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Showing 81 to 100 of 1914 Records
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2016 (12) TMI 1838
Deduction u/s 80P in respect of interest received from the schedule bank - HELD THAT:- As decided in own case , [2016 (5) TMI 1545 - ITAT MUMBAI] as relying on QUEPEM URBAN CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETY LTD. [2015 (6) TMI 573 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] where assessee-cooperative society could not be regarded as “Cooperative Bank‟ on, mere fact that an insignificant proposition of revenue was coming from non-members, and thus, was entitled for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) - Decided against revenue.
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2016 (12) TMI 1837
Deemed registration of an application u/s 12AA - High Court has taken the view that once an application is made under the said provision and in case the same is not responded to within six months, it would be taken that the application is registered under the provision - appellants, has raised an apprehension that in the case of the respondent, since the date of application was of 24.02.2003, at the worst, the same would operate only after six months from the date of the application.
HELD THAT:- We see no basis for such an apprehension since that is the only logical sense in which the Judgment could be understood. Therefore, in order to disabuse any apprehension, we make it clear that the registration of the application under Section 12AA of the Income Tax Act in the case of the respondent shall take effect from 24.08.2003.
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2016 (12) TMI 1836
Sanction of proposed scheme of amalgamation - Ministry of Corporate of Affairs appears to have fowarded a copy of the scheme to the Income Tax Department on 6/14.10.2016 with a request to forward their comments/observations/objections, if any, on the proposed scheme of amalgamation within 15 days, but till date no objection has been received from the said authority. Under such circumstances, it is presumed that the Income Tax Department has no objection to the sanction of the scheme.
HELD THAT:- In the event, the petitioners supply a legible computerized printout of the scheme and the Schedule of assets in acceptable form to the department, the department will append such computerized printout, upon verification, to the certified copy of the order without insisting on a handwritten copy thereof - Petition disposed off.
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2016 (12) TMI 1835
Transfer of cumulative redeemable preference shares in favour of Respondent No.1 - rectification in register of members - HELD THAT:- There is nothing to suggest that the compromise amounts to redemption of the preference shares or conversion of the amount due thereon (or any other reduced amount) into a corporate debt. Respondent No.2, even after the sanction of the scheme, continues to be a preference shareholder with agreement to accept 70% of the face value of the redeemable preference shares over a period of 10 years without any dividend. There is no question of any redemption of shares or conversion into a corporate debt or extinguishment of transferability of the preference shares as a result.
Appellant submits that Respondent No.2 has transferred the subject shares to Respondent No.1 in contravention of law including breach of RBI guidelines. Nothing is pointed out as to what particular contravention is committed by Respondent No.2 in transferring the shares. There is no merit in this contention accordingly.
Appellant further submits that the shares of the face value of ₹ 100/ of 5,00,000 preference shares of the Appellantcompany have been transferred by Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.1 at a price of ₹ 5,000/ and that the value of the shares has thereby been severely undermined by Respondent No.2. The value of the shares is a matter between the transferor and transferee. The Company can hardly be concerned with the same. In any event, such value is not binding on the Company. There is, accordingly, no merit in this contention also.
Appeal dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1834
Rejection of the books of account u/s 145(3) - application of net profit rate of 12% - HELD THAT:- Identical issue have been considered by ITAT Chandigarh Bench in the case of the assessee, in preceding assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2008-09. The Assessing Officer has recorded several reasons for rejection of the books of account in the assessment years which have not been disputed by ld. counsel for the assessee. The ld. counsel for the assessee did not challenge rejection of the books of account under section 145(3) of the Act, therefore, findings of authorities below to that extent are confirmed.
Following history of the assessee, it would be reasonable and appropriate to direct the Assessing Officer to apply NP rate @ 6% as against 12% adopted by the authorities below.
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2016 (12) TMI 1833
Disallowance of interest expenses - interest @ 15% p.a. on advances given to various parties on which no interest has been charged - HELD THAT:- Interest-free own funds available at the disposal of the assessee stands at ₹ 352.91 lakhs as on 31/03/2008 and ₹ 507.94 lakhs as on 31/03/2009. The corresponding interest-free advance as on 31/03/2009 stands at ₹ 21.10 lakhs. In such a situation, where interest-free own funds available to the assessee are far in excess of the interest-free advance, the presumption would arise in favour of assessee that the advances were made from interest-free funds available with the assessee.
On this issue, we find guidance from the judgement of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. [2009 (1) TMI 4 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] - In view of the huge funds available with the assessee without any interest liability - Thus, the disallowance of interest towards interest-free advance is uncalled for - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (12) TMI 1832
Decree of specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property - HELD THAT:- This Court in this matter is exercising power as an Executing Court and orders as sought cannot be granted - The counsel for the decree holder then states that the decree holder be refunded the amounts paid by the decree holder but states that the said refund be as per the value of the built up area agreed to be sold - That is again not part of the decree.
List on 22nd August, 2017.
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2016 (12) TMI 1831
Disallowance of interest paid on loans - Assessee claimed interest on accrual basis - Right to claim deduction on the basis of earlier assessment - Whether said interest was accrued on the loans borrowed in earlier years and there is no actual payment of this interest to the parties? - as per AO assessee has not shown the parties for which the loans were borrowed and the interest was disallowed - HELD THAT:- Assessee has borrowed the amount for the purpose of investment in other firms as capital of the assessee - when the assessee borrowed funds for the purpose of investment in other partner firms, it cannot be allowed as deduction as income earned from firm is not feasible while computing the income of the assessee.
This view is fortified by the judgment of Popular Vehicles and Services Ltd.[2009 (10) TMI 574 - KERALA HIGH COURT] - in earlier assessment years, there was no assessment u/s.143(3) and the return was accepted only u/s.143(1) of the Act without any scrutiny. It cannot be said that the right is vested with the assessee to claim such deduction on the basis of earlier assessment. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the assessee are dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1830
Carry forward of additional depreciation - Additional depreciation of 10% on plant and machinery as purchased and put to use in the previous year u/s 32(1)(iia) - HELD THAT:- In so far as claim of carry forward of additional depreciation to the extent it could not be allowed in earlier year due to use lesser than 180 days, no doubt there are decisions of Co-ordinate Bench which are for and against the assessee. In our opinion the issue is no more res integra due to the judgment in the case of Rittal India Pvt. Ltd [2016 (1) TMI 81 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT].
Intention of the legislation is absolutely clear, that the assessee shall be allowed certain additional benefit, which was restricted by the proviso to only half of the same being granted in one assessment year, if certain condition was not fulfilled. But, that, in our considered view, would not restrain the assessee from claiming the balance of the benefit in the subsequent assessment year. Tribunal, in our view, has rightly held, that additional depreciation allowed under section 32(1)(iia) of the Act is a one-time benefit to encourage industrialisation, and the provisions related to it have to be construed reasonably, liberally and purposively, to make the provision meaningful while granting the additional allowance. - Decided against revenue.
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2016 (12) TMI 1829
Treatment of the interest received prior to commencement of commercial operations of the specified mega road projects - Income from other sources or capital gain - As per the assessee, it is in the nature of capital receipt and will be required to be set off against the pre-operative expenditure capitalized under the head “Capital work in progress” and the same cannot be brought to tax under the head “income from other sources.”- HELD THAT:- Respectfully following the decision of Coordinate Bench in assessee’s own case [2016 (9) TMI 957 - ITAT JAIPUR] we hold that the interest received prior to commencement of commercial operations of the specified mega road projects will be in the nature of capital receipt and will be required to be set off against the pre-operative expenditure capitalized under the head “Capital work in progress” and the same cannot be brought to tax under the head “income from other sources”. - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2016 (12) TMI 1828
Addition u/s 14A r/w Rule 8D - Tribunal held that no investment is made by the assessee in shares and securities (Mutual funds) out of interest bearing funds - HELD THAT:- By an order [2014 (7) TMI 1328 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] this Court refused to entertain the Revenue's two appeals on an identical issue as not giving rise to any substantial question of law. The Revenue has not been able to point out any distinguishing features in the present appeal visa-vis the facts and law involved/existing in the Assessment Years 2006-07 and 2007-08, which would warrant a different view. No substantial question of law.
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2016 (12) TMI 1827
TP Adjustment - comparability - whether Tribunal was justified in accepting the comparables merely on the basis that they have been considered comparable in earlier years? - HELD THAT:- So far as ICRA Management Consulting Services Ltd. is concerned, the impugned order on examination of the functional profile held that it was comparable to the respondent-assessee for the subject Assessment Year. This was further supported by the fact that for the immediately preceding Assessment Year the parties had accepted ICRA Management Consulting Services Ltd. to be a comparable for the purpose of determination of arms length price. Therefore, as far as ICRA Management Consulting Services Ltd. is concerned no interference is called for.
In the above view the appeal is admitted on the following re-framed substantial question of law:
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was justified in accepting EDCIL as comparable to determine the arms length price in the face of rule 10B(4) of the Act only on the basis that for the earlier Assessment Year , the same were also used as comparable.”
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2016 (12) TMI 1826
Infringement of patent vested in the respondents - jurisdiction of the English Court - Executability of order/decree of English Court - Explanation 2 of Section 44A (3) of CPC.
Whether the order passed by the Foreign Court falls within the Exceptions to Section 13 of the CPC? - HELD THAT:- The order passed by the English Court is an order on merits. The appellant who has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court and on its own requested the Court to assess the costs summarily. While passing a reasoned order by dismissing the application filed by the appellant, English Court granted the costs against the appellant. Had it been the case where appellant’s application was allowed and costs were awarded to it, it would have as well filed a petition for the execution of the order - It cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. In our opinion, it is a pure abuse of process of law and the Courts should be very cautious in entertaining such petitions.
The principles of comity of nation demand us to respect the order of English Court. Even in regard to an interlocutory order, Indian Courts have to give due weight to such order unless it falls under any of the exceptions under Section 13 of the CPC. Hence we feel that the order in the present case passed by the English Court does not fall under any of the exceptions to Section 13 of the CPC and it is a conclusive one. The contention of the appellant that the order is the one not on merits deserves no consideration and therefore liable to be rejected.
Whether the order passed by the Foreign Court amounts to a “decree” and the same is executable? - HELD THAT:- As per the plain reading of the definition ‘Judgment’ means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of decree or order and order is a formal expression of a Court. Thus “decree” includes judgment and “judgment” includes “order”. On conjoint reading of ‘decree’, ‘judgment’ and ‘order’ from any angle, the order passed by the English Court falls within the definition of ‘Order’ and therefore, it is a judgment and thus becomes a “decree” as per Explanation to Section 44A(3) of CPC. In this case, the Court at England, after following the principles of natural justice, by recording reasons and very importantly basing on the application of the appellant itself, has conclusively decided the issue with regard to jurisdiction and passed the order coupled with costs - the order passed by the Foreign Court is conclusive in that respect and on merits. Hence executable as a decree and accordingly the issue is answered.
Whether the decree for costs would fall within the ambit of Explanation 2 of Section 44A (3) of CPC and makes it inexecutable? - Whether interest on costs would fall within the ambit of Explanation 2 of Section 44A of CPC? - HELD THAT:- The appellant has advanced an argument that as per Section 35A of the CPC, no Court should pass any order for the payment of compensatory costs exceeding ₹ 3,000/- or exceeding the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction of the said Court whichever amount is less. It is thus argued by the appellant that in the present case, since the costs imposed exceed the bar imposed by Section 35A, therefore, the order of the English Court is not executable in the present case - In the present case, no claim has been advanced by the appellant that the claim filed by the respondents is false or vexatious, therefore, the bar in Section 35A is not applicable. Accordingly the issue is answered. In re Issue No. 5 - It is the case of the appellant that the claim for interest on costs is not recognized in the Indian law. It is to be noted that matters of procedure are to be governed by the lex fori, whereas the matters of the substance are governed by lex causae. In this case, the question whether the interest on sum of decree of costs to be executed in India is a matter of substance as the interest on decree is a substantive right of the decree holder and does not concern itself with the procedural law of the forum.
Whether the interest on costs can be executed in India in view of deletion of Section 35(3) of CPC? - HELD THAT:- It is to the reciprocal advantage of the Courts of all nations to enforce foreign rights as far as practicable. To this end, broad recognition of substantive rights should not be defeated by some vague assumed limitations of the Court. When substantive rights are so bound up in a foreign remedy, the refusal to adopt the remedy would substantially deprive parties of their rights. The necessity of maintaining the foreign rights outweighs the practical difficulties involved in applying the foreign remedy. In India, although the interest on costs are not available due to exclusion of Section 35(3), the same does not mean that Indian Courts are powerless to execute the decree for interest on costs. Indian Courts are very much entitled to address the issue for execution of the interest amount.
The Execution Petition filed by the Respondents for execution of the order dated 19th October, 2006 passed by the English Court is maintainable under the relevant provisions - Appeal dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1825
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) -Tribunal has held that the commission should be taken at 0.15% and the expenditure claimed should be restricted and allowed to the extent of 50% from such income - HELD THAT:- We find that the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal has directed the AO to take commission at the rate of 0.15% and allow the expenses to the tune of 50% of the said commission and bring to tax the amount so worked out. Further, we find that on the identical facts the penalty has been deleted by the co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in M/S. GOLDSTAR FINVEST PVT. LTD. VERSUS THE DCIT- CENTRAL CIRCLE -46, MUMBAI2016 (8) TMI 1502 - ITAT MUMBAI]. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the ld.CIT(A) and direct the AO to delete the penalty. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1824
Oppression and MIsmanagement - misdeeds and dishonesty in the maintenance of minutes of the company - HELD THAT:- On the directions of this Appellant Tribunal the Appellant Company also produced the originals of the relevant minutes of meeting. The 1st Respondent also produced the Photostat copies of the minutes of meeting of the same period which were forwarded to the 1st Respondent for confirmation.
The basic principle of justice delivery system involving offence resulting punishment is that if any-allegation is made by any person before a court of law or Tribunal such person is required to support the allegation by bringing on record some evidence to suggest that a prima facie case is made out and there are good reasons for seeking an order. Therefore, the sentence "Supported by such evidence as may be necessary for the purpose of showing that applicants have good reasons for seeking an order for the conducting an investigation into the affairs of the company", as mentioned below clause (a) of Section 213 is applicable in all cases and the applicant(s), whoever prefers application under Section 213, whether they belong to category as mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b), such evidence is required to be relied upon not only to justify the allegations, but also to Show that there is a good reason for seeking an order, to enable the TribunaI to form its opinion - The other basic principle of justice delivery system that a court or a Tribunal while passing an order is not only required to give good reason based on record/evidence but also required to show that after being satisfied itself the Court/ Tribunal has passed such order.
The sentence “if it is satisfied that there are circumstances suggest" mentioned in clause (b) of Section 213 is applicable to all cases, irrespective of the category to which the applicant(s) belong i.e. clause (a) or clause(b) of Section 213 of the Act - The Tribunal is not expected to refer all the evidence to form opinion about the malpractice or for fraud mentioned in sub-clause (i), (ii) and (iii). It is the-job of the Inspecting Authority (Inspector) to go through the evidence before coming to a conclusion and forming opinion that malpractice or fraud mentioned under sub clause (i) or (ii) or (iii) has been committed by one or other member or director(s) or person(s) or the company.
In the present case, the Tribunal has relied on certain record/evidence, applied it mind, satisfied itself and given good grounds to Order investigation, there are no reason to interfere with the impugned order. For the reason aforesaid and in absence of any merit, appeal is dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1823
Election of the Office Bearers of the Church of South India - Amendment to the Constitution of the Church of South India - mode and manner of election of the office bearers - Whether the procedure prescribed for election in the bye-laws so framed can be said to be in derogation of the Constitution in any manner?
HELD THAT:- The Constitution is the governing book to facilitate the functioning of the Churches and provides a democratic process for elections to various office bearers. The Constitution itself provides the procedure for amendments and the documents placed before the learned Single Judge show that such amendment was made by following the procedure at least prima facie - Similarly, the enacting of the bye-laws is also something which is enshrined in Rule 3 of Chapter XIII and there also prima facie view has been found that it has been made as per the procedure. In fact, both have received overwhelming mandate of 16 out of the 22 Diocesan Councils.
The answer to the question raised would be in the negative - The bye-laws do refer to the principle of nomination by the Bishops from among themselves of the person who has to be elected as the Moderator and the Deputy Moderator. Similarly, for the General Secretary and the Treasurer also a Committee is constituted which would make the nomination, instead of Bishops nominating from amongst themselves. The Committee formed for nomination, in fact, is of a wider spectrum, including apart from Bishop, one Clergy and three lay persons, who bring the names before the Synod for the said posts and the vote is however with the Synod to elect the person. Thus, what is envisaged is a check before the elections.
Whether this check would defeat the principle of secret ballot or franchise principle of majority in any manner? - HELD THAT:- Once again the answer would be in the negative for the reason that the final say is with the Synod. The election has to take place from among the Bishops, who in a religious hierarchy are at the highest level. They from amongst them would find a suitable person and that too by unanimity or a overwhelming majority of two-third. The matter does not end at this since the Synod would have to ratify the same by a simple majority. Thus, if a member of the Synod is not happy with the nomination, they have a right of rejection - The final say thus remains with the Synod, but the collective wisdom of the Bishops as to who among them should be the Moderator has been given weightage. This cannot ipso facto be called a derogation of the Constitution, especially when the bye-laws have been approved, as also the amendment to the Constitution. The position would be the same in case of Deputy Moderator and the only difference for the posts of General Secretary and Treasurer would be that the nomination would be of the Committee which is, in fact, a more representative body as constituted.
Prima facie the bye-laws cannot be said to be in derogation of the Constitution and thus for the coming election process both the amended constitution and the bye-laws as framed would apply.
Appeal dismissed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1822
TP Adjustment - Tribunal restricting the adjustment only on International Transactions where the assessee has selected TNMM and applied the same on entity level - HELD THAT:- Transfer Pricing Adjustment has to be done only in respect of the transaction entered into with the Associated Enterprises and not in respect of all transactions of the entity. See The Commissioner of Income Tax1, Mumbai v/s. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. [2016 (7) TMI 1245 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] AND CIT v/s. Alstom Projects India Ltd [2016 (12) TMI 1408 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]
Delhi High Court has also in CIT v/s. Keihin Panalfa Ltd [2016 (5) TMI 203 - DELHI HIGH COURT] has also independently taken the same view. - Decided against revenue
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2016 (12) TMI 1821
Doctrine of strict construction - commission of the offence by the company punishable Under Section 292 Indian Penal Code - vicarious liability - whether the Appellant who has been discharged Under Section 67 of the IT Act could be proceeded Under Section 292 Indian Penal Code?
HELD THAT:- Section 69 of the IT Act provides for power to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource. It also carries a penal facet inasmuch as it states that the subscriber or intermediary who fails to comply with the directions issued under Sub-section (3) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine - Section 67 clearly stipulates punishment for publishing, transmitting obscene materials in electronic form. The said provision read with Section 67A and 67B is a complete code relating to the offences that are covered under the IT Act. Section 79, as has been interpreted, is an exemption provision conferring protection to the individuals.
The special and specific purpose which motivated the enactment of Section 14-A and Chapter III-A of the Delhi Rent Act would be wholly frustrated if the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act requiring permission of the competent authority were to prevail over them. Therefore, the newly introduced provisions of the Delhi Rent Act must hold the field and be given full effect despite anything to the contrary contained in the Slum Clearance Act.
If legislative intendment is discernible that a latter enactment shall prevail, the same is to be interpreted in accord with the said intention. We have already referred to the scheme of the IT Act and how obscenity pertaining to electronic record falls under the scheme of the Act. We have also referred to Sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act. Once the special provisions having the overriding effect do cover a criminal act and the offender, he gets out of the net of the Indian Penal Code and in this case, Section 292. It is apt to note here that electronic forms of transmission is covered by the IT Act, which is a special law. It is settled position in law that a special law shall prevail over the general and prior laws. When the Act in various provisions deals with obscenity in electronic form, it covers the offence Under Section 292 Indian Penal Code.
The High Court has fallen into error that though charge has not been made out Under Section 67 of the IT Act, yet the Appellant could be proceeded Under Section 292 Indian Penal Code - the orders passed by the High Court and the trial court are set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2016 (12) TMI 1820
Oppression and mismanagement - Disposal of immovable property of company - HELD THAT:- The parties have acted in tandem till the passing of the Board resolution dated 30.07.2010 wherein the parties, namely petitioners 1and 2 and respondents 2 and 3 have made efforts to fortify the C & F business carried at Jharkhand and Bihar probably from the clutches of liabilities which they were well aware was looming on the horizon, particularly after the storm on 29.05.2010 which it is claimed had inflicted severe damage to the manufacturing facilities and thereby crippled production of the 1st respondent company and which had also made them approach the bankers jointly as evident from the letter dated 15.06.2010 sent to SBI wherein the co-operation of the bank had been solicited claiming that the disputes amongst them have been resolved.
Since the main thrust of the challenge of the petitioners seems to be in relation to and concerning the disposal of the immovable property of the company, as an instance oppression of course in addition to their to other instances as well of oppression and mismanagement, the above list of dates has been extracted from the pleadings of the parties for our convenience to understand the events in the correct perspective and as to how the transactions have been perpetrated - in the present case, as notice of EOGM seems to have deliberately been sent to an address where the petitioners were not residing to the knowledge of the respondents thereby clearly showing the intent of the respondents being in majority to exclude the petitioners.
We are forced to come to a conclusion that the acts of the respondents in excluding the petitioners from the affairs of the company had been deliberate and willful and in the absence of notice or any evidence produced before us to sustain the plea of the participation of the petitioners or for that matter the petitioners were put on notice we are constrained to declare the Board Meeting held on 2.11.2010 and 10.12.2010 as well as the Extra-Ordinary General Meeting on 17.03.2011 were not held in accordance with law and as a consequence the agreement to sell is also required to be held as non-est in the eyes of law, however without prejudice to the rights of the third party, namely the 4th respondent from seeking appropriate remedy before the civil court as may be legally available to it.
The meeting of the Board of Directors held on 02.11.2010 and the resolutions passed there at appointing two executive directors were bad in law and the same are declared null and void - Application disposed off.
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2016 (12) TMI 1819
Transfer Pricing adjustments - engineering services rendered by the assessee to its Associated Enterprises abroad - imputing of interest on alleged delay in collection of receivables from Associated Enterprises. - Disallowances of employee’s contribution to Provident Fund - Disallowance u/s.14A - working capital adjustment - HELD THAT:- In so far as imputing interest on delayed payment from Associated Enterprise was concerned, observation of the ld. DRP was that the extended payment terms given to Associated Enterprise without charging interest was exigible to a transfer pricing adjustment, even if commercial expediency was shown by the assessee. As for assessee’s claim for depreciation on goodwill, observation of the ld. DRP was that no such disallowance made by the ld. Assessing Officer and no claim was preferred by the assessee during the assessment proceedings.
Coming to the disallowance for delayed remittance of employee’s contribution of Provident Fund, observation of the ld. DRP was that judgment of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Madras Radiators and Pressing Ltd [2002 (12) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] went in favour of the Revenue and it was rightly disallowed by the ld. Assessing Officer. In so far as disallowance u/s.14A of the Act was concerned, ld. DRP held that such disallowance was justified even though assessee had not earned any exempted income.
DRP had disposed off the grounds taken by the assessee in a summary manner without properly considering the objections raised by the assessee. As for the comparables sought to be excluded/included by the assessee, the ld. DRP had not compared the functional profile of those companies with that of the assessee before deciding on the desirability of their exclusion /inclusion.
Working capital adjustment sought by the assessee was concerned, ld. DRP had not considered the present position of law as laid by a plethora of decisions of this Tribunal which mandated such adjustment as a necessary one while computing profit level indicator. As for interest on delayed receivables, ld. DRP had not dealt with the objections of the assessee against comparing the receivables with pure loans, without considering the commercial expediency factor. On the claim of depreciation of goodwill, ld. DRP had not given any finding why the claim made for the first time before it could not be considered. As for the remittances to employer contribution to Provident Fund, ld. Departmental Representative had not considered the effect of Section 43B on such claim, where remittances of the deducted amount were made before the due date of filing the return. Coming to the disallowance made u/sec. 14A of the Act, the ld. DRP had not adjudicated as to how such disallowance could be made where the claim of the assessee was that it had not earned any exempt income.
We are of the opinion that all the issues raised by the assessee requires a fresh look by the ld. DRP. We therefore set aside the orders of the ld. DRP as well as ld. Assessing Officer and remit all the issues raised by the assessee to the ld. DPR for consideration afresh in accordance with law. Thereafter, ld. Assessing Officer shall reframe the assessment for the impugned assessment year considering such directions.
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