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Showing 61 to 80 of 672 Records
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2005 (8) TMI 694
Issues:
Refund claim rejection based on non-challenge of assessment in service tax refund claim.
Analysis:
The appellants filed an appeal against the rejection of their refund claim for Service tax paid, arguing that certain services they provided were not covered under the scope of Service tax and thus, the tax paid on those services should be returned. However, the Revenue contended that since the appellants were registered with the Service Tax Authority and had not challenged the assessment of Service tax, the refund claim was not maintainable. The Revenue cited previous Supreme Court decisions to support their argument that challenging the assessment in a refund claim without filing a statutory appeal against the assessment order is not permissible.
The Tribunal noted that the appellants had indeed paid Service tax and filed the refund claim without challenging the assessment made under the Service tax. The appellants sought a refund based on the argument that certain services were not taxable under the Service tax. However, the Tribunal agreed with the Revenue's position, citing the Supreme Court decisions that an assessment order cannot be challenged in a refund claim without first filing a statutory appeal against the assessment order. Since no appeal had been filed by the appellants against the assessment order, the Tribunal found merit in the Revenue's contention and dismissed the appeal.
In conclusion, the Tribunal upheld the rejection of the refund claim, emphasizing that challenging an assessment in a refund claim without filing a statutory appeal against the assessment order is not permissible, as established by previous Supreme Court decisions. The appellants' failure to follow the proper procedure of challenging the assessment order through a statutory appeal led to the dismissal of their appeal for refund.
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2005 (8) TMI 693
Issues:
1. Applicability of judgments under Central Excise Act and Rules on Service Tax matters.
2. Imposition of penalty on delayed payment of Service Tax.
3. Deposit of Service Tax and interest before show cause notice issuance.
4. Interpretation of Sections 76 & 77 of Finance Act, 1994.
5. Comparison with the case of Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd.
Analysis:
1. The first issue raised in the judgment pertains to the applicability of judgments rendered under the Central Excise Act and Rules on Service Tax matters. The Appellant argued that the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) was based on judgments under the Central Excise Act and Rules, which are not directly applicable to Service Tax matters. The penalty under Service Tax is imposed for delayed payment of Service Tax, and the Appellant contended that the decisions in the impugned order were not relevant to the present case.
2. The second issue addressed in the judgment concerns the imposition of a penalty on delayed payment of Service Tax. The Respondent had deposited the entire Service Tax and interest before the issuance of the show cause notice and adjudication. Citing the case of Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd., where the penalty for delayed filing of returns was set aside due to payment made before adjudication, the Member (Technical) found that the penalty under Sections 76 & 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 was not mandatory in such cases. Consequently, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was deemed proper, and the appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed.
3. The third issue highlighted in the judgment pertains to the deposit of Service Tax and interest before the issuance of the show cause notice. The case was compared to the precedent of Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd., where a similar scenario led to the penalty being set aside. The Member (Technical) found no fault in the Commissioner (Appeals)'s decision, as the Service Tax and interest had been paid before the show cause notice and adjudication, aligning with the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994.
4. The fourth issue discussed in the judgment revolves around the interpretation of Sections 76 & 77 of the Finance Act, 1994. It was concluded that in cases where Service Tax and interest were deposited before the issuance of show cause notice and adjudication, the imposition of penalties under these sections was not mandatory, as evidenced by the case law and precedent cited in the judgment.
5. Lastly, the judgment compared the present case with the case of Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. to establish a similar factual scenario where the penalty for delayed payment of Service Tax was set aside due to the timely deposit of Service Tax and interest. The Member (Technical) found no flaws in the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue, upholding the principles established in the referenced case law.
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2005 (8) TMI 692
The Bombay High Court extended the period by 6 weeks as a last chance, with no further extensions to be granted. The Notice of Motion was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 691
Challenged the judgment passed by the High Court - rejection of the plaint in terms of Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (’CPC’) - suit barred by limitation - Claim related to execution of the lease deed - Prayer in the plaint was to pass a decree - Period beyond 51 years from the date of agreement in 1983 and not for any period prior to that - HELD THAT:- The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, the Order X of the Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised.
Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an independent remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when the objections can be raised, and also does not say in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word ’shall’ is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13.
When the averments in the plaint are considered in the background of the principles set out in Sopan Sukhdeo [2004 (1) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT], the inevitable conclusion is that the Division Bench was not right in holding that Order VII Rule 11 CPC was applicable to the facts of the case. Diverse claims were made and the Division Bench was wrong in proceeding with the assumption that only the non-execution of lease deed was the basic issue. Even if it is accepted that the other claims were relatable to it they have independent existence. Whether the collection of amounts by the respondent was for a period beyond 51 years need evidence to be adduced. It is not a case where the suit from statement in the plaint can be said to be barred by law. The statement in the plaint without addition or subtraction must show that is barred by any law to attract application of Order VII Rule 11. This is not so in the present case.
We do not intend to go into various claims in detail as disputed questions in relation to the issue of limitation are involved. The appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case which shall be gone into in accordance with law by the Trial Court.
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2005 (8) TMI 690
Issues:
1. Applicability of judgments under Central Excise Act and Rules on Service Tax matters.
2. Imposition of penalty on delayed payment of Service Tax.
3. Deposit of Service Tax and interest before issuance of show-cause notice and adjudication.
Analysis:
1. The first issue raised in the judgment pertains to the applicability of judgments under the Central Excise Act and Rules on Service Tax matters. The Appellants-Revenue argued that the decision of the Commissioner (Appeals) was based on judgments rendered by CESTAT/CEGAT under the Central Excise Act, which they contended was not applicable to Service Tax matters. The penalty under Service Tax, according to the Appellants-Revenue, is imposed for delayed payment of Service Tax. They requested that the appeal be allowed based on this argument.
2. The second issue revolves around the imposition of a penalty on delayed payment of Service Tax. The respondents, represented by Shri Sharma, contended that the case was similar to previous judgments such as Commr. of Central Excise, Mumbai vs. Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. and R.B. Bahutule vs. Commr. of Central Excise, Mumbai. They highlighted that in the present case, both the Service Tax and interest had been deposited before the issuance of the show-cause notice and adjudication. Therefore, they argued that the penalty should not be imposed. They urged for the dismissal of the appeal based on these grounds.
3. The final issue addressed in the judgment concerns the deposit of Service Tax and interest before the issuance of the show-cause notice and adjudication. The tribunal noted that the respondents had indeed deposited the entire Service Tax and interest before the show-cause notice was issued and before adjudication took place. Drawing parallels to the case of Top Detective and Security Services Pvt. Ltd., the tribunal concluded that the penalty under Section 76 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994 was not mandatory in such circumstances. The tribunal found no fault in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and dismissed the appeals filed by the Revenue.
In conclusion, the judgment clarified the applicability of previous judgments under the Central Excise Act on Service Tax matters, emphasized the non-mandatory nature of penalties for delayed payment of Service Tax when taxes and interest are deposited beforehand, and ultimately ruled in favor of the respondents based on the specific circumstances of the case.
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2005 (8) TMI 689
The High Court of Bombay dismissed the appeal as the issue raised was already covered by a previous judgment in C.I.T. v/s. ACE Builders (P) Ltd. No merit found in the appeal. Dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 688
Benami transaction - Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami - Scope of Section 4(1) of the Benami Transaction Act, 1988 - Litigation between a father and his married daughter on the right of ownership of a house - Whether the appellant was entitled to raise the plea of benami in view of introduction of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 ("Act") - Act was retrospective in operation Or Not ? - HELD THAT:- We are of the view that the presumption that the suit property was purchased for the benefit of the respondent only was amply rebutted by the appellant by adducing evidence that the suit property, though purchased in the name of the respondent, was so purchased for the benefit of the appellant and his family. As noted herein earlier, the appellate court as well as the trial court on consideration of all the materials including oral and documentary evidence and on a sound reasoning after considering the pleadings of the parties came to concurrent findings of fact that purchase of the suit property by the appellant in the name of the respondent was benami in nature.
Keeping these concurrent findings of fact in our mind which would conclusively prove that the transaction in question was benami in nature, let us now consider whether the appellant was entitled to raise the plea of benami in view of introduction of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 ("Act").
Admittedly, the transaction in question was registered on 24th August, 1970. The suit was filed on 5th of July 1984 which was long before coming into force of the Act. It is an admitted position that the written statement in the suit taking plea of benami was also filed by the appellant long before the Act had come into force. Therefore, it was not a case where Section 4(2) of the Act will have a limited operation in the pending suit after Section 4(2) of the Act had come into operation.
In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court concurrently found that although the suit property was purchased in the name of the respondent but the same was purchased for the interest of the appellant. We are therefore of the opinion that even if the presumption under section 3(2) of the Act arose because of purchase of the suit property by the father ( in this case appellant ) in the name of his daughter ( in this case respondent ), that presumption got rebutted as the appellant had successfully succeeded by production of cogent evidence to prove that the suit property was purchased in the benami of the respondent for his own benefit.
It is true that the judgment of the trial court was delivered after the Act had come into force but that could not fetter the right of the appellant to take the plea of benami in his defence. Since the Act cannot have any retrospective operation in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are therefore of the view that the appellant was entitled to raise the plea of benami in the written statement and to show and prove that he was the real owner of the suit property and that the respondent was only his benamidar.
It is equally settled that High Court in second appeal is not entitled to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below until and unless it is found that the concurrent findings of fact were perverse and not based on sound reasoning. We ourselves considered the evidence on record as well as the findings of fact arrived at by the two courts below. From such consideration we do not find that the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court as well as the trial court were either perverse or without any reason or based on non-consideration of important piece of evidence or admission of some of the parties. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate court as well as the trial court which findings were rendered on consideration of the pleadings as well as the material ( oral and documentary ) evidence on record.
Thus, this appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court impugned in this Court is set aside and the judgments of the trial court as well as the appellate court are affirmed. The suit filed by the respondent shall stand dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.
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2005 (8) TMI 687
Issues:
1. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that no income accrued to the assessee on account of a decretal amount?
2. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in deleting the addition of a specific amount by holding that the receipt of the decretal amount was not a revenue receipt assessable until the finality of the litigation?
Issue 1 Analysis:
The case involved a dispute where a Civil Judge passed a decree in favor of the assessee against an Insurance Company. The assessee, an exporter following the mercantile system of accountancy, did not show the decree amount as income during the assessment year as the matter was subjudice. However, the Assessing Officer added the decree amount towards damages, which was not allowed in a previous year. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) confirmed this addition. Upon appeal, the Tribunal held that the receipt of the decretal amount by the assessee was not taxable as income for the year under consideration. The Tribunal cited a similar case where an appeal to the High Court had not finalized the matter, thus the amount was not considered taxable until the litigation concluded. The Tribunal's decision was based on the pending appeal and lack of finality in the matter, aligning with previous judgments.
Issue 2 Analysis:
The Tribunal's decision was further supported by the case law of CIT v. Hindustan Housing & Land Development Trust Ltd., where the Apex Court ruled that an amount in dispute due to an appeal did not accrue as income during the relevant year. This principle was upheld by the Calcutta High Court and followed by the Bombay High Court in subsequent cases. Applying this precedent, the High Court concluded that the decretal amount received by the assessee against a bank guarantee was not accrued income during the year under consideration due to the pending appeal and the disputed nature of the entire amount. The High Court's decision was in favor of the assessee, following the established legal principles.
In summary, the High Court ruled in favor of the assessee on both issues, holding that the decretal amount was not taxable income until the finality of the litigation, based on the pending appeal and the disputed nature of the amount. The judgment relied on previous legal precedents to support the decision, emphasizing the principle that income in dispute due to an appeal does not accrue during the relevant year.
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2005 (8) TMI 686
Cash credit - Addition on account of closing stock position in the books of account - Whether the assessee had sufficiently proved that the declaration made to the bank was for the purpose of availing higher cash credit facility and it did not reflect correct position regarding the closing stock - HELD THAT:- We find that in the stock position shown to the Bank the assessee had not disclosed quantity and weight of the stock but had only given particulars of the goods and their value. Whereas the Assessing Authority as well as the Tribunal laboured under the impression that the quantity and weight of the goods declared to the Bank differed with that shown by the assessee in the trading account. It is thus clear that addition has been made neither on the ground that the assessee had more stock on 31-3-1990 nor on the ground that the assessee had any concealed income which had been invested by it in the closing stock but simply on the ground that the closing stock declared in the trading account after physical verification and value thereof differed with the stock position given to the Bank.
While making the addition, the Assessing Authority as well as the Tribunal ignored the important fact that the goods/stock shown in the trading account on 31-3-1990 were as per verification and valued at cost whereas in the declaration made to the Bank the stock was not valued at cost but was on rough estimate. As a matter of fact, no statement of stock as on 31-3-1990 was filed before the Bank. It was only for the period ending up to 15-2-1990. The assessing authority and the Tribunal thus have completely mis-read the document (declaration) furnished by the assessee to the Bank and, therefore, the order of the assessing authority as well as of the Tribunal are not sustainable in law.
Thus, the appeal is allowed and the order dated 14-12-1999 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is set aside and that of the Commissioner Income-tax (Appeals), Jammu dated 19-5-1993, is restored.
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2005 (8) TMI 685
Whether the decision of the High Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was incorrect and that the Court should not have interfered with the decision of a private limited company and that the powers under Article 226 cannot be invoked against a private authority who is discharging its functions on the basis of the contract entered into between the employer and the employees. It was contended that the remedy available to the workers was only ordinary civil litigation?
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2005 (8) TMI 684
Whether a review petition cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise?
Whether the respondent had not started commercial production before the date specified in the Government’s policy, it was not entitled to the benefit of the concessional rate of tariff and electricity duty under the said policy?
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2005 (8) TMI 683
Issues:
1. Deletion of additions made under section 68 as unexplained cash credit.
2. Applicability of section 44AF for making assessment at a fixed percentage of turnover.
Analysis:
Deletion of Additions under Section 68:
The Tribunal found that the peak credit of the bank account cannot be treated as unexplained income of the assessee. While the Tribunal deleted the additions made as unexplained cash credit, it directed the Assessing Officer (AO) to reconsider the issue for all four years in light of its observations. The Tribunal clarified that banking transactions in the regular course of business cannot be considered as cash credit under section 68 of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal's decision to inquire into whether the bank transactions represent undisclosed income of the assessee was deemed appropriate. Therefore, this issue does not give rise to any substantial question of law.
Applicability of Section 44AF:
Section 44AF applies to a wholesale trader not involved in retail trade. The Tribunal concluded that the Revenue failed to prove that the assessee was rightly assessed under section 44AF, as the assessee had provided documentation showing a license for wholesale trade. The burden of proof to demonstrate that the assessee was engaged in retail business despite holding a wholesale trade license rested with the Revenue. The determination of whether the assessee was a retail or wholesale trader is a factual finding and does not raise a legal question. As such, no substantial question of law arises in this regard.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed as no substantial question of law was found to be present in the issues raised.
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2005 (8) TMI 682
The dispute was about allowing abatement for the cost of photographic paper and chemicals in photography services subject to service tax. The tribunal directed the appellant to deposit the service tax demanded within six weeks, with waiver of penalty and stay of recovery. Compliance to be reported on 3rd October, 2005.
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2005 (8) TMI 681
Whether the High Court although has a wide power in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it could not have gone outside the pleadings and make out a new case?
Whether High Court of Himachal Pradesh dismissing the claim for interest @ 12% granted by an earlier order of the Division Bench of the same High Court on equitable consideration for depriving them of their lands without taking proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and payment of compensation was correct?
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2005 (8) TMI 680
Issues: Classification of product under heading 8705 or 8429, imposition of penalty on partner.
Classification Issue:
The appellant manufactured "Loader cum Dozzer" by modifying tractors and mounting material handling equipment on them. The appellant claimed classification under heading 8705 as a special purpose motor vehicle, while Revenue authorities argued for classification under 8429 for self-propelled bulldozers and similar equipment. The Tribunal referred to a previous case involving a similar product and classification under heading 8705. Note 3 to Chapter 87 was crucial, stating that mounting equipment on tractors constitutes the manufacture of a motor vehicle. Since the appellant's product involved mounting material handling equipment on tractors, it fell under heading 8705. The Tribunal found in favor of the appellant due to the previous judgment and set aside the duty demand based on incorrect classification.
Penalty Imposition Issue:
The second appeal pertained to the imposition of a penalty on the partner of the appellant. The Tribunal's decision primarily focused on the classification issue, which was resolved in favor of the appellant. As a result, the penalty imposed on the partner was also set aside along with the duty demand. The Tribunal's decision provided consequential relief to the appellants, considering the incorrect classification and penalty imposition as unsustainable based on the classification order. The judgment highlighted the importance of consistency in classification and the impact it has on associated penalties, ensuring fair treatment for the appellants.
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2005 (8) TMI 679
Whether the Reference Judge acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the said judgment solely on the basis of the deposition of one Sendhabhai Vastaram Patel who alleged that the agricultural lands which he and others had been cultivating were of high fertility and three crops in a year were grown therein?
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2005 (8) TMI 678
Issues:
- Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally justified to hold that the amendment in central registration certificate can be made with retrospective effect?
Analysis:
The case involved a revision filed by the Commissioner of Trade Tax challenging the Trade Tax Tribunal's decision to allow an amendment in a dealer's registration certificate with retrospective effect. The dealer had applied for the addition of certain items in the registration certificate with retrospective effect from 1st of July, 1996. The Trade Tax Officer allowed the addition but refused to amend the certificate with retrospective effect. The First Appellate Authority upheld this decision. However, the Tribunal, in the second appeal, directed the Trade Tax Officer to grant the registration with retrospective effect, leading to the current revision.
The High Court analyzed the legal provisions and previous judgments related to retrospective amendments in registration certificates. It was noted that there was no specific provision under the Central Sales Tax Act allowing for amendments with retrospective effect. The Court highlighted that under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, provisions exist for condonation of delay on payment of late fees, but similar provisions were absent in the Central Sales Tax Act. The Court specifically referred to a Division Bench Judgment of the same Court, emphasizing that the case in question was not about amending an existing registration certificate but adding items with retrospective effect.
The Court concluded that in the absence of statutory provisions permitting retrospective amendments in registration certificates under the Central Sales Tax Act, it is impermissible to amend the certificate with retrospective effect based solely on a dealer's request. The Tribunal's decision to grant retrospective effect to the amendment was held unsustainable. Consequently, the Court allowed the revision, set aside the Tribunal's order, and dismissed the second appeal filed before the Tribunal. No costs were awarded in the matter.
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2005 (8) TMI 677
Buprenorphine Hydrochloride I.P. Injections - psychotropic substance within the meaning of the NDPS Act Schedule Or "H" Drugs under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - application for grant of bail - HELD THAT:- The expression "any psychotropic substance" obviously has reference to those listed in Schedule I to the NDPS Rules. Rule 64 is the governing rule in Chapter VII of the NDPS Rules. When a psychotropic substance des not find mention in Schedule I to the NDPS Rules, the prohibition qua possession contained in Rule 64 does not apply. That being the case, in respect of such a psychotropic substance, Rule 66 would also not apply as it has reference to only those psychotropic substances which are included in Schedule I to the NDPS Rules. Rule 67 of the NDPS Rules relates to transport of psychotropic substances. It is expressly subject to the provisions of Rule 64 and clearly has reference to the transport, import inter-state or export inter-state of those psychotropic substances which are included in Schedule I to the NDPS Rules. The rule would have no applicability in respect of those psychotropic substances which are not to be found in Schedule I to the NDPS Rule. Clearly, then, inasmuch as Buprenorphine Hydrochloride is not included in Schedule I to the NDPS Rules, its manufacture, possession, sale, transport would neither be prohibited nor regulated by the NDPS Rules and consequently by the NDPS Act. It being Schedule H drug would fall within the rigours of the D and C Act and Rules.
Finally, it must be noted that Buprenorphine Hydrochloride I.P. is also a medication and is used as a pain reliever. Recently it is also being used to treat opiate addiction (such as addiction to heroin). It has legitimate uses as an analgesic and for de-addiction. However, it is also capable of misuse being a psychotropic substance. Perhaps because of this reason, it was left out of Schedule I to the NDPS Act but is very much regulated under the D and C Act and Rules.
Application for grant of bail - The petitioner is aged about 70 years and is said to be suffering from heart problems. It is further contended that he was taking treatment in Iran and is undergoing such treatment now in Tihar Jail. Only 1091 ampoules of Buprenorphine Hydrochlorideare alleged to have been recovered from the petitioner. Therefore, taking the content of each 2ml ampoule (as per the complaint itself) to be 0.6 mg of Buprenorphine Hydrochloride, the recovery from the petitioner is only of 1091 x 0.6 = 658.2 mg or 0.6.82 gm of Buprenorphine Hydrochloride which amount is even smaller than the specified small quantity of 1 gm. Moreover, even if all the ampoules are taken to be recovery from the petitioner they would total to 7235 ampoules of 2 ml. each. That would tranlate to a content of only 4.341 gms of Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and not 14.5 kg as erroneously calculated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in his order dated 7.8.2004 whereby the petitioner's bail application was rejected. Even this quantity is far below the commercial quantity of 20 gm.
I have already held that Buprenorphine Hydrochloride is beyond the pale of Chapter VII of the NDPS Rules and therefore, it being a Schedule H drug under the DandC Act and Rules, the offence under section 8 is not made out. Consequently, punishments under section 22, 23, 28 or 29 of the NDPS Act would not be attracted. Furthermore, assuming that an offence under the NDPS Act was, prima facie, made out, the quantity linked to the present petitioner is only 4.341 gm, much lower than the commercial quantity of 20 gm. Accordingly, even in this assumed scenario, the rigours of section 37 of the NDPS Act would not apply.
In view of all these circumstances the petitioner would be entitled to bail. Accordingly, he is directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned trial court.
As indicated, Buprenorphine Hydrochloride is beyond the pale of Chapter VII of the NDPS Rules and therefore, it being a Schedule H drug under the D and C Act and Rules, the offence under section 8 is not made out. Consequently, punishments u/s 22 or 29 of the NDPS Act would not be attracted. Moreover, the petitioner was only a Customs House Agent who cleared medical consignments on behalf of his clients.
Thus, the petitioner would be entitled to bail. Accordingly, he is directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 25,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned trial court.
It is made clear that all observations made in this order, whether common to all the applications or specific to each of the applicants, are only prima facie in nature. They are only for the purposes of consideration of the aforementioned bail applications and are not to be regarded at the time of trial of the respective cases.
All the applications stand disposed of.
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2005 (8) TMI 676
Challenged the findings of Tribunal - claim of lease rentals on the transactions of sale-cum-lease back agreement - Whether the transaction of sale-cum-lease back is genuine or not and whether the lease rent should be allowed or not - HELD THAT:- The admitted facts are that assessee is a Government company and when the Tribunal found the transaction as genuine, this finding of fact in our view is not perverse and when the finding of the Tribunal is not perverse, no question of law does arise for admission of the appeal.
The appeal stands dismissed at admission stage.
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2005 (8) TMI 675
Issues: Pollution and Degeneration of Mithi River, Revival Plan, Legal Directions for Prevention
In this judgment by the High Court of Bombay, the Petitioner presented a comprehensive action plan for the revival of the Mithi River, highlighting its original status and current condition. The plan included steps such as prevention of waste dumping, desilting, stopping encroachments, and controlling pollution sources. The Petitioner also suggested actions for various authorities like the Airport Authority, State Government, and Pollution Control Board to revive the River. The Court acknowledged the pollution issues caused by industrial effluents, waste dumping, and diversions, and deemed it necessary to pass directions for revival and prevention. After hearing all parties, the Court issued specific directions, including identifying illegal commercial units, monitoring waste discharge, preventing encroachments, and ensuring proper garbage collection. The Court mandated strict compliance with these directions and required filing of reply-affidavits by relevant authorities to confirm compliance within specified timelines. Additionally, the Airport Authority was directed to provide necessary information promptly. The Advocate General informed the Court about the formation of the "Mithi River Development and Protection Authority" and was directed to update on the committee's actions. The Court appreciated the Petitioner's detailed action report and scheduled the next hearing for further proceedings on the matter.
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9911796707
