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Showing 241 to 255 of 255 Records

• 1995 (4) TMI 15
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Conviction under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Conviction under Sections 192, 193, 196, and 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  3. Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  4. Mens rea (criminal intent) requirement for offenses under the Income-tax Act and Indian Penal Code.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Conviction under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
  
  The revision petitioner, an income-tax assessee, was convicted by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for filing a false statement under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioner omitted to mention the notional rental income for his self-occupied property in his income-tax return for 1984-85, which was considered a deliberate act to conceal ownership of more than one housing property. The Sessions Judge, however, found that there was no wilful suppression of income and acquitted the petitioner under Section 276C(1) but upheld the conviction under Section 277, stating that the false statement in the return, irrespective of mens rea, constituted an offense.
  
  2. Conviction under Sections 192, 193, 196, and 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860:
  
  The petitioner was also convicted for offenses under Sections 192, 193, 196, and 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. The Sessions Judge upheld these convictions, reasoning that the omission of notional rental income was not wilful. However, the Principal Sessions Judge's view that mens rea was immaterial for these offenses was incorrect, as these sections require the offense to be committed intentionally.
  
  3. Penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
  
  The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal had canceled the penalty imposed on the petitioner under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for claiming an exemption under Section 54F. The Tribunal held that making untenable claims is not an offense under Section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal's decision was not based on whether the omission was intentional or incidental but on the approach of the Income-tax Officer in imposing the penalty.
  
  4. Mens rea (criminal intent) requirement for offenses under the Income-tax Act and Indian Penal Code:
  
  The Principal Sessions Judge's interpretation that no mens rea is required for an offense under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act was incorrect. Section 277 clearly states that the false statement must be made with the knowledge or belief that it is false. The absence of mens rea or criminal intention means that the offense under Section 277 cannot be constituted. Similarly, the offenses under Sections 182, 196, and 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code also require intentional commission.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The High Court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the revision petitioner of all charges. The court concluded that the omission to mention the notional rental income was not wilful, and therefore, the petitioner could not be punished under Section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or the relevant sections of the Indian Penal Code. The revision was allowed, and the petitioner was acquitted.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 14
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to levy penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Applicability of the amended provisions of section 274(2) of the Act.
  3. Determination of the relevant date for the imposition of penalty.
  4. Nature and extent of concealment of income by the assessee.
  5. Validity of the penalty proceedings initiated.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to levy penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
  The primary issue was whether the Income-tax Officer had the jurisdiction to levy a penalty of Rs. 20,000 under section 271(1)(c) for concealment of income in the original return filed by the assessee on September 29, 1970. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the law applicable to penalty proceedings would be the law in force on the date the original return was filed, i.e., September 29, 1970. Under section 274(2) as it stood before April 1, 1971, the Income-tax Officer could only deal with penalties where the maximum leviable penalty did not exceed Rs. 1,000. Therefore, the penalty levied by the Income-tax Officer was deemed without jurisdiction and bad in law.
  
  2. Applicability of the amended provisions of section 274(2) of the Act:
  The Tribunal upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order, leading to the Revenue's appeal. The court referenced its previous judgment in Continental Commercial Corporation v. ITO [1975] 100 ITR 170, which held that the amendment to section 274(2) by Act 42 of 1970 had no retrospective effect. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to levy penalty should be determined based on the law as it stood on the date the return was filed.
  
  3. Determination of the relevant date for the imposition of penalty:
  The court discussed the principle established in CGT v. C. Muthukumaraswamy Mudaliar [1975] 98 ITR 540 (Mad) and CIT v. Bhan Singh Boota Singh [1974] 95 ITR 562, which emphasized that the quantum of penalty should be determined based on the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. However, the court noted that these cases did not address the jurisdiction or competence of the officer to impose penalties. The court distinguished between the power to impose a penalty and the quantum of penalty.
  
  4. Nature and extent of concealment of income by the assessee:
  The court examined whether the assessee had indeed concealed income or furnished inaccurate particulars. The assessee argued that the additional income disclosed was to avoid protracted litigation and facilitate expeditious assessment completion. The court emphasized that penalty proceedings are independent and require a clear finding of deliberate concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
  
  5. Validity of the penalty proceedings initiated:
  The court referred to the Kerala High Court's judgment in CIT v. Varkey Chacko [1982] 136 ITR 733, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Varkey Chacko v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 885. The Supreme Court observed that the authority to impose a penalty is determined by the law in force on the date of initiation of penalty proceedings, not the date of the offence. The court concluded that the Income-tax Officer who had enhanced jurisdiction from April 1, 1971, was competent to impose the penalty, but the quantum of penalty should be based on the law in force at the time of the offence.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court answered the question in favor of the Revenue, stating that the Income-tax Officer had the jurisdiction to impose the penalty under the amended provisions of section 274(2). However, the case was remitted to the Tribunal to determine whether the penalty should be imposed based on a clear finding of deliberate concealment or inaccurate disclosure by the assessee. The reference was disposed of accordingly.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 13
  
  Issues:
  1. Whether the surcharge payable but not paid should be deducted while arriving at the chargeable profits for the levy of surtax.
  2. Interpretation of rule 2(1) of the First Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 regarding deduction of surcharge.
  3. Comparison with judicial decisions regarding deposits made with the Industrial Development Bank of India in lieu of surcharge on income-tax.
  4. Determination of whether the deposits made with the Industrial Development Bank of India are deductible for computing the chargeable profits under the Surtax Act.
  
  Detailed Analysis:
  1. The primary issue in this case revolves around whether the surcharge payable but not paid should be deducted while calculating the chargeable profits for surtax. The Tribunal held that the surcharge payable by the company, though not actually paid due to a deposit made with the Industrial Development Bank of India, should be deducted under rule 2(1) of the First Schedule to the Act. The Department argued that unless the surcharge is paid, the deduction should not be allowed. The key contention was whether the deposit made with the bank in lieu of surcharge can be considered as payment for the purpose of deduction.
  
  2. Rule 2(1) of the First Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 allows for the deduction of income-tax payable by the company. The scheme under the Companies Deposits (Surcharge on Income-tax) Scheme, 1976 permits companies to deposit amounts with the Industrial Development Bank of India instead of paying surcharge on income-tax. The interpretation of whether such deposits can be considered as payment for the purpose of deduction under the Act was crucial in this case.
  
  3. Judicial decisions were cited to support both sides of the argument. The Karnataka High Court in Widia (India) Ltd. v. CIT held that deposits with the Industrial Development Bank of India do not amount to payment of income-tax and, therefore, are not deductible for computing chargeable profits. Similarly, the Gujarat High Court in Ambica Mills Ltd. v. Commr. of Surtax ruled that such deposits are not equivalent to tax paid and, hence, are not deductible for computing chargeable profits. These decisions provided a legal backdrop for the interpretation of the relevant provisions in this case.
  
  4. After considering the arguments and the precedents, the High Court held that the deposit made with the Industrial Development Bank of India in lieu of surcharge on income-tax is not deductible for computing chargeable profits under the Surtax Act. The court disagreed with the Tribunal's decision and ruled in favor of the Department. The judgment emphasized that the deposit does not equate to tax payment and, therefore, should not be considered for deduction purposes.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 12
  
  The High Court of Madras held that the assessee's activities of sorting, grading, clipping, and stemming chillies did not constitute processing or manufacturing. The court referred to previous judgments and the definition of "industrial company" to support its decision. The Tribunal's ruling that the assessee is not an industrial company for tax purposes was upheld.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 11
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Interpretation of provisions u/s 36(1)(ii) and u/s 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 regarding treatment of excess amount paid as customary bonus.
  2. Determination of whether certain expenses incurred in acquiring sub-lease rights can be considered as the cost of acquisition of the tenancy/leasehold rights.
  
  Issue 1 - Interpretation of u/s 36(1)(ii) and u/s 37(1):
  The case involved a dispute over the treatment of an amount paid in excess of the maximum calculated under section 36(1)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as a customary bonus deductible under section 37(1) of the Act. The Tribunal justified the treatment based on the circumstances of the case, which was subsequently upheld by the High Court. The legal principles from previous cases were cited to support the decision, emphasizing the application of relevant sections and the interpretation of the law.
  
  Issue 2 - Determination of Cost of Acquisition:
  The second issue revolved around whether expenses incurred for stamp paper, registration charges, and legal expenses in acquiring sub-lease rights could be considered as the cost of acquisition of tenancy/leasehold rights. The respondent argued that these expenses did not constitute the cost of acquisition, as the original tenancy was acquired without any initial payment. The Court analyzed the timeline of events and the nature of the rights involved, concluding that the expenses incurred later did not alter the fundamental nature of the respondent's possession rights. Legal precedents and accounting principles were referenced to support the decision that such expenses could not be equated to the cost of acquisition.
  
  In summary, the judgment addressed the interpretation of relevant sections of the Income-tax Act and the determination of the cost of acquisition in a specific case involving excess payments and incurred expenses related to leasehold rights. The Court's decision favored the respondent on both issues, highlighting the application of legal principles and factual analysis in reaching the conclusions.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 10
  
  Issues Involved:
  
  1. Whether the Tribunal was correct in law in holding that interest credited to the suspense account cannot be added to the income of the assessee.
  2. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore v. CIT [1986] 158 ITR 102 cannot be applied to the facts of this case.
  
  Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
  
  1. Interest Credited to Suspense Account:
  
  The primary issue revolves around whether interest on loans, kept in a suspense account by the assessee (an insurance company), should be included in the taxable income for the assessment year 1983-84. The Assessing Officer had added Rs. 37.35 lakhs to the total income of the assessee, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT [1986] 158 ITR 102. However, the assessee argued that under Section 44 of the Income-tax Act, read with the First Schedule, such inclusion was arbitrary and illegal.
  
  The Tribunal, upon reviewing the provisions of Section 44 and the First Schedule, concluded that the decision in State Bank of Travancore was not applicable to insurance companies. Section 44, a non obstante provision, mandates that the income of insurance companies be computed according to the rules in the First Schedule. Rule 5 of the First Schedule specifies that the profits and gains of non-life insurance businesses should be based on the annual accounts submitted to the Controller of Insurance, subject to certain adjustments, which do not include interest income.
  
  The Tribunal's decision was supported by precedents such as L.I.C. of India v. CIT [1978] 115 ITR 45 (Bom) and CIT v. Calcutta Hospital and Nursing Home Benefits Association Ltd. [1965] 57 ITR 313 (SC), which emphasized that the computation of income for insurance companies is strictly governed by the rules in the Schedule, and the Assessing Officer cannot make adjustments not specified therein.
  
  2. Applicability of State Bank of Travancore Decision:
  
  The second issue pertains to the applicability of the Supreme Court's decision in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT [1986] 158 ITR 102. The Department argued that, based on the charging section 5 of the Income-tax Act, the interest on mortgage loans should be added to the assessee's income. The Supreme Court's majority decision in State Bank of Travancore supported the notion that income, once accrued and recorded in the accounts, cannot be negated by mere entry into a suspense account.
  
  However, the Tribunal, and subsequently the High Court, distinguished the present case from State Bank of Travancore. It was noted that Section 44 of the Income-tax Act, which applies specifically to insurance companies, overrides other provisions of the Act, including Section 5. The High Court reiterated that the income of insurance companies must be computed as per the First Schedule, and the Supreme Court's decision in State Bank of Travancore does not apply to the unique context of insurance companies.
  
  The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision, stating that the interest credited to the suspense account could not be added to the income of the assessee. The Court held that the controversy in question was not covered by the decision in State Bank of Travancore, thereby answering both questions in favor of the assessee and against the Department.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The High Court dismissed the reference with costs, agreeing with the Tribunal that the interest credited to the suspense account should not be added to the income of the assessee and that the decision in State Bank of Travancore v. CIT [1986] 158 ITR 102 was not applicable to the facts of this case.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 9
  
  The High Court of Delhi dismissed the petition seeking a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer questions of law to the court for its opinion. The Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) did not explore a new source of income, and their directions did not amount to income enhancement. The High Court found the Tribunal's findings to be based on evidence and facts, thus declining to call for a reference on the proposed questions by the assessee. The petition was dismissed.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 8
  
  Issues:
  1. Seizure of cash, gold, and silver during a search conducted by Income-tax and Central Excise Departments.
  2. Orders passed by Customs and Income-tax Departments regarding seized valuables.
  3. Appeal against assessment order by the Income-tax Department.
  4. Appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and subsequent legal proceedings.
  5. Prohibitory order under section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act.
  6. Legal objections raised by the Income-tax Department.
  7. Return of seized valuables, cash, and hundis to the assessees.
  
  Analysis:
  The judgment pertains to a case involving the seizure of cash, gold, and silver during a search conducted at the petitioner's office-cum-residence by the Income-tax and Central Excise Departments. The seized items were claimed to belong to the petitioner's mother and wife. Subsequently, the Customs Department passed orders directing the release of certain items on payment of penalties. The Income-tax Department issued a prohibitory order under section 226(3) of the Income-tax Act, leading to a dispute over the return of the seized valuables to the petitioners.
  
  Following the assessment order by the Income-tax Department, the assessees appealed, resulting in the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) reducing the assessable amount. Both the Department and the assessees appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which decided in favor of the assessees, holding that the seized items could not be added to the income of the petitioner. The Department's applications for reference of legal questions were rejected, leading to the finality of the Tribunal's orders.
  
  The Income-tax Department opposed the petitions, arguing that the Tribunal's orders had not attained finality due to pending reference applications. However, the court rejected the Department's legal objections and directed the return of the seized valuables, cash, and hundis to the assessees in accordance with the Tribunal's order. The court emphasized the assessees' legal right to the return of their valuables under relevant sections of the Income-tax Act, thereby allowing the petitions and cancelling the prohibitory order.
  
  In conclusion, the court ordered the respondents to return the seized items to the assessees as per the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal's decision, revoking the prohibitory order under section 226(3) of the Act. No costs were awarded, and any security deposit was to be returned to the petitioners. The judgment clarified the legal rights of the assessees and resolved the dispute over the seized valuables, cash, and hundis in favor of the petitioners.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 7
  
  Issues:
  - Refusal of applications for making reference by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
  - Dispute over ownership of seized assets
  - Deletion of certain additions to income by Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)
  - Appeal to Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by Department
  - Application for reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act
  - Questions proposed for reference to High Court
  - Arguments presented by Department and assessee
  - Determination of questions of law by High Court
  
  Analysis:
  The High Court of Madhya Pradesh addressed a case involving the refusal of applications for making reference by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The dispute revolved around the ownership of assets seized during a search and seizure operation at the residential-cum-commercial premises of an individual. The assets included cash, gold biscuits, gold ornaments, impure silver, silver coins, and hundi khokas. The Income-tax Officer did not accept the claims made by the individuals related to the seized assets, leading to an assessment that included the value of unexplained items as belonging to the main individual. However, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) deleted certain additions to the income of the main individual, which was then appealed by the Department to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal.
  
  The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and upheld the deletions made by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Subsequently, the Department made an application for reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, proposing eleven questions for reference to the High Court. These questions primarily focused on the justification of the Tribunal's decisions regarding the ownership of various assets and the acceptance of explanations provided by the individuals related to the seized items. The Department argued that the Tribunal's reliance on irrelevant material and evidence led to decisions favoring the assessee without proper discussion of the evidence.
  
  In response, the counsel for the assessee contended that the questions posed did not inherently involve questions of law but were based on factual determinations made by the Tribunal. The High Court, after extensive deliberation and review of the orders of the assessing authorities and appellate bodies, concluded that the issues at hand were primarily questions of fact decided based on the circumstances and evidence presented. The Court emphasized that its advisory jurisdiction under section 256 was limited to questions of law arising from the Tribunal's order, and it could not interfere with factual findings.
  
  The Court highlighted that while mixed questions of law and fact could be referred, they must involve the application of legal principles for consideration as questions of law. In this case, the determinations were deemed pure questions of fact, and the Court found no errors in the orders of the authorities. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the Department's application for reference, stating that the questions proposed did not demonstrate a legal basis for reference under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 6
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether section 80HHC(2)(a) contemplates the making of an application for claiming deduction.
  2. If so, whether such application is to be made before the expiry of the said period of six months.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Whether section 80HHC(2)(a) contemplates the making of an application for claiming deduction.
  
  Section 80HHC(1) of the Income-tax Act entitles an assessee resident in India, engaged in the business of export of specified goods or merchandise, to a deduction of the profits derived from such export in computing the total income. Sub-section (2)(a) provides a condition that the sale proceeds must be "received in, or brought into, India by the assessee... within a period of six months from the end of the previous year." However, this restriction is not absolute, as the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may allow a further period if satisfied that the assessee was unable to do so within the said period for reasons beyond his control.
  
  The court observed that section 80HHC(2)(a) does not specify the making of any application or any time limit for making such an application. The Income-tax Act is a complete code in itself and has laid down the method, manner, and time for making applications wherever required. The manner of claiming deduction is indicated in Form No. 2 appended to the Income-tax Rules, which requires the assessee to give a statement of the total income and specify deductions to be claimed. Therefore, section 80HHC cannot claim special treatment other than the rest of the sections 80C to 80U.
  
  Issue 2: If so, whether such application is to be made before the expiry of the said period of six months.
  
  The court held that the time limit mentioned in section 80HHC(2)(a) is not a limitation for claiming deduction but a right to claim deduction if the sale proceeds are received within six months. The Legislature provided for suspension or relaxation of the said period subject to the satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner if the assessee was unable to receive or bring into India the sale proceeds for reasons beyond his control. The discretion is confined to the question of satisfaction by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, but not with the power to allow the period of suspension or relaxation. If satisfied, the Commissioner is bound to allow the period which remained suspended due to the inability of the assessee to receive or bring into India the sale proceeds for reasons beyond his control.
  
  The court concluded that section 80HHC(2)(a) does not contemplate the making of any application by the assessee within a period of six months for availing of the deductibility or for invoking the power of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to allow a further period. The deductibility claimed in the return is to be decided in computing the total income, and if the six-month period has expired, it is for the assessing authority to place the same before the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner. The assessee may also bring the fact to the notice of the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, but no time limit can be applied except that the claim is to be made in the return to be filed.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The court set aside the order of the Commissioner dated February 13, 1995, relating to the assessment year 1992-93, and directed the Commissioner to decide the matter afresh in light of the observations made. The interim order of stay of assessment shall continue till the disposal of the application of the petitioner and its communication to the petitioner by the assessing authority. The writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 5
  
  Issues:
  1. Interpretation of subsidy as a loan or capital receipt for the purpose of deduction under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  2. Determining the eligibility of subsidy amount for deduction under section 80J as part of the assessee's capital contribution.
  
  Analysis:
  The case involved the interpretation of the nature of a subsidy granted to an assessee for the assessment year 1982-83 under section 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessee claimed a deduction under section 80J by treating the subsidy amount as part of the capital employed by the firm. The assessing authority rejected the claim, considering the subsidy as a cost contributed towards capital assets and not part of the capital employed by the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the claim, directing the Income-tax Officer to recompute the deduction without reducing the subsidy value. In the subsequent appeal before the Tribunal, it was found that the subsidy was granted for the establishment of the industry and not towards any specific asset, leading to a dispute on the nature of the subsidy.
  
  The Tribunal referred two questions of law to the High Court for consideration. Firstly, whether the subsidy should be treated as a loan until a period of five years from the grant, and secondly, whether the deduction under section 80J on the subsidy amount was permissible as the assessee's capital contribution. The High Court analyzed the provisions of section 80J, highlighting that borrowed capital is excluded from the definition of capital employed, and the subsidy received cannot be categorized as borrowed money or debt owed by the assessee. The Court emphasized that the subsidy merges with the capital employed by the industrial undertaking and should not be excluded from the actual cost calculation under section 43(1).
  
  The Court also referred to a Supreme Court judgment regarding the interpretation of "actual cost" and the nature of government subsidies as incentives not specifically aimed at meeting the cost of assets. Additionally, the Court cited a previous decision where it was held that a subsidy cannot be considered a loan. Relying on these precedents and statutory provisions, the High Court concluded that the Tribunal erred in treating the subsidy as a loan until the completion of five years and in denying the deduction under section 80J based on the nature of the subsidy as the assessee's capital contribution.
  
  Therefore, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee, holding that the subsidy should be considered a capital receipt, not a loan, and that the deduction under section 80J on the subsidy amount was permissible as part of the capital employed. The judgment favored the assessee, rejecting the Revenue's appeal and providing no order as to costs.

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• 1995 (4) TMI 4
  

  Power of tribunal - Tribunal remanded the matter to the Income-tax Officer for making a fresh assessment - application by assessee u/s 256(1) asking the Tribunal to refer the questions - Supreme Court is not inclined to go into this question of competency of Tribunal at this stage

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• 1995 (4) TMI 3
  

  Whether Tribunal is justified in law in holding that the reassessment u/s 147(a) cannot include items already barred u/s 147(b) & accordingly in deleting the six additions made in the reassessment for the assessment year 1959-60 - Whether Tribunal is justified in drawing a distinction between items falling under sections 147(a) and 147(b) and in deleting the items of additions that could be brought u/s 147(b) - both the questions must be answered in favour of the assessee

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• 1995 (4) TMI 2
  

  Discretionary Trust - Whether, in law and on facts and having regard to the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 164 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee is entitled to the concessional rate of tax - Whether, in law and on facts and in view of the provisions of the trust deed, the trust cannot be subjected to maximum marginal rate of tax

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• 1995 (4) TMI 1
  

  Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the statutory allowance mentioned in section 23(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, should be allowed every time separately in computing the income from house property falling to the share of each of the co-owners including the assessee

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