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2004 (4) TMI 608
Seeking re-investigation by an independent agency due to alleged biased approach of the local police influenced by a local MLA - HELD THAT:- In Om Prakash Narang and Anr. v State (Delhi Admn.) [1979 (1) TMI 241 - SUPREME COURT] it was observed by this Court that further investigation is not altogether ruled out merely because cognizance has been taken by the Court. When defective investigation comes to light during course of trial, it may be cured by further investigation if circumstances so permitted. It would ordinarily be desirable and all the more so in this case, that police should inform the Court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light instead of being silent over the matter keeping in view only the need for an early trial since an effective trial for real or actual offences found during course of proper investigation is as much relevant, desirable and necessary as an expeditious disposal of the mater by the Courts.
In view of the aforesaid position in law if there is necessity for further investigation the same can certainly be done as prescribed by law. The mere fact that there may be further delay in concluding the trial should not stand on the way of further investigation if that would help the Court in arriving at the truth and do real and substantial as well as effective justice. We make it clear that we have not expressed any final opinion on the merits of the case.
The appeal is accordingly finally disposed of, on the above terms.
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2004 (4) TMI 606
Jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act - suo motu cognizance of contempt - act of attacking in a pre-planned and calculated manner - HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that due reasonable and adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellants to defend themselves and put forth their point of view. The High Court has taken into consideration the entire evidence and material available on the record including the evidence produced by the contemners. It was not necessary for the High Court to discuss each and every affidavit individually. Out of 26 persons named only 9 have been convicted by the High Court. Since the procedure adopted was summary the High Court has taken care not to convict a person unless direct evidence and/or circumstances with sufficient corroborative material doubtless fastening guilt on the contemners who have been punished was available. The High Court found only those contemners guilty against whom the element of doubt was completely eliminated. Affidavit evidence if based on hearsay has been excluded. Contemners against whom there was single identification were also given the benefit of doubt. The version put forth by the appellants was not accepted as it fell short of proof. High Court has considered the entire evidence on the record while recording a finding of guilt against the appellants. Thus the plea that the High Court did not take into consideration the affidavits of independent witnesses is not tenable.
The plea of ali bi taken by the appellants has been negatived by the High Court as the duty charts had been prepared by these officers themselves. None of the superior officers supported their versions. Presence of most of the appellants had been confirmed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Barai, the other two Court officials, advocates, the reports of Director General of Police and the Superintendent of Police. None of these has any interest in falsely implicating any of the appellants.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, directing the appellants to surrender and serve their sentences. The Court also directed the disciplinary authorities and criminal courts to conclude pending proceedings expeditiously and requested the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to monitor the proceedings. The judgment emphasized the importance of maintaining the dignity and authority of the judiciary and condemned the actions of the police officials involved.
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2004 (4) TMI 605
Issues involved: Upholding penalty order under Section 15-A (1) (o) of U.P. Trade Tax Act for wrongly using Form-31, violation of Section 28-A of U.P. Sales Tax Act, applicability of penalty, interpretation of Form-31 issuance, liability for tax payment based on Form-31.
Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the revision against an order passed by the Trade Tax Tribunal upholding a penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act for misusing Form-31. The applicant, not registered as a dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, ordered goods from M/s. K.S.B. Pump Limited and received them with Form-31 issued by M/s. Central Distillery and Breweries Limited. The department alleged misuse of Form-31, leading to penalty proceedings. The Sales Tax Officer contended that goods should be accompanied by Form-31 of the party importing them in U.P. The Tribunal upheld the penalty, prompting the revision.
The counsel for the applicant argued that no violation of Section 28-A occurred, rendering the penalty unjustified. Referring to precedents, it was highlighted that for Section 28-A to apply, goods must be intended for sale in U.P. and imported in connection with business. Another case emphasized that Form-31 need not be in the owner's name, supporting the applicant's position.
A significant aspect of the judgment was the interpretation of Form-31 issuance. A previous ruling established that Forms 31 and 32 could be provided by either the ordering party or the recipient, serving to inform the department about imported goods for tax assessment. The court clarified that the absence of registration did not automatically imply tax evasion, questioning the justification for the penalty based on the applicant's registration status.
Moreover, the judgment cited cases where the issuance of Form-31 by the ordering party was deemed inconsequential, as long as the transaction was known to the tax authorities for appropriate tax assessment. The court emphasized that the purpose of Form-31 was to ascertain tax liability, irrespective of the issuer, reinforcing the applicant's argument against the penalty.
Ultimately, the revision was allowed, setting aside the penalty under Section 15-A (1) (o) and directing the department to return the security amount to the applicant as per legal provisions. The judgment underscored the importance of proper interpretation and application of tax laws to ensure fair treatment and compliance in trade tax matters.
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2004 (4) TMI 604
Discrimination against designated omnibuses in tax imposition - Validity of Section 3A (1) and (2) of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act, 1958 - After the decision of the High Court, the Bombay Motor Vehicles Tax Act was amended by Gujarat Act in order to validate the imposition and collection of tax on designated omnibuses, which was published in the Gazette - non-use of the vehicles - HELD THAT:- The language used in Section 3A - all omnibuses which are used or kept for use in the State exclusively as contract carriages - is in conformity with Entry 57 of List II. The consistent view taken by this Court is that if a vehicle is "used" or is "kept for use" in the State, it becomes liable for payment of tax and the actual use or quantum of use is not material. The fact that the statute provides for refund of the tax, if the authority is satisfied that the vehicle has not been used, does not mean that the legislature can only make a provision for levy of tax which is limited for the period of actual use or that no tax can be levied during the period the vehicle is not put to use in the State. The provision for the refund has been made only for the advantage of the operator so that he may be relieved of the burden of tax when he is not getting any income from the vehicle on account of its non-use but it has no relevance to the competence or authority of the State to enact a law providing for imposition of a tax on vehicles which are used or are kept for use in the State.
In Mahakoshal Tourist v. State of M.P.[2002 (9) TMI 863 - SUPREME COURT] the challenge made with regard to the absence of a machinery for assessment of tax for the vehicles plying in the State of Madhya Pradesh on the basis of All India Tourist permit and denying them refund of tax for the period they were not used or kept for use in the said State was considered. In view of the language used in Section 3 of the relevant Act which provided for levy of tax on every motor vehicle "used or kept for use in the State" at the rate specified in the schedule, it was held that the expression "used" or "kept for use" means, either the actual use of the vehicle on the roads of the State of Madhya Pradesh or keeping the vehicle (which is in condition and capable of being used) available for use in the State, if so desired. It was further held that while plying outside the State in connection with the contract, a vehicle will, nonetheless be within the import of "kept for use in the State" and it is immaterial for the purpose of Section 3 whether a vehicle is actually being used or is kept for use in the State.
Nothing new has been pointed out to challenge Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 by which the Bombay Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, as adopted in the State of Gujarat with up to date amendments, was further amended after the decision of the High Court which was rendered on 17th August, 2001. In fact, the main argument of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners is that the said amending Act merely rearranged the Sections and suffered from the same infirmity as the previous Act. Since we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court is not correct and Section 3A and Rule 5 of the Rules, as incorporated vide notification dated 6.2.2001 are intra vires and are perfectly valid, the challenge made to Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002 has no substance and must fail.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Gujarat, set aside the High Court's judgment, and upheld the validity of Section 3A and Rule 5. The Court dismissed the writ petitions challenging the amendments made by Gujarat Act No.9 of 2002.
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2004 (4) TMI 603
Proportional Representation and Election Procedures - Principles of Interpretation - Application of the Rule - Maintainability of the Election Petition - HELD THAT:- At the first flush it may appear that the election petition was not maintainable as no result in the election had been declared. The provisions of Rules 33 and 34 must be interpreted having regard to the maxim ’ubi jus ibi remedium’. An election dispute would be adjudicated upon by the election tribunal specially constituted for that purpose. A candidate may, having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein make a prayer that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected in the said case.
Once he makes out a case of being entitled to obtain the aforementioned declaration, it goes without saying that he has a right to question the order of the Returning Officer in terms whereof he was not declared elected. A fortiorari he has also a right to question the correctness of the order of the Returning Officer as a result whereof he had not been declared elected. An election petition, therefore, would be maintainable.
CONCLUSION: We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court committed an error in interpreting the statutory provisions laying down procedures for declaration of result on the election of Adhyaksha Panchayat at district level. Applying the law as we have interpreted, the appellant should have been declared elected.
Thus, we are of the opinion that in the instant case the appellant herein had received the highest number of first preference votes and in that view of the matter he should have been declared elected.
The appeal is allowed.
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2004 (4) TMI 602
Issues:
1. Validity of G.O.Ms No. 75 dated 27th April, 1993 increasing road tax on vehicles.
2. Whether road rollers are considered motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Validity of G.O.Ms No. 75
The Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the validity of G.O.Ms No. 75, which increased road tax on vehicles, based on Entry-57 of List-II of Schedule-VII of the Constitution of India. The High Court relied on the judgment in Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, emphasizing that vehicles must be adapted for use on roads to be taxed. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines a "Motor Vehicle" as any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for road use. The High Court concluded that road rollers, not meant for transporting people or goods, could not be taxed despite the upheld G.O.
Issue 2: Classification of Road Rollers as Motor Vehicles
The Supreme Court analyzed the definitions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, stating that a road roller falls within the definition of a "Light Motor Vehicle" and is considered a motor vehicle. The Court emphasized that a vehicle adapted for road use, even if not for carrying passengers or goods, qualifies as a motor vehicle. The Court dismissed the High Court's reasoning that a vehicle must carry people or goods to be classified as a motor vehicle. The Court also distinguished the present case from Bolani Ores Ltd., clarifying that road rollers, built exclusively for road use, are indeed motor vehicles.
Precedents and Decisions:
The Supreme Court cited the case of Ashok Gangadhar Maratha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., affirming that even a light motor vehicle is considered a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act. Additionally, the Court referenced the decision in Bose Abraham v. State of Kerala and Anr. to support the classification of road rollers as motor vehicles. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, dismissing the writ petitions challenging the taxation of road rollers. The Appeals were allowed, with no order as to costs.
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2004 (4) TMI 601
Issues:
Refund claim rejection based on unjust enrichment and manufacturing activity determination.
Analysis:
1. The appeal was filed against the order-in-appeal affirming the rejection of the refund claim by the Deputy Commissioner. The appellants, engaged in energy generation, claimed a refund of duty paid, contending that their activities did not amount to manufacturing based on a precedent. The Apex Court directed a review of the refund claim under protest.
2. Post remand, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the refund claim citing unjust enrichment and manufacturing activity. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld this decision. The Counsel argued that the doctrine of unjust enrichment did not apply due to the duty being paid under protest, citing legal precedents. The JDR supported the impugned order.
3. The authorities found the appellants' activities constituted manufacturing. However, legal precedents and the appellants' subsequent case held otherwise. The Apex Court's acknowledgment of the duty being paid under protest barred invoking unjust enrichment. Citing legal precedents, the Counsel argued against the rejection of the refund claim.
4. Rulings in previous cases and legal precedents established that duty paid under protest precludes unjust enrichment. The impugned order rejecting the refund claim based on unjust enrichment was deemed legally unsustainable. The order-in-original was set aside, and the appeal was accepted with appropriate relief.
5. The Tribunal's decision aligned with legal precedents and the Apex Court's stance on duty paid under protest, disallowing the invocation of unjust enrichment. Consequently, the Commissioner (Appeals) order was overturned, and the appellants' appeal was granted with necessary relief as per the law.
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2004 (4) TMI 600
Issues Involved: Determination of whether the quarry lease rent paid for excavating granite on lease for ten years constitutes capital expenditure and whether the lease was solely for the right to excavate granite blocks.
Issue 1 - Capital Expenditure: The appellant, a partnership firm engaged in granite business, claimed lease rent as revenue expenditure for a quarry lease taken for ten years. The Assessing Officer treated the expenditure as capital. The appellate authority found no enduring asset acquired and allowed the claim as revenue. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, relying on precedent, deemed the expenditure as capital. The appellant argued that only the right to use raw material was conferred, and the initial lump sum should be revenue expenditure. The Supreme Court's distinction in Gotan Lime Syndicate v. CIT [1966] 59 ITR 718 was cited, where royalty payment was considered revenue expenditure. However, the Tribunal's decision was upheld based on Pingle Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1960] 40 ITR 67, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Issue 2 - Lease Nature: The lease in question was not for the land itself but for the right to excavate granite blocks under the surface for ten years. The appellant contended that as no enduring asset was acquired, the expenditure should be revenue. The Supreme Court's decision in Aditya Minerals Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT [1999] 239 ITR 817 was referenced, where a similar lease arrangement was considered capital expenditure due to a one-time payment. Following the precedent in Pingle Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1960] 40 ITR 67, the High Court ruled in favor of the Revenue, dismissing the appeal.
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2004 (4) TMI 599
Issues:
1. Quashing of reasons for assuming jurisdiction under section 147 for reassessment of income.
2. Quashing of notices issued under section 148 for assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95.
3. Restraining the respondent from further proceedings based on the notice issued under section 148.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Quashing of reasons for assuming jurisdiction under section 147 for reassessment of income
The petitioner sought directions under article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to quash the reasons communicated for assuming jurisdiction under section 147 for reassessing the income for the assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The court referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO [2003] 259 ITR 191, which emphasized that when a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is issued, the assessee is entitled to file objections and the Assessing Officer must furnish reasons within a reasonable time. In this case, the reasons had been provided to the petitioner, and the return had been filed by the assessee. The court directed the assessee to prefer objections, and the Assessing Officer was mandated to dispose of the objections within 30 days from their receipt.
Issue 2: Quashing of notices issued under section 148 for assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95
The petitioner also sought to quash the notices dated 29-3-2001 issued under section 148 for the assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The court, in line with the Apex Court's guidance, directed the Assessing Officer to issue a notice to the assessee within 15 days, calling upon the assessee to file objections within four weeks if desired. This process was to be followed to ensure proper disposal of objections and adherence to the principles laid down by the Apex Court.
Issue 3: Restraining the respondent from further proceedings based on the notice issued under section 148
Lastly, the petitioner requested to restrain the respondent from taking any steps or proceedings based on the notice dated 29-3-2001 issued under section 148 for the assessment years 1993-94 and 1994-95. The court did not explicitly address this issue in the judgment, but the directions provided in relation to the objections and the disposal process implied a temporary restraint until the objections were duly considered and disposed of by the Assessing Officer.
In conclusion, the High Court of Delhi disposed of the petition with directions for the assessee to file objections, the Assessing Officer to dispose of objections within 30 days, and for the issuance of a notice to the assessee within 15 days for filing objections. These directions were in line with the principles established by the Apex Court, ensuring a fair and transparent process in dealing with the reassessment of income for the specified assessment years.
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2004 (4) TMI 598
Issues Involved:
1. Adulteration of food sample
2. Application of amended rules during pending appeal
3. Validity and retrospective application of ex post facto laws
4. Sentence modification based on long pendency and technical violations
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Adulteration of Food Sample:
The appellant was charged under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for selling adulterated hard boiled sugar confectionary containing mineral oil, which was considered an unwholesome ingredient and had an unpleasant smell and taste. The Chief Judicial Magistrate found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, which was later reduced to 6 months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- by the District and Sessions Judge, Jodhpur. The High Court upheld this decision.
2. Application of Amended Rules During Pending Appeal:
During the pendency of the appeal, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, were amended by a notification dated April 8, 1988, permitting the presence of mineral oil up to 0.2% by weight if it was of food grade and used as a lubricant. The appellant argued that the courts below erred by not considering the amended rules, which should be applied retrospectively to his case. However, the Supreme Court clarified that the amendment did not unconditionally permit mineral oil but allowed it under specific conditions, which were not met in this case.
3. Validity and Retrospective Application of Ex Post Facto Laws:
The appellant relied on the principle that any law mollifying the rigour of criminal law must be applied retrospectively to pending proceedings. The Supreme Court referred to the case of Rattan Lal vs. State of Punjab, which established that an ex post facto law mollifying the rigour of criminal law could be valid and retrospective. However, the Court distinguished this case, noting that the amended rules did not unconditionally permit the presence of mineral oil and required specific conditions to be met, which were not proven in the appellant's case. The Court concluded that the amended rules could not be applied retrospectively to benefit the appellant.
4. Sentence Modification Based on Long Pendency and Technical Violations:
The appellant cited several judgments where lesser sentences were imposed due to long pendency and technical violations. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act prescribed a minimum sentence of 6 months rigorous imprisonment for the offence charged. The Court highlighted the importance of strict adherence to the Act and the Rules to safeguard consumer interests and found no reason to interfere with the minimum sentence imposed. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellant, emphasizing the necessity of strict adherence to food safety laws and rejecting the retrospective application of the amended rules in this case. The appeal was dismissed, and the minimum sentence of 6 months rigorous imprisonment was affirmed.
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2004 (4) TMI 597
Validity of the sale deed executed by the Bangalore Development Authority - Legality of the allotment process without public auction, tender, or advertisement - Applicability of Section 38 and Section 38-B of the Bangalore Development Authority Act - Delay and laches - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, it would appear, that no restriction, condition or limitation has been prescribed and in that view of the matter, the High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in holding that the provisions of the said rules would apply to any transfer made by the Authority in favour of any person. A similar question came up for consideration before this Court in Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. vs. S.P. Gururaja and Others [2003 (10) TMI 655 - SUPREME COURT]. This Court in that case examined in details the provisions of the said Act vis-`-vis the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966. Therein also allotment of a peace of land in favour of an industrial undertaking was in question.
The provisions of Section 38 and 38B operate in different fields. By reason of Section 38B of the Act, the legislature contemplated bulk transfer of land in favour of the Authorities mentioned therein which, may carry out the development scheme or deal with the matter in accordance with law. The High Court, in our opinion, has not correctly applied the principles of law governing the field inasmuch as it cannot be said that allotment of a plot measuring 1 acre 20 guntas is a bulk allotment. Whenever an allotment of land is made for industrial purpose, it cannot be restricted to a small peace of land. The extent of land sought to be allotted must be commensurate with the purpose for which the same is made.
Furthermore, the writ petition should not have been entertained keeping in view the fact that it was filed about three years after making of the allotment and execution of the deed of sale. The High Court should have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court also does not appear to have considered the plea taken by the appellant herein to the effect that the first respondent had been set up by certain interested persons. In a public interest litigation, the Court should, when such a plea is raised, determine the same.
Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. The writ petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed.
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2004 (4) TMI 596
Validity of the order u/s 263 by the Commissioner of Income-tax (CIT) - Depreciation is optional while computing deduction u/s 80HHC - merger of the assessment order with the order of CIT(A) - value of goods exported - HELD THAT:- We find that there is a merit in the case of the assessee. It has been demonstrated by the above-mentioned chronology of events that computation of deduction under section 80HHC was a subject-matter of appeal before CIT(A). The CIT(A) has given some findings on the computation of deduction u/s 80HHC. Therefore, the assessment order had merged with the order of CIT(A). Thus, under Explanation (c) to section 263(1), such action of CIT was not permissible. The word ';matter'; is certainly a word of wide import and represents a subject or situation that you need to think about, discuss or deal with. Thus, it is difficult to accept the submission of the Learned D.R. that the issue of depreciation being optional or the issue that assessee was at all entitled to deduction u/s 80HHC or not was not a subject-matter of appeal filed by the assessee before CIT(A). A matter may have many aspects and the above-mentioned two factors may be the aspects of the matter but not entire ';matter'; itself. The ';matter'; in the present case is ';deduction u/s 80HHC.
Therefore, we hold that assessment order so as it relates to deduction u/s 80HHC had merged with the order of CIT(A), therefore, exercise of power by Commissioner of Income-tax u/s 263 was even not available under Explanation (c) to section 263(1). We, therefore, hold that order u/s 263 is not a valid order in the eyes of law.
Having held that powers under section 263 having been exercised wrongly by CIT as the assessment order had merged with the appellate order, it is not necessary to consider the other aspects of the matter that when CIT was wrong in holding that assessee did not have positive profit from export activity as per provisions of section 80HHC(1), therefore, the assessee is not entitled at all for deduction u/s 80HHC under the proviso to section 80HHC(3) as the same will be of academic interests only.
It is nobody';s case that the export incentive received by the assessee does not fall within the ambit of items described in clauses (iiia), (iiib) and (iiic) to section 28 of the Act, therefore, export incentives have to be taken into account as per proviso to section 80HHC(3). This point of view is well supported by the Special Bench decision of Delhi Bench in the case of Lalsons Enterprises [2004 (2) TMI 294 - ITAT DELHI-E]. On this count also, the order u/s 263 is not correct.
Thus, we quash the impugned order and allow the appeal filed by the assessee.
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2004 (4) TMI 595
The Supreme Court considered altering the pre-deposit condition imposed by the tribunal for entertaining the appellant's appeal. The court decided that in addition to the Rs. 15,00,000 cash deposit already made, the appellant must furnish a bank guarantee of Rs. 5,00,000 from a Nationalised Bank within three months. If the bank guarantee is provided, the tribunal will proceed to hear the appeal on its merits.
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2004 (4) TMI 594
Issues:
- Whether a respondent who opted for voluntary retirement scheme can withdraw after receiving payments under the scheme?
Analysis:
The case involves a dispute where a nationalized bank introduced a voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) to downsize its staff. The respondent opted for VRS but later requested to withdraw the option, which was not permitted by the bank due to the scheme's clause. The High Court allowed the respondent's plea to withdraw, but the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. The central issue was whether the respondent could withdraw after accepting payments under the scheme.
In the case of Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar, it was held that optees who accepted payments under the scheme could not withdraw. The bank argued that the respondent had received and utilized payments for various purposes, including repaying a car loan and investing in fixed deposits. On the other hand, the respondent contended that he had opted for VRS before the cut-off date and repeatedly requested to withdraw. The respondent claimed that receiving payments did not waive his right to withdraw, especially since the writ petition challenging his relief from service was pending.
The bank relied on the doctrine of estoppel, emphasizing that the respondent knowingly accepted and utilized the payments, which prevented him from withdrawing from the scheme. The bank presented detailed account statements showing the credits and transactions made by the respondent, indicating his awareness and utilization of the payments. The respondent's actions, such as repaying loans and making long-term investments, demonstrated his knowledge and acceptance of the benefits under the scheme.
Considering the principles of estoppel discussed in previous judgments, the Court concluded that the respondent's conduct indicated his awareness and acceptance of payments under the scheme. Therefore, the respondent could not resile from the VRS after utilizing the benefits. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the previous judgment with no costs awarded.
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2004 (4) TMI 593
Issues:
1. Validity of the voluntary retirement scheme introduced by the appellant Bank.
2. Employee's withdrawal of voluntary retirement application and acceptance of retiral benefits.
3. Challenge to the acceptance of voluntary retirement application under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Appellate court's decision on the withdrawal of the application for voluntary retirement.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The appellant Bank introduced a Voluntary Retirement Scheme in 2000, approved by its Board of Directors, operational from November 15 to December 14, 2000. An employee sought voluntary retirement on November 30, 2000, but later requested withdrawal on December 2, 2000. The Bank accepted the retirement request on January 22, 2001, and the employee withdrew retiral benefits on January 25, 2001. The employee challenged the acceptance of his retirement request under Article 226 of the Constitution, leading to a Single Judge of the High Court setting it aside, upheld in a letters patent appeal.
2. Referring to a previous judgment, the Supreme Court noted that an employee who withdraws a voluntary retirement application but accepts retiral benefits per the scheme is not entitled to withdraw the retirement request. In this case, the employee withdrew the retiral benefits on January 25, 2001, reinforcing the decision against allowing withdrawal of the retirement application.
3. Based on the above reasoning and the precedent set in the Punjab National Bank case, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order and judgment under challenge. The Court ruled in favor of the appellant Bank, affirming that the employee, having accepted the retiral benefits, was not entitled to withdraw the voluntary retirement application.
4. Additionally, in light of the decision in the main appeal, related appeals were also allowed, setting aside the orders and judgments under challenge. The Court emphasized that there would be no order as to costs in these matters, concluding the legal proceedings on the issue of voluntary retirement and withdrawal of applications.
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2004 (4) TMI 592
Issues involved:
1. Claim for a writ of mandamus for the grant of reward as per Reward Policy dated 30.03.1985.
2. Interpretation of the Reward Policy regarding the timing of reward payment.
3. Whether the Revenue has actually realized the amount from the party concerned.
4. Jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ in matters related to reward claims.
Detailed analysis:
1. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to direct the respondent to grant a reward of Rs. 68,27,522 with interest, based on providing information about smuggling activity. The petitioner highlighted the significance of the information provided and its role in collecting dues from the evading party.
2. The respondent contended that the reward could only be granted after the conclusion of Appeal/Revision proceedings and actual realization of dues, as per the Reward Policy. An amendment required payment only upon the actual recovery of Central Excise duty/Customs duty/Penalty/Fine. The respondent argued that only a partial amount was disbursed as an advance, exceeding the entitlement of the petitioner.
3. The court noted that the Revenue had adjusted Rs. 2.29 crores towards the recovery of dues from the party, indicating actual realization. The court emphasized that recovery need not be in cash and that the Revenue's duty was to pay the amount as per the rules, especially when the recovery was facilitated by the petitioner's information.
4. The Union of India cited a Supreme Court judgment stating that the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot determine reward claims, as it falls under the jurisdiction of department authorities. However, the Supreme Court also highlighted the need for detailed information in such claims and the absence of a right to claim a specific reward amount. The court differentiated the present case, where recovery was directly linked to the petitioner's information.
5. Considering the admission that the recovery was a result of the petitioner's specific information, the court directed the respondent to pay the final reward amount within 15 days, as per the policy. Interest was to be paid at 15% per annum, failing which it would increase to 18% per annum, with the additional 3% borne by the responsible officer. The petitioner was awarded costs of Rs. 10,000 to be deposited within two weeks.
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2004 (4) TMI 591
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the High Court's decision regarding the opportunity of hearing under Article 311.
2. Applicability of Article 311 to employees of PGIMER.
3. Validity of PGIMER's action deeming the 1st Respondent to have permanently left the institute.
4. The High Court's stay on disciplinary action against the 1st Respondent.
5. Continuation of the 1st Respondent in service during the pendency of the disciplinary enquiry.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the High Court's Decision Regarding the Opportunity of Hearing Under Article 311:
The High Court relied on previous judgments (Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, State of Assam v. Akshaya Kumar, Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, and Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan) to conclude that the 1st Respondent was not given an opportunity of hearing, thereby violating Article 311. The High Court permitted the 1st Respondent to rejoin duty, emphasizing the necessity of an opportunity to defend oneself before termination.
2. Applicability of Article 311 to Employees of PGIMER:
The Supreme Court examined whether Article 311, which provides safeguards to civil servants, applies to employees of PGIMER. It was determined that PGIMER, being a separate legal entity and a 'body corporate' under The Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh Act, 1966, does not constitute a 'State' for the purpose of Article 311. Consequently, employees of PGIMER do not hold 'civil posts' under the State and cannot claim the protections of Article 311.
3. Validity of PGIMER's Action Deeming the 1st Respondent to Have Permanently Left the Institute:
The Supreme Court referenced similar cases (Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan and Dr. Anil Bajaj v. PGIMER) where employees who overstayed their sanctioned leave were deemed to have vacated their posts. The Court held that the 1st Respondent was aware of the condition that failure to resume duty after the leave period would result in automatic termination. Thus, PGIMER's action was justified, and the absence of a formal notice did not prejudice the 1st Respondent.
4. The High Court's Stay on Disciplinary Action Against the 1st Respondent:
The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had granted a stay on disciplinary action against the 1st Respondent in CWP No. 16212 of 1992. The Supreme Court found that this stay was improperly granted as it was unrelated to the disciplinary proceedings concerning the unauthorized absence. Consequently, the stay was vacated, allowing PGIMER to proceed with the disciplinary action.
5. Continuation of the 1st Respondent in Service During the Pendency of the Disciplinary Enquiry:
The Supreme Court allowed the 1st Respondent to continue in service during the disciplinary enquiry, subject to its outcome. PGIMER was directed to complete the enquiry expeditiously. Additionally, PGIMER was given the liberty to consider suspending the 1st Respondent during the enquiry and to appoint another individual in her place if deemed necessary.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, vacated the stay on disciplinary action, and directed PGIMER to proceed with the disciplinary enquiry against the 1st Respondent. The decision of the High Court was overturned, and it was clarified that Article 311 does not apply to PGIMER employees. The 1st Respondent's continuation in service was made conditional upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings.
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2004 (4) TMI 590
Challenge to discriminatory treatment by Commissionerates in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu regarding classification of agricultural knapsack sprayer engine under different headings - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the other manufacturers, like the petitioners, also are merely making engines which are fitted into the knapsack agriculture sprayers being manufactured by the purchasers from the petitioners and the two other manufacturers and then such sprayers with the engines are sold to farmers for agriculture use.
Thus, we are of the view that when the same product is being manufactured by three different companies--M/s. High Power Engineering Company Private Limited, Satara, Maharashtra, M/s. Greaves Limited, Chennai, Tamil Nadu and the petitioner at Valsad, Gujarat, the interest of justice demand that the respondent-authorities are required to give similar treatment to the product being manufactured by the petitioner-Company.
Accordingly, the respondents are restrained from recovering excise duty from the petitioner Company on Agricultural Knapsack Sprayer Engine being manufactured by the petitioner-Company otherwise than at the rate at which the Central Excise authorities are recovering excise duty from the manufacturers of the same product in other States.
The Court concludes that similar treatment should be given to the product manufactured by the petitioner as to those in Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. The respondents are restrained from recovering excise duty from the petitioner otherwise than at the rate applied in other States. The Central Board of Excise and Customs is directed to consider giving uniform treatment to manufacturers of the same product nationwide within four months.
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2004 (4) TMI 589
Whether 563 articles lying in 'Toshakhana' (Treasury of the State of Jammu & Kashmir) can be declared as the private property of the appellant or this issue deserves fresh determination by Government of India or it be referred to arbitration for adjudication?
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2004 (4) TMI 588
Interpretation of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the relevant provisions of Legal Remembrancer's Manual relating to appointment and renewal of term of the District Government Counsel
Whether the High Court was right in its direction in the light of Special Reference No.1 of 1998 that a collegium should be constituted?
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