|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 1237 Records
-
2014 (3) TMI 1201
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - Defective notice u/s 274 - manadation of obtaining prior approval - As per assessee AO has not obtained requisite prior approval of the Joint Commissioner before passing any order imposing penalty under Chapter XXI - HELD THAT:- In this case, the A.O. was mandatorily required to obtain prior approval for imposing penalty from the JCIT, but it has not been obtained from the JCIT. Therefore, the impugned penalty has been imposed in violation of the mandatory requirement of the Act.
We cannot borrow the argument of the ld. D.R. that it does not matter if the prior approval has been obtained from the JCIT because approval has been obtained from the Additional CIT. The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the case of Brij Mohan [1979 (8) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT] has held that the competence of jurisdiction of authority to initiate penalty proceedings could be governed only by law which was in force on the date of initiation of such proceedings. In this regard, the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Varkey Chacko [1993 (8) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] is also relevant. It does not make any difference if the assessee takes any legal issue in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Be that as it may, in this case, penalty has been imposed without obtaining prior approval of the JCIT, therefore, this penalty order is not a legal order in the eyes of law and is null and void. Therefore, we quash the penalty order in question.
We have also satisfied ourselves that the provisions of sections 292B and 292BB would not cure the jurisdictional defect. However, the A.O. is at liberty to initiate penalty proceedings as per section 274 of the Act, but further subject to the limitation provisions of section 275 of the Act. We may clarify that the A.O. cannot calculate limitation from the date of this order but has to calculate it from the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 19.10.2006. From that order, the imposition of penalty would have been barred.
We allow this legal ground of the assessee’s appeal.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1200
Revision u/s 263 by CIT - Deduction u/s 10A - full benefit of section 10A for a total period of 10 assessment years - Assessee submitted that the period of 8 years, as applicable to it, commenced from assessment year 1995-96. Thus, under the normal circumstances, the benefit u/s. 10A was available to us till assessment year 2002-03 - Argument of the assessee that the order of the Assessing Officer has merged with the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and was no longer amenable to revision u/s. 263 - HELD THAT:- In the present case admittedly, the question as to the number of years for which the assessee was entitled for deduction u/s. 10A was not a matter that was considered and decided in the appeal preferred by the assessee against the order of the Assessing Officer. Even the question as to whether the income from staffing was to be regarded as eligible for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, was not a matter of consideration and decision in the appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The Legislature was fully conscious of the fact that the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in an appeal against the order of assessment has powers of enhancement and that power can be exercised to tax income which the Assessing Officer has expressly or by clear implication considered and held to be not taxable.
The language used in Explanation (c) to section 263(1) is "power shall extend to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal". If either in the normal course or in exercise of powers of enhancement by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), in an appeal against the order of assessment, a matter has not been considered or decided, then the power of CIT u/s. 263 shall extend to such matters. There can be no question of the merger of the order of the Assessing Officer with that of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) so as to bar exercise of jurisdiction by the CIT u/s. 263 of the Act.
The decisions relied upon by the learned DR support the plea that different facets of a deduction in particular provisions of the Act can be considered in proceedings u/s. 263 of the Act as long as they had not been considered by the Assessing Officer or the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). According to us, the preponderance of judicial opinion is in favour of the stand taken by the Revenue. We may also hold that the powers u/s. 263 is to safeguard the interests of Revenue. It is a supervisory power which is coupled with fulfilment of two conditions for exercise of such power, namely erroneous order and such order being prejudicial to the interests of Revenue. Any interpretation placed on the section has to be to further the purpose for which it is enacted.
How to reckon the period of 10 consecutive assessment years in the case of the Assessee? - In the case of the Assessee for AYs 1995-96 to 1997-98 the Assessee could not get the benefit of deduction u/s. 10A of the Act, may be due to absence of profits or by exercise of its option to choose the following 5 years to claim deduction u/s. 10A as per the law as it existed then. According to the law as it existed upto AY 2000-01 the Assessee could have claimed deduction only upto AY 2002-03 the end of the 8 year period from 1995-96. The Assessee claimed deduction u/s. 10A for AYs 1998-99 to 2001-02. The Assessee opted out of the provisions of Sec. 10A of the Act by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 10A(8) of the Act which gives such opting out to an Assessee for AYs 2002-03 to 2004-05. In the case of the Assessee, the band of 10 years as per the amended law would be from 1995-96 to 2004-05 only. As rightly held by the CIT opting out of the provisions of Sec. 10A will not have the effect of extending the band period of 10 years.
Assessee could thus get the benefit of the amended law applicable from AY 2001-02 only for 2 more years viz,, A.Ys. 2003-04 & 2004-05. As rightly held by the CIT in the impugned order, the amendment, in the case of the Assessee, had the effect of only extending the period by 2 more years. As rightly held by the CIT the provision for opting out of the provisions of Sec. 10A of the Act is intended to facilitate an Assessee who can get more benefit under any other provisions of the deduction under Chapter VIA of the Act. That provision cannot extend the period of benefit beyond 10 years from the previous year relevant to Assessment year in which the Assessee begins to manufacture or produce articles or things.
We also find that the CIT has not dealt with the argument of the Assessee that the period of 10 years have to be reckoned by considering the 10 different units of the STPI of the Assessee as given in the annexure to this order. This submission is without any basis as the Assessee has always been treating the units as one industrial undertaking and claiming deduction.
Whether income from staffing can be said to be income eligible for deduction u/s. 10A of the Act.? - The question of examining the same in our view would be academic as the Assessee is found to be not entitled to deduction u/s. 10A. Nevertheless, we find that the AO while concluding the assessment made no enquiries whatsoever on this aspect. Therefore exercise of jurisdiction u/s. 263 of the Act was justified. The further direction to the AO to examine the agreements and thereafter decide the issue afresh, in our view, is also a fair direction, calling for no interference. - Thus we uphold the order u/s. 263 of the Act and dismiss the appeal by the Assessee.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1199
Interest received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on enhanced compensation - Whether was not part of compensation but liable to tax under the head ‘Income from other sources’? - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute to the fact that the enhanced compensation is awarded by the Additional District Judged vide his order dated 14.03.2008 under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, as has been affirmed by the AO in his order reproduced hereinabove. It is also not under dispute that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of CIT vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) [2009 (7) TMI 12 - SUPREME COURT] has laid down that the amount received under section 28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas interest u/s 34 is only for delay in making payment after compensation.
In the present case, the amount is received u/s 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and therefore, according to us this is a compensation and cannot take part of the compensation u/s 45(5) and is exempt u/s 10(37) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in confirming the action of the A.O. we direct the A.O. to delete the addition made. Thus, all the grounds of the assessee are allowed.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1198
Addition u/s 69A - unexplained money - sale proceeds from the transaction of shares amounts to LTCG and STCG - Substantial question of law - HELD THAT:- On perusal of the orders impugned in those appeals and finding that substantial questions of law arise for consideration and determination by this court in the instant appeal, the same is ADMITTED. The substantial questions of law which arise for determination are as under -
i] Whether the additions made by the AO u/s 69A to the taxable income of assessee, is just and proper ?
[ii] Whether the sale proceeds from the transaction of shares amounts to LTCG and STCG when the assessee himself had voluntarily admitted to pay the taxes on the additional income ?
Hearing expedited.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1197
Dishonor of Cheque - condonation of delay in presenting the appeal - Section 143 of N.I. Act - HELD THAT:- The accused has already appeared before the trial Court and enlarged on bail under Section 436 of Cr.P.C. It is urged before this Court, that the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is bad in law unless Section 142 application is allowed. In the event of the Magistrate coming to the conclusion that no substantial ground is made out for condoning the delay of the threshold itself, the complaint can be dismissed. Therefore, such opportunity was lost so far as accused is concerned. Even if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the said application has to be considered, after providing opportunity to the accused, then also the Magistrate can take cognizance by means of mentioning in the order that the consideration of the application is deferred after appearance of the accused. But such order has not been passed by the learned Magistrate.
The Magistrate has committed a serious error in not considering the application under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Act, at the initial stage. Therefore, though it is an irregularity, but, in my opinion, it is not the curable defect. Because of the simple reason, that if the Magistrate for any reason does not condone the delay in filing the complaint, it stand result in dismissal of the complaint - it is just and necessary to remit the matter to the Magistrate to consider the said application first and then pass appropriate orders, if necessary.
The matter stands remitted to the JMFC IV Court, Belgaum, with a direction that the Magistrate either has to pass orders on the application filed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act or if the Magistrate is of the opinion that application has to be disposed of after appearance of the accused specifically passing such order, Magistrate can proceed against such accused persons.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1196
Validity of assessment order - initiation of recovery proceedings - petitioner's only apprehension is that recovery proceedings will be initiated as per the order since the petitioner has been directed to pay the amounts determined as per the order within seven days of the order - HELD THAT:- The order is dated 17.2.2014 and has been despatched on 20.2.2014 which has been received by the petitioner on 26.2.2014 - As per the provisions of the EPF Act, an appeal is provided which remedy has to be availed of within sixty days or if delay occurs, within another sixty days.
In the circumstances of an appeal having been provided for against Ext.P4 order under the EPF Act and the period having not yet expired, the petitioner definitely cannot be proceeded against in the intervening period. In such circumstances, there shall be an interdiction in proceeding with recovery proceedings under Ext.P4 order for a period of sixty days from 26.2.2014. The petitioner, if so advised, can approach the appropriate authority and then, the recovery shall be subject to final order or interim order to be passed by the concerned authority.
Petition disposed off.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1195
Stay for recovery of demand and removal of provisional attachment u/s 281B - modify our interim order dated 26th September, 2013, in particular clause (1) and (3) thereof and permit and allow sale of assets by Nokia India to Microsoft/Microsoft International subject to fulfilment of the following conditions - HELD THAT:- SLP dismissed.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1194
Validity of assessment u/s 153A/153C - HELD THAT:- Issue notice. Notice is accepted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of all the respondents. The counter affidavit be filed within six weeks. The rejoinder affidavit, if necessary, be filed within two weeks thereafter.
Renotify on 14.07.2014. In the meanwhile, the assessments may be concluded and orders may be passed, however, the same shall be subject to final orders in these writ petitions.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1193
Gain on sale of land - nature of land sold - Agricultural land v/s capital asset - whether the land sold by the assessee is agricultural land and exempt from capital gain tax? - assessee claimed that the subject land sold to KSIDC is agricultural land, therefore, the gain / income cannot be treated as capital gain within the meaning of section 2(14) read with section 45? - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute land sold by the assessee is actually used for agricultural purpose / activities. The land was a rubber estate and the assessee used the land for agricultural operation till the date of sale this Tribunal is of the considered opinion that the subject land is an agricultural land. Therefore, as found by the Madras High Court in the case of M.S. Srinivasa Naicker & Ors [2007 (1) TMI 149 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] the subject land is not a capital asset within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Act; hence, the assessee is not liable for capital gain tax. - Decided against revenue.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1192
Offence of forgery and misappropriation - HELD THAT:- The stand, which has been taken by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that since no file of the Department had been seized by the Income Tax Authority, the question of committing offence of forgery and misappropriation doest not gets attracted. Accordingly, that part of the order dated 16/04/2010, under which cognizance of the offence under Sections 467, 468, 469, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, has been taken, is hereby set aside.
So far the cognizance under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is concerned, I need not to make any comment at this stage in view of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner on earlier occasion that he will not be pressing this issue, rather he will be pressing the same at an appropriate stage.
Application disposed off.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1191
High Court jurisdiction u/s 260A - assessee submitted that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and determine the appeal because the appeal is against an order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore - HELD THAT:- Section 260A provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order passed by the appellate tribunal. The appellate tribunals are located in every State except those cases where an appellate tribunal may have been entrusted with the jurisdiction of more than one State. The word “High Court” used in Section 260A has to be understood in the light of the Section 269 quoted above, which provides that “High Court” means, in relation to any State, the High Court for that State. There can be no dispute that High Court in relation to the State of Karnataka, where the appellate tribunal is situated, which delivered the impugned judgment and order, is the High Court of that State.
Under Section 260A, orders passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal are appealable to the High Court on a substantial question of law. Sub-section 1 of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted above, permits a second appeal from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question. When Section 260A and Section 269 of the Income Tax Act are read in conjunction with Section 100(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the answer is irresistible that the appeal shall lie only before the Karnataka High Court and not before this Court.
Considering the view we have taken, this appeal cannot be heard. Mr. Dudharia submitted that in that case an order should be passed in the same line as was done in the case of J.L. Morrison [2004 (6) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] granting adequate opportunity to the appellant to present the appeal before the jurisdictional High Court. This prayer of Mr. Dudharia was not objected to by Mr. Bajoria.
The appellant is as such granted liberty to present the appeal before the appropriate Court within six weeks from date.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1190
Discrimnation taking place or not - Case of the Review petitioner is that after publication of the result, the last date for submission of DPE certificate was fixed as 30.7.2009 and the petitioner submitted DPE certificate on 3.8.2009 in the office of the JPSC and inspite of submission of certificate of passing DPE examination, his case was not considered - HELD THAT:- The four candidates appeared in the examination of the Diploma in Primary Education in June 2008, much prior to the date of the JPSC examination held on 10.11.2008, but the review petitioner appeared for the examination of the Diploma in Primary Education only in December 2008, subsequent to the JPSC examination and therefore, the review petitioner cannot contend that he is similarly placed as that of the aforesaid four candidates and that he has been discriminated.
The contention raised by the review petitioner is that four candidates whose names have been recommended have submitted their DPE certificate on 1.10.2009, long after the extended date, i.e. 30.7.2009. Of course, all the above candidates have submitted their DPE certificates on 1.10.2009. Since those candidates were already selected, perhaps the JPSC had chosen to receive provisional DPE certificates submitted by those candidates on 1.10.2009. We are of the view that it does not amount to any discrimination.
Assuming that the appointment of those four candidates have been wrongly made, that does not confer any right upon the review petitioner to seek for appointment. In the case of STATE OF U.P. AND ORS. VERSUS RAJKUMAR SHARMA AND ORS. [2006 (3) TMI 798 - SUPREME COURT], Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if any appointment has been made by mistake or wrongly, that does not confer any right on another person and Article 14 does not envisage negative equality and if the State committed the mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the same mistake.
The order does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record, warranting review of the order - review application is dismissed.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1189
Seeking disposal of revision petition - HELD THAT:- Since we are disposing of the revision petition, without admitting the same, with liberty to the petitioner-State to proceed in accordance with law only after disposal of the S.L.Ps. pending in the Supreme Court, we are not issuing notice to the respondent.
Revision petition disposed off.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1188
Disallowance u/s 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D -CIT-A deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- The impugned Assessment Year is 2007-2008. The jurisdictional High Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. 2011 (11) TMI 267 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has laid down that Rule 8D would apply only from the AY 2009-10. Thus the order of the Ld.CIT(A) on this count is hereby upheld.
Disallowance of product development expenses on the ground that the same is deferred revenue expenditure - only ground of disallowance is that the assessee has got an enduring benefit for a period of 3 years - HELD THAT:- Undisputed fact is that the expenditure in question is incurred for preparation of samples as per requirement of foreign buyers.The assessee company dealing with the wide range of buyers for apparels, home furnishings and other accessories. It has a separate dedicated product team, working to create new designs in style. Prototype designs are developed and sent to different buyers - As decided in MAX INDIA LTD. [2006 (6) TMI 422 - ITAT AMRITSAR] the expenses incurred by the assessee for improving and developing new varieties of films were not capital in nature since these did dnot pertain to extension of its business nor there was any ;change in the installed capacity. Also, the expenses were donot subject to section 35D of the Act as they were allowable u/s 37(1) of the Act even if the assessee had amortised these expenses in its books of accounts - claim of the appellant for allowability of impugned expenditure as revenue expenditure is justified - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1187
Revision u/s 263 - AO failed to verify the applicability of section 194C as well as Section 40(a)(ia) - assessee has taken the contention that M/s. Motibagh Industries Pvt. Ltd is assessed to tax paid on due income but the Commissioner was of the view that M/s Motibagh Industries has paid the tax is not relevant for applicable of Section 40(a)(ia) - HELD THAT:- We find that Section 40 (a)(ia) of the Act is applicable for non deduction of TDS on the expenditure as per the specified under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, determines the disallow-ability of any expenditure. Consequently, if the assessee can establish that payee has paid tax and filed the return of income before the due date, the expenditure by the assessee shall be allowed in spite of the fact that tax has not been deducted on the same.
The memorandum explaining the Finance Act, 2012 also states, “In order to rationalize the provisions of disallowance on account of non-deduction of tax from the payments made to a resident payee, it is proposed to amend section 40 40(a)(ia) to provide that where an assessee makes payment of the nature specified in the said section to a resident payee without deduction of tax and is not deemed to be an assessee in default under section 201(1) on account of payment of taxes by the payee, then, for the purpose of allowing deduction of such sum, it shall be deemed that the assessee has deducted and paid the tax on such sum on the date of furnishing of return of income by the resident payee.” Then there will be no disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act.
Therefore, we are of the view that the payee has also paid the tax, therefore, we are of the view that there cannot be any disallowance U/s.40(a)(ia) of the Act - when the Commissioner has taken view that this amount has to be added as income U/s 40(a)(ia). As per documents filed by the assessee, it is verified and found that the payee to whom the payments is made i.e. M/s. Motibgh Industries has accounted this amount in his profit and loss account. M/s. Motibagh Industries is assessed to tax. M/s. Motibagh Industries has already accounted the amount of ₹ 3245797/- in its profit and loss account and paid the tax. We find that M/s. Motibagh Industires, the payee, is assessed to tax and paid the tax before due date of his return.
As per section 201(1), if the assessee has not deducted the tax but if the payee has furnished his return of income u/s 139 and has taken the amount of sum for computing the income in such return of income and has paid the tax on his income declared by him in such return of income and furnished certificate to this effect from an accountant in such form as may be prescribed, then, assessee will not be regarded as in default. In the instant case the payee has already paid the tax, and the assessee has produced the evidence before us. Therefore, we are of the view that there cannot be disallowance U/s. 40(a)(ia). - Decided in favour of assessee.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1186
Computation of deduction u/s. 10A / 10B - Exclusion of Telecommunication Charges and expenditure in foreign Currency from export turnover - CIT-A directed AO to exclude the telecommunication expenses Chennai unit - II and Bangalore strategic business Unit from the total turnover as well - HELD THAT:- Whatever was argued by the assessee in the relevant grounds before the CIT(A stands accepted. In other words, there is no justification on assessee’s part to raise the grounds in question before the ‘tribunal’. The purpose of reproducing the entire relevant portion of the CIT(A)’s order is to support our observations that there is no relevant argument which remains to be accepted. The assessee raises no plea before us that the relevant arguments were either not considered or accepted by the CIT(A). In these circumstances, we find these grounds to be entirely misconceived. The same are accordingly rejected.
Disallowance u/s 14A r.w.r.8D - is if at all section 14A is held applicable; whether or not the impugned disallowance can be computed under rule 8D which was notified on 24.3.2008? - HELD THAT:- We draw support from the order of the Chennai ‘tribunal’ in TVS Investments Ltd. [2013 (1) TMI 786 - ITAT CHENNAI] to hold that rule 8D could not have been invoked for computing the disallowance from 1.4.2007 to 23.3.2008 inspite of being applicable with effect from assessment year 2008-09. That being the case, we proceed to make disallowance u/s 14A by ‘reasonable’ computation and deem it fit that lumpsum disallowance of ₹ 35 lakhs would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the assessee’s arguments are partly accepted.
Disallowance/addition of expenditure incurred towards current repairs - HELD THAT:- As in assessment year 2004-05, this issue had arisen in assessee’s own case which was remanded back to the AO. On a query being put up by the bench, it informs us that the Assessing Officer is yet to pass consequential order. In these circumstances, by following the order of the ‘tribunal’ for assessment year 2004-05, we restore this issue also to the file of AO for decision afresh after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. This ground is accepted for statistical purposes.
Disallowance of capitalization of software expenses - HELD THAT:- As the assessee submits that the authorities below have wrongly capitalized the impugned software expenditure. In support, it has neither filed any cogent evidence nor case law against the special bench decision in Amway India Enterprises [2008 (2) TMI 454 - ITAT DELHI-C] - the impugned capitalization cannot be interfered with on mere asking. Accordingly, we affirm the findings of the CIT(A) in capitalizing the software expenses.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1185
Suppressed turnover - turnover difference - treating the excess receipts credited in form 26AS as undisclosed incomedifference between the turnover shown in the books of accounts and turnover reflected in Form No.26AS generated from AST system of ITD application - plea of the assessee is that only net profit is to be considered at 8%.- HELD THAT:- Assessee failed to establish that the corresponding expenditure relating to this turnover has not at all been booked in its books of accounts. The assessee’s plea can be accepted only if the corresponding expenditure relating to this turnover is not at all booked by the assessee in its books of account.
Since the assessee failed to substantiate that the expenditure relating to this turnover has not at all been claimed in its regular books of accounts, we are not inclined to allow the same.
Corresponding expenditure relating to this suppressed turnover has already been booked by the assessee, the entire undisclosed turnover is to be considered as income of the assessee. Decided against assessee.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1184
Collection of closure compensation - HELD THAT:- The petitioner by this writ petition seeks confirmation of permanent status with respondent no.4 council - Issue notice to the respondents via ordinary post and approved courier.
List on 16.05.2014.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1183
Bogus payment to sister concerns - as argued commission paid to assessee’s sister concern was already offered for taxation - AO doubted the commission paid on the ground that the assessee has been changing its stand frequently - HELD THAT:- There was nothing on record that the assessee has taken help of its sister concern. Even assuming that the assessee paid ₹ 25,00,000/-, when the Assessing Officer has asked the nature of payment, it has changed the stand and submitted that it was not commission and it was only an interest.
When the AO has asked the assessee that it had already paid advance to sister concern M/s. ICMC Corporation Ltd. and why no interest was charged to that advance, the assessee has not given any explanation before the Assessing Officer or before the ld. CIT(Appeals) and even before the Tribunal. The assessee had changed its stand and bifurcated the amount of ₹ 25,00,000/- with various expenses.
The assessee has not explained as to how it has bifurcated without giving any proper explanation. Simply because the sister concern had offered ₹ 25,00,000/- to tax, on that basis, the assessee cannot escape tax liability, particularly when the sister concern has not paid any tax by filing ‘NIL’ return. We are of the opinion that the assessee has failed to discharge its burden cast upon it that the payment of ₹ 25,00,000/- is a genuine payment. Therefore, the appeal filed by the assessee stands dismissed.
-
2014 (3) TMI 1182
Grant of letters of administration issued by this Court - title in respect of the property of a deceased - section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 - HELD THAT:- In catena of decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, it is held that a party who has no caveatable interest or even a slightest interest in the property of the deceased and a party who claims interest adverse to the interest of the deceased testator cannot maintain a caveat. The Testamentary Court does not decide the title in respect of the property of a deceased. But insofar as the claim of the petitioners that they have interest in some of the properties which were the subject-matter of the petition for letters of administration and those letters of administration could not have been granted is concerned, in my view, this Court cannot decide such an issue of title in this petition for revocation nor has decided the issue of title in the petition filed for letters of administration by the respondent. Such issues can be adjudicated by a Civil Court.
On a conjoint reading of 'just cause' described in Clauses (b) and (c) of section 263 of the Act, it is clear that if a grant is obtained fraudulently by making a false suggestion or by concealing from this Court something material to the case or the grant is obtained by means of an untrue allegation of fact essential in point of law to justify the grant, though such allegation was made in ignorance or inadvertently, such grant can be revoked on such just cause described in the explanation to section 263.
The whole premise of obtaining the letters of administration was that the deceased died intestate and had not left any Will and on that ground the petition for letters of administration came to be filed - letters of administration granted by this Court in favour of the respondent in Testamentary Petition is revoked - respondent is directed to surrender the original of such letters of administration in the office of the Prothonotary and Senior Master of this Court within two weeks from today - petitions are disposed of with costs, quantified at ₹ 25,000/-.
........
|
9911796707
