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Showing 341 to 360 of 374 Records
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1987 (7) TMI 34 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penalty, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... sional assessment under section 141 before its deletion in the year 1971 and an assessment or reassessment under section 147 of the Act. In the instant case, the order of assessment, which has been amended under section 155, was passed under section 143(3) of the Act and hence it would follow that the order passed under section 155 is part of the proceedings for assessment under section 143 of the Act. Therefore, the penalty proceedings, in the instant case, must be held to have been initiated during the course of proceedings in connection with the regular assessment within the meaning of that expression, as defined by section 2(40) of the Act. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the levy of penalty under section 273(b) of the Act was bad in law. Our answer to the question referred to this court is, therefore, in the negative and against the assessees. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1987 (7) TMI 33 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Limitation, Penalty, Transfer Of Case ... ... ... ... ..... at the Tribunal had overlooked any of them. We have heard counsel at some length on this and considered the three orders of the Tribunal and the grounds on which the assessee requested the Tribunal to recall its earlier findings. We think that the contention that the Tribunal has really reviewed its earlier order which it had no jurisdiction to do needs examination and that the question raised in ITC No. 100 of 1984 should be directed to be referred. The question raised in ITC No. 25 of 1985 is normally a question of fact. But, in this case, the answer to it would depend upon the answers to the other three questions on which we are calling for a reference. We would, therefore, direct the Tribunal to refer this question as well. In the result, these applications are allowed. The Tribunal is directed to submit a consolidated statement of case in all the three income-tax cases and refer for our decision all the four questions set out earlier. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 32 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Advancement Of Object Of General Public Utility, Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... ence application will form part of the present statement as other document . We are, therefore, unable to see any distinction between the facts in both the references. We do not, therefore, think it necessary to hear counsel over again on merits, also because the judgment in R.C. No. 13 of 1979 has become final. We cannot take a different view in this referred case. For the above reasons, we answer the first question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We decline to answer the second question. No costs. Learned counsel for the assessee makes an oral request for grant of certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under section 261 of the Income-tax Act. We do not, however, think that this is a fit case to be certified under the said provision more particularly in view of the fact that the judgment of this court in R.C. No. 13 of 1979 relating to an earlier assessment year has become final. The request is, therefore, rejected.
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1987 (7) TMI 31 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Advertisement Expenditure, Appeal To Tribunal, Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Interest, Remand
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1987 (7) TMI 30 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... llate Tribunal categorically found that new material came into the possession of the Income-tax Officer after the completion of the original assessments which necessitated the reopening of the assessments. In this view of the matter, the assessments were held to be legal and valid and covered by section 147(b) of the Act. We are satisfied that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal is right. We are of the view that apart from the fact that the questions formulated for being referred to this court are pure questions of fact, there is no case for the petitioner even on the merits. Further, the petitioner formulated one question under section 256(1) of the Act praying to the Appellate Tribunal to refer the said question to this court. But what has been done now is to specify two questions in paragraph 11 of the original petitions for being referred to this court. This itself is not permissible. On the whole, there is no merit in these two original petitions. They are dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 29 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Leave To Appeal To Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... it wholly proceeds on the rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court in two of its decisions in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843 and New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237. In these circumstances, it is difficult to subscribe to the view that the case involved a law point which is yet to be settled by the Supreme Court. The prayer for leave is, consequently, declined. D. S. TEWATIA J.-I agree. M. R. AGNIHOTRI J. -I agree.
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1987 (7) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... ility of the deduction of interest paid on loans where section 36 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was invoked. There is a difference in the language of sections 36 and 57. Section 36 provided for deduction of interest paid in respect of the capital borrowed for the purpose of the business whereas in section 57, the deduction is allowed on expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of earning income through other sources. The expression purpose of business appears to be wider in scope than the expression purpose of earning income . By reason of the above and in view of the fact that a certificate has been already granted on identical questions in M. M. Thapar s case 1978 114 ITR 331 (Cal), we allow this application. We certify that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. There will be an order in terms of prayer (a). Let the order for issue of the certificate be drawn up separately. Each party to pay and bear its own costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1987 (7) TMI 27 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Firm, Long-term Capital Assets, Nature Of Interest Of Partner, Partners ... ... ... ... ..... ght from November 3, 1967, held assets to the extent of 25 each. That being so, the assets held by these two assessees on July 8, 1975, the date of the sale deed, were obviously held by them for more than 60 months and consequently fell within the definition of long-term capital asset as contained in clause (29A) of section 2. Since capital gains in the instant case arose from the transfer of a long-term capital asset, these capital gains would be long-term capital gains as defined in clause (29B) of section 2. In view of the foregoing discussion, our answer to the question referred to us is that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the capital gains arising to the assessees were liable to be assessed as short-term capital gains. In other words, our answer to the aforesaid question is in the negative, in favour of the assessees and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction To Levy Penalty, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... nd 16(1) and (2) or 51 of the Second Schedule to the present Act are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Had the provisions of section 230A of the present Act stood duly complied with, I would have upheld the operative validity of the two trust deeds as against the subsequent attachment. However, on this point, the plaintiffs must fail. Issues Nos. 3 to 6 Learned counsel have agreed that the validity of the two trust deeds may be decided on the basis of the findings as recorded above and the suit finally disposed of on that basis. I have recorded findings on issues Nos. 2(a) and (b) against the plaintiff. Consequently, the impugned order dated August 10, 1971, made by the 1st defendant will have to be upheld. The two attachments dated July 25, and 27, 1970, are valid in law and do not deserve to be set aside. So also the proclamation of sale dated January 13, 1972. In the result, the suit stands dismissed with costs. Costs of all the three defendants in one set.
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1987 (7) TMI 25 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ot referable questions of law. We direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer the following questions, formulated in para. 12 of the original petition as questions Nos. 1 and 3, for the decision of this court 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and also in view of the finding that reliance cannot be placed on the assessee s book results , the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the hon ble Tribunal are justified in interfering with the addition made by the Income-tax Officer ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the hon ble Tribunal is right in holding that it would be reasonable to determine the income of the assessee at Rs. 1,41,000 for this year and is not the above finding unreasonable, unsupported by relevant materials and independent evidence and also unjustified ? The original petition is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment shall be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal for information and compliance.
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1987 (7) TMI 24 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... is born or adopted. It is only on the advent of son in the Hindu undivided family as a coparcener that the rights of ownership in such property are shared by him with the person throwing the property into the common stock of the Hindu undivided family. Thus, the said amount of Rs. 1,60,000 became the property of the Hindu undivided family soon after the birth of a son. It remained the self acquired property of the assessee till the valuation date of the year 1968-69, i.e., March 31, 1969, as the first son was admittedly born only after this date, i.e., May 16, 1969. Accordingly, the first part of the question is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue for all the said assessment years, the second part of the question is also answered in the affirmative so far the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69 are concerned and it is answered in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee in respect of the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72.
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1987 (7) TMI 23 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HUF, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e is a Hindu undivided family of which the karta is K. Subba Rao. His contention was that since he was a partner of the said partnership firm in his individual capacity, the value of his share in the partnership firm cannot be treated as the wealth of the Hindu undivided family. This argument was rejected by all the three authorities and we agree with them. K. Subba Rao was a partner in the said partnership firm representing the Hindu undivided family. Therefore, the share held by him in the said partnership is the property and share of the Hindu undivided family. Accordingly, it is liable to be taxed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family, according to the definition of it net wealth contained in clause (m) of section 2, read with section 3 of the Act. For this purpose, it may not really be necessary to go to section 4(1)(b). For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 22 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... proviso in sub-section (2) of section 187 retrospectively with effect from April 1, 1975, by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it is clearly a case of succession governed by section 188 of the Act, since the applicability of section 187 is excluded by virtue of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 187. The view taken by the Tribunal that it is a case of succession governed by section 188 requiring two separate assessments for the two periods during the assessment year is justified. Consequently, the reference is answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee by holding that the view taken by the Tribunal is justified. No costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 21 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... and the only question is whether subsection (2) of section 145 is attracted. We find that the Tribunal has not taken into account subsection (2) of section 145 for deciding the appeal before it and the same has been decided only on the question of applicability of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 145 on which the Revenue does not even rely. In such a situation, the appropriate course is to require the Tribunal to decide the matter afresh on the basis of sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act since it is common ground that the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 145 has no application to the present case. We direct accordingly . Consequently the reference is answered with the above direction as follows The Tribunal was not justified in holding that the proviso to subsection (1) of section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was resorted to in the present case and it should have decided the matter on the basis of sub-section (2) of section 145 of the Act. No costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Delay In Application, Provisions Prescribing Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... e code by itself It is true of course that the courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly fair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the, language of a statute merely because in one view of the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision than what a statute accords him. Still less is it the function of the courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment . Therefore, where the will of Parliament has been so expressed, the petitioner cannot say that a longer period of limitation must be afforded to him. Law helps those who are vigilant. The petitioner having been a contributory to his own laches, will have to take the blame upon himself. There are no merits in either of these writ petitions. They are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (7) TMI 19 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... , 1964. In that case the earlier decision of this court in Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. 1982 138 ITR 111 was followed. The decision of the Supreme Court in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. 1981 132 ITR 559 was also cited and considered. It was noted in the said judgment that the Supreme Court dismissed a special leave petition filed by the Revenue against a decision of the Madras High Court in CIT v. Palani Andavar Mills (P.) Ltd. 1983 144 ITR 138, where the question involved was whether the contingency reserve was includible in computing the capital of a company for the purpose of surtax. It was held that such a contingency reserve was in the nature of general reserve and was includible for the purpose of computation of the capital. For the reasons as above, it appears to us that the law stands settled by the decisions of this court as also of the Supreme Court. This application is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. -I agree.
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1987 (7) TMI 18 - PATNA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e it. In this context, it should be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to condone delay is not in question. The Tribunal had the necessary jurisdiction to condone the delay. It might have committed some wrongs while exercising its power, but only therefor, the power of this court under article 226 cannot be exercised. This aspect of the matter is wholly covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim, AIR 1984 SC 38. Further, it is now well known that matters relating to condonation of delay should be judged broadly and should not be judged in a pedantic manner. In a very recent decision, the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji 1987 167 ITR 471, clearly held that the court should exercise its jurisdiction liberally to condone delays. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to exercise my jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order. This application is, accordingly, dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 17 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... It is for the Appellate Tribunal to apply the relevant law to the facts of the case. Therefore, we are of the opinion, that a more meaningful and effective adjudication is necessary by the Appellate Tribunal, on the facts of this case, in the light of the Full Bench decision of this court in Peter John s case 1986 157 ITR 711. In all the, circumstances of the case, We decline to answer the question of law referred to us. It is for the Appellate Tribunal to restore I.T.A. No. 658 (Coch) / 1976-77 to its file and consider the matter afresh, in the light of the Full Bench decision of this court in Peter John s case 1986 157 ITR 711. This shall be done, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The Income-tax referred case is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by law.
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1987 (7) TMI 16 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Exemptions, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... ch 29, 1975. The Appellate Tribunal also relied upon the grounds of appeal filed by the assessee himself to arrive at the conclusion that the transfer was effected on March 29, 1975.. It was not contended that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the date of execution of the sale deed is March 29, 1975 is not based on any evidence or that the said finding is based on irrelevant and immaterial factors or that relevant and material factors were not taken into account. We are of the view that the registration of the deed having taken place on March 29, 1975, the transfer was complete. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the date of execution of the sale deed is March 29, 1975. No referable question of law, as formulated in para 11 of the original petition arises for consideration. We decline to direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer the question of law formulated in para 11 of the original petition. The original petition is without merit. It is dismissed.
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1987 (7) TMI 15 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... d view is sought to be questioned before us in this referred case. We are not, however, satisfied that the view taken by the Tribunal is in any manner contrary to law. The previous assessment was made under section 16(3) and no penalty proceedings were initiated on that occasion. Now, as a result of the proceedings under section 17, the value of the net wealth has gone up, but while levying penalty, it is but just and proper that the wealth assessed earlier should be deducted. If this is not so done, the result would be that penalty would be levied not only upon the escaped wealth but also upon the wealth initially returned and assessed and in respect of which no penalty proceedings whatsoever were initiated. It is not brought to our notice that any provision of law under the Act or the Rules militates against this just proposition. For the above reasons, the answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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