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Showing 21 to 40 of 1760 Records
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2015 (9) TMI 1750
Non-representation on the date of hearing - HELD THAT:- From the cumulative reading of the order sheets in the appeals it is seen that barring few occasions when the hearing was adjourned for want of time and twice on the request of the department the appeals have largely been adjourned on the request of the assessee. Accordingly in the afore-said peculiar facts and circumstances, it can be safely presumed that the assessee is not serious in pursuing the present appeals.The appeals of the assessee are dismissed in limine. Support is drawn from the order Multi Plan India (P) Ltd [1991 (5) TMI 120 - ITAT DELHI-D]and Estate of Late Tukojirao Holkar vs. CWT [1996 (3) TMI 92 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT]
Before parting it is appropriate to add that in case the assessee is able to show that there was a reasonable cause for non-representation on the date of hearing then the assessee if so advised would be at liberty to pray for a recall of this order and decisions on merits. The said order was pronounced on the date of hearing itself in the open Court. Appeals of the assessee are dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1749
Criminal conspiracy in respect of the grant of 122 UAS licenses in the year 2008 against various unknown Government officials, persons and companies - second supplementary chargesheet should be tried by a Magistrate of the First Class or can be tried only by the learned Special Judge? - offences Under Section 120B read with Section 420 Indian Penal Code - HELD THAT:- It is clear that on a reading of the prayers in the said application, only a joint trial was asked for in pursuance of the judgment of this Court dated 1.7.2013. In fact, on a reading of the application and the arguments made before the learned Special Judge, the Petitioners' main argument was that this Court, in the order dated 1.7.2013, had in fact mandated a joint trial. This was correctly turned down by the learned Special Judge, regard being had to the fact that this Court, in paragraph 25 of the judgment dated 1.7.2013, only stated that a discretion was vested with the Special Judge which he may well exercise given the facts of the case.
The other contention of learned senior Counsel for the Petitioners before us has already been answered by this Court by upholding both the administrative order dated 15.3.2011 and the NCT notification dated 28.3.2011. This Court having held that the administrative order dated 15.3.2011 of the High court was valid, it is clear that even a Penal Code offence by itself-that is, such offence which is not to be tried with a Prevention of Corruption Act offence-would be within the Special Judge's jurisdiction inasmuch as the administrative order of the High Court gives power to the Special Court to decide all offences pertaining to the 2G Scam. In fact, once this order is upheld, the learned senior advocate's argument based on Section 4(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act pales into insignificance - once the challenge to the administrative order dated 15.3.2011, is specifically rejected, the offences arising out of the second supplementary chargesheet, being offences under the Penal Code relatable to the 2G scam, can be tried separately only by the Special Judge.
There are no infirmity in the impugned judgment - petition dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1748
Revision u/s 263 - credit that was received and credited in the earlier year, cannot be added during the current year - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered opinion, that the submissions of the Ld. Sr. D.R. were upheld, for the reason that the addition in question, is not made u/s 68 of the Act. Thus the year of receipt of credit and entry into the books of accounts is of no consequence. No other argument has been advanced before us on this issue. Thus this ground of the assessee is dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1747
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Gain on sale of shares - Long term capital gains OR income from other sources - HELD THAT:- Since the returns of income filed by the assessees have been processed u/s 143(1) only and since the assessing officer has reopened the assessments on the basis of report received from the Investigation wing of the department, we are of the view that the AO had proper reasons with him for reopening of assessments. Accordingly, we uphold the order of Ld CIT(A) on this issue.
Gain on sale of shares - CIT(A) has held that the proof of delivery of shares are not sufficient to prove genuineness of sales, when the purchases were found to be not genuine. We are unable to understand the said reasoning given by the Ld CIT(A). If the tax authorities require any other evidence, apart from the evidences furnished by the assessees, they could have asked the assessees to furnish the same. Instead, they have proceeded to assess the long term capital as income under the head income from other sources. In our view, the said action of the tax authorities is not justified. There should not be any dispute that the delivery of shares could not have been done without purchasing them.
Reply given by M/s Interconnected Stock Exchange India cannot be considered to be the sole criteria to suspect the claim of purchase of shares. Barring this, no material is brought on record to suspect the claim of the assessees that they have earned long term capital gains. Accordingly, we are of the view that the Ld CIT(A) was not justified in confirming the additions made by the AO - we direct the AO to accept the claim of impugned Long term capital gain.
Appeals filed by the assessees are partly allowed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1746
Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - existence of legally enforceable debt or not - acquittal of Respondents on the ground that the Appellant did not institute the case against the partnership firm i.e. M/s. Shah Enterprises - HELD THAT:- From a bare reading of Section 138 of the NI Act, the first and foremost essential ingredient for attracting a liability under this Section is that the person who is to be made liable should be the drawer of the cheque and should have drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other liability.
The High Court has correctly come to the conclusion that the liabilities of M/s. Shah Agencies were never taken over by M/s. Shah Enterprises. Therefore, the reasoning given by the High Court is absolutely flawless and we find no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1745
Claim of earlier years losses to be brought forward for set off - denial of claim as assessee had not claimed in its return of income - HELD THAT:- Income tax legislation is welfare legislation. Even in case of any doubt, the benefit has to accrue to the assessee. The assessee or the taxpayers contribute to the development of our economy and the Act helps to guide them and not to penalize them. In the present case, it is a fact on record that the assessee has filed its return of income in due time and whatever relief and rectification that were claimed by the assessee was a bonafide one. There was a technical fault because of which, the legal claim of the assessee should not be denied. The legal claim still remains good. Therefore, in our view, the order of the ld CIT(A) directing the AO to modify the order u/s.154 and allow proper relief to the assessee stands good and proper. Hence, we reject Ground No.1 of appeal filed by the revenue.
Violation of Rule 46A of ITAT Rules - As noted that in the appeal against the order u/s.154 of the Act before the ld CIT(A), no additional evidence was produced by the assessee. At the outset, the Bench has asked the ld D.R to demonstrate the violation of provisions of Rule 46A of I.T.Rules which was mentioned in the ground of appeal. Nothing specific was pointed out by him. In such situation, it is not justifiable to allege that there was any infringement of Rule 46A of I.T.Rules. Therefore, in our view, there was no violation of Rule 46A of I.T.Rules, as agitated by the revenue in Ground No.2. Hence, we dismiss this ground.
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2015 (9) TMI 1744
TP Adjustment - non considering assessee’s contentions - Denial of natural justice - as argued TPO as well as the DRP have not considered the elaborate contentions raised by the assessee before them and therefore, there is violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- We find that even during the relevant assessment year, the assessee had made elaborate submissions and both the TPO as well as the DRP have failed to consider the said objections objectively - we deem it fit and proper to remit this issue to the file of the A.O./TPO for reconsideration of the issue in accordance with law. A.O./TPO is directed to give fair opportunity of hearing to the assessee and also consider judicial precedents on the issue including the orders of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case while determining the ALP. Appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.
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2015 (9) TMI 1743
Determination of the property tax - notification dated 11.10.2013 (Annexure P-3) fixing the rates of property tax - whether the notification dated 11.10.2013 fixing the rate of tax is in accordance with the provisions of Section 87(1)(a) of the Act?
HELD THAT:- The State legislature is competent to make the provisions of law as applicable retrospectively. In the present case, Section 21 of the amending Act, validates the notification issued on 30.9.2003 and 21.6.2012. Therefore, it is not a retrospective imposition of tax, but validating of the action taken earlier i.e. the notification dated 30.9.2003 and 21.6.2012. The notification dated 11.10.2013, has been issued in terms of Section 87(3) and Section 149(1) of the Act. The levy of tax and rates have been made applicable from the Financial Year 2010-11 but with a further option that the property owners have the option to pay the same as per the new or old policy, whichever is opted by them.
Therefore, it is open to the owners to opt for the rates, which were prevailing prior to the publication of the notification on 11.10.2013. It is not a retrospective taxation, but an option has been given to pay the tax as per the old policy or the new provisions. Thus, the Notification dated 11.10.2013 is not contrary to the provisions of the Statute.
Petition dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1742
Non-disclosure of capitalization of borrowing costs in the balance sheets - non-disclosure of details of capitalization of computer software in the Company's books of accounts for the year 31st March, 2010, 31st March, 2011, 31st March, 2012 - non-disclosure of each class of intangible assets, distinguishing between internally generated intangible assets and other intangible assets - alleged contravention of Sections 211(3A), (3B) and (3C) of the Act, read with AS-16 and AS-26 - Balance Sheets did not comply with AS-16 and AS-26 as framed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants - time limitation.
HELD THAT:- The quashing of a complaint is permissible where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. The quashing of a complaint is permissible if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. to the institution and continuance of the proceedings.
In the case of ZANDU PHARMACEUTICAL WORKS LTD. & ORS. VERSUS MD SHARAFUL HAQUE & ANR. [2004 (11) TMI 519 - SUPREME COURT], the Supreme Court held that there may not be any straight jacket formula for exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but the same has to be exercised sparingly and in rarest of rare cases.
The time period taken by the Regional Director to take the decision to direct the Registrar of Companies to launch prosecution cannot be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation as both the Regional Director, i.e. the Central Government as well as the Registrar of Companies was competent to launch prosecution once they had knowledge of the commission of the offences as on 24th June, 2013, i.e. when the inspection reports were filed with either of them. Since for the offences under Section 211(7), 211(3A), (3B) and (3C) of the Act, no consent/sanction for prosecution from the Central Government is required. Section 470 (3) Cr.P.C cannot be relied upon by the respondents.
Admittedly, Section 211 of the Act is punishable with six months imprisonment and fine. Under Section 468 Cr.P.C - no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year from the date of offence or the date of knowledge of the offence. Admittedly, the Inspector submitted his inspection report on 24th June, 2013 and the said complaint was only filed on 18th September, 2014, after the expiry of a year from the date of knowledge of the offence as provided under Section 468 (2) (b) Cr.P.C. - The offences in the present case are not continuing in nature, limitation commenced as per Section 469 (1) (b) Cr.P.C. when actionable knowledge was gained by the competent authority i.e. when the Registrar of Companies had knowledge of the commission of the alleged offences, i.e. 24th June, 2013 when the Registrar of Companies received the report of the Inspector and ran out on 23rd June, 2014 and thus the complaint, which was admittedly filed on 18th September, 2014 was hopelessly barred by limitation.
The complaint is based on the inspection report of the officer. Consequently, in the present case there is no issue of fact at all with regard to the date of knowledge of offence to the Registrar of Companies. The complaint is, therefore, time barred - the impugned summoning orders and other proceedings emanating from the said orders against the petitioners are accordingly quashed - petition allowed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1741
Dismissal of appeal on non appearance - HELD THAT:- Notice of hearing was sent to the assessee by registered post with acknowledgement due on 12/8/2015 fixing the case for hearing on 21/09/2015. Notice was served on the assessee on 14/8/2015 as evidenced by the acknowledgement card of the post office placed on record. When the case was called for hearing none appeared on behalf of the assessee and neither any adjournment petition was filed. This shows that the assessee is not serious in pursuing with this appeal, and therefore, by following the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT Vs. Multiplan India Pvt. ltd. 1991 (5) TMI 120 - ITAT DELHI-D] we dismiss this appeal of the assessee in limine.
The assessee may, if so advised, file an application before this Tribunal for restoration of its appeal and hearing on merits by showing reasonable cause for not appearing before the Tribunal on the date of hearing. Appeal of the assessee is dismissed in limine.
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2015 (9) TMI 1740
Criminal prosecution u/s 276C - Wilful attempt to evade tax, etc. - As alleged that though the assessee was having sufficient resources to make payment of demand, the assessee has not paid and attempted to evade payment of tax - HELD THAT:- Continuing the criminal prosecution of the petitioner/assessee will be subjecting the assessee to needless harassment in view of the facts and circumstances noted hereunder - In the instant case, the complaint is that an additional demand was raised on 27-01-2006. It is admitted that the assessee has paid the same on 17-11-2006 and due to oversight, he again paid the said amount on 25-06-2007. Proof thereof is produced. It is not disputed.
In that view of the matter, all further proceedings are liable to be quashed.
In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed quashing all further proceedings on the file of the Special Judge for Economic Offences at Hyderabad against the petitioner/accused.
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2015 (9) TMI 1739
Rejection of plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction - infringement of trademarks - principal place of business and place of suit shoulb necessarily be same? - whether the Suit for infringement and passing off filed by the plaintiff is maintainable before this Court in the light of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act? - HELD THAT:- With regard to the expression notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure contained in Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, it was pointed out that the same does not oust the applicability of the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is clear that additional remedy has been provided to the plaintiff so as to file a suit where he is residing or carrying on business etc; as the case may be, that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to file a suit where the defendant resides or where cause of action arose. It was further pointed out that Section 20(a) and Section 20(b) usually provides the venue where the defendant or any of them resides, carries on business or personally works for gain. Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure enables a plaintiff to institute a suit where the cause of action wholly or in part, arises. Further, the Explanation to Section 20 C.P.C., has been added to the effect that Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has subordinate office at such place. Thus, 'corporation' can be sued at a place having its sole or principal office and where cause of action wholly or in part, arises at a place where it has also a subordinate office at such place.
The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act have to be interpreted in a purposive manner and that a Suit can be filed by the plaintiff at a place where he is residing or carrying on business or personally works for gain and he need not travel to file a suit to a place where defendant is residing or cause of action wholly or in part arises, however, if the plaintiff is residing or carrying on business at a place where cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen, he has to file a suit at that place.
The interpretation given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment holding that under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, no suit for infringement of registered trade mark could be filed if the plaintiff does not carry on business within the jurisdiction of that Court, is held to be incorrect.
The impugned order is set aside and the suit is restored to the file of this Court and the defendant is directed to file their written statement within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - Appeal allowed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1738
Dishonor of Cheque - grant of conditional leave to defend when the claim for interest was not backed by any written contract - whether the trial court was justified in directing the defendants to deposit only Rs.50,00,000/- when the entire principal amount of Rs.96,03,766/- had been admitted by them? - HELD THAT:- The principal amount of Rs.96,03,766/- claimed in the summary suit has not been disputed by the defendants. The sole ground raised in the petition filed by the defendants is that the claim of interest, not being based upon a written contract, could not have been made in a summary suit.
The cause of action for filing the suit arose on the date when the defendants issued various cheques, on the date when the cheques were returned, and on 30th October, 1996, when the defendants failed to make the remaining payment of Rs.96,03,766/- on 27th November, 1996 when the notice was served to the defendants, on 10th December, 1996, when the defendants replied the notice and that the same cause of action is continuous. The notice dated 27th November, 1996 referred to in the above paragraph is the notice issued under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act upon dishonour of the cheques in question. Evidently, therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, the suit has been instituted on a negotiable instrument. Sub-rule (2) of rule 1 of Order XXXVII of the Code provides that rule 1 applies to all the classes of suits mentioned therein, which includes (a) suits upon bills of exchange, hundies and promissory notes - the statute itself provides for the grant of interest and hence, when a suit is instituted on a negotiable instrument, a claim for interest can be made in view of section 80 of the Act and does not need a written contract in that regard. Besides, in the opinion of this court, where the interest claimed by the plaintiff is on the amount in respect of which cheques have been issued by the defendants, such claim is governed by section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and consequently, the claim of interest made by the plaintiff is a claim of interest under an enactment, therefore, such claim can also be said to be governed by the provisions of Order XXXVII rule 1(2)(b)(ii) of the Code. Accordingly, no relief which does not fall within the ambit of rule 2 of Order XXXVII of the Code can be said to have been claimed in the plaint. Therefore, having regard to the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the claim of interest is beyond the scope of Order XXXVII of the Code.
A suit can be said to fall outside the ambit of Order XXXVII only if the relief claimed therein is based on an action the nature of which does not fall within the classes specified in Order XXXVII rule 1(2). The relief cannot be said to fall outside the ambit of Order XXXVII rule 2 merely because the quantum thereof is excessive, so long as the nature of the relief falls within the clause specified in Order XXXVII rule 1(2) of the Code - the trial court was justified in granting conditional leave to defend to the defendants when the claim for interest was not backed by any written contract in view of the fact that the claim of the plaintiff was based upon bills of exchange (cheques).
Liability to pay the principal amount of Rs.96,03,766/- - HELD THAT:- It may be germane to refer to the second proviso to sub-rule (5) of rule 3 of Order XXXVII of the Code which provides that where a part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court. Thus, from the language employed in the said proviso, it is mandatory for the defendant to deposit the admitted amount as a pre-condition for grant of leave to defend the suit. Under the circumstances, having regard to the fact that the principal amount is admitted as due from them by the defendants, the trial court was not justified in directing the defendants to deposit only Rs.50,00,000/- and ought to have directed them to deposit the entire amount admitted by them.
The summary suit for the claim of interest in the facts and circumstances of the present case is maintainable - Application dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1737
Jurisdiction - competent authority to take disciplinary action either by cancellation or suspension of the licence of a S.K. Oil agent appointed in a district outside the Calcutta - date of effect of order of cancellation or suspension of licence in terms of Paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Control Order - whether it will be effective on the date of passing of the said order or when the said order is communicated to the concerned party?
HELD THAT:- The Control Order was brought into force on 26.6.1968 in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-section 1 of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with Clauses (d), (e), (h) and (j) of Sub-section 2 of that Section and Section 7(1) of the said Act and the Order No. 26(11)-Com.Genl/66, dated 18th June, 1966 feeling the necessity and expediency for proper maintenance of supplies and for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of kerosene in West Bengal - the power conferred on the Director and the District Magistrate are different, for the Director is a higher authority and the rule clothes him with more authority. Needless to say, the said paragraph has to be read in juxtaposition with other paragraphs. It is clear from paragraph 5 that the Director alone is authorised to grant a licence to an agent whereas a dealer's licence can be granted either by the Director or by the District Magistrate. Sub-para 3 of Paragraph 5 of the Control Order is also indicative of the fact that the agent operates at a larger scale than the dealer. An agent can sell, supply or transfer kerosene to a dealer, holder of a permit or delivery order and no other person.
If it is held that the order would become a nullity, it really does not serve the purpose of the Control Order. On the contrary, it frustrates it and, therefore, the interpretation placed by the High Court on Paragraph 9 in juxtaposition with Paragraph 10 to treat the order has null and void is neither correct nor sound. It is desirable that the authority shall pass an order within 30 days from the date of show cause. Be it noted that there are two contingencies when the show cause is issued for violation or when an order of suspension is passed. There can be no trace of doubt that the order will take effect from the date when it is served. The order, unless it is served, definitely neither the agent nor the dealer would suspend its activities or obey any order, for he has not been communicated.
It is concluded that the High Court has erroneously interpreted Paragraph 9 and 10 of the Control Order and that is why it has arrived at an erroneous conclusion - appeal allowed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1736
Exemption u/s 11 - club is not a charitable organization within the meaning of section 2(15) - CIT-A held that assessee is a Charitable Institution and its income has to be computed u/s 11 to 13 -Whether assessee performs a charitable purposes within the meaning of section 2(15) ? - HELD THAT:- Issue is covered by the decision of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the assessee’s own case [2012 (4) TMI 214 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. Further the co-ordinate bench of Tribunal has also followed the said decision in order to decide an identical issue in favour of the assessee in assessment years 2007-08, 2009-10 [2015 (3) TMI 1419 - ITAT MUMBAI] 2008-09 [2014 (11) TMI 379 - ITAT MUMBAI]. We also notice that it is not the case of the AO that the assessee is hit by the proviso to sec. 2(15) of the Act. Hence, we do not find any infirmity in the order of ld. CIT(A) with regard to the first issue.
Claim of the assessee for set off and carry forward of deficit of earlier years - CIT(A) has followed the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection [2003 (7) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. Hence, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the ld. CIT(A) on this issue also.
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2015 (9) TMI 1735
Validity of registered sale deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendants 1 and 2 - permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating or in any manner encumbering the plaint schedule property and for costs - seeking impleadment in the suit as a legal heir on the basis of the testamentary document being the alleged last Will of the deceased - HELD THAT:- The nature of civil proceedings, which are before the Court, i.e., a claim by the deceased to set at naught the sale deeds already executed. The question is of an impediment in the way of the appellant to even claim any right in the absence of having initiated any proceedings for probate of the Will due to the law being specific here, as well as the other two Courts of Mumbai and Kolkatta, as compared to a different position in the remaining part of the country.
The purpose of impleading all the legal representatives arises, as even if there is a dispute of inheritance between the different persons claiming from the deceased, that should not prejudice the proceedings initiated by the deceased and when the inter se rights are determined among the persons claiming estate of the deceased, those could be determined separately or even some time in the same proceedings to come to a conclusion as to who should be the beneficiary of the decree, if any, passed in the suit - In the present case, the appellant would not be able to claim any part of the estate whatsoever even on the basis of the alleged registered Will because he has not taken any steps for obtaining probate. In fact, the question was conveniently evaded.
The appeal is completely meritless and also a proceeding in which ambivalent stands have been taken to somehow get the appeal admitted without answering the Court queries - appeal dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1734
Deduction u/s 80P(2) (a) (i) - whether the assessee - Society is to be treated as a ‘primary co-operative bank’? - Whether the benefit of deduction u/s 80P (2) (a) (i) could be denied to the assessee on the footing that Though the appellant was said to be a Co-operative Society, it was in fact a co-operative bank, within the meaning as assigned to such bank under Part V of the BR Act? - whether Tribunal was correct in holding that the provision of sub-section (4) of Section 80P are applicable only to co- operative Banks and not to credit Co-operative Societies, which are engaged in business of banking, including providing credit facilities to their members? - HELD THAT:- We are in respectful agreement with the general view taken as to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of law, by the co-ordinate bench of this court, in the above and several other judgments adopting the same view. However, it is to be noticed that there is a seriously disputed question of fact which the Authorities under the IT Act have taken upon themselves to interpret in the face of the BR Act prescribing that in the event of a dispute as to the primary object or principal business of any co-operative society referred to in clauses (cciv), (ccv) and (ccvi) of Section 56 of the BR Act, a determination thereof by the Reserve Bank shall be final, would require the dispute to be resolved by the Reserve Bank of India, before the authorities could term the assessee as a co-operative bank, for purposes of Section 80 P of the IT Act. Any opinion expressed therefore is tentative and is not final. The view expressed by this court, however, as to the assessee being a co-operative society and not a co-operative bank in terms of Section 80P (4) shall hold the field and shall bind the authorities unless held otherwise by the Reserve Bank of India. See M/S. BANGALORE COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT CREDIT CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED [2014 (6) TMI 913 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT]- Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (9) TMI 1733
Condonation of delay of 65 days in re-filing the petition - It is alleged that the explanation for delay of nearly two months in re-filing is not satisfactory - Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 - HELD THAT:- There are no infirmity with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in not condoning the delay. It is noticed that the petition was originally filed without the requisite court fees. Even an application seeking enlargement of time for filing the requisite court fees was not filed. The only explanation given is that the matter was filed in a rush without the requisite court fees. It may be noticed that despite the fact that the matter was filed in a rush, the court fees was not filed for over a period of one month from the date of filing. The explanation tendered is that the amount was substantial and as such it took some time in the amount being credited into the account of the counsel and then being credited to the account of the Stock Holding Corporation for the purposes of obtaining the court fees. The appellant should have been diligent in obtaining and filing the requisite court fees. Merely because a substantial amount was required to be paid as court fees, cannot be a ground to circumvent the statutory provision of limitation.
In arbitration matters, the limitation has to be strictly construed and the parties cannot be permitted to frustrate the very purpose of the Act. Even after the court fee was paid, the appellant took over thirty days in removing the defects. Merely because a soft copy was required would not take the appellant over thirty days in preparation of a soft copy. The appellant re-filed the petition repeatedly without curing the defects - the appellant has not been diligent in pursuing the petition and has taken substantial time in removal of the defects. No satisfactory explanation has been forthcoming for the condonation of delay of 66 days in re-filing the petition.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (9) TMI 1732
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Unexplained share capital - HELD THAT:- Reopening of the assessment, it is to be noted that AO in the reasons has mentioned a sum from 9 parties. Wherein the amount in the case of Kuberco Sales Pvt. Ltd and M/s Shriniwas Leasing & Finance has been mentioned twice - the assessee has not received any share capital from M/s VR Traders and M/s Shriniwas Leasing & Finance. Therefore the correct amount from five parties. This factual aspect has been confirmed by the CIT(A) and the same was not denied by the DR.
This shows non-application of mind by AO at the time of reopening of the assessment and hence reopening is bad in law. Thus, the Navodaya Case will not be applicable in the present case as the assessee has given the substantial evidence during the course of original assessment along with confirmation to the AO. The same was ignored by the AO. Hence, on this issue the Ground No. 1 of the Revenue is dismissed.
CIT(A) upheld the contention of the assessee that assessee has not received any share capital from M/s VR Traders and M/s Shriniwas Leasing & Finance. It also held that the amount in the case of Kuberco Sales Pvt. Ltd. And M/s Shriniwas Leasing & Finance has been mentioned twice. Accordingly the CIT(A) held that the disputed amount of the share capital on the basis of which addition has been made by the AO comes - CIT(A) after examination of the evidences and the various judgments further held that assessee has discharged its onus and AO has not brought any material to discredit the evidences submitted by the assessee. Hence CIT(A) rightly deleted the addition made on merit. - Decided against revenue.
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2015 (9) TMI 1731
Disallowance claim of financial loss under the schedule “repair and maintenance expenses” - HELD THAT:- Revenue strongly reiterates its grounds and assails the above extracted findings by pleading that details of evidence had not been filed in the course of assessment. We notice that the CIT(A)’s findings under challenge duly take into account details of loss as in schedule 33 to notes on accounts with all necessary particulars of irregularities in question, division-wise break-up, work orders, bills involved, items selected for verification and actual work carried out. It has come on record that this assessee is already subjected to C & AG audit. Needless to say, the CIT(A) has already concluded that in case there is any amount recovered in future from the concerned contractor, it shall be treated as assessee’s income in the year of receipt. The Revenue fails to file any evidence to the contrary for rebutting the above stated factual findings. We do not see any reason to interfere in the lower appellate findings. This Revenue’s ground is rejected.
Disallowance of extra ordinary items being losses due to cyclone, flood and fire etc made for want of supportive evidence - sole ground for rejecting the claim in question to lack of evidence - HELD THAT:- The lower appellate order mentions very clearly that the assessee had duly filed a letter dated 15-12-2012 comprising of all necessary details; division-wise on expenses towards flood related damages. The Revenue does not produce on record copy of the above stated letter so as to dispel the above said specific findings. The CIT(A) further relies on an identical order dealing with the very claim. The same has also gone unrebutted in course of hearing before us. We decide this ground as well against the Revenue
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