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Showing 21 to 29 of 29 Records
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1954 (5) TMI 22
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a 1st Class Magistrate of Cuttack who was found guilty of contempt for restraining a civil court peon from executing a warrant. The High Court found the Magistrate acted negligently but not with improper motives. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and any fine paid by the appellant will be remitted. The Supreme Court did not approve of the Magistrate's conduct but found no justification for contempt proceedings.
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1954 (5) TMI 21
Challenged the validity of the election - Jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation for the presentation of the election petition - errors apparent on the face of the record - Essential features of a writ of certiorari - violation of the election rules - Agents guilty of a number of major corrupt practices - application for amendment of the petition - Election Tribunal acted without jurisdiction - election expenses - omission to include hiring charges - HELD THAT:- We now come to what the High Court has described as errors apparent on the face of the record. These errors, according to the High Court, appear in respect of three of the findings arrived at by the Tribunal. The Tribunal however discussed this matter only in connection with the question as to whether the violation of any statutory rule or order in the holding of election did materially affect the result of the election which would entitle the Tribunal to declare the election of the returned candidate to be void under section 100(2) (c) of the Act.
The petitioner, it may be noted, got only 34 votes less than the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal has found that the bus of Ahmed Jan, which was procured by respondent No. 1, did carry to the polling booths about 60 voters in two trips and in the, circumstances of the case it could be legitimately presumed that the majority of them did vote for respondent No. 1. If the votes of at least 40 or 50 of these persons be left out of account as being procured by corrupt practice of the first respondent, the latter’s majority by 34 votes would be completely wiped out and the petitioner would gain an undisputed majority.
This, the Tribunal *as competent to do under the provisions of the Act and in doing so it could take into consideration the circumstances And probabilities of the case. But as we have stated already, the Tribunal declared the appellant to be duly elected upon the specific finding that, but for the corrupt’ practice of respondent No. I in the matter of procuring the service bus of Ahmed Jan, the appellant would have got majority of the votes. We cannot say that this is an error apparent on the face of the record which would entitle the High Court to interfere by writ of certiorari.
The High Court has observed that as regards the first item the finding of the Tribunal is based on no evidence and rests on mere speculation. We do not think that we can accept this view as correct. The first respondent stated that he had used two cars which were his own and incurred petrol expenses to the extent of ₹ 1, 083-3-0. The Tribunal has found in paragraph 29 of its order on the basis of both documentary and oral evidence that the respondent No. I had used six other cars and had purchased petrol for them for the purpose of his election campaign. The Tribunal held that the first respondent must have spent not less than the sum of ₹ 1, 250 on this account which was not included in the list of expenses. We are unable to say that this finding rests on no evidence.
We are unable to say that the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent No. 1 had omitted to include in his return of election expenses the dinner and hotel charges is a finding unsupported by any evidence. Reference may be made in this connection to paragraph 29(f) of the Tribunal’s order which deals with the matter in detail. On the whole our opinion is that the so-called apparent errors pointed out by the High Court are neither errors of law nor do they appear on the face of the record. An appellate Court might have on a review of this evidence come to a different conclusion but these are not matters which would justify the issue of a writ of certiorari.
In our opinion the judgment of the High Court cannot be supported and this appeal must be allowed. The writ issued by the High Court will therefore be vacated.
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1954 (5) TMI 20
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the receipt of Rs. 2,400 by the appellants fell within the mischief of section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947.
2. Whether an executory agreement to grant a lease in the future constitutes an offense under section 18(1) of the Act.
3. Interpretation of the terms "in respect of" within the context of section 18(1) of the Act.
4. Applicability of penal provisions to executory agreements under section 18(1) of the Act.
Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Whether the receipt of Rs. 2,400 by the appellants fell within the mischief of section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947:
The appellants were charged under section 18(1) of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947, for receiving Rs. 2,400 as premium or pugree for the grant of a lease of Block No. 15 in a building under construction. The magistrate found the appellants guilty and sentenced them to two months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,200 each. The High Court upheld the conviction, but the matter was referred to a Full Bench due to differing views on the interpretation of section 18(1). The Full Bench held that the receipt of consideration for an executory agreement was within the mischief of section 18(1) of the Act.
2. Whether an executory agreement to grant a lease in the future constitutes an offense under section 18(1) of the Act:
The Full Bench opined that the oral agreement did not constitute a lease but amounted to an agreement to grant a lease in the future. It held that the receipt of money for an executory agreement fell within the mischief of section 18(1). The Full Bench stated, "What the Legislature has penalized is the receipt of a premium by the landlord and the Legislature has also required a nexus between the receipt by the landlord of a premium and the grant of a lease of any premises."
3. Interpretation of the terms "in respect of" within the context of section 18(1) of the Act:
The High Court emphasized the words "in respect of" and concluded that the comprehensive expression used by the Legislature indicated that any nexus between the receipt of a premium and the grant of a lease fell within the penal provisions of section 18(1). However, the Supreme Court held that the High Court laid undue emphasis on the words "in respect of." The Supreme Court stated, "Giving the words 'in respect of' their widest meaning, viz., 'relating to' or 'with reference to', it is plain that this relationship must be predicated of the grant, renewal or continuance of a lease."
4. Applicability of penal provisions to executory agreements under section 18(1) of the Act:
The Supreme Court held that section 18(1) is penal in nature and should be construed strictly. The Court stated, "It is a well-settled rule of construction of penal statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean towards that construction which exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty." The Court concluded that the receipt of money on an executory agreement did not fall within the mischief of section 18(1) as the section envisages the existence of a lease and the payment of an amount in respect of that lease.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellants, and ordered their acquittal. The Court held that the receipt of money by the appellants from the complainant at the time of the oral executory agreement of lease was not punishable under section 18(1) of the Act and was outside its mischief. The Court emphasized that the language of section 18(1) did not warrant the construction placed upon it by the Full Bench and that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not come into existence until a lease was executed.
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1954 (5) TMI 19
Whether the appellant can complain by way of a writ? - the sale of a liquor contract by auction - grant -of the contract to Thimmappa was wrong as he was present at the auction but did not bid
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. He could have done so in an ordinary case. The appellant is interested in these contracts and has a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Here we have Thimmappa who was present at the auction and who did not did not that it would make any difference if he had, for the fact remains that he made no attempt to outbid the appellant. If he had done so it is evident that the appellant would have raised his own bid.
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1954 (5) TMI 18
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Commercial Tax Officer to reopen and revise assessments.
2. Entitlement of the plaintiff to deductions or rebates.
3. Determination of whether sales of groundnut oil occurred outside the Province.
4. Compliance with procedural rules for treating assessments as escaped assessments.
5. Reliefs to which the parties are entitled.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the Commercial Tax Officer to Reopen and Revise Assessments
The Commercial Tax Officer's revisional jurisdiction under section 12 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act and rule 14 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules was contested. The court held that the Commercial Tax Officer had the revisional jurisdiction to impose additional assessments for the year 1946-47 but not for 1945-46 due to the one-year limitation under rule 17(1) of the unamended Act. The court emphasized that retrospective application of rules is generally disfavored unless explicitly stated or necessarily implied by the statute. Thus, the Commercial Tax Officer's action was valid for 1946-47 but invalid for 1945-46.
Issue 2: Entitlement to Deductions or Rebates
The plaintiff's claim for deductions under rule 18 of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment Rules) was upheld. The court referenced recent decisions affirming the absolute right to deductions for registered manufacturers of groundnut oil. However, the plaintiff's claim for a rebate under section 7 was denied because the sales were determined to have occurred within the Province of Madras, and the rebate applies only to sales for delivery outside the Province.
Issue 3: Determination of Sales Outside the Province
The court analyzed the terms of the contracts, which indicated that the property in the goods passed within the Province of Madras. The buyers' responsibilities for packing, shipping, and insurance, along with the fact that the price was for delivery ex-sellers' Royapuram oil factory, supported the conclusion that the sales were completed within Madras. Thus, the sales were not considered to have occurred outside the Province.
Issue 4: Compliance with Procedural Rules for Escaped Assessments
For the assessment year 1945-46, the court found that the Commercial Tax Officer did not conform to rule 17(1) of the unamended Act, which limited the reopening of assessments to one year. This non-compliance rendered the reopening of the 1945-46 assessment invalid. However, for the year 1946-47, the reopening was within the three-year period allowed by the amended rules, making it valid.
Issue 5: Reliefs to the Parties
In C.S. No. 111 of 1951, the court decreed that the plaintiff was entitled to deductions but not to rebates and that the sales took place within the Province. The Commercial Tax Officer had jurisdiction to revise the assessment for 1946-47. The plaintiff was granted a decree regarding deductions and denied other claims, with costs awarded proportionately.
In C.S. No. 112 of 1951, the court ruled that the Commercial Tax Officer was not entitled to reopen the assessment for 1945-46 due to non-compliance with the one-year limitation. The sales were within the Province, and the plaintiff was entitled to the decree as requested, with costs awarded.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Commercial Tax Officer had revisional jurisdiction for the 1946-47 assessment but not for 1945-46 due to procedural limitations. The plaintiff was entitled to deductions but not rebates, and the sales were determined to have occurred within the Province of Madras. The reliefs were granted accordingly, with costs awarded based on the success and failure of the claims.
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1954 (5) TMI 17
Whether the power to impose a tax on the sale of goods under Entry 48 includes a power to impose a tax on forward contracts?
Held that:- The power conferred under Entry 48 to impose a tax on the sale of goods can therefore be exercised only when there is a sale under which there is a transfer of property in the goods, and not when there is a mere agreement to sell. The State Legislature cannot, by enlarging the definition of "sale" as including forward contracts, arrogate to itself a power which is not conferred upon it by the Constitution Act, and the definition of "sale" in Section 2(h) of Act XV of 1948 must, to that extent, be declared ultra vires. For the same reason, Explanation III to Section 2(h) which provides that forward contracts "shall be deemed to have been completed on the date originally agreed upon delivery", and Section 3B which enacts that, "Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 3, the turnover of any dealer in respect of transactions of forward contracts, in which goods are not actually delivered, shall be taxed at a rate not exceeding rupees two per unit as may be prescribed", must also be held to be ultra vires. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (5) TMI 9
Issues: Violation of clauses (h) and (i) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 by a chartered accountant in accepting an auditor appointment, compliance with section 144 of the Companies Act, 1913 in auditor appointments, distinction between casual vacancy and statutory duty in auditor appointments.
Analysis:
The case involved a chartered accountant who was appointed as an auditor for a company without ensuring compliance with section 144 of the Companies Act, 1913. The complaint alleged a violation of clauses (h) and (i) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. The Disciplinary Committee found the second charge, regarding the violation of clause (i), to be proved, leading to the matter being referred to the High Court for orders under section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.
The respondent argued that he accepted the appointment believing it to be a casual vacancy under section 144(8) and not a failure of the company to comply with section 144(3) regarding annual auditor appointments. The Court clarified that the company's failure to appoint an auditor at the annual general meeting was a statutory duty under section 144(3) and not a casual vacancy as per section 144(8). The respondent's lack of experience was considered in his defense, but his misinterpretation of the law did not justify his conduct.
The Court acknowledged that while the second charge was proved, the respondent's conduct did not render him unfit to be a member of the Institute. As a result, the Court issued a warning to the respondent, emphasizing the importance of understanding and complying with legal requirements in future appointments. The Court opted for lenient treatment due to the respondent's lack of experience, cautioning against future violations that could lead to severe penalties. No costs were awarded in the judgment.
In conclusion, the High Court found the respondent guilty of violating clause (i) of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 but determined that his conduct did not warrant severe punishment. The judgment serves as a warning to the respondent to be diligent in ensuring compliance with legal provisions in future appointments, emphasizing the responsibilities associated with the role of an auditor.
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1954 (5) TMI 2
Whether in the circumstances of the case the managing agency commission was liable to be apportioned between the Sassoons and their respective transferees in the proportion of the services rendered as managing agents by each one of them?
Held that:- The whole difficulty has arisen because the High Court could not reconcile itself to the situation that the transferees had not worked for the whole calendar year and yet they would be held entitled to the whole income of the year of account ; whereas the transferors had worked for the broken periods and yet they would be held disentitled to any share in the income for the year. If the work done by the transferors as well as the transferees during the respective periods of the year were taken to be the criterion the result would certainly be anomalous. But the true test under Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act is not whether the transferors and the transferees had worked for any particular periods of the year but whether any income had accrued to the transferors and the transferees within the chargeable accounting period. It is not the work done or the services rendered by the person but the income received or the income which has accrued to the person within the chargeable accounting period that is the subject-matter of taxation. That is the proper method of approach while considering the taxability or otherwise of income and no considerations of the work done for broken periods or contribution made towards the ultimate income derived from the source of income nor any equitable considerations can make any difference to the position which rests entirely on a strict interpretation of the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act.
The result therefore is that the question referred by the Tribunal to the High Court must be answered in the negative. All the appeals will accordingly be allowed.
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1954 (5) TMI 1
Whether certain sections of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947, i.e., Act XXX of 1947, have become void from the date of the commencement of the Constitution of India by reason of Art. 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Sub-s. (4) of s. 5 and the procedure prescribed by the impugned Act in so far as it affects the persons proceeded against under that sub-section being a piece of discriminatory legislation offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution and is thus void and unenforceable. In reaching this decision, we refrain from expressing any opinion, as above pointed out on the validity of s. 5(1) of the Act or on the question whether s. 6(5) of the impugned Act offends against the provisions of Art. 20, sub-cl. (3), of the Constitution. We accordingly direct that an appropriate writ be issued against the Investigation Commission prohibiting it from taking any proceedings under the provisions of the impugned Act against the petitioner.
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9911796707
