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2015 (2) TMI 1356
Demand of differential premium made by the first respondent to the petitioner as a condition for transfer of the said plot in the name of the petitioner - Involuntary transfer or not - formal or informal transfer - circular dated 12th May, 1998 - HELD THAT:- The circular incorporates transfer guidelines for the industrial and other plots. The said guidelines have been issued in super-session of all earlier guidelines. The said circular divides the transfers into two categories, formal transfers and non-formal transfers. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon clause 3 of the first part dealing with formal transfers - The said clause 3 applies to involuntary transfers including amalgamation, demergers etc. under the direction of the appropriate Court. In the present case, the said plot was put to auction and the petitioner has voluntarily opted to participate in bid. Therefore, clause 3 will not apply to the said transfer.
The case of the petitioner will not fall in the category of formal transfers.
Circular dated 12th December, 2011 - HELD THAT:- It is true that the said circular is issued by way of clarification to the circular dated 12th May, 1998. However, the said circular clearly records that the same will apply only to the applications for transfer received after 12th August, 2011 - In the present case, admittedly the application made by the petitioner was prior to the said date. It is true that in the letter dated 30th December 2013, there is a reference to the circular dated 12th November, 2011. However, it is merely stated therein that the said circular is by way of clarification. As stated earlier, the said clarification will apply prospectively and it cannot not be applied to the applications which were pending.
The demand for payment of 30% differential premium is strictly in terms of the policy reflected from the circular dated 12th May, 1998 - there is no no error in the demand made by the first respondent for payment of 30% differential premium as a condition for transfer - petition dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1355
Depreciation on road/bridge - assessee is in the business of development of infrastructural facilities and developed a bye-pass road / bridge in Coimbatore - HELD THAT:- We find that the ld. CIT(A) by following the decisions of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for the assessment years 2002-03 to 2004-05 & 2006-07 [2010 (11) TMI 1040 - ITAT CHENNAI] directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim of the assessee - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (2) TMI 1354
Constitutional Validity of Rule 159 of the High Court of Jharkhand Rules, 2001 - violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and provisions of Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act - Rule 6 of Order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 - HELD THAT:- It is well known practice that generally a revision against conviction and sentence is filed after an appeal is dismissed and the convicted person is taken into custody in Court itself. The object of the Rule is to ensure that a person who has been convicted by two courts obeys the law and does not abscond. The provision cannot thus be held to be arbitrary in any manner. The provision is to regulate the procedure of the Court and does not, in any manner, conflict with the substantive provisions of the Cr.P.C. relied upon by the petitioners.
There are no merit in the challenge to the validity of the Rule. It is well known practice that generally a revision against conviction and sentence is filed after an appeal is dismissed and the convicted person is taken into custody in Court itself. The object of the Rule is to ensure that a person who has been convicted by two courts obeys the law and does not abscond. The provision cannot thus be held to be arbitrary in any manner. The provision is to regulate the procedure of the Court and does not, in any manner, conflict with the substantive provisions of the Cr.P.C. relied upon by the petitioners.
It has not been disputed even by the learned counsel for the High Court that the Rule does not affect the inherent power of the High Court to exempt the requirement of surrender in exceptional situations. It cannot thus, be argued that prohibition against posting of a revision petition for admission applies even to a situation where on an application of the petitioner, on a case being made out, the Court, in exercise of its inherent power, considers it appropriate to grant exemption from surrender having regard to the nature and circumstances of a case.
There are no ground to hold that the impugned Rule suffers from any infirmity - petition dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1353
Business connection in India u/s 9(1)(i) - profits attributable to India - attribution of taxable income to the so called ‘business connection’ in India - HELD THAT:- This decision has been reiterated by the Tribunal in A.Y. 2008-09 vide order dated 21.05.2014 [2014 (5) TMI 1209 - ITAT MUMBAI] Thus, without going into other decision of the Tribunal as cited by Ld. DR, we respectfully following the judicial precedence of the earlier years, decide this issue in favour of the assessee by holding that the assessee’s income from transportation agreement cannot be taxed in India under the deeming provision of section 9(1)(i) as USIPL cannot be said to constitute business connection in India. Accordingly, Ground No. 1 as raised by the assessee stands allowed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1352
Seniority list displayed as provided in Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 or not - alleged breach of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1947 - alleged breach of Rule 81 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules - breach of Section 25F(b) of the I.D. Act 1947 or not - unfair labour practice, as pleaded, by not sending notice to the Government Under Section 25F(c) of the I.D. Act, 1947 - unfair labour practice as contemplated by Section 25G of the I.D. Act 1947, by not following the principle of last come first go - custom, practice or usage has become an agreement, settlement or award, and breach thereof - Section 9-A of the I.D. Act, 1947.
HELD THAT:- The statutory provisions contained in Section 25FFA of the I.D. Act mandate that the Company should have issued the intended closure notice to the Appropriate Government should be served notice atleast 60 days before the date on which it intended to close down the concerned department/unit of the Company. As could be seen from the pleadings and the findings recorded by the Industrial Court, there is a categorical finding of fact recorded that there is no such mandatory notice served on the State Government by the Appellant-Company. The object of serving of such notice on the State Government is to see that the it can find out whether or not it is feasible for the Company to close down a department/unit of the Company and whether the concerned workmen ought to be retrenched from their service, made unemployed and to mitigate the hardship of the workmen and their family members. Further, the said provision of the I.D. Act is the statutory protection given to the concerned workmen which prevents the Appellant-Company, from retrenching the workmen arbitrarily and unreasonably & in an unfair manner.
The cumulative reading of the Statement of Reasons, the retrenchment notice served on the concerned workmen, the pleadings of the Appellant-Company and in the absence of evidence on record to justify the action of retrenchment of concerned workmen on the alleged closure of the department/unit of the Appellant-Company is shown as bona fide. However, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the High Court on this aspect of the case cannot be held to be bad in law by this Court in exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction in this appeal.
It is very clear from the averments of the Appellant-Company in its written statement that its action in retrenching the workmen is sought to be justified before the Industrial Court, which, in fact, is not justified on the basis of evidence on record. It is clear from the pleadings at paragraphs 3 and 4 of the written statement filed by the Appellant-Company before the Industrial Court which would clearly show that the action of the Appellant-Company is a clear case of mala fide which cannot be sustained in law - the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the High Court with regard to non-compliance of Section 25G of the I.D. Act by the Appellant-Company is also the statutory violation on the part of the Appellant-Company in retrenching certain concerned senior workmen. Therefore, the courts below have rightly answered the issue against it. Hence, the same cannot be termed as erroneous for our interference.
Principle of 'last come first go' - HELD THAT:- The principle of 'last come first go' should have been strictly adhered to by the Appellant-Company at the time of issuing retrenchment notice served upon the concerned workmen as provided Under Section 25G of the I.D. Act read with Rule 81 of the Bombay Rules which is not properly complied with by it for the reason that the custom clearance and dock clearance are totally different departments and it has retained 7 workmen who are undisputedly juniors to the concerned workmen, which action is sought to be justified by the Appellant-Company without giving justifiable reasons. Further, no category wise seniority list of the workmen was displayed on notice board of the Appellant-Company as required in law.
The order dated 14.08.2006 extending protection to the Appellant-Company shall stand vacated - Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1351
Dishonor of Cheque - legally enforceable debt - rebuttal of presumption or not - defence of the accused is that the demand promissory note and cheque were forcibly taken - Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act - HELD THAT:- In the cases of MS NARAYANA MENON @ MANI VERSUS STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [2006 (7) TMI 576 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court has explained as to how the presumptions under the Evidence Act as also under the N.I. Act could be rebutted and the concept of standard of proof, in cases under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. There can be no dispute about the propositions laid down in the above cases and the is duly considered.
There are no perversity or jurisdictional error has been shown with regard to the impugned judgment and order - Revision Application is dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1350
Maintainability of grounds of appeal taken before the tribunal - Tribunal justification in law to hold that the grounds of Appeal Nos.1,2 and 3 taken by the Appellant before the Tribunal, are not maintainable and these do not arise out of the order of the CIT(A), as the CIT(A) had dismissed these grounds in limine.?- HELD THAT:- The impugned order of the Tribunal has not dealt with the Appellant's appeal before it with regard to ground Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the ground that same does not arise out of the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)]. The record indicates that the Respondent Assessee's urged these grounds before the CIT(A). Moreover, the CIT(A) also deals with the grounds in his order.
Respondent Assessee's are put to notice that on the next occasion, Appeal would be disposed of
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2015 (2) TMI 1349
Notary Act took place outside India - "Duly authorised" by the petitioning-creditors to make and file the affidavit verifying the instant winding-up petition on the basis of the direction given by this Court - whether this Court can recognize a notarial act which took place before a notary public at Singapore? - HELD THAT:- Since there is clearly no such notification of the Central Government in the Official Gazette granting recognition to the notarial acts done by the notary public of Singapore, this Court is unable to take any judicial recognition of the document which has been handed over before this Court by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners - In the absence of the documents which were required to be produced before this Court in terms of the order dated 27th January, 2015, it cannot be held that the deponents have been "duly authorised" by the petitioning-creditors to make and file the affidavit in support of the winding-up petition. This Court, therefore, is left with no option but to reject the petition.
Petition dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1348
Weighted deduction @ 150% u/s. 35(2AB) on expenses incurred on clinical trial - Diversified views - one hand there are decisions of the Tribunal which are in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and on the other hand we have a decision of the Hon’ble High Court which is in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue - HELD THAT:- The answer lies in the decision of the Tribunal Ahmedabad Bench in the case of Kanel Oil & Export Inds [2009 (8) TMI 806 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C] wherein held A simple answer would be that the judgement of a High Court, though not of the Jurisdictional High Court, prevails over an order of the Special Bench even though it is from the Jurisdictional Bench of the Tribunal on the basis of the view that the High Court is above the Tribunal in the judicial hierarchy. The Tribunal further observed that this simple view is subject to some exceptions. It can work efficiently when there is only one judgement of a High Court on the issue and no contrary view has been expressed by any other High Court.
Before us, the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case is against the assessee but as pointed out elsewhere the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Cadila Healthcare [2013 (3) TMI 539 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] was pronounced later on and therefore the Tribunal did not have the benefit of the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court. Now that we have the benefit of the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court as mentioned hereinabove, we are following the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court and accordingly we set aside the findings of the Ld. CIT(A) and direct the AO to allow the claim of weighted deduction u/s. 35(2AB) in respect of clinical trials as claimed by the assessee. Ground No. 1 is accordingly allowed.
Weighted deduction in respect of (a) consultancy fees (b) patent fees as per patent Act and PCT and (c) patent filing fees not as per patent Act. - HELD THAT:- The claim of weighted deduction in respect of consultancy fees and patent filing fees as per patent Act are concerned, the Tribunal has considered this issue in A.Y. 2007-08 [2012 (9) TMI 43 - ITAT MUMBAI] The Tribunal has considered this issue at para 33 of its order and at para-34 allowed the claim. As no distinguishing facts have been brought on record, respectfully following the decision of the Co ordinate Bench, weighted deduction on consultancy fees and patent filing fees as per patent Act are directed to be allowed.
Patent filing fees which is not according to the patent Act and PCT, we find that the same is allowable as per the decision of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Cadila Healthcare [2013 (3) TMI 539 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] Respectfully following the findings of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court, we direct the AO to allow the claim of weighted deduction on patent filing fees which is not as per patent Act and PCT. Ground No. 2 is accordingly allowed.
Weighted deduction on eligible expenses incurred by the assessee but not considered by DSIR - HELD THAT:- Before us it is claimed that the Tribunal had accepted assessee’s contention for A.Y. 2007-08 that DISR certificate is only for certifying the facilities of Research and Development activity undertaken by the assessee and not a certificate for expenditure incurred by the assessee. After carefully perusing the orders of the authorities below and the factual matrix brought to our notice, in our considered opinion, these expenditures need to be allowed as and when approved by the DISR. We, accordingly, restore the matter back to the files of the AO with a direction to allow the weighted deduction as and when DISR approval is received. Ground No. 3 is treated as allowed for statistical purpose.
Non allowance of deduction u/s. 80IB and 80IC of the Act on interest from customers of eligible unit - HELD THAT:- This issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by the decision of the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Vs Vidyut Corporation [2010 (4) TMI 229 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] There can be no dispute about the position that the price realized by the assessee from the sale of goods manufactured by the industrial undertaking constitutes a component of the profits and gains derived from the eligible business. The purchaser, on account of the delay in payment of the sale price also pays to the assessee interest. This forms a component of the sale price and is paid towards the lag which has occurred in the payment of the price of the goods sold by the assessee. On these facts, therefore, the payment of interest on account of the delay in payment of the sale price of the goods supplied by the undertaking partakes of the same nature and character as the sale consideration . The delayed payment charges consequently satisfy, together with the sale price, the first degree test –Liberty India [2009 (8) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT] We, direct the AO to allow the claim of deduction in respect of interest from customers u/s. 80IB and 80IC of the Act in respect of the eligible units.
Additional ground in respect of deduction u/s. 35(2AB) on gross expenditure without reducing (a) income from sale of products from R &D work (b) income from sale of R&D assets - HELD THAT:- This claim is being made for the first time before the Tribunal and never claimed in the return of income. The Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court of Bombay in the case of CIT Vs Pruthvi Brokers & Shareholders Pvt. Ltd. [2012 (7) TMI 158 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] has held that the assessee is entitled to raise additional grounds not merely in terms of legal submissions, but also additional claims to which claims not made in the return filed by it wherein the Hon’ble High Court has followed the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. [1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] Drawing support from these decisions, the additional grounds are admitted. The matter is restored to the file of the AO. The AO is directed to verify the claim of the assessee and allow the same after verification in the light of the decision of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT Vs Wockhardt Ltd. [2012 (5) TMI 823 - ITAT MUMBAI]
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2015 (2) TMI 1347
Penalty u/s. 271D - contravention of provisions of section 269SS - HELD THAT:- In the present case, in assessment year 2003-04 cash loans were obtained and in A.Y 2004-05 they were repaid. According to the plea raised before AO as well as Ld. CIT(A), the persons who have advanced these loans to the assessee are relatives of a salesman who reside in a village and were having no bank account. Such contention of the assessee has not been discarded or disproved. It is also not mentioned in the penalty order that the aforementioned amount taken by the assessee in violation of section 269SS and repayment thereof in violation of section 269T was not bonafide transaction and the same was made with a view to evade tax.
If it is so, then according to the decision in the case of CIT vs. Triumph International Finance (I) Ltd. [2012 (6) TMI 358 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] no penalty is imposable either under section 271D or under section 271E as the explanation submitted by the assessee would be considered to be reasonable cause under section 273B.
We hold that it is not a fit case where levy of penalty either under section 271D or under section 271E is justified. The same are deleted and the appeals filed by assessee are allowed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1346
Seeking application for stay of the order made under Regulation 20(3) of the Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 - HELD THAT:- Considering that the order is purely interim and has taken note of the previous order of this Court and also the contentions of the appellant no interference is called for. At the same time this Court is conscious of the fact that enquiry proceedings under Regulation 22 have got prolonged to an extent. The respondents are directed to complete the enquiry proceedings after giving two opportunities to the appellant in accordance with provisions of Regulations and other provisions of law and pass final orders at the earliest preferably within three months from today.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1345
Sales Tax subsidy - capital or revenue receipt - HELD THAT:- The issue is covered, in favour of the assessee, by Tribunal’s order in assessee’s own case and that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has merely followed the same. Learned Departmental Representative, however, vehemently relies upon the stand of the Assessing Officer.
We see no reasons to take any other view of the matter than the view so taken by us in assessee’s own case for other assessment years. No distinguishing factors have been pointed out by the learned Departmental Representative. In this view of the matter, and respectfully following the said orders, we uphold the conclusion arrived at by the ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and decline to interfere in the matter.
Appeal of the Assessing Officer is dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1344
Authorized occupant or not - filing of suit by the Respondents for the enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of the subject premises - whether the subject premises can be said to be an asset of the SSML vested with the State?
HELD THAT:- In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. and Othrs. [1986 (4) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT], this Court noticed the stand taken by parties with regard to property in question. The said case related to the very same mill SSML. The Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay on a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by SSML while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 3(1) of the Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1983 held that the surplus land appurtenant to the mill was not an 'asset in relation to the textile undertaking' within the meaning of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and directed the Central Government to restore the possession of the said land to the Company.
The agreement to sell relied upon by Respondent No. 1 itself contains Clause 1(d), 2, 3, 6 etc. which mandates the execution of registered sale-deed or conveyance deed within three years. However, the same was never done. A suit for specific performance was filed by Respondent No. 1 before Bombay High Court against SSML 25 years after unregistered agreement to sell dated 25th March, 1975, thereby, acknowledging that there was no registered document of title with Respondent No. 1. The said suit is still pending - thus, all other rights and interests in or arising out of such property as were existing immediately before the appointed day in the ownership, possession, power or control of the textile company in relation to the said undertaking vested with the Central Government and by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section (3) stood transferred to, and vested in, the National Textile Corporation. Liability if any of the owner of a textile undertaking i.e. SSML of any period to the appointed day is liability of such owner (SSML) and can be enforceable against him and not against the Central Government or the National Textile Corporation in view of Section 5(1) of 1995 Act.
The First Schedule of the 1995 Act provides the amount which the Central Government has to pay to the owner of every textile undertaking for the transfer and vesting of such undertaking to it. This provision cannot be the starting point of investigation as to which amount relates to which property or as a guide to construction - Therefore, it is clear that the property in question stood vested in the Central Government and, in turn, stood transferred and vested with National Textile Corporation Under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of 1995 Act. Even if it is admitted that Respondent No. 1 has acted on the agreement to sell and has paid the entire consideration, it cannot be a ground to hold that Respondent No. 1 is authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act.
Thus, the Division Bench of the High Court failed to analyze the provisions correctly and wrongly presumed that the property in question has been sold to the Textile Undertaking prior to the commencement of 1983 Act. The Court wrongly relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to hold that Respondent No. 1 has valid defence available under the said provision and hence erred in holding that Respondent No. 1 is an authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act - appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2015 (2) TMI 1343
Constitutional validity of Parts I-B and I-C of The Companies Act, 1956 inserted by Companies Second Amendment Act of 2002 - HELD THAT:- The substantial questions of law involving interpretation of the provisions of the constitution falls for determination. That apart since an analogous challenge in the earlier round of litigation had been examined by a Constitution Bench of this Court, we see no reason why the present writ petitions should also not be referred to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the questions that have been raised. We accordingly refer these writ petitions to be placed before a Constitution Bench for final hearing and disposal. Additional paper books shall be filed by the Petitioners within two weeks. The papers shall be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger Bench.
Petition disposed off.
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2015 (2) TMI 1342
Cancellation of Registration u/s 12AA(3) - financial accounts of the assessee relating to the period relevant to Assessment Year 2009-10 reveal that the assessee had surplus of ₹ 57.70 Crores - On a perusal of the Website of the assessee, the ld. DIT (Exemptions),concluded that the assessee was providing buses for casual contracts and chartered services onhire, charging rates similar to those charged by private transporters and assessee permits commercial advertisements on its fleets.
HELD THAT:- In the case on hand the assessee is a public undertaking of the State Government of Karnataka - There is no finding rendered by the ld. DIT (Exemptions) that there was any violation of the two conditions by the assessee, and therefore the grounds which empower the ld. DIT (Exemptions) to cancel the registration u/s 12AA(3) of the Act, are absent. The registration cannot be cancelled in view of the amendment of the first proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, since it is not a ground specified in the statute for cancellation of registration under Section 12AA(3).
If the case of an assessee falls within the ambit of the first proviso to section 2(15) of the Act, the benefits which arise from registration under Section 12AA of the Act will not be available to it, and this aspect is to be considered by the AO, but this would not be a ground for cancellation of registration. From an appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, we find that the facts herein are similar both factually and legally to that of the cited case of DIT(Exemptions) V Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board [2015 (7) TMI 169 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] and therefore respectfully following this decision, we hold that the impugned order of DIT (Exemptions) cancelling the assessee's registration by order under Section 12AA(3) of the Act dt.21.11.2011 is not sustainable and therefore cancel the same. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2015 (2) TMI 1341
Depreciation on the assets acquired from holding company - assessee continued to be 100% subsidiary of the transferor company - whether Tribunal was correct in law in upholding the order of the CIT(A) directing the AO to allow depreciation on the assets acquired from Tata Motors Ltd. at the cost at which they have been acquired? - HELD THAT:- As of now the issue stands concluded against the Revenue by the decision of this Court in M/s. Essar Oil Ltd [2011 (7) TMI 1371 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] - In these circumstances, we see no reason to keep this appeal pending till the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. Essar Oil Ltd. (supra).
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2015 (2) TMI 1340
Disallowance u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- Calculation of disallowance as per Rule 8D(2)(iii) is erroneous, as the AO without assigning any reason did not reduce the investment in mutual funds and group concern which does not quire incurrence of major expenditure. We restore this ground back to the file of A.O. for fresh consideration in terms of our above discussion.
Disallowance upfront brokerage fees - A.O. has disallowed the said expenses on the ground that assessee has changed its accounting policy with regard to expense on upfront brokerage fees - HELD THAT:- Looking into the nature of expenses, the same were incurred in the revenue field and the same has been incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. The change in the accounting system is not violative of any regulations issued by regulatory authorities in this regard. Furthermore change in accounting policy is bonafide and in line with the industry practice. In earlier years the assessee witnessed many times either the clients exited from the scheme or they switched to the other scheme. The same has necessitated the assessee to change their accounting practice and the assessee followed the same in all the subsequent years. It was also brought to our notice that no disallowance was made in next year while framing assessment u/s 143(3) of the Act. Accordingly, we do not see any justification for the disallowance made in respect of upfront brokerage fees actually paid by the assessee during the year under consideration.
Disallowance of office renovation expenses - HELD THAT:- No doubt the expenses were actually incurred by the assessee. However, the same was disallowed on the plea that it was capital in nature. Looking to the fact that the premises were not occupied at all, therefore, there was complete loss of expenditure incurred by the assessee. In the interest of justice, this ground is also restored to the file of A.O. for fresh adjudication in terms of our above discussion and judicial pronouncement cited by ld. A.R.
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2015 (2) TMI 1339
Condonation of delay - delay of 515 days in filing these appeals - HELD THAT:- We have considered the factual matrix of this case to reach the finding that there existed no sufficient and reasonable cause for the inordinate delay of 515 days in filing the appeal as the assessee has also not been able to establish that he was prevented by sufficient causes beyond his control from filing these appeals on time.
In the case on hand, the cause of substantial justice would not be served by condoning the inordinate delay of 515 days in filing these appeals for which no cogent reasons have been given. We accordingly reject these petitions for condonation of delay for Assessment Years 2002-03 to 2005- 06. Consequently, the assessee's appeals for Assessment Years 2002-03 to 2005-06 are not admitted for adjudication on merits and are dismissed in limine. - Decided against assessee.
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2015 (2) TMI 1338
Dowry - a young woman consumes pesticide having been driven to do so by repeated demands being made on her for money by the family into which she is supposed to merge her identity - Can it be argued that it is a penal statute and, should, therefore, in case of ambiguity in its language, be construed strictly?
HELD THAT:- Any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise - Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under Section 304B.
The facts of this appeal are glaring. Demands for money were made shortly after one year of the marriage. A she-buffalo was given by the father to the daughter as a peace offering. The peace offering had no effect. The daughter was ill-treated. She went back to her father and demanded money again. The father, then, went along with his brother and the Sarpanch of the village to the matrimonial home with a request that the daughter be not ill-treated on account of the demand for money. The father also assured the said persons that their money demand would be fulfilled and that they would have to wait till the crops of his field are harvested. Fifteen days before her death, Salwinder Kaur again visited her parents' house on being maltreated by her new family. Then came death by poisoning. The cross-examination of the father of Salwinder Kaur has, in no manner, shaken his evidence. On the facts, therefore, the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below are upheld.
Appeal dismissed.
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2015 (2) TMI 1337
TP Adjustment - notional interest in the determination of Arms Length Price - addition pertaining to variable license fees claimed by the assessee as revenue expenditure and mortized by the AO u/s 35ABB - Revenue urges that the deletion being the interest adjusted on account of interest determined to be payable at 17.26% p.a. instead of 7.33% p.a. is not justified - HELD THAT:- This Court has today declined this question of law on the same ground for another Assessment Year 2007-08 [2015 (2) TMI 1126 - DELHI HIGH COURT]and for the said reason no question of law arises in this case too.
This appeal shall be listed in the category of ‘Regular Matters’, along with ITA above as per its turn.
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9911796707
