|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 644 Records
-
2005 (1) TMI 713 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... (b) CIT v. Metal Corpn. of India Ltd. 1982 133 ITR 1301 (Cal.); (c) Addl. CIT v. Akkamamba Textiles Ltd. 1979 117 ITR 294 (AP). 3. On the other hand, the assessee relied on the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. 1982 137 ITR 3891 and CIT v. Bharat Suryodaya Mills Co. Ltd. 1993 202 ITR 942 . 4. In view of the divergent opinions of the High Courts, the Tribunal applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Vegetable Products Ltd. 1973 88 ITR 192 adopted the view in favour of the assessee. 5. Mr. D.S. Patwalia, learned counsel for the Revenue, has pointed out that the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Akkamba Textiles Ltd.’s case (supra) stands affirmed by the Supreme Court, as the appeal against the same has been dismissed in Addl. CIT v. Akkamamba Textiles Ltd. 1997 227 ITR 464. 6. In view of the above, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
-
2005 (1) TMI 712 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... tioner, we do not find that a case has been made out within the parameters indicated in the decision of this court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra & Another 2002 (4) SCC 388. Hence, this curative petition is dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 711 - SUPREME COURT
Administration of justice - Constitutional validity of the Bombay City Civil Court and Bombay Court of Small Causes Act, 1986 ('the 1987 Act) - abolishing Letters Patent appeals - Implementation of the Notification to a future date and giving liberty to the State Government to apply - violation of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- The High Court exercises judicial and administrative control over subordinate Courts in the State of Maharashtra and having regard to the interest of the litigants in the city of Bombay and having regard to the fact that there is already an institution which is working for the last 125 years, it would not be appropriate to rush through the implementation of the impugned Act without providing adequate infrastructure. It cannot be overlooked that from 1987 till this day, the State Government has not implemented the impugned Act and one of the reasons for non-implementation appears to us that the State Government was unable to provide the infrastructure including appointment of new Judges as per the recommendation of the High Court. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances which are existing in Bombay, in our opinion, it would not be in the interest of administration of justice as also in the interest of litigants or the institution to rush through in such a haste and implement the impugned Act by impugned notification dated 20th August, 1991 from 1st May, 1992."
It is open to the State Government to apply to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said Notification placing on record necessary material to show that there is adequacy of infrastructure and the requirements as to number of judges and court rooms etc. are satisfied. In this regard a report from the High Court is also required to be called as and when the State Government applies to this Court seeking permission for implementation of the said notification dated 20th August, 1991. As indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment, it is open to the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps to amend Section 3 of the 1986 Act for providing an appeal.
Merely because an appeal is not provided in any statute, that by itself does not render a statute constitutionally invalid. It is well settled that the right of appeal is to be provided by a statute. In other words, right of appeal is statutory and not a constitutional right. This apart, if a statute does not provide an appeal in respect of certain matter, the party still will have remedy in approaching the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, in exercise of power of judicial review including under Article 136 of the Constitution. Moreover the difficulty in the case only relates to a class of cases as indicated in paragraph 18 of this judgment to such decrees, which may be passed after the commencement of the 1987 Act and 1986 Act in any suit or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the said Acts. This apart, as stated in paragraph 18, the State of Maharashtra is willing to take steps to provide an appeal by amending Section 3 of the 1986 Act.
As regards the other contention that the Notification has been issued due to pressure brought about by a section of lawyers and for extraneous considerations, it may be stated that no particulars were given and no material was placed on record before the High Court and even before us except repeating this ground. We do not find any good ground to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. Hence, it is rejected.
The argument that the 1986 Act or Adhiniyam encroaches upon the legislative power of Parliament, cannot be accepted, in the view we have taken that it was competent for the State Legislatures to pass law relating to general jurisdiction of the High Courts dealing with the topic `administration of justice' under Entry 11-A of List III. Assuming that incidentally 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam touch upon the Letters Patent, the 1986 Act and Adhiniyam cannot be declared either as unconstitutional or invalid applying doctrine of pith and substance having due regard to the discussion already made above while dealing with the legislative competence of the State in passing the 1987 Act.
Thus, we uphold the constitutional validity of 1987 Act, 1986 Act and the Adhiniyam. The Notification dated 20.8.1991 issued by the State of Mahrashtra shall not be implemented without further orders from this Court in the light of what is stated.
In the result, Civil Appeal is dismissed subject to above observations as to the implementation of the impugned notification. Transfer Cases are dismissed. Another Civil Appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 710 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... bsequently the respondent assessee came to the conclusion that the principal amount itself was difficult to recover and, therefore, stopped charging interest. This position was accepted by the Income-tax Officer till 1980-81 when no interest was charged. However, the Department took a different stand from 1981-82 onwards. As the recovery of principal amounts itself was in doubt, as a prudent businessman the respondent assessee was wholly within its right to decide not to charge any interest from the debtor M/s. Shiv Refiners. In this view of the matter, there was no question of adding the estimated amount of interest on the loan advanced to M/s. Shiv Refiners. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in deleting the addition of interest on the loan advanced to M/s. Shiv Refiners. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (1) TMI 709 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Substantial question of law - search operation - discrepancies in the sale of land - Whether a notice u/s 158BD of the IT Act could have been issued despite the return for the relevant assessment year showing the receipt of a certain amount from the sale of a plot had already been filed and tax liability met - HELD THAT:- Conjoint reading of Section 139(1) and 158BA(3), would, thus, make it manifestly clear that, in order to take out any income or transaction out of the clutches of block period, it is for the assessee to prove to the satisfaction of AO that a particular income/transaction had already stood recorded in the books of account/documents in the normal course of business by the assessee prior to the date of search or their requisition. What is, therefore, material is its disclosure in the books of account and secondly, such disclosure should be prior to the date of search in point of time, In such circumstances, if an assessee has not filed his/her regular return u/s 139(1), even then it would not make much difference because the assessee has already taken care to disclose the income/transaction in his/her books of account the day it was required to be entered into in accordance with accountancy system
In our opinion, thus, it was a clear case of income from undisclosed source in the hands of assessee as defined under Section 158B(b) ibid. It is clear from the fact that firstly, the sale deed recited a sale consideration of ₹ 9 lakhs. Secondly, only a sum of ₹ 9 lakhs was shown to be received by cheque. Thirdly, the balance amount of ₹ 20,60,000 received in cash was not entered in the books of account of any of trio, nor was anywhere disclosed in any document such as bank account or in wealth-tax returns or in the form of issuing a receipt in favour of purchaser against sale consideration by any of the trio including the assessee to the extent of her l/3rd share of ₹ 6,66,666. In this view, the intention of assessee was not to disclose receipt of ₹ 20,00,000 or her l/3rd share out of ₹ 20,00,000, i.e., ₹ 6,66,666 in her income for the year in question. It was thus a clear case which falls in the wordings of Section 158B(b) i.e. "would not have been disclosed for the purpose of this Act."
Thus, the income in question had to be taxed in the hands of assessee as per provisions applicable to block assessment r/w Section 113 of the Act treating the income to be an income from undisclosed one as defined under Section 158B(b) ibid.
Accordingly, we are of the view that no fault can be found in the conclusion arrived at by the AO and that of Tribunal. Appeal, thus fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 708 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... l was found on physical verification. The code number as explained by the applicant was only internal number and merely because mobile phone hand set of different code number other than mentioned in the invoice were found, it cannot be inferred that 1500 mobile phone hand sets were not covered by the invoice and the movement was not from Noida but was from Delhi. This reference is based on no material and merely on surmises and conjecture. Moreover, consignment consists of other items also covered by same invoice in respect of which no adverse inference has been drawn and movement of goods from Noida has not been disputed. In these circumstances, seizure of the goods is wholly illegal and unwarranted and liable to be set aside. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal dated 6th January, 2005 and the seizure of the goods are quashed. Authority concerned is directed to release the goods forthwith without any security. The costs is assessed to Rs. One thousand.
-
2005 (1) TMI 707 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... ha, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 706 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 705 - CESTAT BANGALORE
Classification of goods - guise of Twine of synthetic fibres - suppression and mis-representing the facts - evasion of duty - penalty - appellant classified as 'Twine' falling under CH 5607.50 - Commissioner, classified the goods as Sewing Thread falling under CH 54.01 - HELD THAT:- It is very clear that the adjudicating authority has made out a new case beyond the proposals in the Show Cause Notices. We also find that in all the documents, the appellant has indicated that the impugned goods are Twine. In view of this, it is very difficult to sustain the charge of suppression of facts. In the light of the above observations, invocation of longer period under proviso to Section HA(1) is not correct. Further it is seen that for the period from March 1995 to February 1997, the department initiated proceedings by issue of 4 Show Cause Notices wherein the Department did not question the classification of the product. Even if the goods are classified as 'Multiple (folded) Yarn', as contended by the party, they would be exempted under Notification 8/96 and 5/98. Hence, the OIO deserves to be set aside.
We allow the appeals with consequential relief.
-
2005 (1) TMI 704 - SUPREME COURT
Murder - Application seeking the grant of bail - Series of Bail applications - either rejected by the High Court or when granted by the High Court were set aside by this Court - Offences punishable under Sections 302 read with 34, 307 read with 34, 120-B, 302/307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act - Existence of the prima facie case against the accused and (B) the evidentiary value of retracted confession ; have been considered by the High Court as well as by this Court in the previous proceedings or not - HELD THAT:- The decisions given by a superior forum, undoubtedly, is binding on the subordinate fora on the same issue even in bail matters unless of course, there is a material change in the fact situation calling for a different view being taken. Therefore, even though there is room for filing a subsequent bail application in cases where earlier applications have been rejected, the same can be done if there is a change in the fact situation or in law which requires the earlier view being interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. This is the limited area in which an accused who has been denied bail earlier, can move a subsequent application. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument of learned counsel for the accused that in view the guaranty conferred on a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is open to the aggrieved person to make successive bail applications even on a ground already rejected by courts earlier including the Apex Court of the country.
While deciding the cases on facts, more so in criminal cases the court should bear in mind that each case must rest on its own facts and the similarity of facts in one case cannot be used to bear in mind the conclusion of fact in another case. It is also a well established principle that while considering the ratio laid down in one case, the court will have to bear in mind that every judgement must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be true. Since the generality of expressions which may be found therein are not intended to be expositions of the whole of the law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found.
Bearing the above jurisprudential principle in mind if we examine the case of Jayendra Saraswathi [2005 (1) TMI 673 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] it is clear that it was a case which was decided on the facts of that case and that the court did not overrule the judgment of this court in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav and Anr. (II) [2004 (3) TMI 763 - SUPREME COURT] even by implication but it only distinguished the case on facts. Therefore, in our opinion, that judgment is of no assistance to the respondent accused in this case.
The learned counsel for the appellant had pointed out that there are nearly 44 more witness to be examined by the prosecution and the past conduct of the accused as found by courts below very clearly shows that if he is released on bail he would certainly threaten the witnesses and tamper with the evidence which according to the learned counsel is clear from the fact that a number of witnesses have already turned hostile, many of them during the period when the accused was let on bail. Therefore, releasing the respondent-accused would not be in the larger interests of justice. We agree with this argument.
It is also pointed out that in addition to the retracted confession of the accused Rajan Tiwari the evidence already brought on record clearly shows that there has been a test identification parade of the assailants and also other materials have been brought on record to show that one of the assailants of Ajit Sarkar was closely known to the respondent and there have been telephonic conversation to and from the telephone registered in the name of the respondent which according to the learned counsel would go a long way in establishing the prosecution case.
It is not necessary for us to weigh the evidence at this stage since we have already come to the conclusion that the prosecution on the basis of the material available on record has established a prima facie case against the accused and we are also of the opinion that the conduct of the respondent-accused as brought on record clearly indicates that enlarging the said accused on bail would impede the progress of the trial.
Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was totally in error in allowing the bail application of the respondent by the impugned order. We allow this appeal, quash the impugned order of the High Court and dismiss the bail application made by the respondent in Criminal Miscellaneous on the file of the High Court of Judicature at Patna.
-
2005 (1) TMI 703 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... pport of its claim, the appellant has failed to furnish any data whatsoever. It has failed to set out as to how the supplies made to them were not "deemed exports" or that the supplies were not made at the international prices to them. o p /o p The precise data required for their entitlement has not been given in their affidavits. Even the particulars of the exports, the amount of claim, the price difference and the price at which materials were supplied to them have not been furnished. The appellant has failed to show that any representation had ever been made to it by the Union of India contrary to what is contained in the IPRS. Since the appellant failed to show that it has acted on a representation made by the Union of India to its detriment, the appellant is not entitled to invoke the equitable rule of promissory estoppel. o p /o p For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to the costs. o p /o p
-
2005 (1) TMI 702 - ITAT MUMBAI
Unaccounted sales - addition made on presumption and without any material or evidence to suggest that the sales of waste material - deduction under ss. 80HHC and 80-I - business income - HELD THAT:- It is also notable that during the asst. yrs. 1992-93 and 1993-94, the sale proceeds shown in the books of account in respect of rags amounts to ₹ 68,455 and ₹ 54,260, respectively. Interestingly, in the asst. yr. 1997-98, the sales of such material shot to ₹ 4,56,262. Thus, we hold that it would be fair and reasonable to sustain the addition of ₹ 3,60,000 to the extent of ₹ 2 lakhs only. Accordingly, the addition stands reduced to ₹ 2 lakhs. These sales, for the purpose of ss. 80HHC and 80-I, will have to be treated as local sales and not export sales. Obviously, the waste generated during the manufacturing process will be sold only locally and cannot be exported.
However, it is in the nature of income derived from the industrial undertaking and, therefore, the assessee will be entitled to deduction under s. 80-I. For the purposes of s. 80HHC, the addition will be treated as business profits and the same will also be included in the total turnover while computing deduction under s. 80HHC. The AO is accordingly, directed to recompute the deduction under ss. 80HHC and 80-I.
In the result, while the assessees' appeals are party allowed, both the Departmental appeals are dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 701 - SUPREME COURT
Industrial Dispute - Challenged the Dismissal of workman from services - Guilty of misconduct - Worker lying fast asleep on an iron plate at his working place - Disciplinary proceeding initiated against him in terms of Standing Order 24(1) under the Industrial Employment, 1946 - Whether the enquiry was proper; and (ii) is the finding recorded by the enquiry officer perverse - Respondent herein filed a complaint of unfair labour practice as specified under Item 1(a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the Act) against the Appellant herein before the Labour Court -
HELD THAT:- The Labour Court evidently had taken recourse to Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act which ex facie was inapplicable. The said provision clearly postulates two situations, namely, (i) the misconduct should be of minor or technical character; and (ii) the punishment is a shockingly disproportionate without having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the employee.
The past record of service, therefore, is a relevant factor for considering as to whether the punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee is shockingly disproportionate or not. Thus, before the learned Single Judge an attempt on the part of the Respondent to take recourse to Clause (b) of Item (1) of Schedule IV failed. In absence of any plea of factual victimization and furthermore in absence of any foundational fact having been laid down for arriving at a conclusion of the legal victimization, in our opinion, the Division Bench committed a manifest error in invoking Clause (a) thereof.
Furthermore, it is trite, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, must act within the four-corner thereof. The Industrial Courts would not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a statutory provision in this behalf. Although its jurisdiction is wide but the same must be applied in terms of the provisions of the statute and no other.
If the punishment is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be imposed, but such an order cannot be passed on an irrational or extraneous factor and certainly not on a compassionate ground.
In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the Respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceeding, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the Respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary.
Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (1) TMI 700 - CESTAT, BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... he assessee's contention that out of 27 items declared by the appellants, which were used as inputs, the department raised demands only pertaining to 13 items where the assessable value declared by the assessee is lower. If an overall picture is taken, even according to the Cost Audit Report, the department cannot proceed to initiate proceedings only with regard to part items where the value is lower and ignoring other items. We also find that the assessments were not provisional and had been finalized and that there was no provisional order of assessment. In view of the large number of judgments on time bar cited like Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs CCE Madras-1994 (74) ELT 9 and that of ITW Signode India Ltd. vs CCE, 2003 (158) ELT 403 (SC), there is no ground for invoking larger period and the demands are required to be set aside as time barred. The appeal is allowed on the above terms. Operative portion of this Order was pronounced in open Court on conclusion of hearing.
-
2005 (1) TMI 699 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... sessee, accepted the fact that identical controversy has been decided by this Court in case of CIT vs. Professional Information Systems & Management (IT Ref. No. 304 of 1992) decided today, i.e., 19th Jan., 2005 by this Court reported at (2005) 195 CTR (Guj) 14'Ed. , and that the said issue stands concluded by the aforesaid decision of this Court. 7. Accordingly, question No. 1 relating to motor car expenses is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, following the decision in earlier year in assessee's own case as well as the decision in case of Sayaji Iron & Engg. Co. vs. CIT (2002) 172 CTR (Guj) 339 (2002) 253 ITR 749(Guj). 7.1 Similarly, question No. 2 is also answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue following the decision in case of CIT vs. Professional Information Systems & Management (supra) rendered in IT Ref. No. 304 of 1992. 8. The reference stands disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (1) TMI 698 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ent and secondly, where regular books of accounts are maintained and where books are not rejected, the best judgment assessment resulting in enhancement in the turnover is not justified. 7. Keeping these principles in view, the Tribunal in its order has concluded that it is not in dispute that the assessee has maintained the regular books of accounts and it is also not in dispute that the Assessing Officer has not rejected the books of accounts. In such circumstances, in our opinion, the Tribunal is justified in allowing the appeal filed by the assessee by setting aside the order passed by the Assessing Authority and directing the Assessing Authority to compute the tax liability by accepting the returns filed by the assessee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has erroneously decided the question of law raised before it. Accordingly interference with the said order is not called for. 8. In the result, revision filed by the revenue is rejected. Ordered accordingly
-
2005 (1) TMI 697 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) - HELD THAT:- Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the AO has recorded satisfaction in the order itself. However, bare reading of the order of the AO shows that he has proceeded on the assumption that penalty is an automatic consequence of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Not even a single reason has been recorded as to why in the opinion of the AO, it was just and proper to initiate penalty proceedings or in the alternative, the surrender by the assessee at the very first instance was not bona fide or voluntary. We do not consider it necessary to deal with this contention any further in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal and would refer to the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court in the cases of CIT vs. Ram Commercial Enterprises Ltd.[1998 (10) TMI 13 - DELHI HIGH COURT].
It is thus apparently clear that the question proposed by the Department as a substantial question of law has been squarely answered by different Division Benches of this Court and we see no reason to take a different view.
Thus, we dismiss the appeal in limine.
-
2005 (1) TMI 696 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... Delay condoned. The appeal is dismissed.
-
2005 (1) TMI 695 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the pre-mature retirement of appellant as directed by the respondents was in order affirmed by Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur?
-
2005 (1) TMI 694 - CESTAT, DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ue of the broken glass bottles in the assessable value of the goods and as such, they were not entitled to claim the Modvat credit. But we find that no such plea has been taken in the show-cause notice wherein, it has been only alleged that respondents did not add the value of the broken glass bottles in the assessable value of the goods. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has recorded the findings that the value of the broken glass bottles was added by the respondents in the assessable value of the goods during the period in dispute. That being so, they had been rightly allowed the Modvat credit. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) has also followed the earlier judgment of the Tribunal in this regard, in the respondents own case. He has also followed the ratio of law laid down in Union of India v. Sancheti Foods Products Ltd. 1993 (68) ELT 341 (Cal.) In view of this, we do not find any merit in the appeal and uphold the impugned order. The appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
........
|
