|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 239 Records
-
1986 (11) TMI 356 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... o other material of any kind whatsoever has been pointed in the impugned order by the Sales Tax Tribunal for rejection of the account books for the assessment year 1978-79. I find that the contention raised on behalf of the dealer for the assessment year 1978-79 has force. In my opinion it was not open to the Tribunal to reject the account books of the dealer for the assessment year 1978-79, solely on the basis of the survey dated 4th September, 1977 and that too when on that date it was found that there was difference of stock only. In my opinion it was under the law not possible to reject the account books of the dealer for the assessment year 1978-79. In the result, the revision of the assessee for the assessment year 1977-78 fails and is dismissed and the revision for the assessment year 1978-79 is allowed with a finding that the account books of the dealer are liable to be accepted for this assessment year. Under the circumstances the parties shall bear their own costs.
-
1986 (11) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
Whether counterfeit American dollar notes will fall within the purview of Sections 489A and 489C of the Indian Penal Code?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The omission of an explanation in Sec. 489A for the expression "currency note" similar to the one for 'hank note' thus assumes importance. The expression could refer only to the currency notes issued by the Government of India." applicable to currency notes other than Indian currency notes. And in holding that counterfeiting of or possessing of counterfeit dollar bills or dollar notes is not an offence under the Indian law, thereby issuing a carte blanche to the counterfeiters of the world to establish their headquarters within the State of Kerala with a view to carry on their activities with impunity under the umbrella unwittingly opened for them by the judgment of the High Court. The view taken by the High Court is thus thoroughly unsustainable. The judgment and order of discharge rendered by the High Court are therefore reversed and set aside. The matter will not to go back to the trail court for proceeding further in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove
-
1986 (11) TMI 354 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the petitioners entitled to claim exemption from the levy of sales tax under section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act as it stood in 1978?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The exemption, it is seen, is only to sales of goods which satisfy two conditions, first, the sales should be to an undertaking supplying electrical energy to the public under a licence and second the sale should be for use by the undertaking in the generation or distribution of electrical energy. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that there was any exemption from tax generally. This may be so said even without recourse to the explanation. The explanation only puts the matter beyond all controversy.
-
1986 (11) TMI 347 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Restrictions on persons resident in India associating themselves by participating in concerns outside in India
-
1986 (11) TMI 338 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Reduction of share capital – Application to Tribunal for confirming order, objections by creditors, and settlement of list of objecting creditors
-
1986 (11) TMI 330 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Winding up - Appeals from orders, Distribution of property of company ... ... ... ... ..... ts. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order for costs. For the same reasons, the connected Civil Revision No. 377 of 1985, which is also directed against the order dated October 1, 1985, passed by the executing court, is also liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed, without any order as to costs. The argument was advanced Oil behalf of the appellants that there could be no. res judicata or estoppel against the objections raised by the appellants, as, they basically related to jurisdiction, but sub-rules (2) and (3) of rule 90 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, provides a complete answer to the objection raised and it may also be noted that mere irregularity or fraud standing by itself, is no ground for setting aside the sale, but there must be substantial injury occasioned by the irregularity or fraud alleged. As no such irregularity or fraud itself is made out, much less substantial injury, the objections were rightly rejected by the executing court.
-
1986 (11) TMI 329 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... uld be left in the hands of the liquidators. For the reasons as aforesaid, we direct the liquidators to set apart a sum of Rs. 1,80,000 out of the said amount of Rs. 20 lakhs as against the outstanding claims of other creditors against the company in liquidation and direct the liquidators to pay the balance to the Income-tax Officer against their pending demands. This order is made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the company in liquidation in the pending income-tax proceedings. We make it clear that we have not adjudicated on the merits of the assessments. The balance of Rs. 5,53,973 which will remain in the hands of the liquidators, in our view, will be sufficient to provide for future liquidation expenses. According to the liquidators, a sum of Rs. 4,50,000 would be a suitable provision for such future expenses. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. On the facts and circumstances, each party will pay and bear its own costs. Monjula Bose J. mdash I agree.
-
1986 (11) TMI 328 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Power to adjudicate ... ... ... ... ..... wish to let in before the Board. Counsel for the appellant-Government fairly points out that the Board has all the powers of a civil court under section 53 for summoning the witnesses and recording their evidence. He states that the appellant has no objection to the matter being considered by the Board itself on the merits, instead of remanding the same. The submissions at the Bar are recorded. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the Board in so far as it has remanded the matter, but in every other respect, its order is confirmed. Consequently, we direct the Board to afford both the parties a proper opportunity of being heard and adducing fresh evidence and to dispose of the appeal on the merits. The appellant s counsel submits that the Board will dispose of the appeal within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. This submission is also recorded. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The cross-objections are disposed of as above. No costs.
-
1986 (11) TMI 327 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Board’s sanction to be required for certain contracts in which directors are interested ... ... ... ... ..... ty of the directors even in common law is confined only where they have been guilty of a tort towards the creditors as well as breach of duty owed to the company. Consequently, directors are personally liable to persons who lend money to the company only if they obtain the loan by fraudulent misrepresentations. It is, therefore, obvious that directors are generally immune from liability to creditors of their company. This being the liability of the appellant vis-a-vis the company, respondent No. 2, on the facts discussed above, it must be held that no personal liability is attached to the appellant in his individual capacity, and the executing court was, therefore, right in holding that the personal properties of the appellant could not be attached. For the reasons given above, this appeal must succeed. The judgment and order of the learned single judge is accordingly set aside and the appeal is allowed with costs. S. K. Behera J. mdash I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice.
-
1986 (11) TMI 326 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Appointment of sole selling agent ... ... ... ... ..... as interpreted the subsection in Arantee Mfg. Corporation v. Bright Bolts P. Ltd. 1967 37 Comp. Cas. 758 (Bom.). A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Shalagram Jhajharia v. National Co. Ltd. 1965 35 Comp. Cas. 706 (Cal.) also placed the same interpretation on section 294(2). I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid interpretation. It is not stated in the complaint that the appointment order (or the resolution by which the appointment is made) is shorn of the condition specified in section 294(2). Without such an averment in the complaint, no offence can be spelled out from it and hence no cognizance of the offence should have been taken by the learned Magistrate. When the facts stated in the complaint fail to disclose the offence, this court will be justified in exercising the inherent powers to quash the complaint. Accordingly, I allow this petition and quash the complaint in S. T. No. 37 of 1986 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Spl.), Ernakulam.
-
1986 (11) TMI 298 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Offences against the act to be cognizable only on complaints by registrar, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... ld that such was the intention of the Legislature . In the Act, there is no provision exempting the partner of the firm from any liability after the dissolution of the firm. Therefore, if it is decided that once the firm has been dissolved, there can be no prosecution against any one for any contravention or offence committed by a firm, that would be an invitation for the firm to resort to dissolution and to reappear in some other form in order to evade prosecution. It is thus clear that the prosecution against persons who would be found to have been responsible to the defunct firms is possible and legal. Such being the conclusion arrived at on the only point for consideration, the revision petitions have necessarily to be allowed. In the result, the revision petitions are allowed. The order of the learned Sessions Judge is set aside. The order of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, is restored. The fortnight rsquo s time specified therein shall run from today.
-
1986 (11) TMI 297 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order, General provisions as to liquidators ... ... ... ... ..... ubsequent two years, as we have already observed, the official liquidator had received individual notice. We are accordingly of the view that, on the facts of this case, no rule of natural justice was violated to warrant the declaration which the learned judge made. All this apart, assuming that the declaration was warranted, it was not permissible within the confines of the provisions of the Companies Act. For all these reasons, we set aside the order under appeal. The question which really arose was one relating to recovery. That was the question which ought to have been considered, but was not considered in the light of the declaration made. In the circumstances, we remit the case to the learned judge sitting as company court to dispose of the application afresh on the merits of the claim of the State for recovery after affording an opportunity to both the parties as regards their respective contentions. The appeal is allowed. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
-
1986 (11) TMI 283 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Demand - Show cause notice ... ... ... ... ..... Assistant Collector, but the Collector (Appeals) has also travelled beyond the scope of the show cause notices. As a matter of fact, in his order-in-appeal the Collector (Appeals) has merely cited the legal provision with reference to which the cess is leviable and held that the cess on the jute yarn utilised in the factory of production for jute manufactures is correctly leviable. However, the show cause notices do not refer to or deal with the question of cess on jute yarn. The order of the Asstt. Collector also does not refer to jute yarn. The learned Collector (Appeals) has, therefore, apparently passed an erroneous order unrelated to the facts of the case. 21. I, therefore, set aside the order of the Collector (Appeals). I also set aside the demand issued vide show cause notice dated 9-9-1981 and remand the matter to the Asstt. Collector for re-consideration of the matter in so far as it relates to the demand dated 20-12-1982 only, as already announced in the open court.
-
1986 (11) TMI 282 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... fter it is converted into trough duty is charged. This is a very powerful argument but has not been answered by the Order-in-Appeal. Evidently the Central Excise Department accept that these sheets are steel melting scrap and so charge no duty when they are melted, as they should have done if they are consistent. It is only when they are made into troughs and when they are sold that the Central Excise charge duty. For those cleared, there might be good logic to charge duty since these sheets/strips are not melted. As troughs, they are in every respect steel melting scrap because they melt to form ingots. 11. It is observed from the order-in-appeal that the troughs are made from cut ends of the coils or sheets of uneven thickness. From all, one can see in the documents and the proceedings, the troughs are more appropriately called steel melting scrap, particularly when they are really melted, than strips. The assessment of the trough materials should be as steel melting scrap.
-
1986 (11) TMI 281 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Contempt of Court ... ... ... ... ..... on of India and its officers ought to set the standard of respect due to the court. When the Union of India and its officers flout the courts rsquo orders the punishment must be condign. 9. The Union of India and the said Bhatta are guilty of contempt of court. The Union of India shall pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. The said Bhatta shall serve a term of simple imprisonment for 4 weeks. 10. The contempt of which the Union of India and the said Bhatta are guilty is a continuing offence. They shall be in contempt and liable to be punished therefor until an endorsement is made upon the petitioners rsquo licence that conforms exactly with the order passed by Pratap J. In view of this observation, the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Law and Company Affairs, Bombay, is directed forthwith to send a copy of this order to the Commerce Ministry of the Union of India. 11. The Union of India and the said Bhatta to pay to the petitioners the costs of this motion. 12. Application for stay refused.
-
1986 (11) TMI 280 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... duty only under T.I. 68 CET. There is validity in their submission that Explanation II to the Item 34 is not applicable inasmuch as the imported goods are not mounted/fitted with any weight-lifting or other specialised material handling equipment, but were equipped with only drilling equipment. However, this reason alone does not help the importers. We note that the goods imported can be clearly separated for the purposes of valuation and identification as a truck and drilling equipment. It is not as if the entire unit is so integrated that it becomes inseparable for any of these purposes. Therefore, in our view, the countervailing duty was correctly levied under Item 68 for the drilling equipment and under T.I. 34 for the vehicle part of the equipment. 18. In this view uphold the impugned order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) whereby the confirmed the Assistant Collector rsquo s orders regarding the levy of additional duty. As a result, both the appeals are dismissed.
-
1986 (11) TMI 278 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... 2) E.L.T. J 690 . 11. We see no reason to differ from the ratio of this judgment. We note the submissions made by the learned JDR in this regard and reject them for the same reasons as recorded in the cited judgment (Castrol Limited supra). 12. We, therefore, hold that the goods manufactured by the appellants when they were fully exempt, should not have been charged to duty at the time of clearance even though the exemption was withdrawn. We allow the appeal on this ground. While granting the relief, we lay down that the appellants should prove before the Central Excise authorities that the goods for which they sought relief and for which the relief is now granted, were actually produced prior to 28-2-1982 and were cleared during the disputed period. For this purpose, the Collector (Appeals) may give a reasonable opportunity to the appellants to prove the facts about the date of production of the goods for which they sought clearance. The appeal is disposed of in these terms.
-
1986 (11) TMI 275 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... eing Order No. 537/86-B2, dated 11-6-1986. Shri J. Gopinath, SDR, while conceding that the goods are identical as in the case covered by Order No. 537/86-B2, reiterates his contention, as advanced during the hearing of that case, repudiating the appellants rsquo plea for re-classification under T.I. 76.08/16. 2. ensp Shri Subramaniyam has again argued that this order was recorded after full consideration of the arguments advanced by both sides and goods being identical and the importers being the same and the imports being for, more or less, the same period, the earlier order of the Tribunal may be followed. 3. ensp We have given a careful thought to the matter and have gone into the description and other details of the goods in this file as well as ones recorded in the earlier order. We find no reason to take a view different than the view taken by the Bench in Order No. 537/86-B2. Accordingly, following the said judgment, we allow this appeal also with consequential relief.
-
1986 (11) TMI 272 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Value of clearances
... ... ... ... ..... re distinct and independent firms and their clearances ought not to be clubbed. 15. Shri R.K. Jain argued that in respect of the value certain directions have been issued by the Appellate Collector to the Assistant Collector and to that extent the order would be invalid. He also raised a question of time-bar. But in the light of our findings on the main issue these questions do not strictly arose. However, we must observe that being a quasi-judicial function, the Appellate Collector should have directed the Assistant Collector to give his findings on the value rather than prescribing the mode of working out the same. 16. However, on the question of time-bar, in the absence of any finding that the goods were removed clandestinely or without the knowledge of the department, the finding cannot be supported. 17. In the result, we are of the view that the impugned orders cannot be justified and they are set aside. The appellants should be entitled to consequential reliefs, if any.
-
1986 (11) TMI 271 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Preventive detention ... ... ... ... ..... on the two documents and that their non-supply had deprived the detenu of his valuable rights. We fully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the learned Judge in Crl. W. 179/86. For the same reasons we have also come to the conclusion that there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay in the detention of the detenu and further that he has been denied an opportunity of effective representation by non-supply of copies of the anticipatory bail application the blank sheet of paper said to contain his signature and the visiting card which have been relied upon by the detaining authority in reaching the conclusion that he should be detained. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the continued detention of the detenu is not justified and that he should be released immediately. 5. We, therefore, make the rule absolute and direct the release of the detenu forthwith unless there is some other detention order or other legal justification for not so releasing him.
........
|
