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Showing 41 to 60 of 663 Records
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2004 (8) TMI 735 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... llegality, irregularity or impropriety to interfere in this revision. 7-A. The learned Counsel for applicants placed reliance on a judgment passed by Delhi High Court in R.K. Goenka v. Collector of Customs (supra). In this judgment, the judgment of Supreme Court passed in Assistant Collector of Customs (supra) has been considered and also accepted the legal proposition propounded by Supreme Court in this judgment but relying on some other judgments, it quashed the proceedings on the ground that the accused persons were exonerated from the charges under Income Tax Act by the Tribunal which was final fact finding authority under the Act. Such are not the facts in the case on hand. In view of the aforesaid legal and factual discussion, no case is made out for quashing the charge framed by the Court below. Therefore, this revision is dismissed. As a consequence thereof M.Cr.C. No. 3121/2003 for stay has become infructuous and the same also stands dismissed as become infructuous.
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2004 (8) TMI 734 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on frivolous grounds. No irreparable loss/injury would be caused to the plaintiff if in terms of the arbitration clause it participates in the arbitral proceedings at London. The present suit and application for injunction are abuse of process of law by a party which after taking advantage under a contract is trying to scuttle arbitral proceedings initiated by the other party strictly in terms of contract. The plaintiff's application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure is, Therefore, dismissed. The defendant's application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 read with Section 151 CPC is allowed and interim injunction dated 2nd April, 2003, is vacated. 24. The defendant's application under Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is allowed and the parties are referred to the arbitral Tribunal which already stands constituted. 25. Further proceedings in this suit are stayed. 26. Suit as well as IAs stand disposed of.
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2004 (8) TMI 733 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ubstantial question of law. Even otherwise, the finding of the High Court on question no. 3 cannot be sustained when such a case did not arise for consideration in the absence of necessary pleading in the plaint in that regard. More so when the case of the plaintiff was based clearly on title said to have been derived under Exbt. A-2. Under the circumstances and in the light of what is stated above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside except the direction given to the Wakf Board to act under Section 63 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and the suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed. In other words, the direction given by the High Court to the Wakf Board to exercise power under Section 63 of the Wakf Act, 1995 is maintained. In case any of the parties wants to challenge that the property in question is not a wakf property, it is open to such party to seek appropriate remedy in accordance with law. No costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 732 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... necessary for the purchaser to show is that he was ready and willing to fulfil the terms of the agreement; that he had not abandoned the contract; that he had kept the contract subsisting. Applying the above tests to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the Courts below were right in their conclusion; that the respondent was always ready and willing to comply with his obligations under the contract. In the circumstances, the Courts below were right in decreeing the suit for specific performance. Before concluding, it may be pointed out that under the impugned judgment, the respondent was ordered to deposit ₹ 75,000/- payable under the second installment within eight weeks from 17.6.2000. If the aforestated amount has been so deposited, the appellants herein would be entitled to withdraw the same with interest, if any. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in this civil appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 731 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e should be on the date of application. It cannot be on the date when the orders are passed because if the DDA does not pass any orders that would not mean that because of such delay applicant would suffer. This application is, therefore, disposed of with the following directions The respondent-DDA shall calculate unearned increase on the basis of application dated 2.7.1985, a copy whereof is furnished by the applicant along with affidavit dated 8.8.2002 and taking into consideration the pre-fixed market rate as on that date, and not on the date of approval of mutation by the Competent Authority, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. The DDA shall, however, be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 p.a. on the said unearned increase from 2.7.1985 till the payment is made by the applicant. Necessary calculation shall be made within a period of four weeks and intimated to the applicant and applicant shall pay the amount as calculated within six weeks thereafter.
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2004 (8) TMI 730 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d that the benefit of G.O. is also available to the children born out of the void marriage. Our aforesaid view also receives support from the decision of the Apex Court in RAMESHWARI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR (2000)ILLJ1087SC . 7. The intention under the G.O. issued for employment on compassionate ground is to give protection to the members of the family of the deceased employee. By no stretch of imagination, it can be stated that the children born through the second wife, even though the second marriage is void, are not members of such family. Having regard to all these aspects, we quash the order passed by the Tribunal and quash the order of termination. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. It would be deemed that the petitioner is restored in service from 1.7.2002. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, she would be entitled to 50 of the wages for the aforesaid period. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. WPMP No.14658 of 2003 is closed.
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2004 (8) TMI 729 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the members of the patrolling party. The direction in which the shot from the revolver travelled and the details relating to other logistics are not forthcoming. On the strength of the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 it can only be said that they heard the sound of firing and then they retaliated. There was every possibility of the accused firing a shot aimlessly to scare away those who challenged him from a distance. Hence he is acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC. Of course, his acquittal for the offence under Section 307 does not make any difference as regards the sentence which the appellant has been subjected to under the NDPS Act. 15. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1143 of 2003 is dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 1144 of 2003 filed by Phuman Singh is allowed to the extent of setting aside the conviction under Section 307 IPC. Further, his conviction under section 22 of the ndps act is altered to one under Section 21 of the Act and the sentence shall remain the same.
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2004 (8) TMI 728 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the benefit of sec. 65 of the Evidence Act because the Bank has failed to come out with credible evidence about the loss of the original documents. We do not propose to go into these questions because these questions can be appropriately considered by the Appellate Tribunal in appeal filed against the final order that may be passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In case any adverse order is passed by the Debts Recovery tribunal against the respondents the respondents will be entitled to agitate all the issues in the appeal that would be filed against such order. ( 12. ) For the reasons stated above, we hold that the appeal filed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 before the appellate Tribunal was not maintainable. Accordingly, the impugned order of the Appellate tribunal dated 10th February, 2004 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No order as to costs. ( 13. ) On the request of respondent no. 1, operation of this order is stayed for a period of six weeks.
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2004 (8) TMI 727 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... even exhausted the exemption limit by 31.10.1986 and thereafter started collecting sales-tax from its customers and paid the same over to the State Government. By amending those eligibility/exemption certificates in the year 1990, what the respondents have done is to purport to give retrospective effect to those amendments and take away the benefits which were already vested in the petitioner. The respondents could not have done so without inviting the charge of arbitrariness and unfairness violative of the petitioner's fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to succeed. 7. The petition is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 5/6.3.1990 of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax, Surat (Annexure "A/3") and the impugned order dated 29.3.1990 (Annexure "A/2") issued by the Sales-tax Officer, Billimora are quashed and set aside. 8. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by the High Court. Such admission is not hit by either Section 25 or Section 26 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). The effect of such admission was a relevant factor. Additionally, the effect of Section 54 which raises presumption from possession has not been considered and on the contrary, burden has been placed on the prosecution and it has been held that prosecution was to establish that the possession was conscious. The effect of the evidence relating to dispatch of information to the superior authorities has also not been considered. In view of the unsatisfactory analsysis of evidence and erroneous approach to the statutory prescriptions, we consider this to be a fit case which needs to be adjudicated afresh by the High Court. We remit the matter to the High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law taking into account the evidence on record and applicable provisions of the governing statute. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2004 (8) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is essence of the benami transaction and the money must have bean provided by the party invoking the doctrine of benami. The evidence shows clearly that the original plaintiff did not have any justification for purchasing the property in the name of Ramayee Ammal. The reason given by him is not at all acceptable. The source of money is not at all traceable to the plaintiff. No person named in the plaint or anyone else was examined as a witness. The failure of the plaintiff to examine the relevant witnesses completely demolishes his case. Since the original plaintiff failed to prove that he had provided the money for the purchase of the land and the reasons why he purchased the property benami in the name of his wife, the High Court has come to the right conclusion that Ramayee Ammal did not hold the property as benami on behalf of her husband Malaya Gounder. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to several possible meanings it may be controlled by the proviso (See Jennings v. Kelly 1940 A.C. 206). The above position was noted in Ali M.K. & Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (2003 (4) SCALE 197). Though several documents were referred to contend that the intention of the employer was to exclude certain establishments, a bare perusal thereof shows that they have no relevance and do not in any way fulfill the requirements of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 47. It goes without saying that if a notification in this regard is issued by the appropriate Government the same shall be operative in respect of the establishment which is specifically exempted. That is not the position so far as the present case is concerned. Therefore, on the facts of the case, the order of the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment suffers from no infirmity to warrant our interference. The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 723 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... e appellant would file an application for rectification before the Tribunal. As prayed, the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn.
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2004 (8) TMI 722 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Officer has not bothered about this document may be because it has not been produced by the raiding party. Therefore, at this juncture we are not in a position to say anything about the responsibility of the person concerned for not producing the same. 6. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case we direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to examine the matter administratively and if panchanama dated 25-2-1997 was not placed before the Assessing Officer or before the Tribunal, the Commissioner shall examine the matter in greater detail and it is hoped that he shall take immediate action in the matter and shall file a report about the action taken within a period of three months from today. This appeal is disposed of. However, the same shall be listed after three months for considering the report. 7. List on 25th January, 2005. 8. In view of what is stated hereinabove ITA 134/2004 as well as ITA 13/2002 do not raise any substantial question of law and are dismissed.
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2004 (8) TMI 721 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... udges of their interest. But in the present case, parties accepted the price fixed by the State. They have no choice. Profit is a component for the determination of the price. This theory of price fixation was devised by the State in the interest of the Public. It is based on the price fixation mechanism of sugarcane followed in other countries. Just because profit is one of the component in ascertaining the price, it cannot be said that profit is separately distributed in the guise of additional price. The amount paid by the assessee Co-operatives to the sugarcane growers is consideration for the procurement of sugarcane. It cannot be construed to be appropriation of profits. In our opinion, it constitutes a charge on profits. 60. All the issues were not referred for the consideration of the Special Bench. Therefore, the Division Bench will decide the remaining issues. We direct the Registry to place these appeals before the Division Bench for deciding the remaining issues.
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2004 (8) TMI 720 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... or excise duty. That being so, they are nothing but part of the sales. Hence, they cannot be segregated from the manufacturing activity. It has been noticed a sun-refuted fact that the service charges were received from only very few concerns to whom manufactured items were supplied, and not others to whom manufactured items were not sold. Thus, services are inextricably linked with the manufacturing of furnace and boilers etc. These items without doubt, required technical expertise for preparing evaluation report, technical feasibility and planning report erecting and commissions etc. The disallowance made by the Assessing Officer falls under this category. Evidently, as discussed these services cannot be disentitled from the benefit of section80-IA as per the decision in the case of International Data Management Ltd (supra). That being so, the order of the learned CIT(A) is well reasoned and cannot be interfered with. It is upheld. 5. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2004 (8) TMI 719 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Section 78 (5) are established, after giving a hearing and complying with the principles of natural justice, there is no discretion not to levy or levy lesser amount of penalty." 12. So far as the question of taking advantage of its own wrong is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the penalty has to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and if it is after an unreasonable delay or contrary to law, or outside the purview of the statutory provisions, a person is well within his right to challenge the same. 13. In view, of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the respondent No. 2 was not justified in initiating proceedings for imposition of penalty under Section 15-A (1) (c) of the Act as there was unreasonable delay in commencing the proceedings. 14. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 31st March, 1993 is set aside. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 718 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... de that in the instant case, the action of the assessing officer in resorting to Explanation to section 73 is misconceived. Therefore, we reverse the orders of the lower authorities on this count and allow the ground of the assessee. 12. The third ground is with regard to the adoption of book profit in terms of section 115JA of the Act. 13. After hearing the rival counsels and perusing the orders of the lower authorities, we deem it fit and proper to remand this aspect of the matter back to the file of the assessing officer to compute the book profits of the assessee in terms of section 115JA afresh. To this extent, the assessee succeeds for statistical purposes. 14. Last ground is with regard to charging of interest which in our view is consequential in nature and, therefore, no interference is required from our side. The assessing officer is directed to recompute the same accordingly. 15. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed as indicated above.
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2004 (8) TMI 717 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aside the said assessment and assessee the said individual assessee in his capacity as AOP. 6. In our opinion, when on facts, the Tribunal came to a conclusion that for want of any conclusive evidence there was no basis for holding existence of AOP then in such event, no referable question of law is made out for answer by this Court in section 256(1) proceedings. The question, whether there is a material, or not for holding existence of AOP cannot be said to be a question of law for answer. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Punjab Cloth Stores v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 604 (Delhi) and Deccan Bharat Khandsari Sugar Factory v. CIT 1979 123 ITR 802 (AP) and contended that a question of law does arise in the case. We find no merit in this submission. The facts of the case do not justify that any question of law really arises. 8. We, therefore, find no merit in the case. Accordingly and in this view of the matter, the application fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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2004 (8) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decided in a trial. Therefore, in the facts of this case, it will be incorrect to come to the conclusion that by the amendment the plaintiff will be introducing a different relief. o p /o p We have already noted, hereinabove, that there is an arguable question whether the limitation applicable for seeking the relief of declaration on facts of this case falls under Entry 58 of the Limitation Act or under Entries 64 or 65 of the Limitation Act which question has to be decided in the trial, therefore, in our view, following the judgment of this Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John (supra), we set aside the impugned orders of the courts below, allow the amendment prayed for, direct the Trial Court to frame necessary issue in this regard and decide the said issue in accordance with law bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court in the case of L.J. Leach and Co. Ltd. & Anr. (supra). o p /o p For reasons stated above these appeals succeed and same are allowed. o p /o p
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