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Showing 281 to 300 of 366 Records
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1995 (2) TMI 86
The High Court quashed the order passed by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Balangir Range, stating that he had no jurisdiction to issue the order. The petitioners were found eligible for exemption under Notification No. 23/55-C.E. and were exempted from licensing control. The Court allowed the writ application and made no order as to costs.
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1995 (2) TMI 85
Issues involved: Consideration of affidavit and invoices filed after a delay by the Tribunal, determination of relationship between parties based on evidence, remittance of matter for fresh consideration.
Consideration of affidavit and invoices: The Supreme Court reviewed the Tribunal's decision to reject an affidavit and invoices filed by Mr. Y.B. Sodawala, Partner of M/s. Janta Soft Drinks, due to a delay of almost two years. The Court emphasized that the delay should not have led to the complete dismissal of the documents without assessing their genuineness and relevance to the case. The Court highlighted that the Tribunal should have examined the relationship between the parties based on the evidence presented, including the invoices, and allowed for cross-examination if necessary. The Court stressed the importance of considering all evidence before making a decision.
Remittance for fresh consideration: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and remitted the matter to the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, for a fresh consideration. The Court directed the Collector to prioritize the case due to the passage of time and dispose of it promptly. As the duty and penalty amounts were already deposited, no costs were awarded. The Court indicated that the decision on penalty would be contingent upon the final adjudication outcome, emphasizing the need for a thorough review of the evidence presented.
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1995 (2) TMI 84
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Collector (Appeals), Tribunal, and High Court, and remanded the matter to the Collector (Appeals) to hear the appeal against the order of the Assistant Collector dated 20-3-1992 according to law.
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1995 (2) TMI 83
Issues:
Interpretation of liability of Managing Director for company's fine payment, legality of issuing non-bailable warrant against Managing Director, distinction between company's liability and Director's liability, impact of company winding-up on Director's liability.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a Criminal Revision challenging the refusal to recall non-bailable and distress warrants against a petitioner, who was the Managing Director of a company. The petitioner was charged under the Central Excises and Salt Act along with others. The trial court held the accused guilty and imposed a fine, which the petitioner and the Accounts Officer deposited, but the company did not. Subsequently, warrants were issued against the petitioner for fine realization.
The petitioner contended that as Managing Director, he was not representing the company and should not be liable for the company's fine. The Court below disagreed, holding the petitioner liable as Managing Director, despite the company's separate legal identity. The petitioner argued that after the company was wound up, the official liquidator should be responsible for the fine payment.
The Court analyzed the legal principles governing company liability, citing the Saloman v. Saloman & Co. Ltd. case to emphasize the separate legal entity of a company from its Directors. It highlighted that a company's liability is distinct from that of its Directors, and the company must pay its fines from its assets, not through Directors' personal liability.
The judgment discussed the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, emphasizing that liability could extend to the person in charge of the company at the time of the offense. It clarified that a company's liability does not automatically make its Directors liable, and prosecution can proceed against the person in charge without involving the company as an accused.
Regarding the company winding-up, the Court held that the official liquidator takes over both assets and liabilities of the company. Therefore, once it was established that the company was solely liable for the fine, warrants against the Managing Director were unjustified.
Consequently, the Court allowed the Criminal Revision, recalling the warrants against the petitioner and directing the proceedings to proceed against the company for fine realization. The judgment underscored the importance of distinguishing between company and Director liabilities, ensuring that legal dues of a company are recovered from the company's assets, not from individual Directors.
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1995 (2) TMI 82
Issues:
1. Classification of goods under Heading 54.02 or Heading 56.06.
2. Challenge to the order of the Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise.
3. Petitioner's plea for staying the operation of the appellate order.
4. Duty implications on the petitioner due to classification under Heading 54.02.
5. Justification for avoiding payment of duty under the enhanced heading.
Analysis:
1. The case involves a dispute regarding the classification of goods manufactured by the petitioner under either Heading 54.02 or Heading 56.06. The petitioner initially classified the goods under Heading 54.02, but the Asstt. Collector reclassified them under Heading 56.06. Subsequently, the Appellate Collector allowed the petitioner's appeal and accepted the classification under Heading 54.02. However, the Department appealed to the CEGAT against this decision, leading to ongoing classification issues.
2. The Writ Petition sought to quash the order of the Appellate Collector dated 9-11-1994 and the consequential orders issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise. The petitioner also filed a Writ Miscellaneous Petition to stay the operation of the appellate order and related orders. The court admitted the Writ Petition on 7-2-1995 and granted interim stay until further proceedings.
3. The petitioner contended that the enhanced duty under Heading 54.02, which was initially preferred by the petitioner, would severely impact the company financially. The petitioner argued that maintaining the status quo pending the CEGAT proceedings was appropriate. However, the court found no justification for the petitioner to avoid payment of duty under the accepted heading and dismissed the stay petition, vacating the interim stay granted earlier.
4. The petitioner's reluctance to pay duty under Heading 54.02, despite the classification being in their favor, was primarily due to the substantial duty rate of 69% associated with that heading. The petitioner feared severe financial consequences if forced to comply with the enhanced duty rate, leading to the legal challenge against the appellate order.
5. The court, after considering the arguments presented, concluded that the petitioner had no valid reason to resist payment of duty under the accepted classification of goods. The court found that the petitioner's plea for avoiding duty payment based on the subsequent duty enhancement was not justified. Consequently, the court dismissed the stay petition and lifted the interim stay granted, allowing for the enforcement of duty under Heading 54.02 as per the appellate order.
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1995 (2) TMI 81
The High Court of Madras allowed the writ petition seeking to quash orders demanding interest on payment of excise duty in instalments. The court ruled that there was no statutory provision for claiming interest, and the petitioner had paid the full amount in instalments without any agreement for interest payment. The writ petition was allowed with no costs.
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1995 (2) TMI 80
The Supreme Court upheld the respondent's contention that no duty can be claimed on soap chips made without the use of power. The Exemption Notification exempts soap manufacture without power from duty. The Court found no evidence of power use in making soap chips, thus dismissing the appeal with no costs.
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1995 (2) TMI 79
The petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner filed a rectification petition before CEGAT and requested a stay on enforcement until the petition is decided. The High Court directed the petitioner to file a stay application before the Tribunal by 28-2-1995, and enforcement of the order dated 14-7-1994 was stayed until then. If the stay order is not obtained by the deadline, respondents can enforce recovery.
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1995 (2) TMI 78
Issues:
1. Impugning order dated 6-12-1994 passed by the Tribunal on petitioner's application for stay and waiver.
Comprehensive Analysis:
The petitioner, engaged in the business of manufacturing 'Pan Masala' and tobacco, was issued a notice by the Central Excise department for discrepancies and evasions following a surprise visit by Central Preventive Officers. The Collector, Central Excise, Kanpur confirmed a duty demand of Rs. 3,68,718/- on 'Pan Masala' and Rs. 56,535/- on branded Zarda, along with a penalty of Rs. 25,000. The petitioner appealed to the Customs, Excise & Gold Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, seeking stay and waiver. The Tribunal, in its order dated 6-12-1994, accepted the petitioner's financial hardship plea and modified the pre-deposit condition. The Tribunal directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 2,00,000/- towards duty and Rs. 5,000/- towards penalty within two months, with compliance to be reported by 10-2-1995.
The petitioner challenged the Tribunal's order through a writ petition, arguing that while the Tribunal acknowledged financial hardship, it failed to provide any valid judicial reason for imposing the deposit condition. The petitioner highlighted significant losses suffered, including a fire incident in 1991 that led to a standstill in business operations and non-recovery of insurance amounts. The petitioner contended that the Tribunal should have considered Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act in such circumstances.
During the hearing, the petitioner's counsel emphasized the lack of reasons behind the deposit condition, while the Standing Counsel opposed interference, citing the Tribunal's discretionary relief based on subjective satisfaction. The High Court analyzed the submissions and the Tribunal's order, noting the absence of a justifiable link between the relief granted and the financial hardship pleaded by the petitioner. The Court acknowledged the need for intervention to protect the petitioner's interests without causing harm to the opposite party.
In a fair offer, the petitioner's counsel suggested modifying the Tribunal's order to require a cash deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- and suitable security for the remaining amount. Considering the Tribunal's acceptance of financial hardship, the Court approved the suggested modification, directing the petitioner to comply within one month. Upon compliance, the Tribunal was to proceed with hearing the appeal on merits. The Court thus modified the Tribunal's order and disposed of the writ petition accordingly, instructing the issuance of a certified copy to the petitioner's counsel.
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1995 (2) TMI 77
The petitioner filed an appeal with a stay application against an order by the Adjudicating Authority. The stay application has not been decided yet. The court directed that recovery of Rs. 2,86,036 will not be made until the stay application is decided.
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1995 (2) TMI 76
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of processed and unprocessed tyre cord fabric under Central Excise Tariff Act.
2. Jurisdiction and maintainability of writ petitions in the presence of an alternative remedy.
3. Application of limitation period under Section 11A of the Central Excise and Salt Act.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of Processed and Unprocessed Tyre Cord Fabric:
The primary issue in these writ petitions is whether "tyre cord fabric of high tenacity yarn of polyamides or polyester" under Heading No. 59.02 in Chapter 59, Section XI of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, refers to processed or unprocessed fabric. The petitioner, a manufacturer of tyre cord fabric, contends that only unprocessed tyre cord fabric is covered under Heading 59.02, and after paying excise duty at that stage, no duty is payable on the processed fabric. The authorities, however, classified the processed tyre cord warp sheet under Heading 59.05 and demanded duty.
The court noted that tyre cord fabric, used in tyre manufacturing, must undergo rubberizing, and the fabric is considered rubberized textile fabric under Heading 59.05 if its tenacity falls below the specified limit after processing. The court concluded that Heading 59.02 includes processed tyre cord fabric, as it is rubberized or processed tyre cord fabric, not unprocessed fabric. The court upheld the classification under Heading 59.05 for processed fabric with tenacity below the specified limit.
2. Jurisdiction and Maintainability of Writ Petitions:
The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions, arguing that the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy through the appellate process under the Central Excise and Salt Act. The petitioner countered that the High Court's power under Article 226 is not diminished by the existence of an alternative remedy, especially when the authorities have acted perversely in classifying the goods.
The court, referencing various judgments, held that the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, particularly when the issue involves the interpretation of tariff headings, a mixed question of law and fact. The court decided to exercise its discretion to determine the scope of the entry authoritatively in these proceedings, rejecting the preliminary objection.
3. Application of Limitation Period under Section 11A:
The petitioner argued that the demands for the period from 1-7-1987 to 7-10-1990 were raised beyond the six-month limitation period under Section 11A(1) of the Central Excise and Salt Act. The respondents invoked the proviso to Section 11A, which allows an extended period in cases of fraud, suppression of facts, or willful misstatement.
The court found that the petitioner's assessments were provisional, and the petitioner did not disclose the removal of goods with lesser tensile strength to the respondents. The test results showing lesser tensile strength were not shared with the authorities at the time of removal. The court concluded that the removal of processed fabric with lesser tensile strength without disclosure constituted suppression of relevant facts with the intent to evade duty. Therefore, the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 11A was applicable, and the impugned demands were not barred by limitation.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petitions, upholding the classification of processed tyre cord fabric under Heading 59.05 and the applicability of the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 11A for the demands made by the authorities.
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1995 (2) TMI 75
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad disposed of a writ petition where the petitioner challenged a demand notice issued by the Central Excise authorities before the appeal was decided. The court directed the appellate authority to either decide the appeal or the pending stay application within three weeks. Until then, recovery of the demanded amount was stayed.
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1995 (2) TMI 74
The petitioners completed inspection of record and intended to file a reply within fifteen days. The Collector of Customs wrongly passed an ex-parte order due to misunderstanding. The petitioners will file a reply within a week, and the impugned order is quashed. The petition is disposed of with the condition that a fresh order will be passed after hearing the petitioners.
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1995 (2) TMI 73
Issues:
Challenge to show cause notice under Customs Act, 1962 - Jurisdiction of the officer issuing notice - Allegation of mixed motive in issuing notice - Validity of show cause notice - Adjudication proceedings under Section 122 - Principles of natural justice - Delegation of power - Involvement of Customs officials - Distinction between offence and penalties vs. confiscation and penalties.
Analysis:
The writ petition sought to quash a show cause notice issued under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, to the petitioner and others involved in the illegal export of sandalwood logs/billets. The petitioner contended that the officer issuing the notice lacked pecuniary jurisdiction and had a mixed motive to aid Customs officials suspected of involvement. The respondents justified the notice based on specific intelligence leading to the seizure of goods. The petitioner argued that only the Collector of Customs could issue such a notice under Section 122 for goods exceeding Rs. 50,000 in value. The petitioner cited legal principles on jurisdiction and argued against delegation of power. The respondents countered, emphasizing the necessity of a show cause notice before confiscation or penalties under Section 124. The judgment analyzed the provisions of the Act, distinguishing between adjudication under Section 122 and the issuance of show cause notices under Section 124.
The court considered precedents and legal arguments to determine the validity of the show cause notice. The judgment referenced a case regarding disciplinary proceedings to establish that the authority issuing the notice need not be the same as the adjudicating authority. It concluded that while the first respondent could issue the notice, adjudication must be done by the Collector of Customs as per Section 122. The court found the show cause notice valid, as it was addressed to the Collector of Customs for adjudication. The judgment aligned with a previous decision by Raju, J., and dismissed the petitioner's arguments based on legal textbooks, emphasizing the specific provisions of Section 122 governing the case.
Regarding the allegation of a mixed motive in issuing the notice to avoid C.B.I. investigation, the court held that the enforcement of penalties and confiscation under Chapter 14 of the Act was distinct from Chapter 16 on offences and penalties. It cited a previous judgment to support the separation of these aspects. The court also clarified that the issuance of the show cause notice did not absolve any Customs Officer implicated by the C.B.I., nor did it affect the individuals served with notices. Ultimately, the court found no merit in the writ petition and dismissed it without costs.
In conclusion, the judgment addressed the jurisdictional issues, validity of the show cause notice, and the distinction between enforcement procedures under different chapters of the Customs Act. It upheld the legality of the notice issued by the first respondent for adjudication by the Collector of Customs, dismissing the petition challenging the same.
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1995 (2) TMI 72
Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Preventive Officer of the Department of Revenue Intelligence.
2. Validity of an order under Section 110 for goods already cleared under Section 47.
3. Correct classification of the imported machines under Tariff Heading 8432 or 8701.
4. Finality and review of an order under Section 47.
5. Legality of subsequent proceedings for short levy and confiscation under Sections 28 and 111.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Jurisdiction of the Preventive Officer of the Department of Revenue Intelligence:
The petitioners raised a preliminary objection that the Preventive Officer of the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned order of detention under Section 110 of the Customs Act. The Department produced a relevant notification showing that the Preventive Officer of the DRI was indeed empowered to exercise powers under Section 110. The court decided this preliminary issue against the petitioners by an order dated 19th September 1994.
2. Validity of an order under Section 110 for goods already cleared under Section 47:
The petitioners argued that an order under Section 110 cannot be passed for goods already cleared under Section 47, as such goods are no longer liable to be confiscated under Section 111. The court clarified that Section 47 does not involve any adjudication and is administrative in nature. The proper officer's satisfaction under Section 47 does not preclude the exercise of other powers under the Act, including those under Sections 28 and 111. Therefore, the power under Section 110 can be exercised without the order under Section 47 being revised or set aside.
3. Correct classification of the imported machines under Tariff Heading 8432 or 8701:
The petitioners contended that the machines were correctly classified under Tariff Heading 8432 and that the Customs Authorities' attempt to classify them under Tariff Heading 8701 was incorrect. They cited previous instances where similar machines were classified under Tariff Heading 8432, including an order by Shri Varadarajan, Additional Collector of Customs. The respondents argued that the machines had been imported earlier under Tariff Heading 8701 by the petitioners themselves, and subsequent imports were also classified under Tariff Heading 8701. The court noted that the show cause notice issued under Section 28 read with Section 124 of the Act would allow the Adjudicating Authority to determine the correct classification.
4. Finality and review of an order under Section 47:
The petitioners argued that an order under Section 47 is final and amounts to an adjudication, which can only be corrected by an order passed in Revision under Section 129D or Section 17(4). The court held that Section 47 does not involve adjudication, and the proper officer's satisfaction is administrative. Therefore, an order under Section 47 does not preclude proceedings for short levy under Section 28 or confiscation under Section 111. The court cited several precedents to support this view, including cases from the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras, and Karnataka.
5. Legality of subsequent proceedings for short levy and confiscation under Sections 28 and 111:
The court held that goods cleared under Section 47 can still be subject to confiscation under Section 111(m) if they were imported by misdeclaration. Additionally, duty short-levied can be recovered under Section 28 despite an order under Section 47. The court referenced several cases, including Hindusthan Motors and United India Minerals, to support this position. The court also noted that the Delhi High Court's interpretation of Section 47, which attaches finality to the satisfaction of the officer that the goods are not prohibited, is conditional upon there being no fraud or deliberate suppression.
Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ application with costs and vacated any interim orders. The petitioners were allowed to raise all points in answer to the show cause notice to justify their claim regarding the classification of the machines under Tariff Heading 8432. The court emphasized that the power under Section 110 could be exercised without revising or setting aside an order under Section 47, and that proceedings for short levy and confiscation under Sections 28 and 111 were valid despite the clearance of goods under Section 47.
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1995 (2) TMI 71
Issues: Proper classification of printed cartons for excise duty exemption, validity of show cause notices under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, interpretation of the third proviso to Section 36(2) regarding the time limit for issuing orders.
Classification of Printed Cartons:
The writ petitions involved a dispute regarding the classification of printed cartons for excise duty exemption. The petitioners, engaged in the printing business, claimed that the cartons they manufactured should be considered products of the printing industry and thus exempt from excise duty under specific notifications. Initially, the Assistant Collector rejected this claim, stating the cartons were products of the packaging industry. However, the Appellate Collector ruled in favor of the petitioners, considering the cartons as products of the printing industry. Subsequently, the Central Government issued notices to review the appellate orders, ultimately classifying the cartons as products of the packaging industry. This classification led to the filing of writ petitions challenging the impugned orders.
Validity of Show Cause Notices:
One of the primary grounds for challenging the impugned orders was the issuance of show cause notices beyond the six-month period stipulated under the third proviso to Section 36(2) of the Act. The petitioners argued that the notices were time-barred and, therefore, illegal. The critical issue revolved around the proper interpretation of the third proviso to Section 36(2) regarding the time limit for initiating proceedings related to excise duty matters. The petitioners contended that the notices were issued beyond the statutory time limit, rendering them invalid.
Interpretation of the Third Proviso to Section 36(2):
The Supreme Court's recent judgment in Union of India v. Associated Cement Companies Limited was cited as precedent in determining the interpretation of the third proviso to Section 36(2) of the Act. The Court clarified that in cases of non-levy or short levy of excise duty, the time limit for issuing show cause notices is six months from the relevant date. The Court emphasized that the time limit specified in Section 11A for short levy of excise duty, which is six months, must be adhered to. Therefore, any notice issued beyond this statutory time limit would be considered time-barred. The Court's interpretation favored the petitioners, leading to the quashing of the impugned notices.
In conclusion, the High Court of Delhi, in a common judgment, upheld the petitioners' contentions regarding the classification of printed cartons and the validity of the show cause notices issued by the Central Government. The Court relied on legal interpretations provided by the Supreme Court to determine that the notices were indeed time-barred, thereby ruling in favor of the petitioners. The writ petitions were allowed, and the impugned notices were quashed, with no costs imposed on either party.
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1995 (2) TMI 70
Whether any demurrage could have been charged for the period detention certificate was issued by the Assistant Collector of Customs?
Held that:- If the appellants' claim that IAAI being a statutory body it was entitled to frame its regulations and rate schedule is accepted then it results in conflict between sub-paragraph (vii) of Public Notice and paragraph (3) of the Policy framed by the IAAI. The legislative intention in enacting Act being to check and control economic offences such as smuggling, illegal import etc., the provisions have to be construed to advance the purpose sought to be achieved without sacrificing the consignee's interest. t recognises the legal consequences which must follow the adjudication by directing that no demurrage should be charged for that period as in law the decision by the Tribunal dates back to the date of detention. And by fiction of law it is assumed that the Customs Department clears the goods as it should have done when the goods had landed. Even otherwise if the policy decision of capacity to pay is read along with rate prescribed, then levy of demurrage may defeat the very purpose and objective of the policy. Payment of three times or four times of demurrage of value of goods because the goods were detained at the instance of Customs Authorities does not accord with the policy decision. It is not in common interest. One of the settled principles of construction is to read a provision in such manner that it may not be self-defeating. The levy of demurrage at the prescribed rate by ignoring the Public Notice issued by the Customs Department in 1986 is apt to lead to such disastrous consequences. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (2) TMI 69
Issues:
1. Jurisdictional validity of show-cause notices under Article 226 of the Constitution.
2. Proper forum for addressing grievances against statutory authorities.
3. Applicability of writ jurisdiction in tax assessment matters.
Analysis:
The judgment pertains to a petition under Article 226 seeking to quash show-cause notices issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise. The petitioner, a manufacturer, had claimed exemption under a specific notification but was alleged to have contravened various provisions of the Central Excise Rules. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the notices, while the respondents argued that the petitioner should address objections before the adjudicating authority rather than the High Court. The respondents cited a previous order where the court declined interference in a similar case involving a show-cause notice.
The counsel for the respondents referred to Supreme Court decisions emphasizing that statutory forums should be the primary avenue for redressal of grievances, and High Courts should not entertain matters that fall within the purview of such forums. The judgment highlighted the need to respect the statutory provisions and avoid circumventing the established procedures. The court cited precedents to support the principle that writ jurisdiction should not be used as a blanket solution for all legal issues, urging caution in exercising extraordinary writ powers.
Based on the legal and factual similarities with a previous case, the court upheld the preliminary objections raised by the respondents, indicating that the petition should follow the same course. The judgment directed the petitioner to respond to the show-cause notices before the appropriate authority, allowing for objections and legal contestation. The authority was instructed to make a decision promptly and communicate it to the petitioner. If the outcome was unfavorable, the petitioner was granted the freedom to pursue further remedies. The court disposed of the petition without costs, revoked the interim stay order, and ordered the refund of security costs to the petitioner. Certified copies of the judgment were to be provided to both parties.
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1995 (2) TMI 68
The Supreme Court condoned the delay and dismissed the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) regarding the applicability of the proviso to Section 11A of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 in relation to a show cause notice dated 4-1-1993. The High Court concluded that there was no wilful suppression of facts by the assessee, making the proviso inapplicable. The High Court quashed the show cause notice but clarified that the challenge was only to the proviso's applicability, not the notice within 6 months of its issuance.
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1995 (2) TMI 67
Whether various goods mentioned in the Schedule of Excise Tariff are dutiable as such or they would be, 'excisable goods' as defined in the Act, only when they are marketable or capable of being marketed?
Whether resin or resol produced by the appellants can be considered to be goods for purposes of levy under the Act?
Held that:- Although the duty of excise is on manufacture or production of the goods, but the entire concept of bringing out new commodity etc. is linked with marketability. An article does not become goods in the common parlance unless by production or manufacture something new and different is brought out which can be bought and sold.
Since the test of marketability or capable of being marketable applies even to those goods which are mentioned in the tariff item the intermediate resin produced by the appellants which are mentioned as resols under Tariff Item No. 15A were not exigible to duty. The finding of the Tribunal that once the product manufactured by the appellants answered the chemical description of the product under Tariff Item 15A it was assessable to duty whether it was marketable or not was thus not well founded.In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed. The question of law raised by the appellants is decided by saying that resin at `A' stage which are chemically known as `resols' could not be subjected to duty. In favour of assessee.
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