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Showing 81 to 100 of 1046 Records
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2008 (7) TMI 1049
Issues Involved:
1. Ex-parte injunction order.
2. Maintainability of the appeal.
3. Prior use and registration of the trademark.
4. Concealment and misrepresentation by the Respondent.
5. Acquiescence and delay.
6. Distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion.
7. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury.
8. Common use of the suffix "MOLA".
9. Private settlements and third-party use.
10. Delay, laches, and acquiescence.
11. Back to back advertisement.
Summary:
1. Ex-parte Injunction Order:
The appeal was filed against the ex-parte injunction order dated 20th December 2007, restraining the Appellant from using the mark RASMOLA, which was found deceptively similar to the Respondent's well-known mark HAJMOLA.
2. Maintainability of the Appeal:
The appeal was considered maintainable as the learned Single Judge had not disposed of the injunction application or the Appellant's application for vacation of injunction within thirty days. Both parties requested the Court to dispose of the appeal on merits.
3. Prior Use and Registration of the Trademark:
The Appellant contended that it had been using the mark RASMOLA since 1989 and had registered it in 1996. The Respondent argued that it was the prior user of the mark HAJMOLA since 1972, and its mark was well-known with significant sales and advertisement expenditure.
4. Concealment and Misrepresentation by the Respondent:
The Appellant alleged that the Respondent had concealed the filing of three earlier suits against similar marks and had compromised those suits, allowing the use of marks like SIDHMOLA, SATMOLA, and CHATMOLA.
5. Acquiescence and Delay:
The Appellant argued that the Respondent's suit was barred by acquiescence and delay, as the Respondent had knowledge of the Appellant's use of the mark RASMOLA for a long time. The Respondent countered that it had no knowledge of the Appellant's use and that delay or laches would not be a defense against an interim injunction.
6. Distinctiveness and Likelihood of Confusion:
The Respondent claimed that HAJMOLA was a coined and invented word, and its mark was distinctive. The Court found that the Appellant's and Respondent's marks were similar, their products identical, and sold through the same channels, leading to a likelihood of confusion and passing off.
7. Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Injury:
The Respondent argued that the balance of convenience was in its favor and that no injury would be caused to the Appellant if the injunction continued. The Court agreed, noting that the Appellant had other products under different marks.
8. Common Use of the Suffix "MOLA":
The Appellant's argument that the suffix MOLA was common to the trade was not substantiated with significant evidence. The Court held that the Respondent was not expected to sue all small infringers and that the use of similar marks by others could not be a defense to passing off.
9. Private Settlements and Third-Party Use:
The Court found that private settlements by the Respondent did not offer a license to the world to infringe its mark HAJMOLA. Use of similar marks by third parties was not a defense to the Appellant's illegal act of passing off.
10. Delay, Laches, and Acquiescence:
The Court did not find the Respondent's suit barred by delay, laches, or acquiescence. The Appellant's sales under the mark RASMOLA were insignificant until 2004, and the Respondent had not found the Appellant's goods in the market until December 2007.
11. Back to Back Advertisement:
The Court held that the Respondent's extensive advertisement activities made it difficult to presume awareness of the Appellant's product from a few isolated incidents. The publication of advertisements in the same magazine was not sufficient to infer the Respondent's knowledge of the Appellant's use of a similar mark.
Conclusion:
The appeal was dismissed as devoid of merits, with the Court requesting the learned Single Judge to expeditiously dispose of the suit within six months. The observations made were on a prima facie view and would not prejudice either party at the trial.
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2008 (7) TMI 1048
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the ISDA Master Agreement.
2. Allegations of the contract being a wagering contract.
3. Public policy and statutory violations.
4. Authority of defendants 2 and 3 to enter into the contract.
5. Application of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
6. Scope of judicial authority under Section 8.
7. Effect of fraud on the arbitration agreement.
8. Complementary nature of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act.
9. Historical context and legislative intent of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
10. Applicability of the arbitration clause to non-signatory defendants.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Validity of the ISDA Master Agreement:
The plaintiff challenged the ISDA Master Agreement dated 05.01.2007, claiming it was void ab initio, illegal, vitiated by fraud, opposed to public policy, and not binding on the company. The plaintiff sought a declaration to this effect and a permanent injunction to restrain the first defendant from acting under the terms of the Master Agreement.
2. Allegations of the Contract Being a Wagering Contract:
The plaintiff argued that the ISDA Master Agreement was a speculative contract with no underlying exposure, making it a wagering contract void under section 30 of the Indian Contract Act.
3. Public Policy and Statutory Violations:
The plaintiff contended that the transaction was opposed to public policy and violated the law declared by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), thus void under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
4. Authority of Defendants 2 and 3 to Enter into the Contract:
The plaintiff alleged that defendants 2 and 3 entered into the agreements without specific authorization or approval from the Board of Directors, exposing the company to significant financial risk. The plaintiff claimed that the company was not bound by their actions.
5. Application of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
The first defendant sought to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, based on the arbitration clause in the ISDA Master Agreement. The court noted that Section 8 mandates the judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration if a valid arbitration agreement exists.
6. Scope of Judicial Authority under Section 8:
The court examined whether it could determine the validity of the arbitration agreement under Section 8. It concluded that Section 8 does not explicitly empower the court to decide if the agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed, unlike Section 45, which deals with international commercial arbitration.
7. Effect of Fraud on the Arbitration Agreement:
The court discussed various precedents on whether allegations of fraud could invalidate the arbitration agreement. It noted that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, through Section 16, allows the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including the validity of the arbitration agreement. The court held that even if the main contract is declared null and void, the arbitration clause could still be valid.
8. Complementary Nature of Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act:
The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., which stated that Sections 8 and 11 are complementary. It held that the judicial authority must decide on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement before referring the dispute to arbitration.
9. Historical Context and Legislative Intent of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
The court analyzed the legislative history and intent behind the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, emphasizing its alignment with the UNCITRAL Model Law. It noted that the omission of the rider "unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" in Section 8 was deliberate, indicating that such determinations should be left to the Arbitral Tribunal.
10. Applicability of the Arbitration Clause to Non-signatory Defendants:
The plaintiff argued that defendants 2 and 3 were not parties to the arbitration agreement, and therefore, the dispute could not be referred to arbitration. The court rejected this argument, stating that the inclusion of defendants 2 and 3, who were officers of the plaintiff company, did not invalidate the arbitration agreement.
Conclusion:
The court allowed the application under Section 8, referring the parties to arbitration. It held that the question of whether the ISDA Master Agreement was null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed should be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal. The court emphasized the separability doctrine and the legislative intent to minimize judicial intervention in arbitration matters. The application was allowed, and the dispute was referred to arbitration as per the ISDA Master Agreement.
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2008 (7) TMI 1047
The Bombay High Court upheld the tribunal's decision to rely on a certificate issued by a Chartered Accountant for a refund under the Central Excise Act. The appeal was rejected as the authenticity of the certificate was not disputed. No substantial question of law arose. (2008 (7) TMI 1047 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT)
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2008 (7) TMI 1046
Issues Involved:
1. Illegal appointment of additional directors.
2. Exclusion of petitioners from the office of director.
3. Usurpation of control over the Company.
4. Allotment of shares.
5. Stay of proceedings before the Company Law Board (CLB) until disposal of civil suits.
Summary:
1. Illegal Appointment of Additional Directors:
The petitioners alleged that the appointment of respondent Nos. 2 & 3 as additional directors was illegal. They contended that these appointments were not made with effect from 10-09-2002, as disclosed in Form No. 32 dated 10.09.2002.
2. Exclusion of Petitioners from the Office of Director:
The petitioners claimed they never resigned from the office of director with effect from 17.09.2002, as indicated by Form No. 32 dated 18.09.2002. They argued that the forms were filed after a delay of almost one year with the ulterior intention of usurping control over the Company.
3. Usurpation of Control Over the Company:
The petitioners alleged that the respondents usurped control over the Company by filing Form No. 32 and Form No. 2 after a significant delay, intending to exclude the petitioners from the office of director and allot shares to Selvarathinam and others.
4. Allotment of Shares:
The petitioners challenged the allotment of 22,570 shares on 10.09.2002, out of which 21,550 shares were reportedly allotted to Selvarathinam, as per Form No. 2 dated 15.09.2002. They contended that the board of directors never approved this allotment.
5. Stay of Proceedings Before the CLB:
The respondents sought a stay of all further proceedings before the CLB until the disposal of civil suits in C.S. No. 943/2002 and C.S. No. 36/2003 on the file of the High Court of Madras. They argued that the issues in the civil suits and the CLB proceedings were interconnected and that continuing the CLB proceedings could result in conflicting decisions.
Decision:
The CLB examined whether the present proceedings should be stayed until the disposal of the civil suits. It was determined that the matters in issue in the company petition were not common but entirely different from the issues involved in the civil suits. The High Court would not address the validity of the allotment of shares, the appointment of additional directors, or the exclusion of the petitioners from the office of director. Therefore, the CLB concluded that there was no identity of the subject matter before the CLB and the High Court, and the civil suits were for entirely different purposes. The reliefs claimed by the petitioners before the CLB fell within the jurisdiction of the CLB and would not be granted by the High Court. Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and the company petition was scheduled to be heard on 26.08.2006 at 2.30 PM.
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2008 (7) TMI 1045
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the depiction in the advertisement of the defendant of soap refers to the Dettol soap of the plaintiff?
2. Whether the advertisement of the defendant disparages or denigrates the soap of the plaintiff?
3. Whether the impugned advertisement seeks only to promote the superiority of the defendant LIFEBUOY soap over an ordinary antiseptic soap?
4. Whether the plaintiff is guilty of suppression of material facts? If so, its effect?
5. Whether the impugned advertisement constitutes an attack on the goodwill and reputation of the Dettol brand of the plaintiff?
6. Whether the present suit is barred on account of the provisions of the MRTP Act, 1969 and/or the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?
7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages for disparagement, denigration, loss of goodwill and reputation? If so, the extent thereof?
8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to punitive and exemplary damages? If so, the extent thereof?
9. Relief.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue No. 1:
The court examined whether the orange soap shown in the advertisement referred to the plaintiff's Dettol soap. The advertisement depicted an orange soap bar with contours and curvature similar to that of the plaintiff's Dettol Original soap. The court concluded that the soap in the advertisement was designed to give an impression of the plaintiff's Dettol Original soap. The court held that the orange bar of soap in the advertisement referred to the plaintiff's Dettol Original soap, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 2:
The court analyzed whether the advertisement disparaged or denigrated the plaintiff's soap. The advertisement portrayed the orange soap as harmful and used by naive people needing prayers for protection. The court concluded that the advertisement denigrated the orange soap, which was identified as the plaintiff's Dettol Original soap. The court held that the advertisement disparaged the plaintiff's soap, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 3:
The court evaluated whether the advertisement merely promoted the superiority of the defendant's LIFEBUOY soap over an ordinary antiseptic soap. The court found that the advertisement not only promoted the defendant's soap but also disparaged the plaintiff's soap by showing it in a bad light. The court held that the advertisement did not merely promote the superiority of the defendant's soap but also disparaged the plaintiff's soap, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 4:
The court considered whether the plaintiff was guilty of suppressing material facts. The defendant argued that the plaintiff misled the court into believing that Dettol soap was an antiseptic soap. The court found that the plaintiff had not claimed that its Dettol Original soap was an antiseptic soap and had made a clear distinction between its antiseptic liquid and toilet soap. The court held that the plaintiff was not guilty of suppression of material facts, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 5:
The court examined whether the advertisement constituted an attack on the goodwill and reputation of the Dettol brand. Given the findings on issues 1, 2, and 3, the court concluded that the advertisement attacked the goodwill and reputation of the Dettol brand. The court held that the advertisement constituted an attack on the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 6:
The court addressed whether the suit was barred by the MRTP Act, 1969, and/or the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The court found that there was no express or implied bar in the MRTP Act or the Consumer Protection Act that would prevent the plaintiff from seeking remedies in a civil court. The court held that the suit was not barred by these acts, deciding the issue in favor of the plaintiff.
Issue No. 7, 8, and 9:
The court considered the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, including damages for disparagement and punitive damages. The court agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to relief but noted the lack of evidence to quantify the exact loss or damage. The court awarded punitive damages of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the plaintiff and issued an injunction restraining the defendant from issuing or telecasting the impugned advertisement or disparaging the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. The court also awarded costs of the suit to the plaintiff.
Relief:
The court decreed an injunction in favor of the plaintiff, restraining the defendant from issuing or telecasting the impugned advertisement or disparaging the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. The court awarded punitive damages of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the plaintiff and costs of the suit.
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2008 (7) TMI 1044
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2008 (7) TMI 1044 - SC. Judges were Mr. S.H. Kapadia and Mr. B. Sudershan Reddy.
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2008 (7) TMI 1043
Issues involved: Contradictory orders passed by the Tribunal in appeals filed by different parties.
Summary:
1. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the appeal filed by the appellant based on the interpretation of the term "manufactured" in a notification. Subsequently, the Commissioner (Appeals) also allowed the appeal of M/s.Paramount Silk Mills & M/s.Paramount Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. relying on the same reasoning. However, the Tribunal dismissed all appeals related to these cases. Surprisingly, the Tribunal allowed the appellant's appeal, leading to contradictory orders. The High Court held that the Tribunal's order must be set aside for reconsideration in light of the previous decisions and the department's acceptance of those decisions.
2. The High Court concluded that the Tribunal's order in the present appeal is contradictory to its previous decisions in related cases. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. Appeal no.E/3185/2000 was remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration and decision in accordance with the law and the observations made by the High Court.
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2008 (7) TMI 1042
Issues involved: Malicious prosecution, false evidence, perjury, summary trial for perjury.
The judgment addresses the issue of maliciously setting the law into motion by lodging a false report of rape, leading to the arrest and trial of two individuals under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner, after initially claiming rape, later recanted her statement during trial, resulting in the acquittal of the accused. Subsequently, the Trial Court directed cognizance u/s 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the petitioner for fabricating evidence. The petitioner's appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the conviction was dismissed, emphasizing her admission of guilt and the lack of merit in her defense of being illiterate and coerced. The High Court also considered the petitioner's plea for leniency in sentencing, which was partially accepted due to a factual error in custody duration mentioned before the court.
The petitioner's argument of being pressurized by family members to file a false report contradicted her trial testimony denying any police complaint. The judgment highlights the importance of the victim's statement in sexual offense cases and the serious implications of false accusations leading to arrests and trials. It underscores the legislative intent behind Section 344 of the Cr.P.C. to combat perjury and fabrication of evidence, providing courts with additional tools to address such misconduct effectively. The new provision empowers designated courts to summarily try and punish offenders of perjury, ensuring a fair opportunity for the accused to defend themselves before sentencing.
The Court elucidates the key features of the new provision u/s 344, emphasizing the special powers conferred on specific courts for summary trials of perjury offenses committed during proceedings. It mandates that the court must express a clear opinion on the intentional false evidence or fabrication by the witness, followed by a decision on summary punishment in the interest of justice. The judgment stresses the mandatory nature of providing the accused with a reasonable opportunity to present their defense before commencing the summary trial, aligning with the principles of natural justice.
The judgment concludes by affirming the Trial Court and High Court's orders in the case, finding no grounds for interference. It underscores the necessity for courts to effectively utilize provisions like Section 344 to combat the rising menace of perjury, especially in cases relying on oral evidence. Ultimately, the special leave petitions are dismissed, upholding the actions taken against the petitioner for lodging a false report and fabricating evidence, in line with the objectives of the legal provisions governing perjury.
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2008 (7) TMI 1041
The High Court of Bombay dismissed the appeal challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal regarding the liability to pay interest under sections 234B and 234C of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal's decision was based on previous judgments, and the High Court found no substantial question of law to consider differently. The appeal was dismissed.
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2008 (7) TMI 1040
Issues involved: Appeal against deletion of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the IT Act, 1961 for AY 1995-96.
Facts: The assessee, a partnership firm, filed return declaring loss. During a survey, partner declared additional income of Rs. 20 lakhs as commission, later retracted. AO assessed income @ 27.65% of Rs. 20 lakhs. CIT(A) reduced GP rate to 16.81%. CIT directed to treat Rs. 20 lakhs as commission income. Tribunal confirmed CIT's action, noting shift from commission income to undisclosed sales. AO added Rs. 20 lakhs to total income. Penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) by AO.
Reasoning: CIT(A) cancelled penalty due to: (i) discrepancy in initiating penalty for inaccurate particulars vs. concealment of income, (ii) lack of satisfaction by AO on quantum addition, (iii) multiple opinions by Department. Tribunal upheld CIT(A)'s decision, considering absence of concrete evidence to support penalty imposition.
Analysis: Retraction letter highlighted absence of unrecorded documents or cash during survey, accepted by Department initially. No concrete evidence presented to contradict retraction. Strong presumption cannot substitute conclusive evidence for penalty imposition. CIT(A) rightly deleted penalty based on lack of concrete evidence supporting penalty imposition.
Conclusion: Tribunal upheld deletion of penalty, dismissing Revenue's appeal.
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2008 (7) TMI 1039
Issues involved:
The judgment deals with the cancellation of bail granted to the appellants by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court. The primary issue is the lack of reasons provided for canceling the bail. Another issue is the consideration of circumstances warranting the cancellation of bail, especially when a person interferes with the course of justice or tampers with evidence or witnesses.
Cancellation of Bail:
The appellants challenged the order canceling the bail granted to them, arguing that no reasons were given for the cancellation. The respondent No.1-complainant, however, submitted that the cancellation was justified despite the lack of elaboration in the order. The High Court had granted provisional bail to the appellants and two others, but later directed the cancellation of bail for the appellants due to an incident on 10.10.2006. The High Court failed to provide reasons for canceling the bail, as highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellants.
Legal Considerations for Bail and Cancellation:
The judgment refers to the legal principles outlined in the case of Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra regarding the cancellation of bail. It emphasizes that bail can be canceled if the accused misuses their liberty, interferes with the investigation, tampers with evidence or witnesses, threatens witnesses, or engages in activities hindering the investigation. The judgment underscores that cancellation of bail is a serious matter as it impacts an individual's liberty and should not be taken lightly.
Precedents and Conditions for Bail:
The judgment cites the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, highlighting the need for courts to provide reasons for granting bail, especially in serious offense cases. The conditions under Section 437(1)(i) are crucial for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code. The judgment also emphasizes that irrelevant materials should not influence bail decisions and that the court must consider relevant factors before granting bail.
Review and Remittance:
The judgment notes that the High Court failed to provide reasons for canceling the bail, leading to the setting aside of the impugned order. The matter is remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision on the application filed. It clarifies that no opinion on the case's merits has been expressed. The appeal is allowed to the extent of setting aside the order for cancellation of bail.
This summary provides a detailed overview of the legal judgment, focusing on the issues involved, the reasons for canceling bail, legal considerations, precedents, and the review process leading to the remittance of the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision.
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2008 (7) TMI 1038
The Supreme Court of India dismissed the case with the order that the delay was condoned. The High Court reference was from the Delhi High Court in 2007. The judges were Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia and B. Sudershan Reddy. The petitioner's representatives were Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, SG, Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, and Mr. B.V. Balaram Das.
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2008 (7) TMI 1037
The Supreme Court dismissed a Civil Appeal due to a delay of 183 days in filing the appeal, rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was also dismissed on merits with no costs.
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2008 (7) TMI 1036
Issues involved: Condonation of delay in filing and re-filing of appeal u/s 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Summary:
The appellant filed applications seeking condonation of delay in filing and re-filing the appeal u/s 130 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appeal was required to be filed within 180 days from the date the order appealed against was received by the Commissioner of Customs. The impugned order was received on 20-7-2006, and the appeal was filed on 12-9-2007 after a delay of 239 days, ultimately refiled on 14-1-2008 due to objections raised by the Registry.
The appellant attributed the delay to the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence's investigation, stating that their comments were necessary to examine the legality of the impugned order. The Directorate's comments were received on 9-11-2006, followed by inter and intra-departmental communications regarding jurisdictional doubts. The Senior Central Government Counsel received the draft appeal on 8-8-2007, leading to the final filing on 12-9-2007. The confusion between filing an appeal or a reference application was also mentioned as a reason for the delay.
The Court noted that the total delay amounted to 371 days, including the initial 239-day delay in filing the appeal. However, the Court was not satisfied with the appellant's explanation. It was observed that both the Commissioner of Customs and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence were aware of the 180-day limitation period under Section 130 of the Act. The Court held that the case was not complex enough to justify the delays caused by obtaining comments, legal advice, and inter-departmental communications. Consequently, the Court refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal.
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2008 (7) TMI 1035
The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition as the appellant did not raise the issue before the Tribunal that the matter was not covered by the judgments referred to in the order. The Court found no fault with the Tribunal's decision.
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2008 (7) TMI 1034
Issues involved: Appeal by assessee u/s 80HHC deduction computation and appeal by revenue against the same.
Assessee's Appeal u/s 80HHC Deduction Computation:
The issue revolved around the computation of deduction u/s 80HHC after reducing deduction u/s 80IA of the Act in accordance with section 80IA(9) of the Act. The Assessing Officer had allowed deduction u/s 80HHC at a certain amount but reduced it by the deduction allowed u/s 80IA, resulting in a lower deduction. The assessee contended that there is no statutory requirement to reduce u/s 80IA deduction before allowing u/s 80HHC deduction. The Tribunal noted that the Mumbai Bench consistently held that u/s 80IA deduction should not be reduced while allowing u/s 80HHC deduction. The Tribunal also referred to a decision by the Hon'ble Madras High Court which overruled a Special Bench decision supporting the assessee's argument. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, emphasizing that u/s 80IA deduction should not be reduced from u/s 80HHC deduction.
Revenue's Appeal:
The revenue's appeal primarily focused on the exclusion of excise duty and sales tax from the total turnover while allowing deduction u/s 80HHC. The Tribunal had previously dismissed a similar ground in a previous assessment year for the same reasons. Therefore, the Tribunal upheld the decision and dismissed the revenue's appeal regarding the treatment of excise duty and sales tax in the computation of deduction u/s 80HHC.
Conclusion:
The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal regarding the computation of deduction u/s 80HHC, emphasizing that u/s 80IA deduction should not be reduced from u/s 80HHC deduction. Additionally, the revenue's appeal concerning the treatment of excise duty and sales tax in the deduction calculation was dismissed based on previous decisions.
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2008 (7) TMI 1033
Issues involved:
The judgment involves a demand for payment of a differential duty amount without issuance of a show cause notice or adjudication order, leading to the quashing of three communications and the return of the amount paid by the petitioner.
Judgment Details:
Issue 1: Interim Relief and Payment Demand
The petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,30,00,000/- and another sum of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- against a demand of Rs. 6,76,07,490/-. The court noted the need for a bank guarantee or security for the remaining amount and expressed satisfaction that the petitioner could not have been asked to pay the full amount without due process.
Issue 2: Demand Quantification
The demand for payment of a differential duty amount was quantified at Rs. 6,76,07,490/- through communications dated 5.9.1997 and 14.10.1997, without issuance of a show cause notice or adjudication order.
Issue 3: Lack of Show Cause Notice
The petitioner contended that the demand for duty was made without issuing a show cause notice or adjudication order, while requests for extension of gestation period and conversion from EOU to EPCG were pending. The court referenced previous judgments emphasizing the necessity of a show cause notice under Section 11A.
Issue 4: Legal Precedents
Citing the case of Commissioner of Central Excise v. Akay Cosmetics Pvt. Ltd., the court highlighted the requirement of a show cause notice under Section 11A for demanding differential duty, emphasizing the invalidity of demands made without prior notice.
Issue 5: Quashing of Communications
In light of the legal position and absence of show cause notice and adjudication, the court quashed the three communications demanding duty. The amount paid by the petitioner was ordered to be returned, and the court refrained from delving into the merits of the controversy due to the lack of a show cause notice.
Issue 6: Judgment and Costs
The petition was allowed, the rule was made absolute, and no costs were imposed in the matter.
This judgment highlights the importance of due process in demanding duty payments and sets a precedent for the necessity of issuing show cause notices before imposing such financial obligations on parties involved in customs matters.
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2008 (7) TMI 1032
Supreme Court dismissed the Civil Appeal in the case with citation 2008 (7) TMI 1032 - SC. Judges were Mr. S.H. Kapadia and Mr. B. Sudershan Reddy.
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2008 (7) TMI 1031
The Bombay High Court dismissed the appeal by the Appellant-Revenue regarding bad debts, stating that no substantial question of law was involved in the case. The judgment of the Tribunal from 2006 was upheld for the assessment year 1992-93.
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2008 (7) TMI 1030
Issues involved:
The issue involves whether the assessee is entitled to claim interest u/s 244A(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act on excess tax deducted at source and advance tax paid by the assessee.
Judgment Details:
Issue 1: Entitlement to claim interest on excess tax deducted at source and advance tax paid
The assessee filed a return for the assessment year 1990-91, with advance tax paid and tax deducted at source. After assessment under Section 143(3), a demand of Rs. 96,47,333/- was raised, out of which Rs. 70,27,435/- was adjusted against the previous year's refund, and the balance was paid by the assessee. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal, resulting in a refund of Rs. 1,81,40,474/-. The Assessing Officer granted interest on a part of the refund but not on the advance tax amount of Rs. 84,93,141/-. The High Court held that as per Section 244A of the Act, the assessee is entitled to interest on excess tax paid or collected by the Department, from the date of the assessment order. Therefore, the Tribunal and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) were justified in awarding interest on the advance tax amount.
Conclusion:
The High Court found no substantial questions of law in the appeal and dismissed it.
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