1961 (7) TMI 83 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Professional misconduct by two practicing lawyers, D and S.
2. Validity of the old and new rules under Chapter IV of the Original Side Rules.
3. Authority to receive payment on behalf of clients.
4. Admissibility and evidentiary value of documents.
5. Allegations of fabricated evidence and false documents.
6. Delay in filing the petition and its implications.
7. Penalty for false declaration under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act.
8. Final order and costs.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Professional Misconduct by Two Practicing Lawyers, D and S:
The case arises from petitions filed by Sir Mohammed Yusif and his son, Abdul Rahman, against two practicing lawyers, D and S, for professional misconduct. The petitions alleged that D retained a sum of Rs. 3,10,791-2-0 and failed to render an account. The Bar Council Tribunal found all charges against both advocates established, leading to a final decision by the Divisional Bench to remove them from practice and strike their names off the roll.

2. Validity of the Old and New Rules Under Chapter IV of the Original Side Rules:
Rules 64 to 74 in Chapter IV were recast, and new rules came into force in January 1960. The old rules required double enquiry by the Law Society and Bar Council for attorneys who were also advocates, leading to prolonged proceedings. The new rules simplified the process by referring such complaints directly to the Bar Council. The court decided that the petition filed on 8th February 1961 would be governed by the old rules, as directions were given before the new rules came into force.

3. Authority to Receive Payment on Behalf of Clients:
The court examined whether special authority was necessary for lawyers to receive payments on behalf of clients. Evidence suggested that normally, payment would not be made to anyone other than the claimant without authority. The court concluded that a lawyer holding a Vakalatnama could accept a cheque on behalf of a client if armed with an acknowledgment receipt signed by the client.

4. Admissibility and Evidentiary Value of Documents:
The court dealt extensively with the admissibility and evidentiary value of documents, particularly Ex. 28, which was alleged to be fabricated. The court held that proof of the signature below a document does not amount to proof of its contents. The evidence of the contents contained in a document is hearsay unless the writer is examined before the court.

5. Allegations of Fabricated Evidence and False Documents:
The court found that D and S fabricated documents, including Ex. 28 and Ex. 27, to create false evidence. D was found to have extorted Rs. 15,000 from Abdul Rahman under false pretenses. The court concluded that D and S's actions constituted professional misconduct, warranting their removal from practice.

6. Delay in Filing the Petition and Its Implications:
The petition was filed nearly six years after the alleged retention of money by D and S. The court noted that the question of limitation does not apply in disciplinary proceedings. The delay was explained by Abdul Rahman as being due to D's assurances and the threat of evacuee proceedings. The court found the explanation satisfactory and concluded that the delay did not affect the credibility of the case.

7. Penalty for False Declaration Under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act:
The court discussed the provisions of Section 33 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, which imposes penalties for false declarations. The court noted that D used the threat of evacuee proceedings to exert control over Abdul Rahman, further demonstrating D's misconduct.

8. Final Order and Costs:
The court ordered the removal of D and S from practice, striking their names off the rolls of solicitors and advocates. Costs were awarded to the petitioner on the basis of taxed costs on a long cause scale, with instruction charges quantified at Rs. 1,500 for each enquiry. The burden of costs was to be borne by D and S in the proportion of 1:4 for the proceedings before the Bar Council Tribunal and the court.

Conclusion:
The judgment comprehensively addressed the professional misconduct of D and S, the validity of procedural rules, the authority to receive payments, the admissibility of evidence, the implications of delay, and penalties for false declarations. The court's decision to remove D and S from practice was based on the severity of their misconduct and the need to uphold the integrity of the legal profession.