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Showing 41 to 60 of 1428 Records
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2015 (7) TMI 1395 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Validity of summary suit - deficiencies in supply of material for which the plaintiffs issued credit notes - suppression of any material fact or not - HELD THAT:- The defendants have admitted in their reconciliation statement attached to their email dated 7.11.2012 that a sum of ₹ 9,75,88,621/- is payable to the plaintiffs. In the letter of 1.2.2013 from the defendants' Advocate to the plaintiffs' Advocate, the defendants in any event admit that sum of ₹ 3,83,12,035/is payable. Therefore, the plaintiffs should in any event be entitled to summary decree for ₹ 3,83,12,035/-.
As regards the balance amount of ₹ 2,92,76,586/and ₹ 3,00,00,000/, there is no evidence that the goods were substandard or there were even discussion with the plaintiffs. There is also nothing on record to show that the defendants brought to the notice of the plaintiffs goods worth ₹ 3 crore was lying unutilized and the plaintiffs had agreed to take it back. The defendants don't even mention where these goods are and how they valued it out ₹ 3 crores (approximately). In the circumstances, the defence raised by the defendants in my view, are bogus, illusionary and moonshine.
Interest - HELD THAT:- The invoices raised does provide interest @ 30% p.a. and therefore, the defendants are also entitled to the contractual rate of interest upto the date of filing of the suit.
Application disposed off.
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2015 (7) TMI 1394 - ITAT KOLKATA
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - protective addition - HELD THAT:- Revenue has not initiated any substantive assessment or no addition has been made on substantive basis in any other hand, there is no question of any protective assessment in the present case from the reasons recorded by the AO as reproduced herein above. We are of the view that the AO has initiated re-assessment proceedings u/s 147/148 of the Act on the basis of the statement of one of the directors of the assessee company that the transactions in the hands of the other parties are not accounted for and this may be the income of the assessee. The revenue could not bring on record anything against the other parties or who are the other parties against whom substantive addition is to be made. There is no substantive addition made in any of the hand till date as conceded by the ld. Sr.DR before us now. In view of the above we are very clear that the re-assessment proceedings initiated u/s 147/148 of the Act is invalid and hence quashed. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (7) TMI 1393 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Money Laundering - recording the statement for examining the documents mentioned in schedule attached to the summons issued to the petitioner - section 50(2) of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- By consent, it is decided that the officers of Enforcement Directorate will visit the residential place of petitioner on 30th July, 2015 at 11.00 a.m. and record her statement, if any and may examine the documents as stated in the schedule. This shall not be construed as a direction of the court. This is arrangement by consent for change in the date, time and venue of the summons.
Petition stands disposed off.
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2015 (7) TMI 1392 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - insufficiency of funds - rebuttal of presumption - material defence of the first respondent was that the cheque does not bear her signature - Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the appellant had retired from the school when various advances of the amounts from June 2006 is said to be made to the first respondent on a specious ground that the first respondent was known to the appellant, as she was the husband of the headmaster of the school, where the appellant was earlier serving. It has come in the evidence of PW1 that there was no business transaction as such between the appellant and the first respondent and for the matter of that, between the appellant and Avdhuth Kakodkar, the husband of the first respondent. It is not even the case that Avdhuth Kakodkar had at any time approached the appellant with a request for financial accommodation - It is really difficult to accept that the appellant would advance these amounts without there being anything in writing and without there being any agreement to pay interest and particularly, when on his own saying, he continued to advance the amount, although the amounts paid earlier, were not repaid.
One of the material circumstances to be established in a prosecution of the present nature is that the cheque should have been shown to be issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The existence of such a promissory note by the first respondent was a material circumstance and would have found place in the notice as well as the complaint. However, that is lacking.
It is trite that presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act can arise only where the signature is admitted. In the present case, it appears from the cross-examination of PW1 that the first respondent had disputed her signature on the cheque. It cannot be gainsaid that the first respondent had not made any attempt to get the documents examined. The fact remains that the appellant had himself made an application for sending the document to the forensic laboratory - the observations herein pertain to the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, and the issues which arise thereunder. If the appellant has taken recourse to any other legal remedy for recovery of the amount, the same shall be decided on its own merits, without being influenced by any of the observations herein.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1391 - ITAT HYDERABAD
Deduction u/s 80IA towards O&M - profits derived from Kakinada port, Jamnagar port and Dahei port thought the assessee did not enter into an agreement for operation and maintenance of infrastructure facility with the Central Government/State Government/Local Authority/Statutory Authority - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case [2012 (6) TMI 912 - ITAT HYDERABAD] issue relating to claim of deduction in respect of Jamnagar, Kakinada and Dahej ports are decided in favour of assessee, hence, do not require any more deliberation. The order of ld. CIT(A) in allowing deduction to assessee u/s 80IA in respect of Jamnagar, Kakinada and Dahej ports being in consonance with the view expressed by ITAT in assessee’s own case, we do not find any infirmity in the order.
As far as Nagapattinam port is concerned, on perusal of the certificate issued by the Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd., a copy of which is at page 68 of the paper book, it is evident that assessee has entered into contract with CPCL for O&M of the port. Therefore, the allegation of the AO that assessee is not engaged in operation and maintenance activity is without any basis. It is further observed that AO while denying assessee’s claim of deduction has observed that nature of work carried out by assessee cannot be considered as O&M.
The activities carried on by assessee being in the nature of O&M of infrastructure facility, it is eligible for deduction u/s 80IA(4). Though the aforesaid observation of ITAT is in respect of Jamnagar, Kakinada and Dahej ports, but, since the facts in relation to other ports are also more or less similar, these observations of ITAT will also apply to the other ports in respect of which assessee has claimed of deduction u/s 80iA. In fact, in the assessment order, AO himself has stated that there is no change in the activity of assessee from AY 2000-01 onwards. Therefore, there being no material change either in the facts relating to assessee’s claim of deduction u/s 80IA or the nature of activity of the assessee in the impugned assessment year, the decisions of the coordinate benches on the issue in assessee’s own case would squarely apply.
As far as AY 2010-11 is concerned, the issue is more or less identical, except, the fact that assessee has claimed deduction u/s 80IA for the first time in respect of Karaikal port being operated by Karaikal Port company Pvt. Ltd. In this regard, assessee has submitted a certificate from the port authority certifying that they have entered into an agreement with assessee for O&M of the port. That being the case, the decision rendered in respect of AY 2009-10 equally applies to the facts of the present case. - Revenue appeal dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1390 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Priority claimed by the DICGC over the depositors, creditors (secured and unsecured creditors), workmen and government dues, with respect to the amount paid by them to the concerned depositors paid under Regulations 1961 - Regulation 22 of the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation General Regulations, 1961 - HELD THAT:- The concerned depositor/s in the present case, petitioner of Special Civil Application No.7617 of 2009 (Letters Patent Appeal No.2458 of 2009), Shri Ambaji Mata Devasthan Trust, in whose favour there is a decree passed by the competent Court is/are concerned, they can be said to be the unsecured creditors only and, even if they are permitted to proceed further with the execution proceedings to execute their respective decree/awards in their favour, in that case also, the concerned liquidator (who can be said to be a debtor and against whom the decree/award is passed) can be permitted to make the payment and satisfaction of the decree/award only after the official liquidator makes necessary provisions for the expenses in relation to the liquidation proceedings and for declaration of the dividend and thereafter makes payment to the DICGC as observed herein above and only thereafter, if any excess amount is there with the official liquidator of the concerned Bank in liquidation, the same can be directed to be paid to the concerned decree holder/in whose favour the award is passed. However, that too subject to the priority as provided under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act.
The sum and substance of the above shall be that the DICGC shall be entitled to the first preference over the payment/amount available with the concerned official liquidator of the concerned bank in liquidation. However, after making necessary provisions by the official liquidator, for the expenses in relation to the liquidation proceedings and for declaration of dividend.
The impugned common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No.4260 of 2009, Special Civil Application No.7617 of 2009 and Special Civil Application No.6978 of 2009 are hereby quashed and set aside - the Letters Patent Appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent by directing the concerned official liquidator of the concerned Bank in liquidation to make the payment first to DICGC i.e. the amount which is paid by DICGC to the concerned depositor/s to the extent of ₹ 1 Lac each, however after making necessary provisions for the expenses in relation to the liquidation proceedings and for declaration of dividend.
Appeal disposed off.
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2015 (7) TMI 1389 - SUPREME COURT
Seeking settlement of statutory claims of the depositors - duty of the Corporation to disburse the amount guaranteed among the depositors or not - Winding up proceedings - HELD THAT:- The object with which the Act has been enacted has been stated hereinabove in a nutshell. The object was to insure the depositors so that they may not have to stand in a queue before the Official Liquidator for every paisa deposited by them with the concerned bank. As on today, as per the provisions of Section 16(1) of the Act, a sum of ₹ 1 lakh is being insured or guaranteed in respect of each depositor. So a depositor is safe and he has not to wash his hands off his deposit if the amount deposited by him is less than ₹ 1 lakh. The Official Liquidator, as per the provisions of the Act, has to give details about the depositors and the amount deposited by them in a prescribed form within three months from the date on which the liquidation order is passed or from the day on which he takes charge, whichever is later and within two months from the date on which the details are submitted to the Corporation, the Corporation has to make payment to the above extent either to the depositors directly or to them through the Official Liquidator.
As per the above-referred Scheme, each depositor, including each original petitioner, must have received ₹ 1 lakh from the Official Liquidator. Initially, upon the bank being ordered to be wound-up, the original petitioners and other depositors had a right to recover ₹ 1 lakh or the amount deposited, whichever was less, from the Official Liquidator and the said amount must had been paid to them when the petitions were filed.
Regulation 22 also provides that the Official Liquidator, after making necessary provision for the expenses in relation to the liquidation proceedings and for declaration of dividend, as prescribed in the Regulations, has to make payment to the Corporation - the High Court should not have given the direction which, if complied with, would run contrary to the statutory provisions incorporated in the Act.
Even if one looks at the entire issue from different point of view, one would believe that all the depositors have by and large equal right. If the amount deposited is less than ₹ 1 lakh, each depositor gets the amount in full, but if the deposit is exceeding ₹ 1 lakh, then only the amount which is in excess of ₹ 1 lakh may not be given to the depositor, unless the bank in liquidation is having sufficient funds which can be given to all on pro-rata basis after providing for expenditure in the liquidation proceedings and after repaying the amount to the Corporation as per the provisions of the Act. The Act in a way guarantees repayment of ₹ 1 lakh to each depositor. The High Court or any other authority has no power to direct payment in excess of ₹ 1 lakh by ignoring statutory provisions of the Act and the Regulations made thereunder.
The High Court had exceeded its authority while giving a direction to the Official Liquidator, which is not in consonance with the statutory provisions - appeal allowed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1388 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Application for cancellation of bail - attempt to murder - change in the circumstance or not - HELD THAT:- As per prosecution both prosecutrix and respondent No.2 were Face Book friends. On 22/05/2013, prosecutrix had been to Aurangabad in connection with the marriage of her relative. It is the further case of the prosecution that at Aurangabad, prosecutrix met respondent No. 2. Sum and substance of the F.I.R. is that after having a coffee, while they were going by car, respondent No. 2 started touching private parts of the prosecutrix and also gave his private part in her hand. Though the prosecutrix resisted such obnoxious act of respondent No. 2, on the point of knife he extended threat to kill her.
The filing of the charge sheet subsequent to the rejection of the first bail application would operate as change in the circumstance, by which the accused can press his prayer for liberty on the evaluation of the material placed in the charge sheet by the prosecution.
Though it is the prerogative of the Investigating Officer to file such documents along with charge sheet, however, at the same time, it is expected from the prosecution and from the Investigating Officer to place all material on record, which came in his possession during investigation. The investigation should be impartial. It should not have tendency to take the side of either party. Learned trial Court has considered all these text messages, text chats in between the prosecutrix and respondent No. 2. Merely because those were not forming part and parcel of the charge sheet, Court can not be prevented from looking to such material which was available with the Investigating Officer and for the reasons best known to the investigating agency, it does not form the part and parcel of the charge sheet. Grant or refusal of bail deals with the personal liberty - while deciding the liberty of a person, who is languishing in jail, it is appropriate on the part of the Court to consider every material brought before the Court, if its authenticity is not doubted.
Further, it is not the case of the prosecution or the applicant that after releasing respondent No. 2 on bail, he has misused the liberty.
Application dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1387 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Seeking direction to respondent No.2 to produce before the Court and handover to the petitioner all the records and proceedings of the complaints - mala fide alleged by the petitioner against respondent No.2 - HELD THAT:- ECIR is an internal document of Enforcement Directorate and unlike FIR, it is not a public document. Hence the copy of the same cannot be furnished to the petitioner as of right. The investigation is at the preliminary stage and granting the reliefs as prayed for, would hamper the investigation. We are, therefore, not inclined to issue directions as sought or to furnish the details of the FIR.
It is also pertinent to note that the schedule to the summons requires the petitioner to give 1) details of recent foreign visits; 2) copies of passport since 2000; 3) bank account details- domestic and overseas and 4)Pan number. The summons/schedule, therefore, gives a fair idea of the nature of interrogation as well as the documents required by the agency for the purpose of investigation.
Mala fide alleged by the petitioner against respondent No. 2 - HELD THAT:- There are no substance inasmuch as, the petitioner's husband was arrested in pursuance of the warrant issued by the Court and the nature of the proceedings in which he was arrested were different from the proceedings in the present case.
Application disposed off.
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2015 (7) TMI 1386 - ITAT JAIPUR
Allowable business expenditure - contribution made to ‘Sparsh Trust’ - disallowance of claim as assessee failed to prove direct business nexus and it is not an allowable expenditure u/s 37(1) - CIT (A) allowed the claim of the payments to “Sparsh Trust” relying on ITAT’s order in assessee’s own case [2012 (3) TMI 586 - ITAT JAIPUR]. HELD THAT:- Since the issue in question is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the ITAT judgment in its own case, especially following the same, we uphold the order of ld. CIT (A). Thus Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
Disallowance being contribution made to rehabilitation fund - HELD THAT:- We fund merit in the alternative contention of ld. Counsel for the assessee. In view of the fact that assessee created a separate Rehabilitation Trust which is registered under section 12AA of the IT Act and in the case of RCDF on these facts the claim has been allowed in A.Y. 2010-11, we set aside the matter to decide the same afresh in accordance with law after giving assessee an opportunity of being heard.
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2015 (7) TMI 1385 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Benami transaction - benami ownership of the plaintiff over the suit property taken by the defendant in his written statement - right of coparcener in the Hindu Undivided Family - suit for permanent and mandatory injunction and mesne profits in the year 2010 against Mr. Anil Gulati (brother of her late husband) in respect of suit property - as pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of a registered Gift Deed dated September 03, 1984 executed by her father Late Sh.K.B.Midha - HELD THAT:- The exception contained in Section 4(3)(a) of the Act restricts its benefit only to property held by a "coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family" as opposed to any "Member" of such family. It is so, because coparceners are recognized by law to jointly by birth inherit rights in the joint property of the family property and in the event such property stands in one of their names for the benefit of others, the Benami Act is declared to not come in the way. Such benefit however cannot be extended to all/any members of such family who do not have any vested right in the property and to whom such property devolves in their independent/separate capacity by way of intestate succession under the Hindu Succession Act.
We repeat, the plaintiff, being the daughter-in-law of the family is not a coparcener in the Hindu Undivided Family of Late Sh.Krishan Lal Gulati. In view of the fact that requisite (ii) noted above is not fulfilled, exception contained in Section 4(3)(a) of the Act has no application in the instant case.
Plea of benami ownership contained in Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - The pleadings made in the written statement by the defendant have been noted by us in great extenso in the foregoing paragraphs. There is not even a whisper in the entire written statement that the "plaintiff in whose name the suit property is held is a trustee or was otherwise standing in a fiduciary capacity towards the defendant and suit property was held by the plaintiff for benefit of defendant for whom she is the trustee or towards whom she stands in a fiduciary capacity".
In view of the fact that there are no averments in the written statement to bring the defence raised by the defendant within the exception provided by clause (b) of sub-Section 3 of Section 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, we concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that Section 4(3)(b) of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 does not save the defence raised by the defendant from being barred in law.
Revisiting the averments made in the written statement, we find that the defendant pleads that his father (father-in-law of the plaintiff) had purchased the plot over which the suit property is constructed from the father of the plaintiff and thereafter raised construction over the plot from his own funds and that of joint family business. The defendant further pleads that various decisions were taken regarding distribution of joint family properties between the members of family, one such decision being that Amrit Gulati, the husband of the plaintiff, through his wife i.e. the plaintiff shall be the owner of the ground floor of the suit property while the defendant shall be the owner of the first and second floors of the suit property.
Who took the decisions: All the family members or only some? Where were the decisions taken? On what day, month or year were the decisions taken? Nothing has been pleaded. The averments in the written statement are as vague as vagueness can be.
The written statement filed by the defendant lacks in material particulars and it has to be held that the so-called pleadings relating to an oral family settlement being arrived at between the parties contained in the written statement are no pleadings in the eyes of law. From the afore-noted decisions, it can be safely culled out that a vague plea, sans the particulars thereof, would be no plea in the eyes of law and no issue can be settled between the parties in relation thereto and no trial is warranted - Instant appeal is held to be devoid of any merit and is thus dismissed with costs against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
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2015 (7) TMI 1384 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Vacation of order of attachment - property which the petitioner has purchased in auction under the proceedings under SARFAESI Act - refusal on the part of the Village Officer to effect mutation of the property - attachments were subsequent to the date of mortgage - HELD THAT:- The case put forward by the petitioner squarely falls within the law laid down by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Madhan v. Sub Registrar [2014 (1) TMI 1905 - KERALA HIGH COURT] where it was held that The preponderance of judicial opinion leads to the irresistible conclusion that the sale of the mortgaged property in favour of the petitioner under Ext.P5 sale certificate under the Act is free of all encumbrances. The attachments effected subsequent to the mortgage created in favour of the bank do not affect the title and ownership of the petitioner over the subject property. Such attachments have no impact on the sale conducted under the Act and the same ceases to have any effect or fall to the ground the moment the sale is confirmed in favour of the petitioner.
The appellants are entitled for a similar order - the attachments effected by the Munsiff Court, Thrissur after the date of mortgage are declared invalid and there will be a direction to the Sub Registrar and the Village Officer to efface the attachments effected after 08/07/2008 in their registers.
Appeal allowed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1383 - SC ORDER
Deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) - Loan or advance received - as per HC no loan or advance was granted to the assessee, since the amount had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the book of account of the assessee - The fact that there was defalcation had been accepted since this amount was allowed as business loss - Even assuming that it was a dividend, it would have to be taxed not in the hand of the assessee but in the hands of the shareholder - HELD THAT:- Leave grated.
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2015 (7) TMI 1382 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Levy of Differential charges - change in the constitution of the company or not - petitioner claims the change to be Formal Transfer - HELD THAT:- Since in the instant matter, transfer of share holding to the extent of more than 51% does not amount to formal transfer, MIDC is entitled to claim differential premium. If petitioner is not willing to deposit differential premium and does not abide by the notice, MIDC may take appropriate steps as deemed fit in consonance with the lease agreement and relevant rules and regulations.
Reliance is placed on judgment in the matter of UP. STATE INDUSTRIAL DEV. CORPN. LTD. VERSUS MONSANTO MANUFACTURES (P.) LTD. & ANR. [2015 (4) TMI 846 - SUPREME COURT]. The matter was taken up to the Supreme Court in identical circumstances whereunder U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation directed levy of amount on account of transfer of interest in the property by the lessee in favour of different company.
No interference is called for in the instant matter - Writ petition is devoid of substance hence stands dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1381 - ITAT CHANDIGARH
Additions u/s 68 on account of unsecured loan - HELD THAT:- In the case of loan from Champa Lal Baid, the assessee has filed a copy of the acknowledgment of return, copy of the bank statement of assessee as well as affidavit. The TDS on interest has also been deducted. This person has issued a cheque from the bank account. The immediate source of cheque is receipt of cheques stated to be receipt of loan from another party - Thus this sum cannot be added to the income of the assessee because the depositor is a regular Income-tax assessee. The money was deposited in cheques in his bank and the Revenue cannot investigate the source of source.
The second loan was taken from Shri Parkash Joshi onus to prove the creditworthiness of depositor was on the assessee which has not been properly discharged. In this background, in our opinion, the loan from Shri Parkash Joshi cannot be accepted.
Similarly in respect of loan from Shri Chandra Kanta Joshi, if the loan of ₹ 5 lakhs from Shri Champa Lal Baid should have been accepted and other two loans are required to be added to the income of the assessee. We uphold the order of Ld. CIT(A) in respect of Parkash Joshi and Shri Chandra Kanta Joshi and confirm the addition on account of loan for ₹ 2,50,000/- each. However, we set aside the order of Ld. CIT(A) partly by deleing the addition in the case of Champa Lal Baid. Assessee appeal is partly allowed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1380 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
Maintainability of appeal - non-compliance with regard to pre-deposit under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - Commission Agent - HELD THAT:- If the Appellant was a Commission Agent and for that reason it had been granted complete waiver of pre-deposit on similar allegations, there had to be some justification for differential treatment in the order dated 22-1-2014. This was a fundamental aspect for justice not only to be done but also to appear to have been done.
The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for consideration both on the issue of undue hardship pleaded and also the aspect for complete waiver of pre-deposit granted to it in similar circumstances considering its status as a Commission Agent - appeal allowed by way of remand.
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2015 (7) TMI 1379 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - maintainability of petition in the absence of notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the petitioner - HELD THAT:- Making of a demand by giving a notice is sina-qua-non and it is only thereafter that the complainant can be maintained, that too after it is proved that the notice of such demand was served or deemed to have been served upon the sendee.
Offences by the company has been separately dealt with under Section 141 of the "Act", which essentially means that the offences committed by the company is different from the once which have been committed by its employees. In such situation the company is deemed to be the principal offender and the remaining persons are made offenders by virtue of legal fiction created by the legislature as per the Section, hence the actual offence should have been committed by the company. If that was so, then the notice as mandatorily required under Section 138 ought to have been served upon the company, but in the instant case undisputedly the notice has been served only upon its incharge and authorized signatory Sh. Vijay Kumar.
The learned trial Magistrate has failed to take into consideration this distinction, which vitiate the entire proceedings as the Company can only be tried, in case there is a notice served upon it, that too after satisfying the provisions of Section 141(1) of the Act, but the Company in no event can be prosecuted in absence of a legal and valid notice to this effect as envisaged under the Act - the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate on the basis of complaint case under NIA Act is quashed for want of legal and valid notice.
Petition allowed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1378 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Dismissing or discharging the workman from her service - entitlement to rbe einstated with full back wages and benefits or not - HELD THAT:- The reference has been answered in favour of the petitioner by holding her dismissal to be illegal and directing her reinstatement. Petitioner wants higher wages to be paid to her by the management. The reference was made to the learned Labour Court on two issues, firstly, whether management was justified in dismissing the workman and secondly, if it was not held to be so then whether the workman was entitled to be reinstated with full back wages. It goes without saying that the Labour Court while deciding a reference has to confine its adjudication to the issues referred to it by the appropriate Govt. It cannot deviate from the issues referred to and decide an issue, which is not referred to it for adjudication. It cannot enlarge the scope of the reference. Claim of higher wages by the petitioner was not an issue referred to for adjudication before the learned Labour Court by the appropriate Govt.
It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that if such a decision is given effect to, it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice. Therefore, on this ground, the claim of the petitioner cannot be entertained.
The prayer made by the petitioner seeking a direction to the appropriate Govt. to modify the award by exercising the power under section 17A of the Act is wholly untenable inasmuch as the said provision has been held to be unconstitutional and unenforceable - Petition dismissed.
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2015 (7) TMI 1377 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Liability to Income tax under Article 289 of the Constitution of India - Appeal admitted on the following substantial questions of law:
“(a) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the cases and in law, the Tribunal was right in its interpretation of Articles 289(1)(2)(3) of the Constitution in coming to the conclusion that the company was not exigible to tax?
(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the cases and in law, the Tribunal is justified in coming to the conclusion that the company was an agent of government and therefore not exigible to tax?
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2015 (7) TMI 1376 - ITAT BANGALORE
Disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) - shortfall in deduction of tax at source - HELD THAT:- Respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in the case of S.K. Tekriwal [2011 (10) TMI 10 - ITAT, KOLKATA] which is factually similar to the case on hand, we hold that no disallowance can be made by invoking the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act if there was any shortfall in deduction of tax at source due to any difference of understanding or opinion as to the taxability of any item or the nature of payments falling under various TDS provisions and therefore reverse the findings of the authorities below and allow the assessee's appeal.
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