2007 (3) TMI 808
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the cheque issued by the respondent.
2. Determination of liability and quantum of punishment under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
3. Appropriateness of compensation versus fine.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Cheque:
The appellant and respondent were partners in a business that faced disputes. The appellant alleged that the respondent withdrew money from a joint bank account without authorization. A compromise was reached, including terms for finalizing accounts and issuing a cheque for Rs. 7 lakhs as security. The cheque was dishonored, leading to a complaint by the appellant. The respondent claimed the cheque was issued under duress and was meant as security pending an audit.
2. Determination of Liability and Quantum of Punishment u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
The Trial Judge convicted the respondent u/s 138 of the Act, imposing a fine of Rs. 7,05,000/- and three months simple imprisonment in default. The Additional Sessions Judge modified the sentence to a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and set aside the compensation order. The High Court upheld the conviction but maintained the fine. The Supreme Court noted that the cheque was issued in anticipation of an audit, and the actual liability was yet to be ascertained. However, the respondent admitted liability for Rs. 7 lakhs, and the courts below found no merit in the defense of coercion.
3. Appropriateness of Compensation versus Fine:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the power to award compensation is not limited, unlike the imposition of fines. The purpose of compensation must be considered under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court concluded that awarding compensation would serve justice better than a substantial sentence. The respondent was directed to pay Rs. 7,00,000/- as compensation within eight weeks, failing which recovery steps would be taken.
Conclusion:
The appeal was disposed of with the respondent ordered to pay Rs. 7,00,000/- as compensation instead of the fine, aligning with the principles of justice and the specific circumstances of the case.
-
2007 (3) TMI 807
Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the arbitration clause to the dispute raised in the suit.
2. Jurisdiction of the civil court to decide on the applicability of the arbitration clause.
3. Whether the civil court can decline to refer a dispute to arbitration despite the existence of an arbitration clause.
4. The impact of a compromise decree on the arbitration clause.
5. Maintainability of the revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Applicability of the Arbitration Clause to the Dispute Raised in the Suit:
The core question was whether the arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties applied to the dispute raised in the suit. The court noted that the existence of the arbitration clause was admitted by the plaintiff company. According to Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a judicial authority must refer the parties to arbitration if an arbitration agreement exists. The court emphasized that it is the arbitrator's role, under Section 16 of the Act, to decide the applicability of the arbitration clause to the dispute. This position was reinforced by the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd vs. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, which held that the civil court must refer the dispute to arbitration if an arbitration clause exists, leaving the determination of its applicability to the arbitrator.
2. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court to Decide on the Applicability of the Arbitration Clause:
The court highlighted that the civil court does not have jurisdiction to decide whether the arbitration clause applies to the facts of the case. This determination is within the exclusive domain of the arbitrator as per Section 16 of the Act. The Supreme Court's ruling in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. further clarified that objections regarding the applicability of the arbitration clause should be raised before the arbitral tribunal.
3. Whether the Civil Court Can Decline to Refer a Dispute to Arbitration Despite the Existence of an Arbitration Clause:
The court ruled that the civil court cannot decline to refer a dispute to arbitration if an arbitration clause exists and the application for arbitration is made before the filing of the written statement. The trial court's decision to dismiss the defendant's petition for arbitration was found to be a serious error of jurisdiction, as it contradicted the mandatory provisions of Section 8 of the Act.
4. The Impact of a Compromise Decree on the Arbitration Clause:
The court examined whether the compromise decree in a previous suit affected the arbitration clause. It was noted that the compromise decree settled the disputes raised in that specific suit. However, the new money suit filed by the plaintiff company was based on different grounds, such as illegal termination and harassment, which were not covered by the compromise decree. Therefore, the arbitration clause remained applicable to the new disputes, and the civil court should have referred the matter to arbitration.
5. Maintainability of the Revision Petition Under Section 115 of the CPC:
The court addressed the objection regarding the maintainability of the revision petition. It was observed that the impugned order, if allowed to stand, would cause failure of justice and irreparable injury to the defendant company. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, which held that refusal to refer a dispute to arbitration when an arbitration clause exists amounts to a jurisdictional error. Consequently, the revision petition was deemed maintainable under Section 115 of the CPC.
Conclusion:
The revision petition was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. The trial court was directed to refer the parties to arbitration. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and reiterated that the arbitrator has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the arbitration clause to the dispute. The parties were instructed to appear before the trial court on a specified date for further proceedings.
-
2007 (3) TMI 806
The Supreme Court ordered the issuance of a passport to the petitioner without limitations for study and travel abroad, with a condition for reconsideration if activities are prejudicial to the state. The passport is to be issued within four weeks.
-
2007 (3) TMI 805
Issues involved: Assessment of loan transaction u/s 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Summary:
Assessment of Loan Transaction:
The case involved the assessment of a loan transaction amounting to Rs. 35 lakhs taken by the assessee from M/s Vandana Investment & Finance Company. The assessing officer doubted the genuineness of the transaction and raised concerns about the source of the loan. Despite the assessee providing the bank statement of the sole proprietor of the firm, showing a balance of Rs. 72 lakhs, the assessing officer overlooked this crucial evidence. The assessing officer questioned the need for the loan from a Mumbai firm when an interest-free loan was already obtained from a sister-concern in Delhi. Consequently, the assessing officer added the loan amount to the income of the assessee u/s 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Appeal and Tribunal Decision:
Upon appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) considered the payment method, confirmation from the sole proprietor, PAN details, and the bank statement indicating a substantial balance before issuing the loan. The Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the loan was genuine and the creditor had the financial capacity to provide the loan. Subsequently, the revenue appealed to the Tribunal, which upheld the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal emphasized that if the assessing officer had doubts, further examination should have been conducted instead of merely disbelieving the assessee.
High Court Decision:
The High Court noted that both the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal had acknowledged the evidence provided by the assessee, including the bank statement of the creditor demonstrating sufficient funds and details establishing creditworthiness. Based on the facts presented, both authorities deemed the transaction genuine. The High Court found no fault in the decisions of the lower authorities and concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
-
2007 (3) TMI 804
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit schedule properties are ancestral and joint family properties.
2. Whether the defendant unlawfully got the revenue entries in his name and refused to allot the plaintiff's share.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to half share and mesne profits.
4. Pecuniary jurisdiction and maintainability of the suit.
5. Whether the suit schedule properties are absolute properties of T.C. Nanjappa.
6. Additional issues regarding the acceptance of additional evidence and amendment of the written statement.
Summary:
Issue 1: Ancestral and Joint Family Properties
The plaintiff claimed that the suit schedule properties were ancestral and joint family properties. The trial court, based on oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff proved the properties were joint family properties and in joint possession. The appellate court affirmed this finding, rejecting the defendant's claim that the properties were absolute properties of T.C. Nanjappa.
Issue 2: Revenue Entries and Refusal to Allot Share
The trial court found that the defendant unlawfully got the revenue entries in his name with an ulterior motive and refused to allot the plaintiff's half share. This finding was upheld by the appellate court.
Issue 3: Entitlement to Half Share and Mesne Profits
The trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to half share in the suit schedule properties and mesne profits. The appellate court affirmed this decision.
Issue 4: Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Maintainability
The trial court rejected the defendant's contention that the court had no pecuniary jurisdiction and that the suit was not maintainable. This was also upheld by the appellate court.
Issue 5: Absolute Properties of T.C. Nanjappa
The trial court found that the defendants failed to establish that the suit schedule properties were the absolute properties of T.C. Nanjappa. The appellate court affirmed this finding.
Additional Issues:
The appellate court rejected applications for additional evidence and amendment of the written statement, holding that no satisfactory grounds were made out for allowing them.
Substantial Questions of Law:
The High Court considered whether the courts below were justified in holding that the mortgage deed Ex.D1 did not establish partition and whether the rejection of applications for additional evidence and amendment was justified. The High Court also considered whether the courts below were justified in holding that there existed a joint family and the suit schedule properties were joint family properties, given the plaintiff's admission of a partition 80 years back.
High Court Judgment:
The High Court found that the courts below ignored material evidence, including the mortgage deed Ex.D1, which indicated a partition. The plaintiff's admission of a partition 80 years back and the lack of evidence of joint family living and enjoyment of properties led the High Court to conclude that the plaintiff was not a member of the joint family and the properties were not joint family properties. The High Court set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts and dismissed the plaintiff's suit, with parties bearing their own costs.
-
2007 (3) TMI 803
Issues Involved:
1. Sanction of the Modified Composite Scheme of Arrangement.
2. Classification and treatment of creditors.
3. Disclosure and adequacy of information in the explanatory statement.
4. Reduction of share capital and compliance with statutory requirements.
5. Allegations of fraud on revenue and tax benefits.
6. Validity and fairness of the share exchange ratio.
7. Objections regarding specific creditors and their claims.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Sanction of the Modified Composite Scheme of Arrangement:
The court sanctioned the Modified Composite Scheme of Arrangement between Core Healthcare Limited and Nirma Limited, binding on all equity shareholders, Class 'A' lenders, and Class 'B' lenders. The court directed the petitioner companies to file a certified copy of the order with the Registrar of Companies for registration.
2. Classification and Treatment of Creditors:
The court addressed objections regarding the classification of creditors, particularly the inclusion of ARCIL, Niya Finstock Pvt. Ltd., and Astramed Technologies Ltd. as Class 'A' and Class 'B' lenders. The court emphasized that creditors with similar rights should be treated as a single class. ARCIL, having acquired debts from various banks, was deemed to step into the shoes of the original lenders, and its votes were considered valid. The court found no conflict of interest between ARCIL and other lenders, as all had a common interest in recovering dues from Core.
3. Disclosure and Adequacy of Information in the Explanatory Statement:
The court examined whether the explanatory statement provided sufficient information to the creditors and shareholders. It was noted that the explanatory statement must contain the terms of the scheme and its effect, particularly any material interest of the directors. The court found that the explanatory statement did not suffer from inadequacies, as the lenders were already aware of the relevant facts, including the role of ARCIL and the injunction order from the Debts Recovery Tribunal.
4. Reduction of Share Capital and Compliance with Statutory Requirements:
The court considered the objection that the scheme involved a reduction of share capital without following the procedure prescribed under Sections 100 to 104 of the Companies Act. The court held that the reduction of share capital could be approved as part of the scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 391, provided the procedure for reduction was carried out simultaneously. The court found that the statutory requirements were met, and the reduction of share capital was approved.
5. Allegations of Fraud on Revenue and Tax Benefits:
The court addressed the objection that the scheme amounted to fraud on revenue due to the tax benefits arising from the carry-forward of losses and unabsorbed depreciation. The court held that Section 72A(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, allowed such benefits, and taking advantage of statutory provisions could not be considered fraud on revenue.
6. Validity and Fairness of the Share Exchange Ratio:
The court examined the share exchange ratio, which was based on the report of M/s. RSM & Company, Chartered Accountants. The court noted that the ratio was accepted by the overwhelming majority of shareholders and creditors. The court emphasized that it was not for the court to substitute its judgment for the commercial wisdom of the shareholders and creditors who approved the scheme.
7. Objections Regarding Specific Creditors and Their Claims:
The court addressed specific objections from creditors like HDFC Bank and M/s. Alstom Projects (India) Ltd. HDFC Bank objected to the treatment of amounts paid under bank guarantees. The court held that HDFC Bank, having become a lender upon payment under the guarantees, was subject to the scheme. M/s. Alstom Projects (India) Ltd. and IDBI Bank sought the return of a power plant, but the court found that such issues were beyond the scope of the scheme proceedings and advised them to seek appropriate legal remedies.
Conclusion:
The court sanctioned the Modified Composite Scheme of Arrangement between Core Healthcare Limited and Nirma Limited, finding it fair, reasonable, and beneficial for all stakeholders. The objections raised were addressed and found to be without merit. The scheme was approved, subject to the directions for registration with the Registrar of Companies.
-
2007 (3) TMI 802
The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal as no substantial question of law arose based on their previous order in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Devi Dass Malhan (ITA No.155/2007). (2007 (3) TMI 802 - DELHI HIGH COURT)
-
2007 (3) TMI 801
Issues Involved:
1. Service of summons and substituted service.
2. Setting aside ex-parte order.
3. Compliance with procedural rules under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Summary:
1. Service of Summons and Substituted Service:
The appellant, Smt. Renu Sharma, was the defendant in Suit-CS(OS) No. 898/2003 filed by M/s. Titan Industries Ltd. for recovery of goods and damages. The appellant could not be served by ordinary process and was served by publication in the newspaper 'The Statesman' and was proceeded ex-parte vide Order dated 23rd April, 2004. The learned Single Judge rejected the appellant's application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the Code, holding that three attempts were made to serve notice upon the appellant by registered post and ordinary process but without success. The reports of the process server and postal authorities indicated that the appellant was avoiding service, justifying substituted service through publication.
2. Setting Aside Ex-Parte Order:
The appellant moved an application for setting aside the ex-parte Order on 2nd June, 2006, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The High Court, upon review, found that the process server and postal authorities failed to meet the appellant or any adult male member of her family personally. The reports lacked specific findings required under Order V, Rule 15 of the Code, and the process server did not record the time of service attempts. The Court noted that the appellant had met with the respondent in May 2004 but was not informed of the suit, raising doubts about the fairness of the proceedings.
3. Compliance with Procedural Rules:
The Court emphasized the importance of personal service of summons as per Order V, Rule 12 of the Code. The process server's failure to meet the appellant or any adult male member of her family and the lack of proper documentation in the service reports were critical issues. The Court highlighted that procedural law aims to advance justice and should not obstruct a party from presenting their case. The Court decided to set aside the ex-parte order to ensure substantial justice, subject to the appellant paying costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the respondent.
Conclusion:
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the ex-parte order dated 23rd April, 2004, and directed the appellant to pay costs of Rs. 50,000/- to the respondent. The appellant was instructed to file a written statement within three weeks, and the matter was listed for compliance and payment of costs on 17th April, 2007. The Court stressed the need for a fair opportunity for both parties to present their cases, adhering to principles of natural justice.
-
2007 (3) TMI 800
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2007 (3) TMI 800 - SC. Judgement was delivered by Mr. S.H. Kapadia and Mr. B. Sudershan, JJ.
-
2007 (3) TMI 799
Deliberate and Willful Violation of the Prohibitory order passed by the High Court - Guilty of contempt of Court - Plea of mistake of understanding - Contempt Petition - Applications for Grant of licenses for excise shops - HELD THAT:- The High Court in that view of the matter committed a grave mis-carriage of justice by not taking into consideration another most important fact that if actually the lottery was held by mistake or by misunderstanding of the orders, then the respondent would have immediately rectified it and would have cancelled the lottery but in the instant case, instead of canceling the lottery, the respondents have justified their conduct from which the determined declination of obeying the order is clearly proved
It is settled law that a party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an unfair advantage by committing breach of an interim order and escape the consequences thereof by pleading misunderstanding and thereafter retain the said advantage gained in breach of the order of the Court. Such violations should be put an end with an iron hand.
We are unable to accept the argument advanced by learned Addl. Solicitor General that the respondents did not understand the implication and consequences of a prohibitory order passed by the High Court. We have already explained their conduct and the refusal to cancel the order when they were advised to do so by the High Court during the pendency of the contempt proceedings. The act of the respondent is not only willful but also deliberate and contumacious. The High Court committed a grave error of law by not holding that if there was a doubt about the implication of the order of the Court, the alleged contemnors should have approached the Court and have clarified their alleged confusion.
Likewise, this Court while ordering notice in the present appeal @ SLP have clearly directed on 18.09.2006 that no license shall be granted on the basis of the lottery and pursuant to the circular dated 20.01.2004. Even after the receipt of the order, the respondents have not cancelled the license, but allowed them to continue the business. The reason is obvious. The respondents though tendered unqualified apology before the High Court, the High Court was not inclined to go into the question of apology in view of the observations made by it in the order impugned in this civil appeal. Even before us no apology whatsoever was tendered by respondent Nos.1-4. We, therefore, hold them guilty of willful and deliberate act of contempt.
As it is evident that respondent Nos.1-4 have no regard for the orders passed by this Court on 4, 19 and 20.01.2005 and have scant respect for the Court’s orders and have deliberately and willfully and with utter disregard violated all the 3 orders and are thus guilty of contempt of Court. However, taking a lenient view and taking into consideration of the future prospects of the officers, respondent Nos. 1-4 we are not imposing any punishment for their willful violation of the order of the High Court and accept the unqualified apology filed before the High Court.
We, therefore hold them guilty of contempt of Court and do hereby censure their conduct - Civil appeal stands allowed.
-
2007 (3) TMI 798
Issues involved: Validity of a predated revision order and delay in serving the order to the petitioner.
The petitioner raised a grievance regarding a revision order dated 23.1.2006, alleging it was predated and served to them much later in November 2006. The original assessment was conducted in 2002, and the petitioner contended that the revision order should have been passed by 8th March 2006 u/s the Sales Tax Act. The petitioner claimed the order was actually passed after the deadline and predated to 23.1.2006.
The petitioner argued that the proximity of the respondents' office to the petitioner's office made it implausible for the order to take 10 months to be served if it was genuinely passed on 23.1.2006. The lack of explanation from the respondents regarding the delay in serving the order further supported the petitioner's claim that the order was not passed on the stated date. The Court noted the absence of any valid reason for the delay in serving the order.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay in serving the revision order, the Court relied on previous judgments to presume that the order was indeed passed much later than the stated date. Citing precedents, the Court allowed the Writ Petition, quashing the revision order dated 23.1.2006 issued by the second respondent. The decision was made without imposing any costs on the parties involved.
-
2007 (3) TMI 797
Issues Involved:
1. Limitation for filing application for gratuity.
2. Jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority.
3. Withholding of gratuity due to non-vacation of employer's premises.
4. Remittance of the matter back to the Controlling Authority.
Summary:
1. Limitation for filing application for gratuity:
The petitioner retired on 31st May 2000 and applied for gratuity on the same day, but the claim was not settled. He later moved an application dated 12th July 2005 to the Controlling Authority u/s 4 and 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, along with an application for condonation of delay. The Controlling Authority directed the respondent to pay the gratuity with interest. However, the Appellate Authority reversed this order, holding the application was barred by limitation. The High Court noted that the Controlling Authority failed to consider the application for condonation of delay, which was a lapse.
2. Jurisdiction of the Controlling Authority:
The Appellate Authority held that without condoning the delay, the Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the application for gratuity. The High Court agreed, stating that the Controlling Authority should have first addressed the delay condonation before proceeding on merits.
3. Withholding of gratuity due to non-vacation of employer's premises:
The respondent argued that the gratuity was withheld because the petitioner refused to vacate the bank's residential accommodation. The petitioner contended that gratuity cannot be denied on this ground, citing precedents. The respondent cited a recent judgment allowing employers to withhold gratuity for unauthorized occupation of quarters. The High Court noted that the Controlling Authority should consider this factor when deciding the application.
4. Remittance of the matter back to the Controlling Authority:
The High Court set aside the Appellate Authority's order and remitted the matter back to the Controlling Authority to consider the application for condonation of delay. The Controlling Authority was directed to decide the application on its merits, following principles of natural justice. The amount of Rs. 3,50,000/- deposited by the respondent was directed to be held in fixed deposits by the Controlling Authority, subject to the result of the application. The petitioner was allowed to withdraw the amount if he vacated the bank premises.
Order:
The petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute with no order as to costs.
-
2007 (3) TMI 796
Issues involved:
Appeal against the order of the Tribunal regarding short deduction of tax under section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and interest thereon for assessment years 1990-91 to 1999-2000.
Summary:
Issue 1: Short deduction of tax under section 201 of the Act for assessment years 1990-91 to 1998-99
The appeals arose from a consolidated order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal concerning the short deduction of tax by the assessee. The Assessing Officer held that the price difference between items sold to employees and their written down value was a perquisite in the employees' hands, leading to short deduction of tax under section 201 of the Act. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) upheld this decision, but the Tribunal set it aside, ruling in favor of the assessee. The revenue contended that the assessee sold assets below market price, while the assessee argued that no perquisite was involved as market prices were not proven to be lower. The Court agreed with the Tribunal, stating that without evidence of items being sold below market price, no default in TDS deduction existed under section 201.
Issue 2: Short deduction of tax under section 201 of the Act for assessment year 1999-2000
Similarly, for the assessment year 1999-2000, the Assessing Officer found a shortfall in tax deduction and imposed interest under section 201(1A) of the Act. The Tribunal reversed the decision, prompting the revenue to appeal. The revenue claimed the assessee sold assets below market value, but the assessee argued against the existence of a perquisite due to lack of evidence on market prices. The Court concurred with the Tribunal's findings, stating that no default in TDS deduction was established.
Conclusion:
The Court dismissed the appeals filed by the revenue, upholding the Tribunal's decision that the assessee was not in default of short deduction of TDS under section 201 of the Act. Consequently, no penalty under section 271C for tax deduction was applicable, and the Tribunal's cancellation of the penalty was deemed appropriate. The Court found no substantial question of law to entertain the appeals, leading to the dismissal of the revenue's appeals.
This summary provides a detailed breakdown of the judgment, addressing each issue involved in the case regarding the short deduction of tax under section 201 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
........
|
9911796707
