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Showing 21 to 40 of 1572 Records
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2015 (8) TMI 1562 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Illegal Construction or not - sanction was granted to the petitioner by the Municipal Corporation or not - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the petitioner has not been summoned by the Lokayukt Organization in regard to any criminal case. The Organization has registered an Inquiry Case No.134/2013 and conducting the inquiry against the officers of the Municipal Corporation and it is necessary to find out that whether permission for construction of a house was granted illegally or not.
The Organization has a right to conduct the inquiry against the officers or employees of the Municipal Corporation.
The Corporation has issued notice to the petitioner in regard to illegal construction. It is an independent issue. If any illegal construction has been made by the petitioner the Corporation has its right to take action in accordance with law and if the petitioner has made the construction in accordance with proper sanction, she can very well place the fact before the Corporation. Corporation is at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (8) TMI 1561 - SC ORDER
Club and Association service - Charitable service - Service provided to members - HELD THAT:- The delay is condoned - application admitted.
The matter to be heard along with Civil Appeal No. 7497 of 2012.
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2015 (8) TMI 1560 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Levy of Entry tax - procurement of 66393.87 mts of boulder from the petitioners own leased quarry and the purchase of boulder by the petitioner of 250977.78 mts from one M/s. Start Trading Pvt. Ltd. - whether boulder was not a schedule goods under the Orissa Entry Tax Act, 1999? - HELD THAT:- The second proceeding under Section 10 of the O.E.T. Act under Anenxure-3 to the writ application was merely based upon the audit conducted by the Auditor General which once again raised the issue as to whether boulder was a mineral or not. This turn- over and the period was covered by the earlier order dated 26.02.2011 passed under Section 10 of the O.E.T. Act under Anenxure-1 and consequently having attained finality and no challenge having been made to the same, remains final and binding on all parties.
The opposite party had no jurisdiction in this matter to initiate a fresh proceeding under Section 10 of the O.E.T Act, resulting in passing of the order dated 31.07.2012 under Annexure-3 - there are no hesitation in directing quashing of Anenxure-3 - application disposed off.
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2015 (8) TMI 1559 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash credit - CIT(A) has confirmed the AO's action of adding unsecured loans in case of four parties wherein letter issued stood returned with remarks “not known” - HELD THAT:- As in case CIT vs. Orrisa Corporation Pvt. Ltd. [1986 (3) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] holding that once an assessee submits all assessments details of its creditors, it is not supposed to do anything further and the primary onus of proving identity, genuineness and creditworthiness stand discharged. And also that it is Revenue’s job thereafter to rebut the same.
It is to be seen that the assessee’s supportive evidence in case of all the creditors eg. its books of accounts, creditors PAN details, confirmations, returns and bank statements etc. stands on equal footing. We observe in these facts that merely because some of them have not been served the postal letters in question does not form a valid ground in rejecting assessee’s plea of genuineness and creditworthiness of the impugned credit to the extent as affirmed in the lower appellate order.
Revenue fails to point out any distinction on merits in case of abovestated four creditors vis-à-vis the other eleven parties. We quote the decisions of Chanakya Developers [2013 (10) TMI 7 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] and CIT vs. Ranchhod Jivabhai Nakhava, [2012 (5) TMI 186 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] reiterating the abovestated view of the hon’ble apex court in these facts and hold the assessee to have successfully proved genuineness/creditworthiness of all the impugned unsecured loans hereinabove. The Revenue’s sole substantive ground in its appeal fails and assessee’s first ground is accepted.
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2015 (8) TMI 1558 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r. 8D - CIT-A considering the fact that after insertion of rule 8D w.e.f. A.Y. 2008-09 there is no notional disallowance - HELD THAT:- On consideration of the above facts and submissions of the parties, we find that issue raised in the departmental appeal is covered in favour of the assessee by order of the Tribunal in the case of the same assessee for assessment year 2010-11 [2014 (5) TMI 1082 - ITAT CHANDIGARH] in which on identical grounds, the Tribunal dismissed the departmental appeal following the order of the Tribunal in earlier years. Departmental appeal is dismissed.
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2015 (8) TMI 1557 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking eviction of the Respondents - default in the payment of rent - proper service of notice under Section 12(2) of The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - statutory presumption contained in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act - Respondents have denied receiving notice under Section 12(2) of the Rent Act - whether such bald denial is sufficient for the purposes of rebutting the statutory presumption arising out of the provisions contained in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act?
HELD THAT:- The finding that there was no valid service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Rent Act is vitiated by perversity as well as material irregularity and illegality. This is a case where the onus of proof was incorrectly and in any case excessively cast upon the Applicant landlord. The presumption arising out of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act was not allowed its full play. As noted earlier, the Respondents have admitted in the course of their evidence that the address to which the envelopes containing the notices were addressed, are correct addresses. The Respondents have also admitted that they normally receive their correspondence at such address. There is material on record which establishes that the notices were indeed sent by R.P.A.D. and U.C.P. There is no evidence led by the Respondents either by way of examination of postman or otherwise to establish that such notices were not served.
The Appeal Court, in such circumstances, was not right in holding that a bald statement that the notices were not served, suffice to rebut the statutory presumption. The Appeal Court, has already recorded the findings of fact that the Respondents were clearly in arrears in the payment of rent for a period of in excess of six months. Such findings have not been challenged by the Respondents. For all these reasons, the impugned Judgments and Decrees are liable to be set aside.
This Civil Revision Application is allowed.
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2015 (8) TMI 1556 - SC ORDER
Validity of Summons issued for offence under Section 630 of the Companies Act 1956 - Validity of Board resolution is already in dispute - It was held by High Court that It is settled law that the complaint under Section 630 of the Company Law may be maintainable despite of pendency of the civil litigation, but the facts in the present case are distinct as it is doubtful whether the complaint in the existing circumstances when the board resolution itself is under dispute is maintainable whether the proceedings can continue, therefore, instead of dismissal of complaint, I am of the view that the summoning order are liable to be quashed.
HELD THAT:- The order of High Court is upheld - The special leave petition is dismissed.
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2015 (8) TMI 1555 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - legally enforceable liability or not - acquittal of accused - framing of charges - presumption of innocence - Section 138 of NI Act - HELD THAT:- In the present case, there is no conclusive proof of actual payment of Rs.50,000/- by the petitioner-complainant to the accused/respondent. The petitioner has failed to show that at any point of time, he was having this amount in his account. Even the date on which the alleged transaction took place has not come either in the complainant or in the statement of the petitioner. The purpose of advancing alleged friendly loan has also not come forth. The stand of the petitioner that he had advanced the loan to the accused by taking the money from his father is also without any foundation in the absence of examination of his father as a witness. The impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court is detailed and reasoned judgment and no fault can be found therewith.
The finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record. In fact there is no infirmity in the reasoning assigned by the trial Court for acquitting the accused/respondent.
It is a settled law as has been held in C. Antony Vs. K.G. Raghavan Nair, [2002 (11) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT] that even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused. In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible.
The leave to appeal stands declined.
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2015 (8) TMI 1554 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Addition u/s 68 - assessee has booked cash sales of Rs. 3 Crores in the month of September,2006 to different parties - HELD THAT:- Merely because addition on merit have been confirmed by itself is no ground to sustain the penalty automatically. It is an admitted fact that cash sales of Rs. 3.12 Cr were out of the total sales of Rs. 94.54 Cr. The assessee maintained complete books of account and the accounts are audited. The assessee produced books of account, purchase bills, sales bills and stock register before the authorities below and disclosed complete facts with regard to the sales made to different parties. Therefore, nothing was concealed to the revenue department in filing of the return as well as at the time of assessment framed by the AO.
The sale bills were supported by sales tax paid challans and sales tax return filed by the assessee with Commercial Tax Department of Una and as well as shown by the assessee in the books of account have been accepted by the sales tax authorities (VAT authorities). Thus, the sales made by the assessee including the cash sales have been accepted by the sales tax authorities. The authorities below dis-believed the explanation of the assessee with regard to cash sales made to different parties because their complete details are not noted in the bills.
It was also noted that since no complete particulars of the purchasers are mentioned in the sale bills, therefore, cash sales are not subjected to verification. This was the sole reason for making the addition as well as levying the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act against the assessee - As in the case of R.B. Jessa Ram Fateh Chand [1969 (7) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and similarly M. Durai Raj [1971 (3) TMI 11 - KERALA HIGH COURT] held that the books of account cannot be rejected if in cash sales, names and address of the purchasers are not mentioned. There is no need to mention name and address in the cash sales. These judgements support the version of the assessee that mere dis-believing the explanation of the assessee would not be enough to levy the penalty under section 271(1)(c)
The facts and circumstances of the case shall have to be considered because levy of the penalty is discretionary in nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills [2009 (5) TMI 15 - SUPREME COURT] held that on every demand, penalty is not automatic.
We are of the view that even if addition on quantum have been sustained, however assessee has been able to make out an arguable and debatable case to prove that penalty need not be imposed in this case. We, therefore, do not subscribe to the views of the authorities below in levying and sustaining the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. We, accordingly, set aside the orders of the authorities below and delete the penalty. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (8) TMI 1553 - ITAT LUCKNOW
Exemption u/s 11 - as per revenue receipts of the assessee are commercial in nature - Charitable activity u/s 2(15) proved or not? - whether the Revenue has brought on record any material/evidence which may suggest that the assessee was conducting its affairs on commercial line with the motive to earn profit? - HELD THAT:- On dissolution of the assessee authority, all properties, funds and dues which are vested in or realizable by the authority shall vest in or be realisable by the state government and therefore, the funds generated during so called charitable purpose period may be utilized for the purpose of the business - On page 5 of the assessment order, there is a chart of the income of the assessee from various sources and as per the same, Realisation from allotted properties is only Rs. 480.45 lacs and interest income is of Rs. 458.24 Lacs plus Rs. 232.25 lacs and Other receipts Rs. 665.62 lacs. In this manner, as against Realisation from allotted properties of only Rs. 480.45 lacs, interest income and Other receipts is Rs. 1356.11 Lacs.
In view of these facts, the A.O. came to the conclusion that the receipts of the assessee are commercial in nature. Under these facts, in our considered opinion, the judgment of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court rendered in the case of CIT vs. Lucknow Development Authority[2013 (9) TMI 570 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] cannot be made applicable in the facts of the present case. Learned CIT (A) has simply followed this judgment without examining this aspect that the facts in the present case are tallying or not with the facts in the case of CIT vs. Lucknow Development Authority (Supra). Therefore, we feel it proper that this issue should go back to CIT (A) for a fresh decision after examining this aspect that the facts in the present case are tallying with the facts in the case of CIT vs. Lucknow Development Authority (Supra) or not. We, therefore, set aside the order of CIT (A) and restore the entire matter back to him for a fresh decision - Appeal of the revenue is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (8) TMI 1552 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Detention of imported Consignments - wrongful goods dispatched from China erroneously and petitioner could not act immediately on account of intervening holidays - R22 refrigerant gas - restricted goods/improper import - petitioner seeks release of consignment or immediate re-export of the consignments as the goods were hazardous to the environment - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, on 30.01.2015, the consignments have been detained by the customs authority pointing out as an improper import on 30.01.2015 invoking Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner company approached the authority concerned repeatedly opting to pay penalty for the purpose of release of goods with an undertaking to participate in the adjudication proceedings. Both the prayers were never met by the authorities and the matter is kept pending without passing any order.
The learned senior panel counsel appearing for the 1st respondent would submit that even according to Section 69 of the Customs Act, the time limit of six months granted for the authority to take a decision is extended up to six months and the six months time is not yet over and hence time may be granted for passing appropriate orders.
The 1st respondent is directed to decide the issue, one way or the other, with regard to release of consignments or to enable the petitioner to re-export the consignments to the originating company or otherwise, after affording due opportunity to the petitioner - Petition disposed off.
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2015 (8) TMI 1551 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
TDS u/s 194A - amount of interest deposited with the Motor Accident Claims - HELD THAT:- When interest is paid by any person, who is not an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family, who is responsible for paying to a resident any income by way of interest other than income by way of interest on securities, he is liable to deduct income-tax at the rate in force
As it would quite apparent that the award amount inclusive of interest in the present case has been deposited by the petitioner Company on 25.6.2003, 14.7.2003, 28.5.2003, 11.7.2003 and 24.7.2003 i.e. after 1st June, 2003, the date on which clause (ix) of sub-section (3) of Section 194-A of the Act came into force, which obliges the deductor to make any deduction at source on an amount paid by way of the interest on the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. In view of the specific provisions contained in the Income Tax Act, the petitioner Company was duty bound to deduct the amount of income-tax from the amount of interest deposited with the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for being disbursed to the respondents/claimants.
In the matter of The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Ramesh Kumar Tamrakar and others [2010 (12) TMI 1340 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT] it has been clearly held by this Court that in view of the provisions contained in clause (ix) of sub-section (3) of Section 194-A of the Act, if the interest component of the award had been deposited after 1-6-2003, the Insurance Company is duty bound to deduct T.D.S. from the amount of interest paid by it.
Claims Tribunal is absolutely unjustified in holding that the petitioner Insurance Company ought not to have deducted the tax at source from the amount of interest paid to the respondents/claimants, as such, the impugned order dated 8.10.2004 deserves to and is accordingly set aside and it is held that the petitioner Company is absolutely justified in deducting tax at source while making the payment of the award inclusive of the interest. In consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to and is accordingly allowed and the impugned order is hereby set aside,
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2015 (8) TMI 1550 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash deposits in bank - As per the explanation furnished by him, Shri Dalip Singh was an agriculturist, not well educated and had come from village for making purchases for marriage of his daughter and the money was deposited in the bank account, since, the assessee and Shri Dalip Singh both had to make purchases for the marriage of their daughters - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the stated evidences and in the back ground of the fact that Shri Dalip Singh himself has confirmed before the Assessing Officer that he has deposited this amount of Rs.3,55,000/- in assessee’s bank account, this explanation cannot be rejected outrightly. These evidences filed by the assessee also prove that Shri Dalip Singh is a man of means and there is also a relation between him and the assessee, therefore, it cannot be denied that Shri Dalip Singh, in fact, has given this amount to the assessee.
The explanation given by the assessee and Sh. Dalip Singh that the amount was deposited for making purchases for the marriage of daughter may sound weird and can raise suspicion in the mind of Assessing Officer. It can be a trigger point for further investigation by the Assessing Officer. However, in its order the Assessing Officer has not been able to bring on record any material or evidence to falsify this explanation and documentary evidences filed by the assessee. Even before me, the learned DR has not been able to do the same. The addition has solely been made on the basis of surmises. Suspicion howsoever strong cannot partake the character of the evidence/material, as held by the Apex Court in the land mark judgement in case of Umcharan Shaw & Bros. vs. CIT [1959 (5) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT]
Thus we are not able to come to a conclusion other than that the deposit has in fact been deposited by Shri Dalip Singh. Therefore, the addition made by the Assessing Officer is hereby deleted. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (8) TMI 1549 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Seeking provisional release of imported goods seized - LED Spare parts for Lighting Fixtures Spare Parts for Lighting Fixtures and Capacitor for Lighting Fixtures - section 110-A of Custom Act 1962 read with customs (Provisional Duty Assessment Regulations) 1963 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is permitted to file an application within one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and also directed to appear before the respondent on the date and time so specified so as to assess as provided by law. The matter shall be decided within 3 weeks from the date of receipt of the application submitted by the petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (8) TMI 1548 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Blacklisting the petitioner from the panel of the respondent SDMC - non-payment by the petitioner of the outstanding dues - HELD THAT:- There can be no proposition of law in absolute terms that pendency of a litigation between the contractor and an authority / body / municipality / government, the dispute wherein entitles the authority / body / municipality / government to exercise the power to blacklist the contractor, cannot be a ground to deprive such authority / body / municipality / government from exercising the power of blacklisting. If it were to be so held, it would become very easy for a contractor to defeat the right of the authority / body / municipality / government to blacklist, by, as soon as the dispute has arisen, initiate the litigation - It would thus follow that the exercise of the power to blacklist is independent of any provision therefor in any law or in the contract.
The right of the government / governmental agency to blacklist is in addition to the right to make a claim for the amount, which according to it is outstanding or any other right which it may have under the contract or law.
Whether invocation of one right i.e. of initiating recovery proceedings, would bar the invocation of another right i.e. to blacklist? - HELD THAT:- The power to blacklist, in this case on the ground of non-payment of dues, is independent of the power to recover the said dues, whether by instituting arbitration proceedings or by instituting a suit for recovery of the said amount and the mere pendency of such proceedings would per se not be a bar to the exercise of the power to blacklist.
If during the pendency of legal proceedings the power to blacklist has been invoked, what would be the proper fora for entertaining a challenge if any made to the exercise of such power-whether by way of an independent proceeding or by way of an application for interim relief in the pending legal proceedings? - HELD THAT:- If blacklisting is on the same grounds which are subject matter of pending legal proceedings, the proper mode for challenging the said action of blacklisting would be by way of an application for interim relief in the same legal proceedings.
The adjudication of a challenge to the order of blacklisting would necessarily entail determination, at least prima facie, of the grounds of blacklisting. It is opined that the Court / Arbitral Tribunal before which the disputes are already pending adjudication, would be a more appropriate fora for determining the said factor and / or for balancing the equities, being already seized of the matter. Permitting such challenge to be made by an independent proceeding, whether by way of a suit or a writ petition, would not only lead to multiplicity of proceedings but may also be capable of conflicting views and decisions and which are to be best avoided.
In the present case, rather than adopting the aforesaid course of action it is deemed appropriate that the Arbitrator Mr. Bharat Bhushan Addl. District Judge (Retd.), before whom the proceedings are pending, be requested to dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible and before 30th November, 2015. The said time has been arrived at after understanding from the counsels the stage at which the arbitration proceedings are pending and the time required to be taken by them for further proceedings and on their assurance that they will not seek any adjournment and fully co-operate with the Arbitral Tribunal in disposal of the arbitration proceedings by the said date.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (8) TMI 1547 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - delay of 5 days in filing the complaint - seeking condonation of delay in filing the complaint - Section 142(b) of Negotiable Instruments Act - rebuttal of evidences - HELD THAT:- After going through the records, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the accused is not able to probablise the defence set up by him and therefore, the offence punishable under Section 138-A of the Act is proved. The rebuttal evidence placed by the accused is not at all sufficient to discharge this burden to the effect that he has not committed any offence is the finding of the trial Court. Therefore, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that the accused had received a sum of ₹ 1.5 lakhs from the complainant and the cheque marked as per Ex. P1 was issued for having received the said amount in discharge of the debt. Therefore, he is stated to have committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
In the present case, the complainant had filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act supported by an affidavit sworn by him, explaining the reasons for the delay of five days in filing the complaint. This aspect of the matter, as argued by learned Counsel Sri.Ameet Kumar Deshpande, has not been considered by the trial Court. But, this aspect of limitation had been raised as one of the grounds before the First Appellate Court in the appeal filed under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. by the accused in Criminal Appeal No. 1/2014.
In fact, the present case stands on a higher footing than the facts found in Pawan Kumar Ralli's case. The accused therein had received the legal notice on 27.04.2012. On the basis of the said averment, the learned Judge of the Trial Court was satisfied that the complaint was within the prescribed period of limitation. In the present case, there was a delay of five days and therefore, the complainant has filed an application under proviso to Section 142 (b) of the Limitation Act, which has come into effect on 06.02.2003.
What is the sufficient cause for condonation of delay is dependent upon the facts of each case and delay may be liberally condoned without adopting a pedantic approach as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of LAO Anantanay Vs. Khathij [1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT]. The proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 came to be inserted in the year 2003 keeping in mind the reasons and objects of the Act and to obviate the complainant of the hardship. If proceedings are held without condoning delay, such proceedings do not have any force of law. If delay is noticed, the trial Court can even call upon the complainant to file an application for condonation of delay.
Therefore, it is expected of all the trial Courts dealing with offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act to direct the office to put-up a specific note about the delay, if any, in filing the complaint and whether any application is filed for condonation of delay. It is also expected that before issuing process, the judge to specifically indicate that there is no delay in filing the complaint.
The matter is remitted to the trial Court to pass appropriate orders on the application already filed for condonation for delay - petition allowed.
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2015 (8) TMI 1546 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Additional complaint - respondent complainant/ Board sought to make the petitioners as accused persons, not in the capacity as Directors or Principal/responsible officers of M/s. QRG Central Hospital & Research Centre but as Directors or authorised representatives of M/s. QRG Medicare Limited, a different company incorporated under the Companies Act - HELD THAT:- The facts of the case are hardly in dispute. Original Complaint No. 10 of 2013 (Annexure P-5) was already pending. In the said original complaint, even the summoning order dated 25.4.2014 (Annexure P-7) has been issued by the learned court of competent jurisdiction. During the pendency of the above-said original complaint (Annexure P-5), complainant-respondent/Board filed the impugned additional complaint No. 158 of 2014 dated 3.9.2014 (Annexure P-1), which was not maintainable in the present form and at this stage of the trial of original complaint. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has rightly contended and was fully justified to say so that once the learned court has taken the cognizance of the original complaint, the complainant-Board ought to have waited till the appropriate stage and the present petitioners along with other accused persons, if any, could have been summoned to face the criminal trial as additional accused, by moving an appropriate application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
In case, after re-examination of the matter, the respondent- Board was of the view that some additional accused were also involved in the commission of offence in question, it should have waited and taken recourse to the well known procedure of law provided under Section 319 Cr.P.C., by invoking the said provisions at the appropriate stage. Such peculiar fact situation, as obtaining in the present case, has been taken care of by the legislature by providing Section 319 Cr.P.C on the statute book - However, since the complainant-Board proceeded in haste without waiting for the appropriate stage of the criminal trial of its original complaint (Annexure P-5), additional complaint (Annexure P-1) was not maintainable and the same cannot be sustained, for this reason also.
The cognizance of the offence having already been taken by the learned Magistrate, while issuing summoning order (Annexure P-7) in the original complaint (Annexure P-5), neither the additional impugned complaint (Annexure P-1) was maintainable nor the impugned summoning order (Annexure P-3) could have been issued, thus, the impugned additional complaint (Annexure P-1) as well as the impugned summoning order (Annexure P-3) cannot be sustained, for this reason as well.
Petition allowed,
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2015 (8) TMI 1545 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Refund of the unutilized credit - absence of any provision for refund especially in Rule 5 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - HELD THAT:- Appeal admitted on the substantial question of law.
List for hearing after six weeks.
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2015 (8) TMI 1544 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
Validity of DRP order - violating the principle of natural justice - Failure to provide reasonable opportunity to the Appellant to furnish documents and evidences - HELD THAT:- It would meet the ends of justice if the order of the DRP is set aside, because in our opinion certainly adequate opportunity of being heard is not allowed by the DRP to the assessee. There are different dates mentioned in the order of the DRP supplied to the assessee and the order in the file of the DRP. No satisfactory explanation for this variation in dates in both the orders could be given by the ld. CIT-DR. In the order-sheet there is a noting of only one date of hearing, i.e., 28.11.2014 on which date the assessee was directed to file chart/submission and time was granted up to 05.12.2014. However, thereafter there is no other noting whether any further hearing took place or not.
DRP has passed the order without allowing adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. We, therefore, set aside the order of the DRP and restore the matter back to its file. We direct the DRP to allow adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee, and thereafter pass a speaking order in respect of assessee’s objections in accordance with law. Assessee’s appeal is deemed to be allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (8) TMI 1543 - ITAT CHENNAI
Depreciation on the windmill - Addition on the ground that the Revenue has filed an appeal before the Apex Court against the judgment of the Madras High Court in Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills Ltd. [2010 (3) TMI 860 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] - AO admits in the assessment order that the issue before him is similar to one that was decided by the Madras High Court - HELD THAT:- No infirmity in the order of the lower authority in following the binding judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court. A mere pendency of SLP before the Apex Court cannot be a reason for not following the judgment of the Jurisdictional High Court. It is not the case of the Revenue that the operation of the judgment of the Madras High Court was stayed by the Apex Court. In those circumstances, this Tribunal do not find any infirmity in the order of the lower authority. Accordingly, the same is confirmed.
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