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• 2008 (8) TMI 1029
  
  The High Court of Bombay ruled on an appeal stating that the first question of law was decided in favor of the Revenue based on a previous Supreme Court case, while the second question was decided in favor of the Assessee based on a previous case in the same court. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1028
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the proceedings before the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Karimnagar.
  2. Application of Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957.
  3. Application of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
  4. Allegations of offenses under Sections 448, 380, 384, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Proceedings Before the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Karimnagar:
  The appellant, an Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, inspected the business premises of the respondent No. 2's son on 24.10.1994. The inspection revealed non-maintenance of books of accounts and unfiled returns. Following the inspection, the respondent No. 2 filed a complaint alleging that the appellant forcibly took away business records and valuables without proper documentation or search warrant, and intimidated his son. The police, after investigation, found the complaint to be false. However, the Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the appellant, leading to the appellant seeking quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the present appeal.
  
  2. Application of Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957:
  Section 37 of the Act provides protection to officers for acts done in good faith under the Act, requiring previous sanction from the State Government for any suit, prosecution, or proceeding. The appellant argued that the inspection and subsequent actions were conducted in official capacity and in good faith, thus attracting the protection under Section 37. The High Court, however, held that the appellant needed to establish that the acts were done in the discharge of official duties and that non-issuance of receipts for seized documents was not in dereliction of duty.
  
  3. Application of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
  Section 197 Cr.P.C. provides protection to public servants from prosecution for acts done in the discharge of official duties without prior sanction. The appellant contended that the inspection and seizure were part of his official duties, thus requiring sanction for prosecution. The High Court noted the specific allegations that the appellant did not issue receipts for the seized documents and did not have a search warrant, concluding that it was for the appellant to prove that the acts were in due discharge of official duties.
  
  4. Allegations of Offenses under Sections 448, 380, 384, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
  The complaint alleged that the appellant committed house trespass (Section 448 IPC), theft (Section 380 IPC), extortion (Section 384 IPC), and criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC). The appellant argued that the allegations were false and an abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court referred to the guidelines in Bhajan Lal's case, which outline circumstances under which proceedings can be quashed to prevent abuse of the process of law.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court concluded that the proceedings against the appellant were an abuse of the process of law. Given the protection under Section 37 of the Act and Section 197 Cr.P.C., and the guidelines in Bhajan Lal's case, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the proceedings in CC No. 356/96 pending before the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Karimnagar. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were quashed.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1027
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Legality and jurisdiction of the rejection of building plans submitted by the respondents.
  2. Applicability and binding nature of the LBZ guidelines dated February 8, 1988.
  3. The extent of executive power under Article 73 of the Constitution and its application to the case.
  4. Interpretation and application of Sections 41 of the DD Act, 1957, and Sections 235 and 241 of the NDMC Act, 1994.
  5. The impact of the Master Plan 2001 and Zonal Development Plan on the building plans submitted by the respondents.
  6. The High Court's decision to deem the building plans as sanctioned.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Legality and Jurisdiction of the Rejection of Building Plans:
  The Supreme Court examined the rejection of the building plans by the New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and held that the rejection was neither illegal nor without jurisdiction. The rejection was based on the plans being in breach of the LBZ guidelines, which were binding and had the force of law. The Court found that the NDMC Chairperson was correct in refusing to grant sanction as the plans contravened the LBZ guidelines.
  
  2. Applicability and Binding Nature of the LBZ Guidelines:
  The Court emphasized that the LBZ guidelines dated February 8, 1988, were binding and had statutory force after their incorporation into the Master Plan 2001. These guidelines were issued to maintain the low-density character and green cover of the Lutyens' Bungalow Zone (LBZ). The guidelines were reiterated and enforced through various communications from the Central Government, making them mandatory for any development in the LBZ.
  
  3. The Extent of Executive Power under Article 73:
  The Court clarified that under Article 73 of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union extends to matters where Parliament has the power to make laws. The LBZ guidelines, issued under the executive power, were valid and binding as they were aimed at the planned development of Delhi. The guidelines were not mere administrative instructions but had the force of law.
  
  4. Interpretation and Application of Sections 41 of the DD Act and Sections 235 and 241 of the NDMC Act:
  The Court analyzed Sections 41 of the DD Act and Sections 235 and 241 of the NDMC Act, concluding that the directions issued by the Central Government under these sections were binding on the NDMC. Section 235, with its non-obstante clause, required the Chairperson to act under the general superintendence, direction, and control of the Central Government, thus making the LBZ guidelines mandatory.
  
  5. Impact of the Master Plan 2001 and Zonal Development Plan:
  The Master Plan 2001 and the Zonal Development Plan, which included the LBZ guidelines, were binding and had legal sanction. The Court noted that any building plan contrary to these plans could not be sanctioned. The respondents' building plans, which proposed a two and a half storey building with 15 dwelling units, were found to be non-compliant with the LBZ guidelines and the Master Plan.
  
  6. High Court's Decision to Deem the Building Plans as Sanctioned:
  The Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in deeming the building plans as sanctioned. The High Court's direction to the NDMC to return the plans with an endorsement of "sanctioned" was against the statutory mandate and the weight of evidence. The Court held that the plans could not be deemed sanctioned as they were contrary to the LBZ guidelines and the Master Plan.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, clarifying that the respondents could submit new building plans in accordance with the LBZ guidelines dated February 8, 1988, and May 9, 1997. The appropriate authority was directed to pass orders on such plans within two months. The appeals were allowed, and no order as to costs was made.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1026
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the enquiry process.
  2. Role and conduct of the Enquiry Officer.
  3. Compliance with principles of natural justice.
  4. Justification of the High Court's decision to quash the dismissal orders.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity of the enquiry process:
  The Supreme Court examined whether the enquiry against the respondent, a temporary Forest Guard, was conducted properly. The respondent was dismissed from service based on an enquiry report which concluded his involvement in the illegal felling of trees. The High Court quashed the dismissal orders, citing procedural infirmities and bias in the enquiry.
  
  2. Role and conduct of the Enquiry Officer:
  The Court highlighted that the Enquiry Officer, Mr. P.V. Lohni, acted as the Investigator, Prosecutor, and Judge, which is against the principles of natural justice. The Enquiry Officer himself inspected the forest area, noted deficiencies, and secured answers from the respondent without examining witnesses or having a presenting officer. This approach was deemed improper.
  
  3. Compliance with principles of natural justice:
  The Court reiterated the principles from previous judgments, emphasizing that:
  - Enquiries must be conducted bona fide and should not be empty formalities.
  - An officer who is a witness or initiates the enquiry should not act as the Enquiry Officer.
  - The delinquent must be given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and respond to the evidence against him.
  - The disciplinary authority must supply the enquiry report and related documents to the delinquent before making a decision.
  
  The enquiry in this case failed to adhere to these principles. The respondent was not provided with necessary documents, and the enquiry report was not shared with him before the disciplinary authority's decision.
  
  4. Justification of the High Court's decision to quash the dismissal orders:
  The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the enquiry process was flawed and biased. The Enquiry Officer's recommendation for immediate dismissal exceeded his authority, as the punishment should be decided by the disciplinary authority based on the gravity of the charges. The appellate authority also erred by dismissing the respondent's appeal without addressing the procedural deficiencies.
  
  Conclusion:
  The appeal by the State of Uttaranchal and other appellants was dismissed, affirming the High Court's order to reinstate the respondent with all consequential benefits. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of conducting enquiries in accordance with established legal principles and ensuring fairness and natural justice.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1025
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Disallowance of deduction u/s 80-IB due to submission of audit report in old form.
  2. Determination of whether the business activity qualifies as manufacturing for deduction u/s 80-IB.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Disallowance of Deduction u/s 80-IB Due to Submission of Audit Report in Old Form

  The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the disallowance of deduction u/s 80-IB on the ground that the audit report was furnished in an old form, although the amended form was submitted during the assessment proceedings. The Tribunal found that the defect was rectified during the assessment proceedings and substantive compliance was made. Citing the case of Punjab Financial Corporation, it was held that the provision relating to the submission of the audit report along with the return of income was not mandatory. Therefore, the objection was deemed unsustainable for denying the claim of deduction u/s 80-IB.

  Issue 2: Determination of Whether the Business Activity Qualifies as Manufacturing for Deduction u/s 80-IB

  The assessee, engaged in manufacturing exercise books and registers, claimed deduction u/s 80-IB. The assessing officer and Commissioner (Appeals) disallowed the claim, arguing that the process did not amount to manufacturing and the audit report was not in the prescribed form. The Tribunal examined the manufacturing process, which involved cutting, ruling, stitching, and binding of raw materials like plain paper sheets, cardboard, and gum to produce exercise books and registers. It was concluded that the final product was a commercially different commodity with a distinct character, use, and name, thus qualifying as manufacturing. The Tribunal referred to various case laws, including the Supreme Court's judgment in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., which emphasized that 'manufacture' implies a transformation resulting in a new and different article.

  Conclusion:

  The Tribunal found no merit in both objections raised by the assessing officer. It set aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and directed the assessing officer to allow the deduction u/s 80-IB as claimed by the assessee. The appeal of the assessee was allowed.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1024
  
  The Supreme Court of India passed an order on 17th January, 2008, adjourning the matter for one month for parties to exchange properties after entering into a settlement. The parties filed a joint compromise petition complying with the court's order, and the appeals were disposed of based on the joint settlement without any costs.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1023
  
  Issues involved: Challenge to judgment quashing process under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act against respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
  
  Summary:
  1. The petitioner, a Cooperative Bank, filed a complaint against M/s New Sheetal Traders, alleging dishonored cheques signed by accused No. 2 Sheetal for his parents (respondent Nos. 1 and 2). Process was issued against all accused, including respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
  
  2. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 challenged the process issuance, claiming they were not partners of M/s New Sheetal Traders. The Sessions Judge quashed the process against them, stating they were not shown to be involved with the firm.
  
  3. Petitioner argued that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 could not be absolved from liability prematurely. They contended that joint liability could be established under Section 141 of the Act, covering the criminal liability of the respondents.
  
  4. The Court noted that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not deny the legal liability and were part of the joint family business. The absence of a registered partnership deed did not warrant quashing the process prematurely.
  
  5. The Court emphasized the unity of ownership in joint family businesses, where all members have a collective interest. The Explanation to Section 141 includes "association of individuals," encompassing joint family businesses under the Act.
  
  6. Citing legal precedents, the Court held that the process should not have been quashed prematurely, as the true nature of the business could only be determined after a full trial. The impugned judgment was set aside, restoring the order of the Judicial Magistrate.
  
  7. In conclusion, the revision application was allowed, overturning the judgment of the Sessions Judge and reinstating the order of the Judicial Magistrate.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1022
  
  Issues involved:
  The judgment deals with the liability of a private limited company to pay entertainment tax for its discotheque under the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1937 as extended to Union Territory of Delhi. The company challenged the constitutional validity of the Act, alleging it violated its right to carry on business.
  
  Details of the Judgment:
  
  Issue 1: Liability to pay entertainment tax
  The company operated a discotheque named 'Pussycat Discotheque' within its hotel, charging an entry fee from customers. The Entertainment Tax Officer held that the discotheque fell within the definition of 'entertainment' under the Act and levied entertainment tax. The company challenged this decision, arguing that the discotheque did not provide entertainment as defined under the Act.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of 'entertainment' under the Act
  The Act defines 'entertainment' broadly to include any performance or amusement for which payment is made. The Supreme Court in a previous case laid down tests to determine if an activity falls within this definition. The Court applied these tests to the company's discotheque and found that the activities, including providing a dance floor, recorded music, and an element of amusement for customers, constituted 'entertainment' under the Act.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the company's petition, upholding the decision to levy entertainment tax on the discotheque. It found that the activities at the discotheque satisfied the definition of 'entertainment' under the Act, as per the tests laid down by the Supreme Court. The Court also noted that similar judgments had upheld the payment of entertainment tax on similar establishments. The company's argument that the Act violated constitutional rights was not pursued during the proceedings.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1021
  
  Issues involved: Grant of interim relief in petitions challenging refusal of admission of goods due to non-payment of export duty.
  
  In the judgment, the Honorable Mr. Justice K.A. Puj heard arguments from both sides. The Respondent argued that there were distinguishing features in the petitions and no immediate interference was required as the petitioner had paid export duty under protest. On the other hand, the Petitioner's Counsel argued that delay in supplies of steel items would cause immense loss as construction was on the verge of completion. The Court granted ad-interim relief restraining the respondent from refusing admission of goods based on non-payment of export duty, subject to the petitioners furnishing a Bond or Bank Guarantee of 10% of the supply value. This relief was granted in line with previous similar petitions where ad-interim relief had been provided. The petitioners were given a deadline to furnish the Bank Guarantee, and the next hearing was scheduled for a later date.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1020
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the affidavit supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007.
  2. Previous attempts by the first respondent to address issues before the Arbitrator.
  3. Scope and application of Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  4. Consideration of fresh evidence post-arbitration award.
  5. Distinction between Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the Affidavit Supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007:
  The petitioner argued that the affidavit supporting I.A. No. 206 of 2007 did not contain any necessary averments for remanding the case under Section 34(4) of the Act. The court found that the first respondent had made a prima facie case for setting aside the arbitration award under Section 34(2) due to the lack of opportunity to challenge the affidavit and documents submitted by the petitioner after the conclusion of arbitration proceedings.
  
  2. Previous Attempts by the First Respondent to Address Issues Before the Arbitrator:
  The petitioner contended that the first respondent had previously attempted to address the same issues before the Arbitrator under Section 33 of the Act, which was dismissed. The court noted that the first respondent did not have the opportunity to challenge the affidavit and documents submitted by the petitioner after the conclusion of proceedings, thus justifying the remand.
  
  3. Scope and Application of Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
  The court discussed the scope of Section 34(4), emphasizing that it allows the court to adjourn proceedings to enable the arbitral tribunal to eliminate grounds for setting aside the award. The court highlighted that this provision is not akin to the power of remand under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and is intended to give the tribunal an opportunity to address specific issues that may invalidate the award.
  
  4. Consideration of Fresh Evidence Post-Arbitration Award:
  The court addressed the issue of whether fresh evidence obtained post-award could be considered. It noted that the arbitral tribunal might entertain additional evidence if it believes it would eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The court emphasized that the tribunal has discretion under Section 34(4) to determine the necessity and extent of such an exercise.
  
  5. Distinction Between Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and Section 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
  The court elaborated on the differences between the two sections, noting that Section 16(1) of the 1940 Act allowed the court to remit the award for reconsideration under specific conditions, while Section 34(4) of the 1996 Act empowers the court to adjourn proceedings to enable the tribunal to eliminate grounds for setting aside the award. The focus has shifted from the court's discretion to the tribunal's discretion under the new Act.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court modified the order of the District Court, Tuticorin, to adjourn the proceedings for three months, allowing the Arbitrator to decide whether to resume proceedings or take other actions to eliminate the grounds for setting aside the award. The Arbitrator was requested to communicate his decision within three months to the Principal District Court, Tuticorin, and the parties. The court clarified that the findings were prima facie and not conclusive, and both the Arbitrator and the District Court should consider the matter uninfluenced by these findings. The Civil Revision Petition was allowed on these terms, with no costs, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1019
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the property was acquired out of the funds of the firm M/s. Bhagmal Satyapal.
  2. Whether the defendants have any right, title, or interest in the property.
  3. Whether defendant No. 1 is a tenant in respect of the first floor of the suit property.
  4. Relief.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  Issue Nos. 1 and 2:
  The plaintiff, Ms. Padmavati Mahajan, is the owner of the property in question, having acquired leasehold rights through a perpetual Sub-Lease Deed dated 29th May 1968 and later converting it to freehold via a Conveyance Deed dated 12th November 2001. Defendant No. 1, her son, claimed that the property was purchased and constructed using funds from a Partnership Firm, M/s. Bhagmal Satyapal, where he held a 29% share. He argued that he is a benami owner of the property, asserting that the funds were provided by the Partnership Firm.
  
  The court noted that for a benami transaction to be established, the person claiming it must prove the consideration was paid by someone other than the purported owner and that the intention was for the owner to act as a facade. The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, prohibits such claims unless specific conditions are met under Section 4(3). The court found that the defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence, such as documents or reliable testimony, to support his claim. The defendant's assertion that the funds were treated as a loan to the plaintiff further weakened his case. Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff is the rightful owner of the property and the defendant's claim of benami ownership was rejected.
  
  Issue No. 3:
  Defendant No. 1 also claimed to be a tenant of the first floor of the property, paying a monthly rent of Rs. 2000. The court found this claim contradictory and vague, as he also claimed to be a benami owner. There was no written agreement or evidence in house tax or income tax returns to support the tenancy claim. Letters presented by the defendant, allegedly indicating tenancy, were found to be inconclusive. The court rejected the claim of tenancy, concluding that the defendant was not a tenant but possibly a gratuitous licensee.
  
  Relief:
  The court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from parting with possession or creating third-party rights in the property. A mandatory injunction was also issued, directing the defendants to remove themselves from the property. The plaintiff was awarded costs.
  
  In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiff is the rightful owner of the property, the defendant's claims of benami ownership and tenancy were unsubstantiated, and the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1018
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of the panel preparation for promotion.
  2. Application of the Tribunal's judgment to similarly placed individuals.
  3. Compliance with statutory rules regarding promotion and seniority.
  4. Discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Validity of the panel preparation for promotion:
  The petitioner was appointed as a Junior Assistant in 1973 and promoted as an Assistant in 1983. He argued that he was qualified for promotion in 1980 after passing the required departmental tests but was not included in the panel for promotion due to administrative lapses. The petitioner contended that Rule 4(a) of the Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules mandates that a panel should be prepared every year and is valid only for one year. However, no panel was prepared until 1984, leading to the promotion of his juniors ahead of him. The respondents argued that the panels prepared between 1973 and 1979 were valid and promotions were made accordingly. The court found that the respondents had failed to draw panels for each year as required by Rule 4(a), and the administrative instructions to keep a panel alive for more than one year were contrary to the rule.
  
  2. Application of the Tribunal's judgment to similarly placed individuals:
  The petitioner cited a Tribunal judgment in O.A.No. 7331 of 2001, where it was held that the denial of promotion to seniors due to the use of outdated panels was illegal. The Tribunal had directed the promotion of Mr. Amurudeen, a similarly placed individual, with retrospective effect. The respondents argued that the Tribunal's judgment was applicable only to Mr. Amurudeen. The court examined whether the Tribunal's judgment was "in rem" (binding on all similarly placed individuals) or "in personam" (binding only on the parties involved). The court concluded that the judgment was "in rem" and applicable to all similarly placed individuals, including the petitioner.
  
  3. Compliance with statutory rules regarding promotion and seniority:
  The petitioner argued that as per Rule 30(b) of the Tamil Nadu Ministerial Service Rules, he was eligible for promotion in 1980 after passing the required tests. The respondents contended that the petitioner was promoted in 1983 based on his seniority and the date of passing the tests. The court found that the respondents had not followed the statutory rules regarding the preparation of panels and promotions, leading to the wrongful denial of promotion to the petitioner.
  
  4. Discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India:
  The petitioner argued that denying him the benefits of the Tribunal's judgment was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees equality before the law. The court agreed, stating that once the Tribunal's judgment was implemented for Mr. Amurudeen, denying the same benefit to the petitioner would be discriminatory.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court set aside the impugned order and directed the respondents to promote the petitioner as an Assistant from 1981 and consequently promote him to the post of Superintendent with effect from 16.6.2000, extending all monetary and service benefits retrospectively. The writ petition was allowed with no costs.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1017
  
  The High Court of Bombay rejected the appeal as the issue was already covered by a Division Bench judgment dated 10-7-2008 in Central Excise Appeal No.163 of 2007. The appellant's appeal was not entertained.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1016
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Breach of Takeover Code.
  2. Breach of Insider Trading Regulations.
  3. Violation of Section 372A of the Companies Act, 1956.
  4. Violation of Sections 108A and 108G of the Companies Act, 1956.
  5. Jurisdiction of the Company Law Board (CLB) versus SEBI.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Breach of Takeover Code:
  The petitioner alleged that Respondent No. 9 illegally acquired 1,90,441 shares of the petitioner-company from Respondent Nos. 1 to 8, violating the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997. The petitioner argued that the acquisition was disguised as two separate transactions on 28-5-2008 and 29-5-2008 to avoid triggering the Takeover Regulations. The petitioner cited the case of *Aska Investments (P.) Ltd. v. Grob Tea Co. Ltd.*, where the CLB held that non-compliance with regulation 7 was mandatory and any act in violation was invalid. The respondent countered that SEBI has exclusive jurisdiction over such matters under regulation 44 of the Takeover Regulations and Sections 15Y and 20A of the SEBI Act.
  
  2. Breach of Insider Trading Regulations:
  The petitioner claimed that Respondent No. 1, an insider with access to unpublished price-sensitive information, violated the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992. The petitioner argued that Respondent No. 1 attended board meetings where sensitive information was discussed and thus breached regulations 3 and 3A. The respondent argued that the information discussed in the board meetings was made public within 15 minutes as per the listing agreement, negating any insider trading claims.
  
  3. Violation of Section 372A of the Companies Act, 1956:
  The petitioner contended that Respondent No. 9's acquisition of 1,90,441 shares exceeded the limits prescribed under Section 372A, which restricts a company from acquiring securities beyond 60% of its paid-up share capital or 100% of its free reserves. The petitioner argued that the acquisition was not within the permissible limits based on Respondent No. 9's balance sheet as of 31-3-2007.
  
  4. Violation of Sections 108A and 108G of the Companies Act, 1956:
  The petitioner argued that the acquisition required prior approval from the Central Government as it created a dominant undertaking, with the combined market share of Respondent No. 9 and the petitioner exceeding 25% in the "Rubefacient" product category. The petitioner supported this claim with statistical analysis from A.C. Nielsen.
  
  5. Jurisdiction of the CLB versus SEBI:
  The respondent argued that the CLB lacked jurisdiction over the matter as the SEBI has exclusive powers to regulate and take action on Takeover Code violations under Sections 15Y and 20A of the SEBI Act. The respondent cited the case of *Kesha Appliances (P.) Ltd. v. Royal Holdings Services Ltd.*, where it was held that SEBI has exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the Takeover Regulations.
  
  Conclusion:
  The CLB dismissed the petition, stating that the SEBI has exclusive jurisdiction over the alleged violations of the Takeover Code and Insider Trading Regulations. The CLB noted that the allegations were yet to be investigated and confirmed as violations of the law. The CLB also referred to the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court judgment in *Aska Investments (P.) Ltd.*, which held that the CLB could not direct forfeiture of shares for violations of the Takeover Regulations. The CLB emphasized that corporate democracy should prevail and declined to grant interim relief, allowing the annual general meeting to proceed as per rules. The petition was dismissed with no order to cost.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1015
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Award of Interest Higher than 18% u/s 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  2. Status of the Award as a Decree under CPC.
  3. Objections under Section 47 CPC in Execution Proceedings.
  4. Application of Usurious Loans Act, 1918.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Award of Interest Higher than 18% u/s 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
  The appellants contended that the Arbitrator could not award interest higher than 18% per annum as stipulated in Section 31(7)(b) of the Act. They argued that the Court could invoke Section 31(7)(b) at the execution stage to reduce the interest rate. However, the Court held that Section 31(7)(b) uses the words "unless the award otherwise directs," indicating that the stipulated rate in the Award gains precedence and cannot be interfered with by the Court at the execution stage.
  
  2. Status of the Award as a Decree under CPC:
  The appellants argued that the Award, being based on a settlement, did not have the status of a decree under the CPC. They relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. However, the Court clarified that the said judgment was specific to the Insolvency Act and did not apply to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that an arbitral award is enforceable as a decree under the CPC.
  
  3. Objections under Section 47 CPC in Execution Proceedings:
  The appellants contended that all objections permissible under Section 47 CPC could be raised in execution proceedings for the enforcement of an award. The Court, however, reiterated that recourse against an arbitral award could only be made by an application for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act within the stipulated period. Since no such application was made, the award became enforceable as a decree.
  
  4. Application of Usurious Loans Act, 1918:
  The appellants argued that under Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, the Court could declare the interest charged as excessive or the transaction as "substantially unfair." The Court rejected this argument, stating that the Usurious Loans Act applies to suits and not to execution proceedings. Allowing such objections at the execution stage would render every decree vulnerable, which is neither intended nor permissible.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the learned Single Judge's decision. The objections raised by the appellants were found to be without merit, and the Court emphasized the enforceability of the arbitral award as a decree. The appeals were dismissed with costs of Rs. 20,000/- each, to be paid by the appellants to the respondent within four weeks.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1014
  
  The Calcutta High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision that impugned inputs have no role in the production of coke oven gas, leading to a nil rate of duty. The appeal was dismissed, and parties were directed to act on a signed copy of the order.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1013
  
  Supreme Court of India dismissed the appeal in the case. Judges were Mr. S.B. Sinha and Mr. Cyriac Joseph. The citation is 2008 (8) TMI 1013 - SC.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1012
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against conviction under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC, challenge to rejection of plea under Section 84 IPC for unsoundness of mind.
  
  Background: The case involved the conviction of the appellant for offenses under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC, related to the death of the maternal grandfather-in-law of the accused. The prosecution's case detailed the events leading to the death, including the accused's alleged violent behavior towards witnesses and the deceased, resulting in the death by burning of the grandfather-in-law.
  
  Plea under Section 84 IPC: The appellant argued that the unusual behavior exhibited by the accused, as witnessed by PW2 and PW4, should have led to the application of Section 84 IPC for unsoundness of mind. The prosecution contended that Section 84 was not applicable in this case, a stance upheld by the High Court.
  
  Legal Test of Responsibility: Section 84 of IPC provides the legal test for cases of alleged unsoundness of mind, equating "unsoundness of mind" to insanity. The burden of proving insanity rests on the accused, with a distinction made between legal and medical insanity. The section outlines criteria for exoneration based on the accused's capability to understand the nature of the act and its legality at the time of committing the offense.
  
  Types of Unsoundness of Mind: The judgment elaborated on four categories of individuals considered non compos mentis, including idiots, those made non compos by illness, lunatics, and individuals under the influence of alcohol. It emphasized that the intent and act must concur for an offense, except in cases of insane persons where culpability is not established due to lack of free will.
  
  Application of Section 84 IPC: The section provides exemption from liability if the accused, due to a defect of reason from a mental disorder, was unaware of the nature or wrongfulness of the act at the time of committing it. The judgment highlighted the importance of proving the accused's mental condition at the material time of the offense and the relevance of conduct before and after the event.
  
  Decision: The trial Court and the High Court correctly determined that Section 84 IPC did not apply in this case, dismissing the appeal against conviction. The judgment did not delve into the application of Section 339 of Cr.P.C concerning the appellant's custody since 1996.
  
  Conclusion: The appeal challenging the conviction under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC, along with the plea for unsoundness of mind under Section 84 IPC, was dismissed by the Supreme Court, affirming the lower courts' decisions.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1011
  
  Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, quashing of criminal proceedings against partners of a Firm.
  
  Interpretation of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
  The High Court held that only partners of a Firm who are in-charge of the affairs of the Company and responsible to it can be proceeded against under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was noted that not every partner of the Firm can automatically be implicated under this provision. However, the High Court quashed the criminal proceedings on the grounds that the necessary averments as required by Section 141 were not made in the complaint petition.
  
  Legal Fiction under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act:
  Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act creates a legal fiction where Directors of a Company, including partners of a Firm, can be deemed to have committed an offence along with the Company if they are in-charge of the Company's affairs and responsible to it. In this case, respondent No. 3, as the authorised signatory of the Company, and respondent No. 2, the Firm, were involved in the matter.
  
  Decision and Outcome:
  The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the High Court's judgment concerning the involvement of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The Court upheld the quashing of proceedings against respondent Nos. 4 and 5, as the necessary averments were not made against them. This decision was based on the precedent set in the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla and Anr. 2005CriLJ4140.

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• 2008 (8) TMI 1010
  
  Issues involved:
  The issue involves the interpretation of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 regarding the adjustment made by the Assessing Officer for extra depreciation on a furnace, changing from straight line method to WDV method, for assessment year 1997-98.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Adjustment of Extra Depreciation
  The assessee provided for extra depreciation on the furnace by changing the method from straight line to WDV. The Assessing Officer adjusted this amount while computing book profit under Section 115JA of the Act. The CIT (Appeals) deleted the adjustment, citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Limited vs. CIT. The Revenue challenged this before the Tribunal, which upheld the CIT (Appeals) decision. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer's disallowance of depreciation lacked a quantitative basis and that the change in method was permissible. The Revenue contended that the change was a colorable device to reduce tax incidence, but the Court held that the assessee had followed the Companies Act provisions and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Apollo Tyres Limited.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of Section 115JA
  The Revenue argued that the change in depreciation method was not in accordance with Part-II of Schedule VI of the Companies Act and was a colorable device. However, the Court held that the Assessing Officer's power under Section 115JA is limited to examining the certified accounts and making specified adjustments. The Court emphasized that the Assessing Officer cannot recompute profits by excluding depreciation provisions. The Court also noted that the conditions of the second proviso to Section 115JA(2) were satisfied in this case, and the assessee's method of accounting was in compliance with the Companies Act.
  
  Conclusion:
  Based on the principles established in the Apollo Tyres Limited case and the compliance with the Companies Act, the Court found no substantial question of law arising from the Tribunal's order. The appeal was therefore disposed of accordingly.

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