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Showing 61 to 80 of 831 Records
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2010 (4) TMI 1178 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be kept renewed till further orders which shall be sought from the court. (iv) It shall be open for the company or the promoters to make an appropriate application placing before this court the result of the adjudication proceedings on the claims of the statutory authorities as well as the unsecured creditors and seek appropriate orders for adjustment of the dues out of the amounts lying with the Official Liquidator in case the adjudication results in an order against the company. In the alternative, it shall be open to them to seek appropriate orders for release of the amount(s) with all accruals thereon in favour of the company. (v) The Official Liquidator shall be entitled to such expenses incurred by him, from the funds available in the accounts of the company. A report in this behalf shall be placed by the Official Liquidator before the court for appropriate directions with regard to the adjustments of the amounts. 63. The applications stand allowed in the above terms.
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2010 (4) TMI 1177 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... he High Court to consider the following issue "Whether the petitioner was served ornot served with a notice under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962? If not served, the consequences thereof." Dasti service, in addition, is permitted.
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2010 (4) TMI 1176 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... bour Court and even before the High Court that the appellant was engaged/employed without following the statutory rules or Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that was the basis for discontinuing his engagement. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in relying upon the alleged illegality of the engagement/employment of the appellant for upsetting the award of reinstatement. 21. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Division Bench of High Court is set aside and the award passed by the Labour Court is restored. If the appellant has not already been reinstated, the respondent shall do so within one month from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. The respondent shall also pay the back wages to the appellant within a maximum period of three months, failing which the appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per annum from the effective date of reinstatement i.e., 21.3.2000. The parties to bear their own costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1175 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t. In these circumstances, the Court's subjective perceptions - in the absence of objective materials, or even pleadings, cannot metamorphasize into "judicial notice"; such inferences would be dangerous, and undermine the process of judicial decision making. The court is not rendering any findings or observations about other allegations leveled by the IA No. 8042/2009 I CS(O)S No.1154/2009 Page 10 defendant regarding Chorian's so called "trafficking" in the trademark. No such findings, even of the prima facie kind, are called for, as the parties have to establish their relative strengths during the trial in the suit. 19. In view of the above discussion and on account of lack of evidence by the plaintiff, the Court does not find it appropriate to injunct the defendants from using their registered trademark, at this stage. I.A. No. 8042/2009 is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. CS (OS) 1154/2009 List for further proceedings on 01.09.2010.
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2010 (4) TMI 1174 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ssion, we wish to make note of the fact that respondent no. 9 has, in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court, prayed for declaring the consent terms to be cancelled and annulled on the ground that the consent terms have been rendered infructuous due to the failure of respondent no. 8 to perform his obligations as per the consent terms. We have a strong feeling that a money game is being played. Since the stakes are high, each party before us is trying to draw the maximum advantage. To us, there seems to be no other reason for respondent no. 9 having adopted such a course of action. 42. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered view that entering into the compromise as also filing of the same in the High court of Bombay by respondent no. 9 on behalf of the appellants was without any fraud and well within the scope of his authority. Accordingly, we find no merit in the present appeals and the same are hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1173 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... refore, we are of the view that the interest u/s.234D is chargeable. However, the AO is directed to charge the interest after giving effect to this order and according to law. The ground taken by the assessee is therefore partly allowed. ITA No.7293/M/07 (A.Y. 2005-06) (Assessee’s Appeal) 15. At the time of hearing both parties have agreed that the facts of the above issues are the same as the facts of the case for the Assessment Year 2004-05, therefore, the plea taken by them for the said Assessment Year may be considered while deciding the grounds for the Assessment Year 2005-06. 16. That being so and in the absence of any distinguishing feature brought on record by the parties we direct the AO to follow our finding recorded in paras- 10,12, and 14 of this order. We hold and order accordingly. The grounds taken by the assessee are therefore partly allowed. 17. In the result, assessee's appeals stand partly allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 20.4.2010.
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2010 (4) TMI 1172 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e, whether there is adequate compliance of Section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. 14. As far as compliance with the provisions of Section 57 of NDPS Act is concerned, as has been indicated earlier, it has been held by this Court that the same was not mandatory, and, in any event, information of the arrest of the petitioner and seizure of the contraband had been duly reported to the local police station on the basis of which the First Information Report had been drawn up. 15. As to the submissions advanced with regard to conscious possession of the seized Poppy Husk, we are of the view that the same cannot be accepted having particular regard to the fact that the six bags containing 32 kilograms of Poppy Husk in each of the bags were not only recovered from the premises of the petitioner but from a room which was opened by him with a key in his possession. 16. We, accordingly, find no merit in the Special Leave Petition, and the same is dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1171 - SC ORDER
SSI Exemption - Brand name - Demand - Limitation - Held that:- There is no merit in the appeal - the appeal is dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1170 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd as such further reasoned order is not invited. 6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present petition is allowed. The respondent Company Mahendra Suitings Limited is hereby ordered directed and ordered to be wound up. The Official Liquidator attached with this Court is appointed as Official Liquidator for the respondent Company Mahendra Suitings Limited. The Official Liquidator is hereby directed to take possession of the properties (movable and immovable) of the respondent company along with its bank accounts, cash and accounts books, etc. immediately after preparing inventory and Panchnama. The inventory and the Panchnama of the properties of the respondent Company shall be made by the Official Liquidator immediately without wasting any further time. The Official Liquidator shall submit his report within a period of three months. If required, he can take services of the Official Valuer for the purpose of preparation of possession note, etc. No costs.
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2010 (4) TMI 1169 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pplied in each case to similar facts. 19. In my view, the effort made by learned Senior Counsel is an effort to distinguish something which is indistinguishable. In my opinion, the principle laid down in Nozer Gustad Commissariat v. Central Bank of India and Ors. (supra) as well as Om Wati v. Delhi Transport Corporation New Delhi and Ors. (supra) are required to be followed and they are in consonance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in Smt. Sarbati Devi v. Smt. Usha Devi (supra). 20. The entire amount due in the Provident Fund Account of the deceased has been paid to defendant No. 3. It is she alone who was entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased. Plaintiff being her cousin is not entitled to any share. Even if he had received 50 of the amount due, he was liable to pay the same to defendant No. 3 as the successor of the deceased Joazinho Dias. 21. Considering the above, I find there is no merit in this appeal and, consequently, the same is hereby dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1168 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Strike of company name - Seeking restoration of the name of the Petitioner Company u/s 560(6) of the Companies Act, 1956 - Registrar of Companies struck the petitioner company's name off the Register due to defaults in statutory compliances, namely, annual returns for the period 30.09.2000 to 30.09.2008 and balance sheets for the period 31.03.2000 to 31.03.2008 - HELD THAT:- Looking to the fact that the petitioner is a running company, that it has filed this petition within the stipulated limitation period, and to the decision of the Bombay High Court in PURUSHOTTAMDASS VERSUS REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES [1984 (4) TMI 247 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY] which says that object of section 560(6) of the Companies Act is to give a chance to the company, its members and creditors to revive the company which has been struck off by the Registrar of Companies, within a period of 20 years, and to give them an opportunity of carrying on the business only after the company judge is satisfied that such restoration is necessary in the interests of justice.
To my mind, this petition deserves to be allowed, although a greater degree of care was certainly required from the petitioner company in ensuring statutory compliances. Looking to the fact that annual returns and balance sheets were not filed for almost eight years, the primary responsibility for ensuring that proper returns and other statutory documents are filed, in terms of the statue and the rules, remains that of the management.
To my mind, the expression "shall otherwise order" used in Rule 94, as reproduced above, means that costs may be imposed on the petitioning party which cover the costs of the "Registrar of Companies" involvement in the proceedings, but are not limited to the same, unless the Court otherwise orders.
The restoration of the petitioner's name to the Register maintained by the respondent will be subject to the payment of ₹ 50,000/- as exemplary costs, payable to the common pool fund of the Official Liquidator. In addition, further costs of ₹ 11,000/- be paid to the Registrar of Companies. Costs be paid within three weeks from today. The restoration of the petitioner's name to the Register will also be subject to the completion of all formalities, including payment of any late fee or any other charges which are leviable by the respondent for the late deposit of statutory documents.
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2010 (4) TMI 1167 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , he seeks permission to withdraw the petition with a liberty to file the petition afresh with correct facts and annexures. Permission is, accordingly, granted. Petition is dismissed as withdrawn with above liberty.
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2010 (4) TMI 1166 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... n different units and learned CIT(Appeals) deleted those additions after taking into consideration the results shown in the year for which the audited account are available. Since we have allowed the appeal of assessee and hold that income of the assessee deserves to be redetermined after getting accounts audited. In that situation, all these issues agitated by the revenue are to be looked afresh and, therefore, for statistical purpose the appeal of the revenue is also allowed. The Learned Assessing Officer shall have a look on all issues afresh.” 3. There is no disparity on facts. Respectfully following the order of the ITAT in asstt. year 2002-03 extracted supra we allow the appeal of assessee for statistical purpose and set aside all the issues to the file of AO for readjudication. The assessee will be at liberty to produce evidence in support of its explanation and the AO shall afford due opportunity to the assessee. Order pronounced in the open court on 15.4.2010.
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2010 (4) TMI 1165 - ITAT BANGALORE
Validity of notice issued u/s 143(2) beyond the prescribed period - unaccounted income for the block period 1988-89 to 1998-99 - Block assessment u/s 158BC - AO passed an order of assessment - CIT, set aside the assessment order and remanded the matter back to AO - Subsequent to the remand, AO held the same to be suppressed income and completed and assessment for the block period.
HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that in the instant case, notice was issued u/s.143(2) pursuant to a search conducted on 6.7.1998 in the premises of the respondent-assessee and it was with regard to the block period of 1988-89 to 1998-99 and the said notice though originally issued u/s 158 BC and the assessment order was completed and the same became a subject of remand. We find that subsequently the notice issued on 9.8.2002 is beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
Keeping in mind the proviso to section 143(2) as it then stood, where the limitation period was one year, since the date of filing of the return in the instant case is 4.5.1999 keeping in mind the ration of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of HOTEL BLUE MOON [2010 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT], wherein it has been stated that if the AO for any reason repudiates the return filed by the assessee in response to a notice u/s 158BC (a) then he must necessarily issue a notice u/s 143(2) within the time prescribed in the proviso to Sec. 143(2). If there is a omission of the part of the Assessing Authority to issue notice u/s 143(2), then it is not a more procedural irregularity and the same is not curable.
Therefore, the notice issued u/s 143(2) was beyond the period of limitation as stated in proviso (2) to the said section and hence the proceedings initiated pursuant to the notice are vitiated. We have to dismiss the appeal.
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2010 (4) TMI 1164 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 50C is not applicable to depreciable assets covered under Section 50 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?” The stay application stands disposed of. The appellant shall file requisite number of paper book within three months from date. Let notice of this appeal be issued to the respondent. Let photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.
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2010 (4) TMI 1163 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... peals deserve to be dismissed on the ground that they are barred by limitation. Even otherwise we are of the opinion that the Orders passed by the CIT(A) are in accordance with law. When applications filed by the assessee are admitted by the Settlement Commission, exclusive jurisdiction vests with the Settlement Commission and hence appeals filed before the CIT(A) automatically become infructuous. Under exceptional circumstances, if no orders passed by the Settlement Commission, appeals or proceedings pending before the Income Tax authorities automatically gets revived in which event the assessee has to approach the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). In other words, appeals cannot be filed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and, instead, the assessee has to approach the CIT(A) for appropriate remedy. Under these peculiar circumstances, appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed as un-admitted, being barred by limitation as well as on merits. Pronounced accordingly.
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2010 (4) TMI 1162 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd of accounting ?” 2. It is an admitted position that the controversy involved in the present case stands concluded by a decision of even date rendered by this Court in the case of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Bharuch Circle Vs. Narmada Chematur Petrochemicals Ltd., in Tax Appeal No. 852 of 2007. 3. In the circumstances, for the reasons stated in Tax Appeal No. 852 of 2007, this appeal is dismissed.
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2010 (4) TMI 1161 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
SSI exemption - clubbing of clearances - independent unit - N/N. 1/93-CE dated 28.2.93 - denial on the ground that the different units were not independent units and they were liable to be clubbed together to consider the claim regarding the said exemption -
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2010 (4) TMI 1160 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... g from earth leveling, road making, horticulture, soil testing, electrification, underground cabelling of entire area, putting HT lines, street lighting, sewerage, water supply, drainage etc. Thus, this case is distinguishable on facts and does not help the Revenue for declining assessee’s claim u/s 80IB(10). 25. The restriction put in by the insertion of Explanation to Section 80IB(10) relates to denial of exemption to an undertaking which executes the housing project as a work contract. In view of the above findings recorded by us which is as per the scope of the work actually undertaken by the assessee in terms of the agreement executed with DDA/IRWO, we can safely conclude that assessee has worked as a developer, therefore claim for exemption u/s 80IB cannot be denied. We accordingly dismiss the appeal of the revenue for the above mentioned reasons. 26. In the result, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed. Decision pronounced in the open Court on 23rd April, 2010.
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2010 (4) TMI 1159 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... sment can be made, the assessee would be entitled only to amount of tax paid consequent to final assessment, and not the tax paid by him by way of advance tax or self assessment tax”. In this view of the matter, “the self-assessment tax, if any, is paid by the assessee on the return filed by him for the block period cannot be refunded”. Therefore, whatever taxes are paid by the assessee as per returned undisclosed income, in our opinion, those cannot be refunded. Further, in case, the Department is aggrieved by the order of Tribunal in Miscellaneous Application recalling the entire order and thereafter cancelling the assessment, in our opinion, those orders are separately appealable, because Tribunal in the present appeal has no power to review those orders. 10. In the result, for statistical purposes, the appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed subject to our observation contained in para 9 (supra). The Order was pronounced in the Court on 30.04.2010.
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