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Showing 21 to 40 of 1052 Records

• 2011 (4) TMI 1537
  
  The Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2011 (4) TMI 1537. Judges were Mr. D.K. Jain and Mr. H.L. Dattu.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1536
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment involves the consideration of bid validity, withdrawal from a consortium, disqualification of a consortium, and forfeiture of bid security.
  
  Consideration of Bid Validity:
  The tender required a bid security and specified a validity period for bids. The consortium extended the bid validity period, but a member withdrew before the expiry. The bid security could be forfeited if a bidder withdrew during the bid validity period.
  
  Withdrawal from Consortium and Disqualification:
  A member's withdrawal from the consortium led to disqualification, affecting the consortium's ability to qualify in bid evaluation stages. The court held that withdrawal of a material member from the consortium should be treated as withdrawal of the bid, justifying forfeiture of bid security.
  
  Forfeiture of Bid Security:
  The court determined that the first respondent should have issued a notice regarding the forfeiture of bid security due to the withdrawal of a member from the consortium. The bidder should have been given an opportunity to respond before any action on bid security forfeiture.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court quashed the decision to forfeit the bid security and directed the first respondent to issue a proper show cause notice and pass a reasoned order after considering the petitioner's response, if any. The writ petition was allowed to this extent.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1535
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the acquisition proceedings lapsed due to non-compliance with Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  2. Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to quash the acquisition proceedings despite the award not being made within the prescribed period.
  3. Whether the High Court correctly applied the ratio of the judgments in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Non-compliance with Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
  The Supreme Court held that the acquisition proceedings lapsed due to non-compliance with Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court noted that the Respondents failed to take possession of the acquired land and pass the award within the period prescribed u/s 11A. The Respondents knew about the dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the Appellants in 1990 and 1997 respectively, yet they failed to act within the stipulated period.
  
  Issue 2: High Court's Refusal to Quash Acquisition Proceedings
  The Supreme Court found that the High Court was wrong in refusing to quash the acquisition proceedings. The High Court had accepted the Respondents' assertion that they did not know about the dismissal of the writ petitions until April/May 2000. However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the Respondents were aware of the dismissal of various petitions in 1995 and 1997 in the presence of their advocates. The High Court failed to scrutinize the entire record carefully before concluding that there was no violation of Section 11A.
  
  Issue 3: Application of Judgments in Satendra Prasad Jain and Awadh Bihari Yadav
  The Supreme Court held that the High Court was not justified in applying the ratio of the judgments in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. and Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar. In those cases, possession of the acquired land was taken within two years of the publication of the declaration issued u/s 6(1), resulting in the land vesting in the State Government. In the present case, possession was not taken within two years of the dismissal of the writ petitions, and thus, the land did not vest in the State Government.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeals were allowed, and the impugned orders were set aside. It was declared that the acquisition proceedings would be deemed to have lapsed concerning the Appellants due to non-compliance with the mandate of Section 11A of the Act. The parties were left to bear their own costs.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1534
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Continuation or vacation of office by members of the Empowered Standing Committee upon the election of a new Mayor/Chief Councilor.
  2. Interpretation of Section 27 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 in relation to other connected sections.
  3. Constitutional validity of Section 27 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007.
  4. Authority of a newly elected Mayor/Chief Councilor to nominate members to the Empowered Standing Committee.
  5. Harmonious construction of statutory provisions to avoid conflict and ensure democratic governance.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Continuation or Vacation of Office by Members of the Empowered Standing Committee:
  The Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, provides for the election of the Mayor/Chief Councilor and the Deputy Mayor/Deputy Chief Councilor, as well as the formation of an Empowered Standing Committee. This committee consists of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor, and seven other councillors nominated by the Mayor under Section 21(3). The term of office for these members is supposed to be co-terminus with the duration of the Municipality as per Section 27. However, the Act does not explicitly state whether the members of the Empowered Standing Committee should vacate their office when a new Mayor/Chief Councilor is elected. This leads to an anomalous situation where the new Mayor, who has the confidence of the house, might have to work with committee members nominated by the previous Mayor, who has lost the house's confidence.
  
  2. Interpretation of Section 27 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007:
  The primary question is whether Section 27 should be read in isolation, meaning the members of the Empowered Standing Committee continue for the entire period of the municipal body, or whether it should be read in conjunction with Sections 25(4), 23(3), and 21(3). The latter sections provide for the removal and election of a new Mayor and the nomination of committee members. The court considered whether a literal reading of Section 27 would result in treating the newly elected Mayor dissimilarly, thereby making Section 27 ultra vires the Constitution of India. The court decided that Section 27 should be harmoniously read with the other sections to ensure that the term of the nominated members is co-terminus with the nominating Mayor, and they automatically vacate their office when the Mayor nominating them is no longer in office.
  
  3. Constitutional Validity of Section 27:
  The court examined whether Section 27, as interpreted by the respondents, would violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India by treating the newly elected Mayor differently from the earlier Mayor. The court found that such an interpretation would indeed lead to an unreasonable and discriminatory situation. Therefore, to save Section 27 from being ultra vires, it must be read down harmoniously with other relevant sections, ensuring that the new Mayor has the authority to nominate new members to the Empowered Standing Committee.
  
  4. Authority of a Newly Elected Mayor/Chief Councilor:
  The court concluded that the newly elected Mayor/Chief Councilor should have the authority to nominate members to the Empowered Standing Committee. This is necessary for the effective exercise of executive power and to maintain the principle of collective responsibility in municipal governance. The court emphasized that the new Mayor should not be at the mercy of the committee members nominated by the previous Mayor, as this would hinder the functioning of the municipal body.
  
  5. Harmonious Construction of Statutory Provisions:
  The court highlighted the importance of interpreting statutory provisions in a manner that avoids conflict and ensures the smooth functioning of democratic governance. The court referred to principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that when two interpretations are possible, the one that avoids anomalies and promotes harmonious functioning should be preferred. The court decided to read Section 27 subject to Sections 25(4), 23(3), 21(3), and 21(4), thereby ensuring that the newly elected Mayor can nominate his nominees to the Empowered Standing Committee.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment of the Patna High Court. Section 27 of the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007, is to be read down harmoniously with Sections 25(4), 23(3), 21(3), and 21(4). The District Magistrate, Patna, was directed to administer the oath of secrecy to the seven Municipal councillors nominated by the appellant to the Empowered Standing Committee. The appellant and the committee members are entitled to exercise their powers in accordance with the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007. The parties will bear their own costs of the proceedings.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1533
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to order u/s 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, application for expert examination of cheques, fair trial rights.
  
  In this judgment, the petitioner challenged the order dated 20.06.2010 passed by JMFC, Jalna below Exhibit46 in STC No. 466/2009, which was confirmed by the learned Sessions Court in Revision Application No. 86/2010. The petitioner sought relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, arguing that the cheques in question were given as security and filled up by the respondent conveniently. The petitioner requested to refer the cheques to an expert for determination of ink age and signature authenticity. The application was rejected by JMFC, leading to the present petition.
  
  During the proceedings, the petitioner's counsel cited the Supreme Court's observations in "T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar" 2008 (5) SCC 633, emphasizing the importance of fair trial rights. The Apex Court highlighted that a magistrate can direct sending documents to a handwriting expert for comparison, and denial of this opportunity can result in a lack of fair trial. The petitioner, although not disputing the signature on the cheques, argued that sending the cheques to an expert is crucial for a fair trial, as per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.
  
  The court, considering the arguments and legal precedents, allowed the petition, quashed the impugned orders, and directed the application (Exhibit46) in STC No. 466/2009 to be allowed. The court also set a time-bound program for the trial court to send the disputed cheques to an expert for examination of ink age and signature authenticity. The trial court was instructed to collect the expert report within 3 months and decide the case expeditiously after receiving the report, ensuring fair trial rights are upheld.
  

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1532
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the announcement regarding the export order was deliberately made to mislead investors.
  2. Whether the price of the scrip increased solely due to the announcement regarding the export order.
  3. Whether the company promptly informed the public about the non-materialization of the export order.
  4. Whether the promoters violated regulations by selling their shares after the announcement.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Misleading Announcement
  The precise charge against the appellants was making a false/misleading corporate announcement about an export order, leading to an increase in the price and volumes of the scrip of M/s. Vijay Textiles Limited. The adjudicating officer concluded that the appellants falsely informed the BSE about the receipt of the export order, which was just an intent to purchase and not an actual order, thus violating Regulations 4(1), 4(2)(e), and (r) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices relating to Securities Market) Regulations 2003. However, the Tribunal found that the announcement was not misleading and that the company treated the letter of intent as an order based on subsequent communications with Simran Enterprises.
  
  Issue 2: Price Increase Due to Announcement
  The adjudicating officer concluded that the price of the scrip increased due to the misleading announcement, and the promoters sold their shares making huge profits. The Tribunal disagreed, stating that the price increase could not be attributed solely to the export order announcement. The company had made several other price-sensitive announcements around the same time, including financial performance improvements, dividend declarations, and bonus issues, which were primarily responsible for the price increase.
  
  Issue 3: Public Information on Non-Materialization
  The Board argued that the company did not promptly inform the public about the non-materialization of the export order. The Tribunal found that the company had informed the public through BSE and a newspaper announcement, and it was reasonable for the company to wait before concluding that the order had not been finalized. The Tribunal held that the announcement was made in a manner that prominently brought the information to the public's notice.
  
  Issue 4: Promoters' Share Sales
  The Board contended that the promoters sold a substantial part of their holdings when the price went up, violating the Regulations. The Tribunal found no fault with the sales, noting that the promoters had been selling their stocks before and after the public announcements regarding the export order. The Tribunal held that the price increase was due to other corporate announcements and not the export order announcement.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeals were allowed, and the impugned orders were set aside. The Tribunal concluded that the company did not deliberately make a misleading announcement and that the price increase was due to other corporate announcements. The Tribunal also found that the company had informed the public about the non-materialization of the export order in a reasonable manner and that the promoters' share sales were not in violation of the Regulations.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1531
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Requirement of Lessor's Permission for Lease Assignment
  2. Validity of Lease Assignment for 99 Years
  3. Compensation for Ex-Post Facto Permission
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Requirement of Lessor's Permission for Lease Assignment:
  The applicant, a statutory body, objected to the assignment of a lease by the Official Liquidator without their prior permission, as required by Clause 6(i) of the lease agreement. The Court agreed that the Official Liquidator should have obtained express prior permission from the applicant before assigning the lease. The Court noted that the Official Liquidator could not confer any better title to the property than what the company-in-liquidation had, and the absence of such permission rendered the assignment invalid.
  
  2. Validity of Lease Assignment for 99 Years:
  The applicant contended that the current industrial policy of the Jharkhand Government only allowed for a new lease to be executed for a period of 30 years. The Court examined the terms and conditions of the sale and found that the Official Liquidator had not properly represented the title in the sale notice, leading to a misunderstanding that the property was being sold as freehold. The Court held that the defect in the title was significant and the sale was void ab initio due to the lack of prior permission from the applicant.
  
  3. Compensation for Ex-Post Facto Permission:
  The applicant was willing to grant ex-post facto permission for the lease assignment if compensated with Rs. 53,78,472/-, calculated as the land cost. The Court decided that both the Official Liquidator and the purchaser were equally responsible for the oversight and should bear the compensation equally. The Official Liquidator and the purchaser were each ordered to pay 50% of Rs. 53,78,472/- to the applicant within four weeks. Upon receipt of the payment, the applicant would be deemed to have accorded their ex-post facto permission.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court ordered that the Official Liquidator and the purchaser each pay 50% of Rs. 53,78,472/- to the applicant for ex-post facto permission. The payment by the Official Liquidator was to be treated as expenses of winding up. The order was executable as a decree, and both applications were disposed of with no order as to costs.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1530
  
  The Supreme Court of India dismissed the special leave petitions after condoning the delay. (Citation: 2011 (4) TMI 1530 - SC)

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1529
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against acquittal, delay in lodging FIR, evidence of eyewitness, recording of statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
  
  Appeal against Acquittal:
  The appellant, along with two others, was initially acquitted by the Trial Court, but the High Court set aside the acquittal and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant challenged this decision, leading to a series of appeals. The Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the case to determine if the High Court's interference was justified based on the evidence and the principle of perversity in trial judgments.
  
  Delay in Lodging FIR:
  The defense argued that there was a delay in lodging the FIR, suggesting manipulation to cover up the delay. However, the Supreme Court clarified that a FIR is always recorded at the police station, not at the site of the incident. The timing of the statements and the formal FIR registration were found to be reasonable, with the post-mortem report also supporting the timely handling of the case.
  
  Evidence of Eyewitness:
  The eyewitness, PW-4, the mother of the deceased, provided crucial testimony regarding the incident. Despite challenges to her credibility, the Court found her account consistent and supported by other witnesses. The Court highlighted her actions during the incident, her relationship with the victim, and the corroboration from other witnesses, strengthening the prosecution's case.
  
  Recording of Statements under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.:
  The defense raised concerns about the perfunctory recording of statements under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The Court acknowledged the importance of these statements but noted that no objections were raised earlier in the appellate process. Without evidence of prejudice to the appellant due to the recording process, the Court concluded that the appeal lacked merit and dismissed it.
  
  In conclusion, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside the acquittal and convict the appellant based on a thorough review of the evidence and legal principles.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1528
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the respondent committed an offense u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondent.
  3. Whether the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act.
  
  Issue 1: Offense u/s 138 of the NI Act
  The petitioner alleged that the respondent issued seven cheques totaling Rs. 2,10,000/- for repayment of a loan, which were dishonored due to insufficient funds. The petitioner contended that the respondent intentionally issued cheques without sufficient balance, thereby committing an offense u/s 138 of the NI Act and Section 420 IPC. The respondent denied owing any debt and claimed the cheques were forged.
  
  Issue 2: Trial Court's Acquittal
  The petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously acquitted the respondent by not recognizing the presumption in favor of the cheque holder u/s 139 of the NI Act. The petitioner asserted that the trial court wrongly concluded that the complaint was filed prematurely and overlooked the statutory presumption. The respondent's counsel supported the acquittal, arguing that the petitioner failed to prove the loan and that the cheques were forged.
  
  Issue 3: Rebuttal of Presumption u/s 139 of the NI Act
  The court referred to Sections 138 and 139 of the NI Act, emphasizing that dishonor of a cheque alone does not constitute an offense unless certain conditions are met. The court cited the Apex Court's decision in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, which clarified that the presumption u/s 139 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The court noted that the respondent did not need to adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and could rely on the material brought on record.
  
  The court found that the petitioner failed to provide corroborative evidence of the loan, such as witnesses, documents, or receipts. The court also questioned the credibility of the petitioner's story regarding the issuance and timing of the cheques. Given the lack of evidence and the inconsistencies in the petitioner's account, the court held that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption by preponderance of probabilities.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court dismissed the revision, upholding the trial court's acquittal of the respondent. The court concluded that the respondent successfully rebutted the statutory presumption against her, and the petitioner's case lacked merit.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1527
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to judgment convicting under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and dismissal of Criminal Appeal. Interpretation of Section 147 of the N.I. Act for compounding offences.
  
  The judgment pertains to a revision petition challenging a judgment convicting the accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and dismissing a Criminal Appeal. The accused had issued a cheque worth &8377; 1,20,000, leading to the legal proceedings. The complainant indicated satisfaction with a settlement, supporting the accused's plea to set aside the conviction and sentence.
  
  In the case, reference was made to a Supreme Court judgment highlighting the compounding of offences under Section 147 of the N.I. Act, even at the appellate stage. The Court emphasized that once a matter is settled between parties, the appellant is entitled to acquittal, allowing for the setting aside of the conviction and sentence.
  
  Considering the facts and the power to compound offences under Section 147 of the N.I. Act, the Court allowed the revision petition. The order of conviction and sentence against the petitioner was set aside, based on the full and final settlement between the parties. The judgment emphasized the importance of allowing compounding of offences in appropriate cases under the legal provisions.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1526
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against the order rejecting registration u/s 12A of Income-tax Act.
  
  Summary:
  1. The appellant, a development authority, sought registration as a charitable institute u/s 12A of the Income-tax Act, which was declined by the ld. CIT based on the nature of activities not falling under charitable purposes as per Section 15 of Sec 2. The ld. CIT also found the appellant not to be a charitable institute or trust, thus ineligible for registration u/s 12A.
  
  2. The appellant appealed to the Tribunal, citing a similar case involving Punjab Urban Development Authority, where the rejection of registration u/s 12A was upheld. The appellant acknowledged the similarity of issues with the previous case.
  
  3. The Tribunal noted the dissolution of PUDA Ludhiana and the formation of Greater Ludhiana Area Development Authority, indicating a continuity of activities. Relying on the precedent set in the case of Punjab Urban Development Authority v. CIT, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, as the issues were found to be covered by the previous decision.
  
  4. The appeal filed by the assessee was dismissed based on the Tribunal's decision in a similar case, Punjab Urban Development Authority v. CIT, where the rejection of registration u/s 12A was upheld.
  
  (Order pronounced on April, 2011)

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1525
  

  Challenged the Recruitment Rules 2005 as well as the letters - Promotion to the post of Raj Bhasha Adhikari AD(OL) - HELD THAT:- It was pointed out by learned Counsel for the Appellants that the impugned Raj Bhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules 2005 were quashed by the High Court without service of any notice of the writ petition on the Appellants (Respondents 3 to 6 in the writ petition) and that too at the preliminary stage of admission on the basis of an alleged submission of a counsel who did not have any authority and Vaklatnama in his favour by the Appellants and who had not been given any instruction to appear on their behalf. We agree with this submission.

  When rules are challenged it is necessary to have the matter gone into in depth by inviting a counter affidavit and examining the matter in detail. A summary disposal of a writ petition by allowing it without even calling for a counter affidavit and quashing the rules, in our opinion, is totally against any established procedure of law.

  This is evident from the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah [1997 (7) TMI 662 - SUPREME COURT]. It was held therein that pension is no longer treated as a bounty but was a valuable Constitutional right under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) of the Constitution, which were available on 1.1.1973 and 1.4.1974 (that is before the 44th Constitution Amendment). Since this was a Constitutional right it could not be taken away by amendment of the rules. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and hence a Constitutional right can only be taken away by amending the Constitution, not by amending the rules or even by amending the statute.

  We are of the opinion that the above observations are not sustainable. When Rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, no undertaking need be given to anybody and the Rules can be changed at any time. For instance, if the retirement age is fixed by rules framed under Article 309, that can be changed subsequently by an amendment even in respect of employees appointed before the amendment. Hence, we cannot accept the view taken by the High Court. There is no question of equity in this case because it is well settled that law prevails over equity if there is a conflict. Equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it. As the Latin maxim states "Dura lex sed lex"' which means "The law is hard, but it is the law".

  The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1524
  
  Issues involved: Petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus for final assessment orders, challenge to previous orders, time required for finalization of assessment.
  
  Issue 1 - Writ of Mandamus for Final Assessment Orders:
  The petitioner approached the court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to issue final assessment orders on specific items within 15 days of a previous order. The petitioner claimed entitlement to benefits as per a previous verdict (Ext.P9) by CESTAT.
  
  Issue 2 - Challenge to Previous Orders:
  The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents mentioned hurdles in finalizing the assessment and indicated a need for a minimum of 'four months' to conclude the proceedings in accordance with the law. The court acknowledged the need to take proceedings to a logical conclusion and directed the respondents to finalize the assessment orders based on relevant provisions of law and materials, allowing the petitioner to rely on Ext.P9.
  
  Issue 3 - Time Required for Finalization of Assessment:
  After hearing both sides, the court directed the respondents to pass the final assessment orders within 'three months' from the date of receipt of the judgment copy. The writ petition was disposed of with this directive for expeditious finalization of the assessment.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1523
  
  Issues involved: Interpretation of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946 in a case involving dishonour of cheques for loan repayment and legality of debt.
  
  Interpretation of Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946:
  The case involved dishonour of two cheques for repayment of loans allegedly given by the accused at 2% interest per month. The trial Court found the debt not legally enforceable under the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946, due to the absence of a valid money lending license held by the complainant. The Court noted the significant amounts lent by the complainant to various individuals and the lack of evidence supporting the friendly nature of the transactions. The absence of a money lending license and the execution of promissory notes stipulating interest in cash transactions led the trial Court to conclude that the debt was not legally enforceable under the Act.
  
  Validity of Debt and Evidence:
  The defense argued that the trial Court's view lacked evidential basis as the accused did not present any evidence to support the claim that the transactions were friendly and not usurious. However, in criminal cases, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and the accused is not required to prove anything. The complainant's activities as a money lender were highlighted through evidence of substantial cash transactions and legal actions taken against debtors, indicating a pattern of lending without a license. The absence of a money lending license and the nature of the transactions supported the trial Court's decision regarding the enforceability of the debt under the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court upheld the trial Court's decision, refusing leave in Criminal Application No. 5397 of 2010, and disposing of the matter. The judgment emphasized the importance of complying with the provisions of the Bombay Money Lenders Act, 1946, in determining the legality and enforceability of debts in cases involving money lending activities without a valid license.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1522
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Method of Accounting (Cash vs. Mercantile)
  2. Addition of Accrued Interest on REC Bonds
  3. Addition of Income from House Property
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1 & 2: Method of Accounting and Accrued Interest on REC Bonds
  The Revenue challenged the CIT(A)'s decision to accept the assessee's cash method of accounting instead of the mercantile method and the deletion of additions for accrued interest on REC Bonds. The AO had added Rs. 25,86,569/- for Shri Rakesh Karsanbhai Patel and Rs. 87,47,522/- for Shri Karsanbhai Khodidas Patel based on the mercantile method. The CIT(A) deleted these additions, referencing previous ITAT decisions which upheld the assessee's consistent use of the cash method since AY 1999-2000. The ITAT, following its earlier decisions, upheld the CIT(A)'s findings, confirming that the assessee was following the cash system of accounting. Thus, the additions made by the AO were deleted, and ground nos. 1 and 2 in the appeals were dismissed.
  
  Issue 3: Addition of Income from House Property
  The AO added Rs. 4,55,000/- as income from house property for both assessees, arguing that the properties were not legally transferred and remained in the assessee's possession. The CIT(A) deleted these additions, accepting the assessee's claim of property transfer. However, the ITAT found that the CIT(A) did not provide specific findings or evidence to support this conclusion. The ITAT noted the absence of proper documentation and compliance with legal formalities for property transfer. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order on this issue and remanded it for reconsideration, directing the CIT(A) to pass a speaking order in compliance with sec. 250(6) of the Act.
  
  General Grounds:
  Ground nos. 4 and 5, being general in nature, were dismissed without separate adjudication.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeals were partly allowed for statistical purposes, with the order pronounced on 8-04-2011.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1521
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Sustaining the addition of Rs. 2,18,000/- towards unexplained investment u/s 69 on a protective basis.
  2. Legality of protective assessment in appellate proceedings.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Sustaining the addition of Rs. 2,18,000/- towards unexplained investment u/s 69 on a protective basis

  All these appeals pertain to the same assessee consequent to order passed u/s 155A(a) of the Act. The CIT(A)-I Pune sustained the addition of Rs. 2,18,000/- towards unexplained investment u/s 69 of the Act in the hands of the assessee on a protective basis. The CIT(A) observed that the seized material found in the possession of Shri Shriram Soni did not establish that the assessee had advanced funds to him, and there was no incriminating material found during the search conducted on the appellant's premises. The assessee and his family members had disclosed and offered to tax unaccounted income of Rs. 30 lakhs in returns filed in pursuance of notice u/s 153A. The CIT(A) held that the same income had been held to be taxable on a substantive basis in the case of Shri Shriram Soni, and thus, no addition could be made in the case of the appellant on a substantive basis. However, the CIT(A) directed that the income should be taxed on a protective basis to protect the interest of revenue until the issue reaches finality in appellate proceedings in the case of Shri Shriram Soni.

  Issue 2: Legality of protective assessment in appellate proceedings

  The learned counsel for the assessee opposed the CIT(A)'s finding, arguing that protective assessment at the appellate stage is not permissible. The counsel relied on several decisions, including CIT Vs. Smt. Durgawati Singh (1998) 234 ITR 249 (Alld), Prakash Wine Agencies Vs ITO (1990) 38 TTJ (All) 39, and Saipem UK Ltd. Vs. Dy. Director of Income-tax (International Taxation) Range 2(1) Mumbai (2007) 108 ITD 545 (MUM), to support the contention that appellate authorities cannot make a protective order. The Tribunal agreed with this view, stating that it was the duty of the CIT(A) to determine the real owner of the income in question and that the issue could not be left undecided in appeal. The Tribunal held that the CIT(A), after upholding the addition on a substantive basis in the other case, could not make a protective appellate order in the case of the assessee. Consequently, the direction of the CIT(A) to sustain the addition on a protective basis was vacated.

  Conclusion:

  The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) was not justified in directing the Assessing Officer to sustain the addition on a protective basis and vacated the CIT(A)'s direction. All the appeals of the assessee were partly allowed.

  Decision pronounced in the open court on 13th April 2011.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1520
  
  The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal based on a previous judgment related to the same issue, citing the case of Director of Income Tax v. Galileo International Inc. 224 CTR 251.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1519
  

  Validity of order passed by the Assessing officer u/s 154 r.w.s. 143(1)(a) - time barred mistake - limitation of four years laid down in section 154(7) - HELD THAT:-We are of the considered view that the ratio laid down in the case of Hind Wire Industries Ltd v. CIT [1995 (1) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] remains confined to a case where subject matter of second rectification is the same as the first rectification and it was only in such a situation that the time limit of second rectification proceedings gets extended by the fact of first rectification proceedings. In a situation in which the subject matter of second rectification proceedings is wholly unrelated to the subject matter of first rectification proceedings as is the situation in the present case, the time limit for second rectification proceedings remains unaffected by the first rectification proceedings. In view of the these discussion, as also bearing in mind entirety of the case, we are of the considered view that the impugned rectification order, having been passed well after the end of four years from the end of financial year, in which, intimation u/s 143(1)(a) passed, is time barred. In any event, by no stretch of logic, a rectification of mistake almost after eight years of processing an intimation u/s 143(1)(a) can be said to have been made within a reasonable time limit. We, accordingly, quash the impugned rectification order.

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• 2011 (4) TMI 1518
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the seniority list of Assistant Commercial Tax Officers (A.C.T.Os.) for the years 1968 to 2006.
  2. Compliance with the Supreme Court's guidelines and previous judgments.
  3. Inclusion of temporary posts in the cadre strength for seniority purposes.
  4. Alleged violation of rules and principles of seniority fixation.
  5. Application of the "Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation."
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Seniority List:
  The primary issue in these writ petitions is the challenge to the seniority list of A.C.T.Os. published by the State of Tamil Nadu. The petitioners sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order communicating the inter-se seniority list for the years 1968 to 2006. The impugned order was passed following the Supreme Court's judgment in Civil Appeal No. 1454 of 1987.
  
  2. Compliance with Supreme Court Guidelines:
  The Supreme Court had previously laid down guidelines for drawing the seniority list, including:
  - Each year should be taken as a unit for fixing inter-se seniority.
  - Persons not actually appointed in a year should not be included in that year.
  - The date of probation commencement is the criterion for fixing inter-se seniority.
  - Temporary appointments should not fill vacancies reserved for direct recruits.
  
  The State of Tamil Nadu did not challenge these guidelines but only the direction regarding the expression "permanent cadre strength." The Supreme Court affirmed that temporary appointments do not confer any right to claim seniority over regularly appointed officers.
  
  3. Inclusion of Temporary Posts in Cadre Strength:
  The petitioners argued that the cadre of A.C.T.Os. included temporary posts, citing G.O.Ms. No. 1374 CT and RE Dept., dated 28.10.1988. However, the Supreme Court found no evidence that the cadre strength included temporary posts. The Court held that temporary appointments made under Rule 10(a)(i) or 39(a) of the General Rules were stopgap arrangements and did not confer seniority rights.
  
  4. Alleged Violation of Rules and Principles of Seniority Fixation:
  The petitioners contended that their appointments were regular and not temporary or ad hoc. They argued that the seniority list violated the principles of seniority fixation by placing them below junior direct recruits. The Court rejected this contention, emphasizing that seniority is determined by the date of appointment to a cadre post. The Court also noted that temporary posts were made permanent prospectively from 04.01.2010, and thus, the petitioners could not claim seniority over those appointed to cadre posts.
  
  5. Application of the "Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation":
  The petitioners invoked the "Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation," arguing that their long service should entitle them to seniority. The Court dismissed this argument, stating that legitimate expectation cannot override the rules and guidelines established by the Supreme Court.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court upheld the seniority list, concluding that the petitioners, holding temporary posts, could not claim seniority over those appointed to permanent cadre posts. The Court emphasized that the impugned order complied with the guidelines set by the Supreme Court, and no grounds were made out to interfere with it. Consequently, all writ petitions were dismissed.

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