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Showing 81 to 100 of 2063 Records
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2019 (1) TMI 1987
Profits on sale of land - LTCG - CIT(A) held that the land comprised in the project ‘RMT Phase II’ is a capital asset and the gain out of the sale of the same should be treated as capital gains - HELD THAT:- When we called for the relevant documents, both the parties could not place anything but pleaded on the orders of the lower authorities. However, both of them have agreed that this issue can be remitted back to the AO for a fresh examination. In the facts and circumstances, we deem it fit to remit this issue back to the AO for a fresh examination. The assessee shall place all the materials in its support before the AO and comply to the AO’s requirements as per law. A O is free to conduct appropriate enquiry as deemed fit, but he shall furnish adequate opportunity to the assesssee on the material etc to be used against it and decide the matter in accordance with law for assessment years 2008-09 to 2011-12.
The proposal of the AO for enhancement of income to the CIT(A), towards disallowance of expenditure in the activity of breeding horses for assessment year 2008-09, the Ld. DR pleaded on the lines of grounds of appeal extracted.
CIT(A) followed the order of this tribunal, supra, we do not find any reason to interfere with his order and hence, the corresponding grounds of the Revenue for assessment year 2008- 09 is dismissed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1986
Maintainability of application - initiation of CIRP - Corporate Debtor failed to make repayment of its dues - Operational Creditors - existence of debt ad dispute or not - HELD THAT:- On the basis of the evidences on record the Operational Creditor has established that the Corporate Debtor is under an obligation to pay for pending Operational Dues aggregating to 4,03,750/- along with interest @ 18% p.a. through two invoices. The said amount is due and a default has also occurred. Considering these facts and circumstances, in my humble opinion the nature of the Debt is an ‘Operational Debt’ as defined under section 5 (21) of the Definitions under The Code. There is a “Default” as defined under section 3 (12) of The Code on the part of the Debtor.
The conduct of the Corporate Debtor, despite being served with the notice for intimation of hearings, is evident of the fact that he has admitted its liability - the Operational Creditor has not received the outstanding Debt from the Debtor and that the formalities as prescribed under The Code have been completed by the Operational Creditor.
This Petition deserves ‘Admission’ specially wherein the Debtor is accepting its default - Petition admitted - moratorium declared.
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2019 (1) TMI 1985
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Reason to believe or reason to suspect - disallowing genuine loss suffered on share trading treating the same as contrived on account of client code modification - HELD THAT:- As recording shows that this was not at all a reason to believe envisaged u/s 147 of the Act. At best the same can be considered as reason to suspect only. The recording states that the assessee Sh. Tulsi Dass has suffered a loss in a transaction in which client code modification was involved and earned profit- in a transaction in which client code modification was involved. However, there is no material on record to show that prima facie the said client code modification was because of some malafide reason and the assessee has received cash in lieu of payment made for loss and profit in which client code modification was involved.
Thus, the above recording does not satisfy requirement of law mandatory for assuming jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. My above view is supported by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Coronation Agro Industries Ltd. Vs. DCIT [2017 (1) TMI 904 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] - Therefore, the reassessment order passed pursuant to the above recording is hereby quashed and ground of the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1984
Maintainability of petition - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is yet to make a complaint to the Nodal Officer. At this stage, it would not be appropriate to intervene.
The petitioner is at liberty to avail of his remedies. The petitioner is also at liberty to approach the Writ Court if the situation so demands.
Petition disposed of
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2019 (1) TMI 1983
Seeking condonation of delay of 22 days in filing Company Scheme Petition - compromise or arrangement - Rule 15 of the Amalgamation Rules - HELD THAT:- Rule 15 sub-clause 3 provides that where the company fails to present the petition during the prescribed period, then with the leave of the Tribunal, Petition can be filed on payment of cost.
There is a delay of 22 days in filing Company Scheme Petition - Application allowed under Rule 15(3) of Amalgamation Rules, subject to payment of Rs.2,000/- as cost, which shall be paid in the account of Prime Minister National Relief Fund and allow the Petitioner to file the Company Scheme Petition within seven days from today.
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2019 (1) TMI 1982
Settlement of company - company has not filed its Annual Returns from 2001 onwards till date - HELD THAT:- On perusal of this application, it appears that this company has not filed its Annual Returns from 2001 onwards till date i.e. for more than 15 years, that apart, this Bench has noticed that this company has not been doing any business.
The Companies not doing any business and not doing filings, such companies shall not be settled, henceforth this Application is hereby dismissed for want of merit.
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2019 (1) TMI 1981
Contempt petition - order and direction not followed - bank guarantees in question whose details are already on record, have not been returned till date - HELD THAT:- All parties (including Axis bank and Bharti Airtel Ltd.) to proceed on the basis that the three bank guarantees referred to in the opening paragraph of this Court’s order dated 28.11.2018 and in the TDSAT order dated 16.07.2018 (particulars at page 18 of I.A. No. 180450 of 2018) stands cancelled and shall no longer be used for any purpose whatsoever.
Application allowed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1980
Suit for injunction restraining infringement of an existing and valid patent - seeking permanent injunction against the Defendants from using the trademark "BOLGARD" and "BOLGARD II" brand cotton technology - seeking to restrain the Defendants from selling and or using seeds/hybrid seeds bearing the patented technology, infringing the registered patent of the Plaintiffs, along with rendition of accounts - HELD THAT:- Section 64 of the Act provides for revocation of patent based on a counter claim in a suit. It necessarily presupposes a valid consideration of the claims in the suit and the counter claim in accordance with law and not summary adjudication sans evidence by abstract consideration based on text books only. The Code of Civil Procedure provides a detailed procedure with regard to the manner in which a suit instituted Under Section 9, including a counter claim has to be considered and adjudicated. The Code mandates a procedure by settlement of issues, examination and cross examination of witnesses by the parties, including discovery/inspection of documents, culminating in the hearing of the suit and decree. A suit can be disposed of at the initial stage only on an admission inter alia Under Order 12 Rule 6 or when the parties are not in issue Under Order 16 Rule 1 and the other grounds mentioned therein, none of which are applicable herein.
The Division Bench ought not to have disposed of the suit in a summary manner by relying on documents only, extracted from the public domain, and not even filed as exhibits in the suit, much less examination of expert witnesses, in the facts of the present case. There is no gain saying that the issues raised were complicated requiring technological and expert evidence with regard to issues of chemical process, biochemical, biotechnical and microbiological processes and more importantly whether the nucleic acid sequence trait once inserted could be removed from that variety or not and whether the patented DNA sequence was a plant or a part of a plant etc. are again all matters which were required to be considered at the final hearing of the suit.
The Division Bench ought to have confined itself to examination of the validity of the order of injunction granted by the learned Single Judge only. But we are not inclined to remand the matter for that purpose to the Division Bench as we are satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the case that the nature of the injunctive relief granted by the Single Judge was in order and merits no interference during the pendency of the suit.
The order of the Division Bench is set aside - Appeal disposed off.
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2019 (1) TMI 1979
Exemption u/s 11 - non-registration of the Appellant u/s 12AA - applicability of proviso of Sec.12A (2) which was inserted w.e.f 1st October, 2014 - benefit of Sec. 11/12 as well as 10(23C)(iii ad) of the Act was denied to the assessee society on the ground that the assessee is not registered u/s. 12AA - HELD THAT:- As observed that the Appellant got registration u/s 12AA of the Act w.e.f. 09-02-2012 and as on that date the appeal against the quantum was pending before the Ld. CIT(A) which was decided on 10-10-2012 and against which the appeal is still pending for adjudication before this bench and hence the assessment proceedings can be construed as continuing and pending.
While respectfully following the dictum of the Apex Court as well as the Co-ordinate Benches, we are of the considered opinion that the issue is squarely covered by the aforesaid decisions, therefore, we do not have any hesitation to held that proviso to Sec.l2A(2) which was added by Finance Act, 2014 shall be retrospective in operation.
There is nothing either on record or otherwise brought on record by the Ld. DR to the effect that there is any change in the objects and activities of Assesse/Trust for the preceding assessment years involved. Hence, we are inclined to held that registration granted to the assessee by the CIT(E) vide letter dated 09-02-2012 shall be effective from 10-08-2008 being the date of formation of society and the assessee shall be entitled to get the benefit of registration for A.Ys. 2009-10 and 2010-2011 as well, against which appeals are under consideration. Consequently we set aside the impugned order passed by the Id. CIT(A) as well as assessment order and delete the addition, by allowing the assessee's appeal.
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2019 (1) TMI 1978
Capital subsidy - incentive received by the assessee from Govt. of Maharashtra in the form of Octroi Refund - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the assessee has received incentive in the form of Octroi refund under Govt. of Maharashtra Package Scheme of Incentives, 2007. We find that the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT Vs. M/s.Universal Construction Machinery and Equipments Ltd. [2018 (8) TMI 1752 - ITAT PUNE] in an identical set of facts has held subsidy received by the assessee under Package Scheme of Incentives, 2007 as capital in nature - Decided against revenue.
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2019 (1) TMI 1977
Deduction u/s 80P - assessee society is a cooperative society registered under Tamilnadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 - As per AO assessee bank may not function as a normal scheduled bank. But it functions as a bank specialized in re-finance. The business of banking cannot be narrowly taken to the definition of banking as per the Banking Regulations Act. The assessee bank gets loans from NABARD, State Governments, raises debentures and finance to its members - HELD THAT:- The provisions of Sec.80P envisages exemption of income from tax for a cooperative society in the case of cooperative societies engaged in the business by providing credit facility to its members and the sub Sec.4 of the Sec.80P carves out an exception to this provision by providing that the exemption u/s.80P shall not be available to a Cooperative bank.
However, primary agricultural cooperative societies which are engaged in agricultural and rural development bank whose business operations are confined to taluk level, the deduction would be available. In the present case, the AO had not gone into the question of verifying whether the Respondent-assessee-society is a mere cooperative society or a cooperative bank. In case, it is engaged in the activities of cooperative bank, and activities are not confined to the taluk level, it is clearly hit by provisions of Sub.Sec.4 of Sec.80P of the Act.
It is also requires to be verified whether the activities of the Respondent-society are confined to its Members and non-members also. In these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the matter should be restored to the file of the AO for the purpose of carrying out exercise of verification of business activities of the appellant on the above lines and accordingly we remit the issue to the file of the AO for examining the applicability of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Citizen Co-operative Society Ltd. [2017 (8) TMI 536 - SUPREME ] - Appeal filed by the Revenue is partly allowed for statistical purposes.
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2019 (1) TMI 1976
Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) - assessee filed revised return beyond the due date for filing revised return and only due to the enquiries in the assessment proceedings - defective notice u/s 274 - argument of non specification of clear charge - CIT-A deleted the penalty levy - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the notice issued under section 274 r.w.s. 271 of the Act which is at page no. 17 of the paper book reveals that the AO has not deleted the inappropriate words and parts of the notice, whereby it is not clear as to the default committed by the assessee, i.e. whether it is concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income that the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act is sought to be levied. In this regard, we find that in its order in the case of M/s Manjunatah Cotton & Ginning Factory [2013 (7) TMI 620 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] relied on by the assessee /respondent, had held that such a notice, as had also been issued in the case in hand, is invalid and the consequential penalty proceedings are also not valid.
Thus we hold that the notice issued under section 274 r.w.s. 271 for initiating penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act in the case in hand is invalid and consequently, the penalty proceedings are also invalid - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2019 (1) TMI 1975
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy of appeal - HELD THAT:- Since the petitioner has an alternative remedy of appeal before the appellate authority, this writ petition stands disposed of with a direction that if the petitioner approaches the appellate authority by filing an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay within a period of four weeks from today, the appellate authority shall take into consideration all the contentions raised by the petitioner.
The original documents filed by the petitioner may be returned after substituting attested photo copies thereof.
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2019 (1) TMI 1974
Allowability of depreciation - AO rejected the claim of the assessee on the ground that excavation/raising of coal is not manufacture or production of any article or thing - AO has disallowed 50% of additional depreciation claimed only on the ground that lack of details being filed - disallowance sustained by the ld. CIT(A) at 20% of the claim - HELD THAT:- We are of the considered opinion that the matter should be restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, after considering the details of plant and machinery used by the assessee for the purpose of extraction/raising of coal. The assessee claims to have produced audit statements which gave all the required particulars before the Assessing Officer. We direct the assessee to once again produce all the details as required by the Assessing Officer in support of his claim for deduction of additional depreciation. The additional depreciation should be granted on such plant and machinery that have been used for the production of coal. The Assessing Officer should keep in mind that the assessee is a public sector undertaking and its accounts are audited by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India and such audited statements have evidentiary value.
Allowability of provision of NCWA-VIII and executives ad hoc payments - CIT-A deleted the addition - HELD THAT:- As the nomenclature used was “provision”, the Assessing Officer was of the view that the liability in question is not crystallized. The assessee produced wage agreement arrived at with the unions in support of the claim that the liability in question is a crystallized liability.
The issue in question is covered by the decision of the Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Western Coalfield Ltd. [2009 (6) TMI 630 - ITAT NAGPUR] Interim relief @15% of the basic wage affected from 1st July 2008 had been made from the month of April, 2008. The communication of this effect was received from Coal India Ltd. on 16.04.2008. The interim relief to employees is covered under National Coal Wage Agreement. Thus, we find no infirmity in the order of the ld. CIT(A).
Excluding from the total income of the assessee, exempt income by way of interest on account of exempt RBI Bonds, which was wrongly included by the assessee in its total income - HELD THAT:- The fresh claim was made for the exclusion before the ld. CIT(A). This was not adjudicated by the ld. CIT(A). The assessee relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. [1996 (12) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT] and submitted that this issue should have been adjudicated by the ld. CIT(A) in accordance with law as the amount in question is not taxable under the Income Tax Act. On a conspectus of the matter, we admit this additional ground and set aside the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. This fresh claim by way of a ground of appeal is admitted by us by applying the proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd.(supra). The Assessing Officer is directed to dispose off this issue on merits in accordance with law.
Carry forward of unabsorbed allowance for deduction u/s 35E - HELD THAT:- As relying on assessee own case we set aside the matter to the file of the Assessing Officer passing orders in accordance with this order of the Tribunal on this issue.
Disallowance paid on account of donation - HELD THAT:- As relying on assessee own case [2017 (7) TMI 1362 - ITAT KOLKATA] expenditure in question was incurred in terms of the National Coal Wage Agreement under sub-title, Education Facility and Workers Education. This is not a donation per se, but an obligation imposed on the assessee in terms of the National Coal Wage Agreement.
Nagpur Bench of the Tribunal the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. [2002 (2) TMI 344 - ITAT NAGPUR] noted as a fact that the contributions to the various schools were not incurred voluntarily, but the same was incurred to discharge the obligation, which fell on the assessee in terms of a National Coal Wage Agreement entered into with the employees' unions and such an agreement was enforceable under the law both under the Indian Contract Act as also the industrial Disputes Act. - Decided in favour of assessee.
Deduction on account of expenditure on environmental expenses and on account of land reclamation expenses - HELD THAT:- As decided in assessee's own case the appellant’s case is not covered by sec.40A(9).
Grants to “Sports & Recreation” - HELD THAT:- As in the assessee’s own case while adjudicating on identical issues for the Assessment Year 2003-04 to 2007-08 have taken a view that the claim in question is allowable expenditure. The ld. DR could not controvert these submissions of the assessee that the orders in question cover this issue in favour of the assessee.
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2019 (1) TMI 1973
Re-summon of witnesses - permitting the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by examination of one witness Mr. H.S. Tuteja - whenever a date is fixed for examining Mr. H.S. Tuteja, he would fail to turn up and the prosecution would invariably come up with a petition either praying for time or for adjournment of the matter - HELD THAT:- Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code) provides for the power of the court to summon material witness or examination person present - It is well settled that the power conferred under Section 311 should be invoked by the court only to meet the ends of justice. The power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons and it should be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The court has vide power under this Section to even recall witnesses for reexamination or further examination, necessary in the interest of justice, but the same has to be exercised after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of each case. The power under this provision shall not be exercised if the court is of the view that the application has been filed as an abuse of the process of law.
In the instant case, the case was registered in the year 1983. 29 prosecution witnesses have already been examined. The application of the prosecution to examine Mr. H.S. Tuteja was allowed in the year 2004. However, prosecution has failed to keep him in court for his examination. Thereafter, multiple applications have been filed to summon him and all of them have been allowed. However, the prosecution has failed to procure his attendance in the court. - As mentioned earlier, on 28.07.2011 the High Court of Calcutta gave the prosecution a last opportunity to procure his attendance and declared that in case of failure on the part of the CBI to procure the attendance of witnesses and get them examined, the Trial Court will proceed further with the trial without granting any further adjournment to the CBI. Even thereafter, the applications filed by the CBI have been allowed - On 15.09.2014, yet again, the High Court in a criminal revision application observed that since the trial is pending for a long time, steps must be taken by the trial court to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six months. Even thereafter, the trial court has allowed the application filed by the prosecution for summoning Mr. H.S. Tuteja, which order has been confirmed by the High Court. In our view, the High Court ought to have accepted the appeal and rejected the application of the prosecution for summoning the witness, Mr. H.S. Tuteja.
Appeal allowed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1972
Territorial Jurisdiction - maintainability of the suit - whether a decree passed on appeal by a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by reason of undervaluation or overvaluation can be set aside on the ground that on a true valuation that court was not competent to entertain the appeal, the Court held that a mere change of forum is not 'prejudice' within Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act? - HELD THAT:- The objection which was raised in execution in the present case did not relate to the subject matter of the suit. It was an objection to territorial jurisdiction which does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. An executing court cannot go behind the decree and must execute the decree as it stands.
In VASUDEV DHANJIBHAI MODI VERSUS RAJABHAI ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. [1970 (3) TMI 166 - SUPREME COURT], the Petitioner filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad for ejecting the Defendant-tenant. The suit was eventually decreed in his favour by this Court. During execution proceedings, the Defendant-tenant raised an objection that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and its decree was a nullity. The court executing the decree and the Court of Small Causes rejected the contention. The High Court reversed the order of the Court of Small Causes and dismissed the petition for execution.
The High Court was manifestly in error in coming to the conclusion that it was within the jurisdiction of the executing court to decide whether the decree in the suit for partition was passed in the absence of territorial jurisdiction - the High Court has manifestly acted in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the judgment of the executing court which had correctly declined to entertain the objection to the execution of the decree on the ground of a want of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the court which passed the decree.
By the impugned order, the High Court has directed the executing court to entertain an objection to the validity of the decree for want of territorial jurisdiction. Such an objection would not lie before the executing court. Moreover, the objection that the property at Ranchi did not belong to the common ancestor is a matter of merits, which if at all, has to be raised before the appropriate court in the first appeal - appeal allowed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1971
Freedom of Press - Refusal to remand the accused who was produced after the arrest by the petitioner police - publication of fake / derogatory news about His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu - intent to prevent the Governor from exercising his lawful powers and duties, or not - offence under Section 124 of IPC - mandatory procedure followed by police while arresting the respondent, or not - proper application of mind, regarding the materials available on record while rejecting the remand of the respondent, or not - entitlement to 3rd party to participate in Judicial proceedings - extraneous consideration while deciding the remand of the respondent - sufficient reasons, for rejection of remand, given or not.
Whether the Police followed the mandatory procedure while arresting the respondent before producing him before the learned Magistrate? - HELD THAT:- On a prima facie consideration of the materials available on record, this Court is not satisfied with the manner in which the arrest has taken place in this case. The arrest intimation form given to the respondent does not even reveal the reasons for the arrest, which is a very fundamental requirement before a person is arrested in a case. The order of the Court below shows that the gist of the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused in the publication of Nakkeran was read out to the accused in the open Court. This was the first time the respondent came to know the reason for his arrest. If the arrest intimation form does not even reveal which police station is involved in the process of arrest, it will be difficult to even fix the jurisdiction of the Court which has to consider the remand of the accused. The arrest intimation form does not contain these fundamental particulars about the police station involved and that is the reason why, the Court below has stated in the order that the very jurisdiction of the court is not clear since, no police station has been mentioned in the arrest intimation form.
Whether a learned Magistrate had properly applied his mind regarding the materials available on record while rejecting the remand of the respondent? - Whether the learned Judicial Magistrate has given sufficient reasons in the impugned order while rejecting the remand of the respondent? - HELD THAT:- In order to satisfy the requirements of the word “overawe”, there must be something more than the creation of an apprehension, alarm or even perhaps fear. On a prima facie consideration of the allegations made in the complaint, this Court is of the considered view that a lot of intellectual debate is required in this case in order to come to a conclusion as to whether a publication by itself can attract the provisions of Section 124 of IPC. Section 124 of IPC has the ingredients similar to Section 353 of IPC. The latter is a generic version of Section 124 of IPC applying to public servants - While such a fundamental question as to whether an offence under Section 124 of IPC looms large, the petitioner police should not have resorted to arrest on 09.10.2018, the very next day after registering the FIR. The learned Magistrate was therefore right in stating that there is no sufficient material to justify the remand of the respondent.
In this case, the publication is said to have been made from April to September 2018. The petitioner police is not able to demonstrate as to how these publications are preventing His Excellency the Governor of Tamil Nadu from exercising his lawful powers and duties and in what manner it has overawed the Governor. Except the ipse dixit statement made in the complaint, no other material was available with the police in order to seek for the remand of the respondent. Therefore, the Court below was right in rejecting the remand on the ground of in sufficient materials - the learned Magistrate apart from considering the irregularities committed by the police at the time of arrest of the respondent, has also given sufficient reasons while rejecting the remand of the respondent.
Whether a 3rd party is entitled to make his submissions before a Court of law and how far the Court can entertain a 3rd party to participate in Judicial proceedings? - Whether considering the submissions made by the 3rd party in this case will amount to extraneous consideration while deciding the remand of the respondent? - HELD THAT:- It is clear from the provision of Section 32 of the Advocates Act, that the Court has the power to permit any person not enrolled as an advocate to put forth his submissions before a Court whenever called for by the Court.
It is clear from the judgment in HARISHANKAR RASTOGI VERSUS GIRDHARI SHARMA AND ANR. [1978 (3) TMI 213 - SUPREME COURT] that with the prior permission of the Court, the Court can permit any person to speak in the Court. In this case, the Court was dealing with a very peculiar case where a publication has been made a subject matter of an offence under Section 124 of IPC, which is unprecedented and which has come up for the first time before a Court. Therefore, the learned Magistrate wanted to get the views of a reputed and senior journalist as to whether there are any such instances in the past. This query was answered by Mr.N.Ram by touching upon the Freedom of press.
Whether the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate, who on the one hand rejected the remand of the respondent and on the other hand directed the respondent to execute a bail bond, by itself shows uncertainty in the mind of the Magistrate and consequently, will amount to non-application of mind? - HELD THAT:- This Court does not find any ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Magistrate rejecting the remand of the respondent, who was produced by the police officer after arrest.
This Court wants to record its appreciation to the learned XIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Egmore, for the manner in which the proceedings were conducted in the midst of a charged atmosphere in a packed Court hall flooded with advocates, police officers and media persons. The learned Magistrate had maintained equipoise and the same is reflected in the order passed by the learned Magistrate - Petition dismissed.
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2019 (1) TMI 1970
Estimation of income - Bogus purchases - HELD THAT:- We find that under the identical facts and in the case of assessee’s group concern, the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s Mahaavir Universal Homes Pvt. Ltd.[2018 (11) TMI 1898 - ITAT MUMBAI] has directed the AO to apply a GP rate of 3% to assess the bogus purchase under similar facts. We, therefore, respectfully following the same, direct the AO to apply the GP rate of 3% of the bogus purchase.
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2019 (1) TMI 1969
Disallowing Sales Incentive expenses - A.O. for disallowing payment is that the fact of the appellant was already crystallized during the year on the basis of sales booked and hence the liability in respect of payment of sales incentive on the sales booked during the year by the company and was already known to the company - HELD THAT:- As relying on INDIAN PETROCHEMICALS CORPORATION LTD. [2016 (9) TMI 110 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] ground of appeal allowed.
Disallowing Sales Promotion expenses - HELD THAT:- As relying on M/S. SUNFLOWER PHARMACY [2017 (12) TMI 1552 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] which has already given relief to some pharmaceutical company, therefore, we allow this ground of appeal.
Disallowance of Employees Provident Fund u/s. 36(1)(va) - HELD THAT:- This issue is already against the appellant for late deposit of Employees Provident Fund with the authority by the judgment of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the matter of GSRTC [2014 (1) TMI 502 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] - . In the meanwhile, it is noticed that on this issue appeal is pending before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and recently Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in [2018 (10) TMI 1632 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has held that two clear ways are possible to enable the appellant-assessee to get benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court, in case the High Court judgment is reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court - A.R. requested that in view of the order passed by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court as aforesaid therefore this matter may be restored to the file of the ld.CIT(A). Appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2019 (1) TMI 1968
Depreciation @ 40% on vehicles given on lease under hire purchase agreement - HELD THAT:- Question already been answered against the Revenue by a Bench of this Court [2012 (9) TMI 1222 - TELANGANA HIGH COURT] Therefore, following the same, the first question of law is answered against the appellant.
Interest u/s.244A (2) - there was a delay in furnishing the TDS Certificates by the assessee - HELD THAT:- Tribunal has recorded a finding on fact to the effect that the delay in furnishing the TDS Certificates was not attributable to the assessee.
In fact, the assessee claimed credit to the extent of ₹ 1,10,70,255/-.But, the Assessing Officer gave credit only to the extent of ₹ 1,08,39,129/-. The certificates for the value of ₹ 2,31,126/- were found to be defective. But, the Tribunal recorded a factual finding that the assessee had no control in respect of the issue of TDS Certificate. We do not think that the second question of law arises for consideration in this case.
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9911796707
