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Showing 61 to 80 of 886 Records

• 2013 (3) TMI 833
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Deletion of addition made by AO by invoking the provision of section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Deletion of Addition u/s 41(1) of the Act

  The only issue in this appeal of revenue is against the order of CIT(A) in deleting the addition made by AO by invoking the provision of section 41(1) of the Act. The AO noticed credit balances in the names of various parties and invoked provisions of section 41(1) of the Act, making an addition aggregating to Rs. 24,69,889/-. The AO's rationale was that the credit balances were old, and the assessee did not have continued transactions with these parties.

  The CIT(A) deleted the addition, observing that the AO did not bring any positive material on record to establish that the liabilities had ceased to exist. The CIT(A) noted that the assessee continued to show the amounts as liabilities in the balance sheet and had not transferred the credit balances to its profit and loss account. The CIT(A) relied on various judicial pronouncements, including the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs Sugauli Sugar Works Pvt. Ltd., which held that mere entry in the books of accounts unilaterally would not enable the department to invoke section 41(1).

  The CIT(A) further cited cases like CIT vs Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation and CIT vs GP International Ltd., where it was held that unless there is a cessation of liability, section 41(1) cannot be invoked. The CIT(A) concluded that the AO was not justified in holding that the outstanding liabilities had ceased to exist in the year under consideration and directed the deletion of the addition of Rs. 24,69,889/-.

  The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, noting that the assessment order did not contain any material establishing that the liability ceased during the relevant year. The Tribunal confirmed that the liabilities were outstanding as on date and could not be assessed by invoking section 41(1) of the Act. Consequently, the appeal of the revenue was dismissed.

  Order pronounced in the open court on 19.03.2013.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 832
  
  Issues Involved:
  The judgment addresses the compliance of hospitals in Delhi with the conditions of land allotment for providing free treatment to indigent patients, the initiation of contempt proceedings against hospitals allegedly disobeying the court's directions, and the clarification sought regarding the calculation of profits earned by hospitals in extending free treatment.
  
  Compliance of Hospitals with Free Treatment Conditions:
  The petition sought directions for identifying hospitals allotted land at concessional rates for free treatment of poor patients. The court directed hospitals to provide 25% free treatment for OPD and 10% for IPD patients. Hospitals not complying faced legal action. Subsequently, a clarification was sought by the Director of Health Services regarding the application of these directions to hospitals based on their compliance status and operational dates. The court clarified that compliance obligations apply prospectively from the date of the order for hospitals meeting the conditions, and from the date of becoming functional for non-compliant hospitals.
  
  Contempt Proceedings Against Hospitals:
  Allegations of disobedience were raised against three hospitals for not providing free treatment to poor patients despite being named in a government list. The hospitals argued that they were not party to the original petition and had no stipulation in their lease deeds for free treatment. The court noted the lack of impleadment and hearing for these hospitals and acknowledged the need for further arguments on hospitals without stipulations. It concluded that no contempt case was made out due to lack of willful disobedience and dismissed the petition seeking contempt proceedings.
  
  Clarification on Profit Calculation for Hospitals:
  The Director of Health Services sought clarification on calculating profits earned by hospitals not complying with free treatment directives. The court clarified that hospitals failing to comply must repay unwarranted profits from the date of possession of allotted land, with accounts to be scrutinized from two years after possession. The court directed the authorities to determine the possession dates for relevant hospitals for proper scrutiny of accounts.
  
  This judgment emphasizes the importance of compliance with land allotment conditions for hospitals in providing free treatment to indigent patients and clarifies the application of directives based on compliance status and operational dates. It also highlights the need for due process in initiating contempt proceedings and provides guidance on calculating profits for hospitals failing to meet free treatment obligations.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 831
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity of Exts.P4 to P7 assessment orders for sales tax dues.
  2. Legitimacy of the demand for damages by the Harbour Engineering Department.
  3. Royalty demand for granite quarrying.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity of Exts.P4 to P7 Assessment Orders for Sales Tax Dues:
  The petitioner contended that Exts.P4 to P7 assessment orders are "non est and void" as they were issued without providing a reasonable opportunity to contest the matter. The assessments were originally set aside by the Commissioner and remitted back for fresh disposal. The petitioner sought adjournment to file an appeal, which was granted an interim stay. However, the department proceeded with the assessments without granting the requested time, leading to the orders being passed on 20/03/2003. The Court found that the petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to adduce evidence, rendering Exts.P4 to P7 liable to be set aside.
  
  2. Legitimacy of the Demand for Damages by the Harbour Engineering Department:
  The petitioner argued that the demand for damages due to breach of contract, as per Exts.P8 and P10, was invalid as there was no provision for the department to unilaterally fix liability. The Court referenced the principle that a party to a contract cannot be an arbiter in its own cause, citing precedents such as State of Karnataka v. Rameshwara Rice Mills and Shriram Engineering Construction Co. Ltd. v. K.S.I.D.C. The Court concluded that the Harbour Engineering Department must seek adjudication through a suit rather than unilateral assessment and recovery.
  
  3. Royalty Demand for Granite Quarrying:
  The petitioner claimed exemption from royalty for granite quarried for government works, arguing that the same principle should apply to granite from private land. The Court noted that the petitioner's representation for exemption was pending and directed the petitioner to submit a fresh representation. The Government was instructed to dispose of this representation within three months, during which any recovery proceedings would be stayed.
  
  Final Orders:
  i) Exts.P4 to P7 assessment orders were set aside.
  ii) The 1st respondent was directed to finalize the assessments within three months.
  iii) The petitioner was instructed to appear before the assessing authority within six weeks to adduce necessary evidence.
  iv) Exts.P8 and P10 were quashed.
  v) The petitioner was allowed to submit a fresh representation for royalty waiver, to be disposed of within three months.
  vi) Ext.P16 was quashed, allowing revenue authorities to initiate further proceedings post-assessment and Government's decision on royalty.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 830
  
  Issues involved: Appeal by revenue for assessment year 2004-05 regarding exclusion of accrued but not received interest from total income of assessee company.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Exclusion of accrued interest from total income
  In this appeal, the High Court considered whether the Tribunal was correct in excluding the amount of interest of Rs. 44,16,08,111/- which had accrued but not fallen due or received from the total income of the assessee company for the assessment year 2004-05. The counsel for both parties acknowledged that the issue was already decided in favor of the respondent-assessee in a previous case. Referring to the decision in Income Tax Appeal No.1621 of 2011, the Court found no reason to entertain the present appeal and dismissed it without any order as to costs.
  
  Conclusion:
  The High Court upheld the decision to exclude the accrued but not received interest from the total income of the assessee company for the assessment year 2004-05 based on the precedent set in a previous case.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 829
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether the amount received by the assessee from the AOP is a loan or a withdrawal.
  2. Applicability of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  3. Levy of penalty u/s 271D for contravention of Section 269SS.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Nature of Amount Received
  The assessee, a company engaged in construction, received Rs. 3.25 crores in cash from an AOP of which it was a member. The A.O. treated this amount as a loan and initiated penalty proceedings u/s 271D for violating Section 269SS. The assessee argued that the amount was a withdrawal from the AOP and not a loan. The A.O. disagreed, noting that interest was paid on the amount, and classified it as a loan.
  
  Issue 2: Applicability of Section 269SS
  Section 269SS mandates that loans or deposits above Rs. 20,000 must be taken through an account payee cheque or draft. The A.O. held that the assessee violated this provision. The assessee contended that the transaction was between sister concerns and thus outside the purview of Section 269SS. The A.O. and CIT(A) did not accept this argument, emphasizing the different nature of businesses and the minimal shareholding of the assessee in the AOP.
  
  Issue 3: Levy of Penalty u/s 271D
  The A.O. imposed a penalty of Rs. 3.25 crores u/s 271D, which was upheld by the CIT(A). The assessee appealed, highlighting that the transaction was genuine, the AOP was identifiable, and no tax evasion was intended. The assessee also argued that the transaction was recorded in the books and the repayment was made via cheque, showing no malafide intent.
  
  Tribunal's Decision:
  The Tribunal found that the amount received was not a loan but a withdrawal from the AOP. It noted that the assessee had a running account with the AOP, and such transactions do not constitute loans. The Tribunal referenced several judgments, including CIT Vs. Idhayam Publications Ltd. and Muthoot M. George Bankers Vs. ACIT, which supported the view that transactions between sister concerns or within a running account do not attract Section 269SS.
  
  The Tribunal also held that the transaction was between sister concerns, managed by the same individuals, and thus outside the purview of Section 269SS. It emphasized that the primary intent of Section 269SS is to curb tax evasion, which was not the case here. The Tribunal concluded that there was a reasonable cause for the cash transaction, and no penalty u/s 271D was warranted.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal deleted the penalty of Rs. 3.25 crores imposed u/s 271D, allowing the appeal of the assessee. The judgment underscored that genuine transactions between sister concerns, even if conducted in cash, do not necessarily attract penalties under Sections 269SS and 271D, especially when no tax evasion is involved.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 828
  
  Issues Involved: The judgment involves the following issues:
  1. Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition based on cash receipts and project completion method.
  2. Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the addition failed to follow accounting standards.
  
  Issue 1: Addition based on Cash Receipts and Project Completion Method
  The Tribunal deleted the addition after considering whether the assessee actually received cash receipts and if the declaration by the partner was towards total sale receipts, not income for the year. Additionally, the Tribunal examined if the project completion method applied to the receipts of Rs. 5 crores, despite not being accounted for in the regular books of accounts. The Tribunal's decision was based on the fact that the disputed income had already been offered for tax under the project completion method in a subsequent assessment year, which was accepted by the revenue. Consequently, the Court found no reason to entertain the proposed questions of law as it would be an academic exercise, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
  
  Issue 2: Compliance with Accounting Standards
  The Tribunal also considered whether the addition of Rs. 5 crores failed to adhere to accounting standards, specifically AS-7 and section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, regarding the disclosure of receipts. The Tribunal's decision highlighted that the addition did not follow the norms of accounting standards, further supporting the dismissal of the appeal.
  
  Therefore, the High Court of Bombay dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the disputed income had already been addressed in a subsequent assessment year, and the addition did not comply with accounting standards.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 827
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Taxability of asset sold (paintings) as capital asset within the meaning of section 2(14) chargeable to capital gain tax u/s 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Taxability of Asset Sold (Paintings) as Capital Asset
  
  The primary issue in this appeal by the revenue and the cross-objection by the assessee revolves around the taxability of the sale of paintings, specifically whether these paintings qualify as capital assets within the meaning of section 2(14) and are chargeable to capital gain tax u/s 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  The Assessing Officer (AO) added Rs. 35,00,000 to the income of the assessee on account of the sale of paintings, rejecting the assessee's claim of exemption on the grounds that the paintings were personal effects. The AO argued that the amendment in section 2(14)(ii) effective from 01.04.2008, which included paintings as capital assets, did not apply to the assessment year 2007-08. The AO treated the receipts as revenue receipts and taxed them accordingly.
  
  The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] deleted the addition, stating that the paintings were personal effects and thus exempt from tax. The CIT(A) noted that the amendment to section 2(14)(ii) was applicable from the assessment year 2008-09 onwards and not to the relevant assessment year 2007-08. The CIT(A) also observed that the AO failed to provide reasons why the paintings could not be considered personal effects. The CIT(A) relied on various judicial precedents, including the decisions of the ITAT, Mumbai, and ITAT, Kolkata, which supported the view that paintings held for personal use were not capital assets prior to the amendment.
  
  The revenue appealed against the deletion, but the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, citing the consistent view of the Coordinate bench decision in the case of Borendra Nath Mookerjee Vs. ITO, AY 2007-08, which held that the sale of old paintings inherited by the assessee did not fall within the definition of capital assets and did not attract capital gains tax prior to the amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2007, effective from 01.04.2008.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal and the assessee's cross-objection, affirming that the sale of paintings in the assessment year 2007-08 did not attract capital gains tax as they were considered personal effects and not capital assets under section 2(14) prior to the amendment effective from 01.04.2008.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 826
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Whether CIDCO is a necessary and/or proper party in the Land Acquisition Reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  2. The interpretation of sections 113(2), 113(3A), and 116 of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966, and Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Whether CIDCO is a necessary and/or proper party in the Land Acquisition Reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  
  The High Court addressed whether CIDCO, the appellant, is a necessary and/or proper party in the Land Acquisition Reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The original claimant contended that CIDCO was not the acquiring body and that the State of Maharashtra had made the acquisition independently before transferring the land to CIDCO for development. The Reference Court initially allowed the State's application to include CIDCO as a party, but this decision was overturned by the learned Single Judge, who ruled that CIDCO was not a necessary or proper party. The learned Single Judge's judgment was based on the interpretation that CIDCO, acting as an agent of the State, was not directly involved in the acquisition process.
  
  Issue 2: Interpretation of sections 113(2), 113(3A), and 116 of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966, and Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
  
  The court examined the statutory provisions to determine CIDCO's role. Section 113(3A) of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966, designates CIDCO as an agent of the State Government for developing and disposing of land in the new town area. The court emphasized that this statutory status cannot be altered by administrative decisions. The Government Resolutions dated 12th February 2008 and 12th August 2010 further clarified that CIDCO's role was to represent the State Government in land acquisition matters, reinforcing that CIDCO was not the acquiring body but merely an agent.
  
  The court also considered Section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which allows a local authority or company bearing acquisition costs to appear and adduce evidence in compensation determination proceedings. However, since the State Government bore the acquisition expenses, CIDCO, receiving only administrative expenses, was not deemed a necessary party.
  
  Conclusion:
  
  The High Court upheld the learned Single Judge's decision, concluding that CIDCO is not a necessary or proper party in the Land Acquisition Reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed, affirming that CIDCO's role as an agent of the State Government does not warrant its inclusion as a party in the land acquisition proceedings.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 825
  
  The High Court of Bombay heard a case where the Tribunal erred in holding that rental income of Rs. 29,16,242 was assessable in the hands of the Appellant, who was not the owner of the property. The court admitted the case based on the substantial question of law regarding ownership and assessment of rental income. (Case citation: 2013 (3) TMI 825 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT)

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• 2013 (3) TMI 824
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Validity and execution of the agreement dated 31.1.2005.
  2. Maintainability of the company petition.
  3. Jurisdiction of the court.
  4. Quantum of debt payable by the respondent.
  5. Bona fide nature of the dispute.
  
  Summary:
  
  1. Validity and Execution of the Agreement Dated 31.1.2005:
  The petitioner claimed that an agreement was entered into on 31.1.2005 for regulating business transactions, with the respondent liable to pay Rs. 10,51,00,028/- along with interest for delayed payments. The respondent denied the execution of this agreement and questioned its validity, arguing that the petitioner company was registered only on 18.2.2005, making the agreement dated 31.1.2005 doubtful. Additionally, the ages of the partners during the alleged deployment of machines in 1983-84 were inconsistent with the timeline provided.
  
  2. Maintainability of the Company Petition:
  The respondent challenged the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the claims raised involved disputed questions of fact that could not be determined in a summary company petition. The court agreed, noting that the dispute required appreciation of evidence and was not suitable for adjudication in a company petition.
  
  3. Jurisdiction of the Court:
  The respondent contended that as per clause 15 of the agreement, disputes were to be resolved through arbitration or legal proceedings in competent courts at Bellary. The court found merit in this argument, indicating that the present forum was not appropriate for resolving the dispute.
  
  4. Quantum of Debt Payable by the Respondent:
  The petitioner was inconsistent about the quantum of debt, claiming Rs. 20,75,54,708/- in the statutory notice dated 20.7.2009, but only Rs. 10,51,00,028/- in the company petition. This discrepancy was not adequately explained, undermining the petitioner's claim.
  
  5. Bona Fide Nature of the Dispute:
  The court observed that the respondent's denial of liability was not frivolous but contained merit. The court emphasized that winding up proceedings should not be used as a means to recover disputed debts and that bona fide disputes should be resolved in civil courts.
  
  Conclusion:
  The court exercised its discretionary power, concluding that the dispute should be adjudicated in a civil court rather than through a company petition. Consequently, the company petition was dismissed.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 823
  
  Issues Involved:
  1. Eligibility of the assessee to claim exemption u/s 11 of the Income Tax Act.
  2. Applicability of the principle of mutuality to the assessee's income.
  3. Whether the assessee's income is liable for wealth tax.
  
  Summary:
  
  Issue 1: Eligibility for Exemption u/s 11 of the Income Tax Act
  The assessee, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1975, and also u/s 12A(a) of the Income Tax Act since 4.7.1983, claimed exemption u/s 11 and 12 based on its charitable activities. The Assessing Officer denied the exemption for the assessment years 1986-87 to 1993-94, stating that the assessee's predominant activity was importing and distributing wattle extract to its members, resulting in surplus income. The CIT(Appeals) ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that its primary object was research and development for the leather industry, which is charitable in nature. The Tribunal upheld this view, emphasizing that the assessee's activities, including the import and distribution of wattle extract, were incidental to its charitable purpose of reducing pollution and benefiting the public. The Tribunal concluded that the assessee was entitled to exemption u/s 11 and 12.
  
  Issue 2: Applicability of the Principle of Mutuality
  The CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal held that the principle of mutuality applied to the assessee. The surplus arising from the distribution of wattle extract among its members was not due to any profit motive but was incidental to the recovery of costs. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was a mutual benefit society, and its activities did not constitute a business. The High Court remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to specifically address the eligibility for exemption u/s 11, without disturbing the finding on mutuality.
  
  Issue 3: Liability for Wealth Tax
  The CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal ruled that since the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s 11 and 12, it was not liable for wealth tax. The High Court directed the Tribunal to pass appropriate orders under the Wealth Tax Act, consequent to its findings on the Income Tax exemption.
  
  Conclusion:
  The Tribunal, after considering the directions from the High Court, reaffirmed that the assessee was eligible for exemption u/s 11 and 12 of the Income Tax Act for the relevant assessment years. Consequently, the assessee was also not liable for wealth tax. The appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 822
  
  The Gujarat High Court judgment in 2013 (3) TMI 822 involved a typographical error in a question framed by the court. The corrected question was whether the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in not appreciating that the extended period of limitation was not applicable.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 821
  
  The Delhi High Court was informed that the Tribunal has heard the matter and orders are reserved. The case was renotified for directions on 30.07.2013 with the interim order to continue. (2013 (3) TMI 821 - DELHI HIGH COURT)

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• 2013 (3) TMI 820
  
  Issues involved: Appeal by Revenue against Tribunal's order for assessment year 2007-08 regarding disallowance of expenses under Section 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act, treatment of freight expenses, applicability of TDS provisions, and treatment of purchases made by the assessee.
  
  Disallowed Expenses under Section 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia):
  The Revenue appealed the Tribunal's decision to delete the disallowance of expenses amounting to Rs. 56,47,12,860 under Section 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) of the Act for non-deduction of TDS. The Tribunal found that there was no independent contract for freight between any transporter and the assessee, as it was part of a composite contract for the supply of raw material. The Tribunal concluded that since the assessee was not obligated to pay freight separately, there was no requirement to deduct TDS. Therefore, the Tribunal's decision was upheld based on factual findings, and the appeal on this issue was not entertained.
  
  Applicability of TDS Provisions:
  The Tribunal's decision on the applicability of TDS provisions to freight expenses was upheld, as there was no separate contract for freight and it was part of a composite contract for the supply of goods. Since the assessee was not directly responsible for paying freight, the Tribunal found no basis for disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income Tax Act. This decision was based on factual findings, and the appeal on this issue was not entertained.
  
  Treatment of Purchases Made by the Assessee:
  Regarding the purchases made by the assessee, the Tribunal upheld the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (A) by distinguishing between purchases and works contracts. It was found that statutory levies on the purchases were paid by the assessee to its seller, and the transactions were on a principal-to-principal basis. As there was no need to deduct TDS on these purchases, the Tribunal's decision was based on factual findings, and the appeal on this issue was not entertained.
  
  Admitted Questions:
  The High Court admitted the appeal on questions related to the order of the CIT (A) regarding the treatment of fees paid for services utilized by the Indian company, and the oversight of provisions under Section 40(a)(ia) applicable to payments made outside India. These questions will be further examined by the Court.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 819
  
  Issues involved: Revenue appeal against CIT (A)'s order directing exemption u/s 11 of the IT Act, 1961.
  
  Summary:
  1. The assessee, a non-profit research and education organization in Gemology, was denied exemption u/s 11 by the AO based on lack of formal education courses and affiliations. The CIT (A) allowed the exemption, stating that the institute was imparting education in Gemology and Diamond jewellery, thus entitled to exemption u/s 11.
  
  2. The Revenue argued that conducting coaching classes does not constitute education, citing precedents. The assessee countered by highlighting its registration under section 12A and relying on relevant case laws. The ITAT held that since the assessee was registered under section 12A, further probing into its objects was impermissible, as per the Supreme Court's decision in ACIT vs. Surat City Gymkhana.
  
  3. The ITAT emphasized that the AO's role is to ensure compliance with the objects for which the organization was established, not to delve into unrelated matters. Upholding the CIT (A)'s order, the ITAT dismissed the Revenue's appeal, stating that as long as valid registration under section 12A exists, the AO cannot question the organization's objects.
  
  Conclusion: The ITAT upheld the CIT (A)'s decision to grant exemption u/s 11 to the assessee, dismissing the Revenue's appeal.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 818
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against order of ld. CIT(A)-II, Kanpur for assessment year 2005-06.
  
  Deduction u/s 80IB:
  The main issue is whether the deduction under section 80IB of the Act of Rs. 45,70,969 was rightly allowed by the first appellate authority. The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the process of cutting big rolls into smaller size does not qualify as manufacturing or production. However, the first appellate authority relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in India Cine Agencies vs. CIT [2009] 308 ITR 98, which held that such conversion amounts to production. The Tribunal upheld this view, stating that the conversion of jumbo rolls of photographic films into smaller rolls constitutes manufacturing. Additionally, the allegation that the assessee did not employ 10 or more workers was refuted, as the assessee had 41 workers directly employed, along with skilled labor supplied by a contractor. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee maintained separate books of account for each unit, and the Assessing Officer failed to provide concrete evidence supporting the claim of excess profits in the Pondicherry Unit. Consequently, the Tribunal upheld the findings of the first appellate authority and dismissed the appeal of the Department.
  
  Judges:
  The judgment was delivered by Shri Sunil Kumar Yadav, Judicial Member, and Shri J Sudhakar Reddy, Accountant Member.
  
  This summary provides a detailed overview of the issues involved in the legal judgment, focusing on the deduction u/s 80IB and the key arguments and decisions made by the Tribunal.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 817
  
  Issues involved: Interpretation of deduction under Section 80IB u/s 147 of the Income Tax Act.
  
  Summary:
  The High Court of Delhi dismissed the Revenue's appeals against the order relating to assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05. The main issue was whether the disallowance of the assessee's claim for deduction under Section 80IB was justified due to the failure to furnish the audit report in Form 10CCB along with the return of income. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the audit report was filed during the reassessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Act, satisfying the requirement for claiming the deduction under Section 80IB. The Tribunal's decision was based on a previous ruling of the Court which stated that the requirement of filing the audit report during assessment proceedings initiated u/s 147 had been met by the assessee. Therefore, the disallowance of the assessee's claim under Section 80IB was deleted, and the Assessing Officer was directed to modify the assessment order accordingly. The Court found no merit in the appeals and concluded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 816
  
  The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, with the question of law being kept open. Delay was condoned. Key persons involved: Mr. S. Wasim A. Qadri, Ms. Gargi Khanna, Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Ms. Kavita Jha.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 815
  
  Issues involved: Appeal against penalty u/s 271(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act for non-compliance with notices u/s 143(2) & 142(1).
  
  Summary:
  The appellant, in this case, challenged the penalty of A.10,000/- imposed by the Assessing Officer u/s 271(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act for not responding to notices issued under sec.143(2) & 142(1) on three occasions. The appellant contended that no Show Cause Notice was issued before the penalty was levied. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the penalty, stating that the appellant did not respond to the notices. However, the appellant argued that since the assessment was completed u/s 143(3) and not u/s 144, the penalty was unjustified. The Tribunal referred to previous decisions where compliance in assessment proceedings after an assessment u/s 143(3) was considered sufficient, and held that the penalty was not warranted in this case as the appellant cooperated with the assessment proceedings.
  
  Therefore, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, ruling that there was no basis for the penalty u/s 271(1)(b) in the appellant's case.

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• 2013 (3) TMI 814
  
  Issues involved: Jurisdictional issue of reopening assessment u/s. 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
  
  The Appellate Tribunal ITAT Kolkata heard an appeal by the assessee against the order of CIT(A)-XIV, Kolkata for Assessment Year 2002-03. The assessment was framed by ACIT, Circle-23, Kolkata u/s. 147/143(3)/252 of the Act. The first legal issue regarding the assessment order's limitation was not pressed by the assessee and was dismissed. The second jurisdictional issue raised was about the reopening of assessment u/s. 147 of the Act, contending that the reasons for reopening were recorded after the notice u/s. 148, making the reopening bad in law. The assessee argued that the reassessment was unjustified as the reasons for initiation of proceedings ceased to survive. The reasons recorded for the notice u/s. 148 highlighted discrepancies in the assessee's income and investments, leading to the belief that income had escaped assessment.
  
  During the hearing, the assessee's counsel pointed out that the AO had made disallowances under section 14A of the Act, but the reasons for reassessment were based on interest deduction from salary income. The Tribunal noted that the AO's reasons for issuing the notice u/s. 148 were different from the actual disallowances made. It emphasized the importance of fulfilling the conditions under sections 147 and 148 for reassessing escaped income. The Tribunal held that the AO must have jurisdiction to reassess issues other than those for which proceedings were initiated, but only if the reasons for initiation ceased to exist. Citing relevant case laws, the Tribunal allowed the appeal in favor of the assessee on the jurisdictional issue, stating that once this issue was resolved, there was no need to address the remaining issues on merits.
  
  Judgment: The Appellate Tribunal ITAT Kolkata allowed the appeal of the assessee, concluding that the reassessment u/s. 147 of the Act was unjustified due to discrepancies in the reasons for initiation and the actual disallowances made. The Tribunal emphasized the necessity for the AO to have jurisdiction to reassess issues and held that once the reasons for initiation of proceedings ceased to exist, reassessment on new issues was not permissible. The appeal was allowed solely on the jurisdictional issue, rendering further adjudication on merits unnecessary.

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