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2013 (1) TMI 1028
Issues Involved: 1. Whether the Official Liquidator discharged his obligation of proving that the failure to submit the statement of affairs of the company was without reasonable excuse. 2. Whether the appellant's failure to submit the statement of affairs was without reasonable excuse. 3. Whether the burden of proof lies on the appellant or the Official Liquidator to prove the absence of reasonable excuse.
Summary:
Issue 1: Obligation of Official Liquidator The Court examined whether the Official Liquidator had fulfilled his duty to prove that the appellant's failure to submit the statement of affairs was without reasonable excuse as stipulated u/s 454(2) of the Companies Act. The Court noted that the Official Liquidator's evidence, provided by a Junior Technical Assistant, did not demonstrate that the appellant failed to submit the statement without reasonable excuse. The learned Single Judge also doubted whether the Official Liquidator had discharged his obligation of proving the offence.
Issue 2: Reasonable Excuse for Failure The appellant contended that he was not given possession of the necessary documents by the second respondent, which hindered his ability to submit the statement of affairs. The second respondent, however, claimed to have handed over all relevant documents. The Court found that the appellant was not in possession of all the documents required to prepare the statement of affairs, as evidenced by the fact that the second respondent eventually submitted the statement after a warrant was issued against him. This supported the appellant's claim of having a reasonable excuse for the delay.
Issue 3: Burden of Proof The Court discussed the legal principle that the burden to prove the absence of reasonable excuse lies initially on the Official Liquidator. The jurisprudence of criminal law places the burden on the prosecution to prove the case, not on the accused to prove innocence. The Court concluded that the Official Liquidator failed to prove that the appellant's default was without reasonable excuse, and thus, the appellant should be acquitted.
Conclusion: The Court set aside the order dated 6 February 2009 in C.A. No. 1081 of 2004 in C.P. No. 101 of 1994, acquitting the appellant of the offence. The Official Liquidator was directed to refund the fine amount paid by the appellant. The intra-court appeal was allowed, and the connected MP was closed with no costs.
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2013 (1) TMI 1027
Issues Involved: 1. Allegations against the petitioners regarding the recovery of explosive substances. 2. Petitioners' claims for bail and their defenses. 3. Prosecution's evidence and arguments against granting bail. 4. Court's decision on the bail applications.
Summary:
1. Allegations against the petitioners regarding the recovery of explosive substances: The FIR No.546 was registered on 21.6.2011 at Police Station CCS, Port Blair, based on a complaint by H.L. Tiwari. It was alleged that a cargo ship, Gati Zipp, carried cartons shipped by VMR Shipping Agency containing unauthorized substances. The raiding party found cartons containing gelatine sticks, electronic detonators, and ammonium nitrate. The petitioners were arrested following further investigations revealing their involvement.
2. Petitioners' claims for bail and their defenses: - S. Namochivayama: Claimed to run a grocery shop and denied involvement with the explosive substances. - N. Kannapan, R. Chidambaram, and Sanjay Choudhary: Asserted they were genuine quarry operators with valid licenses and used explosives legally issued by the Andaman Public Works Department. They contended their detention was prolonged due to successive supplementary chargesheets and argued for bail based on their extended jail time and lack of direct recovery of explosives from their premises.
3. Prosecution's evidence and arguments against granting bail: - S. Namochivayama: Alleged to be the distributor of ammonium nitrate, gelatine sticks, and electronic detonators, and considered the kingpin of the activity. Evidence included statements from G.S. Babu and the driver, linking him to the consignment. - N. Kannapan: Linked through statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., call details, and unauthorized use of ammonium nitrate for quarrying. The clandestine transportation of explosives was highlighted. - R. Chidambaram: Evidence showed he used more explosives than officially issued, indicating unauthorized procurement. Statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and financial transactions supported his involvement. - Sanjay Choudhary: Similar to R. Chidambaram, with evidence of unauthorized use of ammonium nitrate and financial transactions linking him to the illegal activity.
4. Court's decision on the bail applications: The Court found prima facie material establishing the petitioners' involvement in violating the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Given the serious consequences and the potential for interference with the trial, the Court declined the bail applications. The Court directed the prosecution to first examine the material witnesses and allowed the petitioners to file fresh bail applications after this examination. The impugned orders by the High Court were affirmed.
Conclusion: The petitions were disposed of with directions for the prosecution to prioritize examining material witnesses, and the petitioners were permitted to reapply for bail post this examination. The observations made would not prejudice the trial's outcome.
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2013 (1) TMI 1026
Issues involved: The judgment involves the conviction of the Appellant and others for offences u/s 364A, 368, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, based on the abduction of children and subsequent events leading to their recovery.
Details of the judgment:
Issue 1: Conviction and sentencing of the accused The Appellant (A1) and others were convicted u/s 364A, 368, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code by the Sessions Judge, with the High Court later confirming the conviction and sentence. The Appellant challenged this judgment before the Supreme Court.
Issue 2: Evidence against the Appellant The prosecution's case was based on suspicion, with witnesses alleging the Appellant's involvement in the abduction due to prior misconduct and threats. However, the evidence presented did not conclusively link the Appellant to the crime. The children abducted did not mention the Appellant visiting them, and the anonymous calls received were not traced by the investigating agency.
Issue 3: High Court's decision The High Court affirmed the trial court's order, citing circumstances like the Appellant's employment history and alleged threats as indications of a planned abduction. However, the Supreme Court found that these circumstances did not establish the Appellant's active role in the crime, emphasizing the lack of credible evidence against him.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order and ordering the release of the Appellant. The judgment highlighted the importance of legally admissible evidence in criminal cases and cautioned against convicting based on suspicion rather than proof, ensuring adherence to the principles of criminal jurisprudence.
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2013 (1) TMI 1025
Eligibility to claim depreciation as an application of income for the purpose of claiming exemption under Section 11 & 12 - Held that:- Hon’ble P&H High Court in the decisions of Market Committee, Pipli(2010 (7) TMI 374 - Punjab and Haryana High Court ) and of M/s.Tiny Tots Education Society (2010 (7) TMI 377 - Punjab and Haryana High Court ) had held clearly in favour of the assessee that depreciation was allowable as utilization for the purpose of computing exempt income under sections 11 & 12 of the Act. Thus Ld. CIT(A) was justified in directing the A.O. to consider the claim of depreciation as a part of utilization of the assessee. - Decided against revenue.
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2013 (1) TMI 1024
Issues involved: Appeal against judgment of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission regarding rejection of insurance claims due to non-compliance with contractual obligations.
Facts and Circumstances: The appellant, an insurance company, rejected multiple claims made by the insured due to failure to comply with the contractual requirement of informing about default by a foreign importer within the stipulated period. The insured sought enhancement of credit limit and presented 17 claims, which were rejected by the insurer based on non-compliance with Clause 8(b) of the insurance agreement.
Appellant's Argument: The appellant contended that the insured failed to communicate default information within the specified period, leading to the rejection of claims. Typographical errors in the judgment were highlighted, and it was argued that only two claims deserved acceptance while the rest should be rejected due to non-compliance.
Insured's Argument: The insured claimed that there were typographical errors in the judgment and argued that some claims were wrongly rejected despite no default on their part. They requested that certain appeals should be allowed while others should be rejected accordingly.
Court's Analysis: The court examined the clauses of the insurance policy, emphasizing the importance of strict interpretation of contractual terms in insurance agreements. Legal precedents were cited to support the principle that insurance contracts must be construed strictly without altering the nature of the contract. The court highlighted that the insured cannot claim more than what is covered by the policy and must adhere to the terms of the agreement.
Decision: After considering the submissions and the record, the court found that the insured failed to comply with Clause 8(b) of the agreement in most cases, except for two claims. Accordingly, only those two claims were allowed, and the rest were rejected. The judgment disposed of all 17 appeals based on the findings.
This summary provides a detailed overview of the legal judgment, including the issues involved, arguments presented by both parties, court's analysis, and the final decision rendered by the Supreme Court of India.
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2013 (1) TMI 1023
Issues involved: Appeal against acquittal based on consideration of evidence from separate cases, interpretation of evidence in relation to consent for sexual intercourse, application of CrPC provisions for appellate review.
The Supreme Court heard a batch of appeals arising from a common judgment of the High Court of Kerala. The appeals stemmed from cases involving alleged kidnapping, wrongful confinement, rape, and gang rape of a minor girl. The Special Court convicted multiple accused in Sessions Case No. 187 of 1999 and one accused in Sessions Case No. 241 of 2001 under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
The High Court, in a common judgment, considered evidence from both cases and acquitted all accused based on the lack of convincing evidence regarding the prosecutrix's willingness in sexual intercourse. The State of Kerala contended that the High Court failed to consider evidence from Sessions Case No. 187 of 1999 and highlighted the provisions of Sections 385(2) and 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) regarding appellate review.
The respondents' Senior Counsel argued that the evidence warranted acquittal, negating the need for remand to the High Court. After hearing both parties, the Supreme Court found merit in the State's submission. It noted that the High Court's acquittal was based solely on evidence from Sessions Case No. 241 of 2001, without considering evidence from Sessions Case No. 187 of 1999.
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of evaluating each case's facts individually to determine consent in sexual intercourse. It criticized the High Court for not considering the distinct circumstances of each case and remanded the matters back to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with the law.
Additionally, the High Court's discharge of bail bonds for the acquitted respondents was noted. The Supreme Court allowed the respondents to file fresh bail applications within four weeks. It clarified that its order did not express any opinion on the case merits and urged the High Court to expedite the appeals' hearing and disposal within six months.
The Supreme Court directed that if any appeal had abated due to the death of an accused, the State should inform the High Court for appropriate action. The appeals were disposed of, and the original records were to be returned to the High Court promptly.
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2013 (1) TMI 1022
Issues involved: Challenge against orders passed u/s 200A of the I.T. Act, 1961 by the CIT(A)-XXX, New Delhi for different quarters of the assessment year 2011-012.
Summary: The department's appeals were directed against the orders passed u/s 200A of the I.T. Act, 1961 by the CIT(A)-XXX, New Delhi. The Ld.DR argued that there is no provision u/s 246A of the Act for filing a first appeal against the order passed u/s 200A before the CIT(A). The Ld.AR of the assessee contended that the rectification order had been passed and necessary appeal effect had been given, thus supporting the CIT(A)'s order. The Ld.DR presented a similar issue before various benches of ITAT, Delhi, citing a precedent where the ITAT accepted the department's plea. After hearing both sides, the Tribunal found that the Ld.CIT(A) could not have given any direction as no appeal is provided u/s 246A against the intimation issued u/s 200A. Therefore, the directions issued by the Ld.CIT(A) were expunged from the order. Following the precedent, the Tribunal accepted the appeals of the Revenue for statistical purposes, concluding that all three appeals filed by the department were accepted.
The order pronounced on 31.01.2013 by the Appellate Tribunal ITAT DELHI, with the citation 2013 (1) TMI 1022 - ITAT DELHI, accepted the department's appeals against the orders passed u/s 200A of the I.T. Act, 1961 by the CIT(A)-XXX, New Delhi for different quarters of the assessment year 2011-012.
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2013 (1) TMI 1021
Issues involved: Interpretation of partnership deed for payment of remuneration to partners u/s 40(b)(v) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Summary: The appeal arose from the order of the CIT(A), Jalandhar, for the assessment year 2007-08, where the AO disallowed remuneration to partners claimed by the assessee based on the partnership deed clause and CBDT Circular No.739. The assessee contended that the remuneration was specified and quantified in the deed, satisfying the conditions u/s 40(b)(v).
Before the CIT(A), the assessee's explanation was rejected, and the action of the AO was confirmed based on the Circular. However, the ITAT Amritsar held that the assessee had indeed laid down the manner of quantifying the remuneration, directing the AO to delete the addition made. The appeal was allowed, emphasizing compliance with the Circular's conditions.
The ITAT noted that the Circular required either specifying the remuneration amount or quantifying it, which the assessee had done. Relying on various court decisions, the ITAT concluded that the AO and CIT(A) misinterpreted the Circular and unjustly disallowed the claim, as the partnership deed clearly outlined the remuneration amount. Consequently, all grounds of the assessee were allowed, and the appeal was granted in favor of the assessee.
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2013 (1) TMI 1020
Issues Involved: 1. Limitation of the Claim 2. Termination of the MOU 3. Quantum Meruit
Summary:
1. Limitation of the Claim: The Petitioner challenged the arbitral award dated 12 November 2009 u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, on the ground that the claim was barred by the law of limitation. The Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the claim was barred by limitation since the expenditure was incurred prior to 18 April 2001. The Petitioner argued that the MOU was terminated on 20 December 2002, and the arbitration was invoked on 25 June 2005, thus within the limitation period. However, the Tribunal found that the termination occurred on 26 December 2001, making the claim time-barred.
2. Termination of the MOU: The Tribunal held that the MOU was terminated by the Petitioner's letter dated 26 December 2001, which demanded reimbursement of Rs. 4.4 Crores. The Petitioner contended that the termination was effective from 20 December 2002, but the Tribunal found that the letter of 20 December 2002 merely reiterated the termination and demand made in the letter of 26 December 2001. The Tribunal noted that the demand for interest from 26 December 2001 indicated the understanding of both parties that the MOU was terminated on that date.
3. Quantum Meruit: The Tribunal also addressed the principle of quantum meruit, concluding that the claim was barred by limitation. The Petitioner had incurred expenditure on pre-project activities before 18 April 2001, and the Tribunal found no basis to recover these costs due to the limitation period. The Tribunal emphasized that monetary claims are governed by the law of limitation, and the Petitioner's claim was not recoverable for this reason.
Conclusion: The High Court dismissed the Petition, upholding the Tribunal's findings that the claim was barred by limitation and that the MOU was terminated on 26 December 2001. The Court found no merit in the Petitioner's arguments and ruled that the claim for reimbursement of pre-project expenditure was time-barred. There was no order as to costs.
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2013 (1) TMI 1019
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 44(1)(c) of the Insurance Act, 1948 regarding entitlement to commission on renewal premiums after resigning as an agent and joining a competitive company.
Summary: The petitioner, a former Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) agent, resigned and joined another life insurance agency, 'SBI Life', seeking commission on renewal premiums from LIC. LIC denied the commission citing Section 44(1)(c) of the Insurance Act. The respondent argued that under Section 44(1)(c), an agent who resigns after serving for at least 10 years and joins a competitive company is not entitled to renewal commission. The court referred to previous judgments supporting this interpretation.
Proviso (c) to Section 44(1) states that an agent is not entitled to renewal commission if they have served the insurer for at least 10 years and then join a competitive company without soliciting insurance business for any other person. The court emphasized that the obligation to pay commission is statutorily recognized under Section 44(1) and is part of a statutory contract, not unconstitutional. The court held that the restriction imposed by proviso (c) is reasonable and not illegal, thus dismissing the writ petition.
In conclusion, the court upheld LIC's decision to deny the petitioner commission on renewal premiums based on the provisions of Section 44(1)(c) of the Insurance Act.
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2013 (1) TMI 1018
The High Court of Bombay heard a case regarding the taxation of transportation fees received by an assessee from M/s. Menio Worldwide Forwarding (India) Pvt. Ltd. The court admitted the case based on the substantial question of law related to whether the transportation fee is taxable as fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) in India.
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2013 (1) TMI 1017
Issues involved: Redemption of compulsory convertible debentures (CCDs), repayment terms, reconciliation of interest amounts, payment of future interest, seeking directions from the court, compliance with settlement terms, filing of undertakings and affidavits, stay on impugned notices, communication with bankers, keeping Expression of Interest in abeyance.
Redemption of CCDs: The CCDs with a face value of Rs. 10 Lakhs issued to the respondent for Rs. 100 Crores will be redeemed. A repayment plan is agreed upon where Rs. 100 Crores will be repaid in three instalments: Rs. 10 Crores by 15.03.2013, Rs. 15 Crores by 20.04.2013, and the balance of Rs. 75 Crores by 30.06.2013.
Reconciliation of Interest: The accrued interest due as of 15.01.2013 is disputed between the parties, with the respondent claiming Rs. 4.34 Crores and the petitioner acknowledging Rs. 1 Crore. The parties agree to reconcile the difference, with the petitioner paying the admitted amount of Rs. 1 Crore within a week.
Payment of Future Interest: Future interest on sums payable for CCD redemption will be paid as per the subscription agreement terms. The interest will be paid on due dates specified in the agreement.
Seeking Court Directions: Parties will jointly approach the Single Judge to adjourn proceedings of OMP 1087/2012 until settlement terms are met. The interim order regarding the petitioner's immovable properties will be varied to allow usage for generating funds subject to specified conditions.
Compliance and Filing: The Managing Director will file an undertaking with the court to comply with the settlement terms. Promoters will file an affidavit accompanied by a Board resolution ratifying the settlement terms within a week, with copies provided to the respondent.
Stay on Notices: Impugned notices dated 11.01.2013 and 17.01.2013 will remain stayed due to the settlement agreement between the parties.
Communication with Bankers: Respondent will inform mentioned bankers about the court's order and the settlement with the petitioner. A copy of the order will be furnished to the bankers.
Expression of Interest: The Expression of Interest dated 16.01.2013 for the sale of equity shares will be kept in abeyance until further court orders.
Conclusion: The writ petition is disposed of with the agreed terms, and necessary documents will be filed and shared as per the settlement requirements.
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2013 (1) TMI 1016
Issues involved: Appeal against the order of Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) registering the assessee Trust u/s 12AA of the I.T. Act as Public Religious Trust.
Summary: The assessee Trust, formed as a Public Charitable Trust, applied for registration u/s 12AA of the Act. The Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) initially rejected the application citing one object clause promoting God consciousness. The Tribunal directed registration based on the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court. The Tribunal clarified that the law does not disqualify trusts with religious purposes from applying for registration u/s 12AA. The Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) subsequently granted registration as a Public Religious Trust. The assessee contended that the Tribunal had directed registration only as a Public Charitable Trust, not a Religious Trust. The Tribunal, following the High Court decision, directed the modification of the registration to Public Charitable Trust, as originally intended.
In conclusion, the appeal of the assessee was allowed, and the Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) was directed to modify the registration to grant status as a Public Charitable Trust.
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2013 (1) TMI 1015
Issues Involved: Disallowance of expenses under section 14A of the Income tax Act, 1961 in relation to exempt income.
Dispute Raised by AO: The AO disallowed expenses under section 14A for exempt income earned by the assessee from personal investment and trading shares.
Assessee's Submission: The assessee maintained separate accounts for personal investments and trading activities, arguing that no expenses were incurred for personal investments and that trading shares' dividend income was incidental.
CIT(A) Decision: CIT(A) upheld the disallowance for trading shares but deleted the disallowance for personal investments, citing no expenses incurred and separate accounts maintained.
Assessee's Appeal: The assessee contended that no disallowance should be made for trading shares' dividend income as per section 14A.
Legal References: The assessee cited the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka in CCI vs. JCIT and a Tribunal decision in DCIT vs. M/s. India Advantage Securities Ltd.
Tribunal Decision: The Tribunal found that no disallowance could be made for expenses related to dividend income from trading shares, following the High Court's judgment.
Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, deleting the disallowance for trading shares and upholding the deletion of disallowance for personal investments. The revenue's appeal was dismissed.
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2013 (1) TMI 1014
Issues Involved: 1. Interference in Appeal against Acquittal 2. Analysis of Evidence and Witness Testimonies 3. Delay in Filing FIR 4. Motive and Recovery of Weapons
Summary:
Interference in Appeal against Acquittal: The trial court acquitted the accused based on the evidence presented. However, the High Court reversed this decision, convicting the accused u/s 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court, as the first appellate court, has the authority to reappreciate evidence and interfere with an acquittal if there is an "absolute assurance of the guilt" based on the evidence. The court cited precedents emphasizing that an appellate court must find "compelling and substantial reasons" to overturn an acquittal and that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by an acquittal.
Analysis of Evidence and Witness Testimonies: The prosecution relied on the complaint (Exh.P-1) and testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 4, and 5. PW-1, the father-in-law of the deceased, provided a detailed account of the incident and identified the weapons used. Despite being related to the deceased, his testimony was deemed credible. PW-4, although hostile at one stage, corroborated the events described by PW-1 and PW-5. PW-5's testimony aligned with PW-1's account, and both witnesses confirmed the timeline and actions of the accused. The medical evidence provided by Dr. Tmt. Bhanumathi (PW-2) supported the prosecution's timeline and the nature of injuries inflicted on the deceased.
Delay in Filing FIR: The defense argued that there was a delay in filing the FIR. However, the Supreme Court found that the FIR was registered promptly at 08:00 hours on the day of the incident, and the Magistrate received it by 02:00 p.m. the same day. The court accepted the explanation provided by the police constable (PW-9) regarding the timing and process of delivering the FIR to the Magistrate, concluding that there was no undue delay.
Motive and Recovery of Weapons: The motive for the crime, as stated by PW-1, was the deceased's solicitation of A-2's wife. The court addressed the absence of blood stains on the recovered weapons and clothing, attributing it to the passage of time and environmental factors. The recovery of these items was deemed credible despite the lack of blood evidence.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, agreeing that the trial court had erred in its assessment of the evidence. The High Court's thorough analysis and reliance on credible witness testimonies justified the reversal of the acquittal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and life sentence of the accused were affirmed.
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2013 (1) TMI 1013
Issues involved: Appeal against addition of cash deposits in bank account u/s 68 of the Income Tax Act.
Details of the judgment:
1. The assessing officer added an amount of Rs. 30,33,000 as unexplained cash credits under S.68 of the Act, based on deposits in the bank account. The assessee, an individual and Director of a company, explained that the deposits were from earlier withdrawals. However, the CIT(A) rejected this explanation, noting lack of proper reasons for withdrawals and deposits, and absence of maintained books of account. The addition was confirmed, leading to the appeal.
2. The assessee contended that the assessing officer's calculation of Rs. 30,33,000 was incorrect, as only Rs. 29,75,000 was deposited in the bank account. Legal principles were cited to argue against the addition under S.68. The Departmental Representative supported the assessing officer's decision, stating inadequate explanation by the assessee.
3. The Tribunal found discrepancies in the assessing officer's calculation and lack of consideration for withdrawals from another bank account. The matter should have been remanded for proper examination. The source of deposits needed fresh assessment, including verification of all bank accounts, previous withdrawals, possible expenditures, and any running account in the company. The assessing officer was directed to reevaluate the explanation provided by the assessee and consider all relevant facts before deciding on any warranted addition.
4. The appeal of the assessee was allowed for statistical purposes, and the issue of unexplained cash deposits was remanded to the assessing officer for reexamination in accordance with the Tribunal's directions.
Order pronounced in the Court on 11.1.2013.
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2013 (1) TMI 1012
Issues Involved: 1. Deletion of addition u/s 40a(ia) for TDS not deposited within due date. 2. Deletion of addition for disallowing interest charged. 3. Reopening of assessment u/s 147. 4. Sustaining addition of Rs. 2,67,300/- for TDS not deducted.
Summary:
Issue 1: Deletion of addition u/s 40a(ia) for TDS not deposited within due date The CIT(A) deleted the addition of Rs. 11,53,378/- by holding that the payment was for capital expenditure and not covered u/s 40a(ia). The Tribunal upheld this decision, noting that the assessee deposited the entire TDS before the last due date for filing the return. The Tribunal referenced the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Shri Jawahar Lal, which held that the amendment to Section 40a(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010, was retrospective from 1.4.2005. Therefore, no disallowance was warranted as the TDS was paid before the due date for filing the return.
Issue 2: Deletion of addition for disallowing interest charged The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance of Rs. 10,94,314/- for bank charges and finance charges, holding that these were revenue expenditures incurred after the commencement of production and were allowable u/s 36(i)(iii). The Tribunal agreed, stating that such expenses are revenue in nature and allowable u/s 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Issue 3: Reopening of assessment u/s 147 The assessee challenged the reopening of the assessment u/s 147. The Tribunal found that the Assessing Officer had recorded detailed reasons for reopening the assessment and upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to maintain the reassessment proceedings.
Issue 4: Sustaining addition of Rs. 2,67,300/- for TDS not deducted The CIT(A) sustained the addition of Rs. 2,67,300/- for payments on which TDS was not deducted and which pertained to revenue expenditure. The Tribunal, however, noted that since the entire amount of TDS was deposited before the last date of filing the return, no disallowance was warranted. Consequently, the CIT(A) was not justified in sustaining the addition of Rs. 2,67,300/-.
Conclusion: The appeal filed by the Revenue was dismissed, while the cross objection by the assessee was allowed in part. The order was pronounced in the open court on 14th January, 2013.
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2013 (1) TMI 1011
Issues Involved:1. Deletion of addition by restricting the deduction claimed u/s 54F of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 2. Benefit of indexation from 01.04.1981 instead of the Year 1984-85. Summary:Issue 1: Deletion of Addition by Restricting Deduction Claimed u/s 54FDuring assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer noticed that the assessee sold 60% share of a property for Rs. 5,40,54,000/- and claimed deduction u/s 54F by purchasing another property. The new property was registered in the joint name of the assessee and her husband. The Assessing Officer restricted the deduction to 50% as the husband's name was included in the registry. On appeal, the Ld. CIT(A) found that the property devolved on the appellant due to HUF partition and had been assessed under the Wealth Tax Act for over 25 years. The Ld. CIT(A) held that the inclusion of the husband's name was irrelevant as the consideration was invested in the new property. The Tribunal upheld this view, stating that the assessee was entitled to 100% deduction u/s 54F, as the entire consideration was paid by the assessee, and the inclusion of the husband's name did not alter the situation. Issue 2: Benefit of Indexation from 01.04.1981The Assessing Officer allowed the benefit of indexation from 1985, the year the property was inherited. On appeal, the Ld. CIT(A) accepted the appeal based on the decision of the Special Bench in DCIT Vs Manjula J. Shah, which held that for computing long-term capital gain, the indexed cost of acquisition should be computed with reference to the year the previous owner first held the asset. The Tribunal confirmed the order of Ld. CIT(A), stating that the property was purchased by the previous owner in 1968-69, and thus, the benefit of indexation from 01.04.1981 was appropriate. Conclusion:In the result, Revenue's appeal was dismissed, and the order of Ld. CIT(A) was confirmed in both issues. Order Pronounced in the Open Court on 18.01.2013.
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2013 (1) TMI 1010
Issues Involved:
1. Deletion of penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act. 2. Wrong grouping of expenses. 3. Non-payment of entry tax. 4. Provision for unpaid bonus. 5. Short term capital gain. 6. Non-deduction of tax at source on freight payment. 7. Applicability of judicial precedents.
Summary:
1. Deletion of Penalty Imposed u/s 271(1)(c) of the I.T. Act: The Revenue appealed against the deletion of a Rs. 21 lakh penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer (AO) u/s 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The CIT(A) had deleted the penalty, concluding that the assessee admitted its liability without objection and agreed to the addition.
2. Wrong Grouping of Expenses: The assessee admitted to a mistake due to wrong grouping of expenses under "rates and taxes," which led to an oversight in adding back Rs. 24,25,973/- to the income. The AO found that this mistake was detected during assessment proceedings, and the assessee agreed to the addition only after detection.
3. Non-payment of Entry Tax: The AO found that the assessee did not pay entry tax amounting to Rs. 31,94,466/- and disallowed it u/s 43B. The assessee admitted the liability but claimed it was due to a dispute with the Sales Tax Department.
4. Provision for Unpaid Bonus: The assessee made a provision for unpaid bonus of Rs. 4,85,000/- but did not pay it by the due date of filing the return. The AO added this amount to the total income as it was not paid within the statutory period u/s 43B read with 36(1)(ii).
5. Short Term Capital Gain: The AO found discrepancies in the investment details and added Rs. 4,394/- as short term capital gain, which the assessee agreed to after detection.
6. Non-deduction of Tax at Source on Freight Payment: The assessee admitted to not deducting tax on freight payments, resulting in an addition of Rs. 77,308/-.
7. Applicability of Judicial Precedents: The CIT(A) relied on decisions in CIT vs. Dharampal Premchand Ltd. and Reliance Petro Products Pvt. Ltd. to delete the penalty. However, the Tribunal found these cases inapplicable as they involved wrong claims rather than furnishing inaccurate particulars. The Tribunal also distinguished the case from Price Water House Coopers Pvt. Ltd., noting that the assessee in the present case did not file a revised return or establish bona fide intentions.
Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the assessee deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars with the intention to conceal income, and the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) was justified. The appeal of the Revenue was allowed, and the cross-objection of the assessee was dismissed as infructuous.
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2013 (1) TMI 1009
Issues Involved: 1. Taxation of Rental Charges on Bottles and Crates 2. Applicability of Section 5E of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 3. Applicability of Section 6C of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957 4. Applicability of Section 6 of the AP VAT Act, 2005
Summary:
1. Taxation of Rental Charges on Bottles and Crates: The primary issue was whether the rental charges collected by the manufacturer from the distributors/wholesalers for bottles and crates should be treated as part of the sale price of the soft drinks or as compensation for the transfer of possession thereof for a limited period, assessable u/s 5E of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The Tribunal held that the manufacturers collected deposits for bottles and crates, which were returned by the end customers, and these deposits were merely for security. The Tribunal concluded that the segregation of rental charges from the sale price was a colorable device to avoid tax, and therefore, the entire amount should be taxed as part of the sale price of the soft drinks.
2. Applicability of Section 5E of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957: The Tribunal's decision was challenged on the grounds that there was a transfer of the right to use the bottles and crates, making it assessable u/s 5E of the Act. The High Court found that the bottle is used only for storing the contents (soft drinks) and must be returned to the manufacturer, indicating a transfer of the right to use. Therefore, the rental charges should be taxed u/s 5E of the Act.
3. Applicability of Section 6C of the AP General Sales Tax Act, 1957: Section 6C of the Act states that the rate of tax on packing material sold with the goods shall be the same as that of the goods packed or filled. The High Court observed that this section applies only if the packing material is sold with the goods. Since the bottles are returned to the manufacturer, Section 6C does not apply in this case.
4. Applicability of Section 6 of the AP VAT Act, 2005: For the period April to July 2005, the assessing officer under the AP VAT Act, 2005, taxed the entire turnover, including rental charges for bottles and crates, at 12.5%. The High Court held that the bottles and crates constitute packing material, and such turnover is liable to be taxed at 4% u/s 4(8) of the AP VAT Act, 2005, r/w Item No.90 of Schedule-IV. The assessing officer's view that the total consideration, including both categories, should be taxed at 12.5% was incorrect.
Conclusion: The High Court allowed the TREVCs and writ petitions, setting aside the Tribunal's order and the assessment orders under the AP VAT Act, 2005. The High Court restrained the respondents from taking any action contrary to its decision. No costs were awarded.
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